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Milligan: Dissolution of Marriage

DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE-'FRESH AIR
IN FAMILY COURT"
HON. JOHN R. MILLIGANt

Breakdown of Marital Relations-Dissolution*
0

GENERALLY
mo CONTINUEs to adhere to the historic tradition that marriage is to

be fostered and preserved, and divorce is to be disfavored. Thus,
statutes authorizing common pleas courts to grant divorces for certain

grounds are to be strictly construed, and grounds must be strictly proved.1

The state has a vital interest in marriage and divorce as a matter of
public policy. Divorce is not simply a private controversy between
husband and wife. The family relationship is the basis of our society, and
its preservation is a matter of state concern. 2 Publication or circulation
of any article "with the intent to procure or aid in procuring divorces,
either in this state or elsewhere" is made a crime punishable by a fine
3
of $25 to $500 and/or six months' imprisonment.
The "Winds of Change"
The revolution in family law in Ohio is over, and not a shot was fired.
In 1974, the 110th General Assembly adopted two sweeping reforms:
(1) a living-apart statute 4 and (2) a comprehensive divorce reform bill. 5
Ohio joined the trend across the country to modify grounds for divorce.
t A.B., College of Wooster; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law; Senior Judge,
Family Court, Stark County, Ohio; Chairman, Ohio Judicial Conference; President,
Ohio Association of Juvenile Court Judges; Member, Ohio State Bar Association
Family Law Committee.
* Reproduced with permission from WEsT's Omo PAAcTicc, FAMEY LAW, by John
R. Milligan, Volumes 13 and 14, Copyright 1975 by West Publishing Company. All
footnote references to sections refer to sections of the above text, however, section
numbers have been deleted from the sections reproduced.
1 Kennedy v. Kennedy, 111 Ohio App. 432, 165 N.E.2d 454, 12 O.O.2d 201 (1959).
The court quotes with approval the following statement:
The public policy relating to marriage is to foster and protect it, to make it a
permanent and public institution, and to prevent separation. This policy finds
expression in probably every state in legislative enactments designed to prevent
the sundering of the marriage ties for slight or trivial causes, or by the agreement of the husband and wife, or in any case except on full and satisfactory
proof of such facts as the legislature has declared to be cause for divorce....
See 17 Am. Jur. 262; Accord, Nelson v. Nelson, 108 Ohio App. 365, 154 N.E.2d
653, 9 O.O.2d 318, 79 O.L.A. 602 (1959).
2Pashko v. Pashko, Coin. P1., 101 N.E.2d 804, 45 0.0. 498, 63 O.L.A. 82 (1951).
s R.C. § 3105.02 and § 3105.99(A). It is yet to be determined whether "do-it-yourself"
divorce kits fall into this class of prohibited activity.
4R.C. § 3105.01(K), effective May 7, 1974; Amended Sen. Bill No. 348, 110th General
Assembly (1974).
5 Am. Sub. H.B. No. 233, effective September 23, 1974.
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The presagers of change were New York and California, where each went
from very limited divorce to divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. In the decade of the 1960's, Ohio considered numerous amendments
to its divorce laws, and the 1974 legislation culminates these efforts.
Living apart. Ohio follows some 34 states that have adopted living
apart as a ground for divorce in one form or another. This was achieved
by simply providing that "on the application of either party, when husband
and wife have, without interruption for two years, lived separate and apart
without cohabitation; and four years in the case in which one of the parties
is continuously confined to a mental institution..." the court may grant a
divorce. 6 The Legislature intends that the divorce may be granted, notwithstanding the fault of the party requesting the divorce on this ground.
Dissolution of marriage. Am. Sub. H.B. 233, 110th General
Assembly, is much more sweeping than simply establishing a new
ground for divorce. Its features include:
(1) Mandatory premarital counseling where juvenile court consent
7
is required;
(2) Four-year living apart where a party is confined in a mental
institution;8
(3) Reduction in the residency requirement for divorce from one
9
year to six months and changes in the venue requirements;
0
(4) Dissolution of marriage by approved separation agreement;'
(5) Elimination of condonation and recrimination as defenses to
divorce on any ground;"
of dower upon granting divorce or alimony-alone
(6) Elimination
12
relief;
(7) Alimony may be granted, notwithstanding that the parties are
6 R.C. § 3105.01(K).

In this sense, divorce on this ground is of the "no fault" variety.

The critical issue is whether the parties have lived separate and apart without
cohabitation for the required period of time. If they have done this, the legislature is
satisfied that the marriage is finished "in fact" and should not be continued over the
protestation of the adverse party.
7 R.C. § 3105.05
8 R.C. § 3105.01 (K).
9R.C. § 3105.03.
10 R.C. § 3105.61 et seq. For reasons not made clear, the legislature has determined to
develop another label for a husband and wife who terminate their marriage. When
done pursuant to this provision, the order of the court will not be a "divorce," but
a "dissolution" of marriage. (Will this new "label" result in people being called
"single," "divorced," or "dissolved," or "dissolutioned"?)
1. R.C. § 3105.10 (B). The court, by this section, is granted enormous discretion. Thus,
where both parties are guilty of misconduct sufficient to constitute ground for divorce,
the court may grant a divorce to both parties, or one of the parties, even though the
other does not want a divorce.
12R.C. § 3105.10(D). If this section is interpreted to permit the elimination of the
right of a spouse in real estate, upon the granting of an alimony-alone decree, it
represents a significant departure from historical Ohio law.
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living together at the time the complaint or counterclaim is
filed;'3

(8)

Granting alimony-alone upon simple "ill treatment by the
14
adverse party";
(9) Specific guidelines for determining and awarding alimony;'9
(10) Continuing jurisdiction in alimony-alone orders where periodic

payments ordered;' 8

(11)

(12)

Grant authority to the court to make orders concerning the
disposition, care, and maintenance of children of the marriage,
17
notwithstanding denial of primary relief;
Establish the "best interest" of children as the pole-star of

custody awards;' 8
(13)
(14)

Provision for conciliation in domestic relations cases;' 9
Guidelines for modification of prior custody orders;20

(15) Specific guidelines for determining child support.n
Courts and analysts of marriage and divorce have been calling for
these kinds of changes in the recent past and in numerous ways.22
Ohio Legislation-Divorce, Alimony Alone, and Dissolution Distinguished
Domestic relations statutes are grouped in Chapter 3105 of the
Revised Code. Courts have no authority to grant divorce or alimony

alone separate and apart from enabling legislation. 2

There is no common law right of divorce,24 and a divorce may not
be granted as a result of agreement between the parties,2 5 nor because
the parties are irreconcilable.2 6 Further, irreconcilable differences may
§ 3105.17.
§ 3105.17.
15 R.C. § 3105.18(B).
13R.C.

14 R.C.

16 R.C. § 3105.18(C).
17 R.C. § 3105.21 (B).
18 R-C. § 3109.04.

19 R.C. § 3105.091.
20 R.C. § 3109.04(B) and (C).
21 R.C. § 3109.05.
See Newell v. Newell, Com. P1., 21 Ohio Misc. 239, 257 N.E.2d 90, 50 0.0. 2d
461, reversed and remanded 23 Ohio App. 2d 149, 261 N.E.2d 278, 52 O.O.2d 178,
where the court held that a plaintiff was entitled to divorce, notwithstanding birth of
an adulterine bastard child. "No fault divorce in Ohio"-see C. W. Rose, Jr., 31 Ohio
St. Law Journal 52. Civ. R. 75 is a further expression of this mood.
23 Thus enactment of statutory grounds does not apply retroactively. Scott v. Scott, 6
Ohio 534, where new ground of habitual drunkenness held not to apply to cases
occurring before its passage.
24
Jelm v. Jelm, 155 Ohio St. 226, 98 N.E.2d 401, 44 0.0. 246, 22 A.L.R.2d 1300.
2 Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322, 193 N.E. 657, 1 0.0. 489, 15 O.L.A. 734.
2
6Winnard v. Winnard, 62 Ohio App. 351, 23 N.E.2d 977, 16 0.0. 51.
22
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not justify a divorce even where both parties request divorce.Y Mental
incompetency is not a ground for divorce.s
The essential difference between an action for divorce and one for
other relief is that the former terminates the marriage contract and
relationship absolutely and totally,29 while the latter authorizes orders
of alimony during separation without terminating the marriage. Divorce
although
in Ohio is akin to the ancient divorce "vinculo matrimonii,"
30
law.
English
under
than
broader
much
are
causes
the
Alimony-only decrees are more akin to the ancient divorce from "bed
3
and board," divorce "a mensa et thoro." 1 Sometimes a decree of alimony'3 2
In
only, or alimony-alone, is incorrectly called a "legal separation.
has
court
the
action,
in
such
alimony-only
grant
to
right
to
the
addition
the same power as in divorce cases to grant temporary relief pending
determination of the issues of the case,33 to grant temporary custody
34
and make orders of support and maintenance, and to grant custody,
visitation and orders of support.s
Annulment distinguished. An annulment of a marriage may be
distinguished from both divorce and alimony-only in that in an
annulment, the court determines that for some specific cause, ground, or
36
impediment, no legal marriage exists or existed.
Dissolution of marriage distinguished. In its effect, a dissolution of
marriage will be the same as a divorce, i.e., it will terminate the marriage.
It may be distinguished from an annulment in that the annulment
relates back to the time of the marriage, whereas the dissolution will
acknowledge the validity of the prior marriage.
PROCEDURE

The non-adversary remedy of dissolution of marriage, established in
27 Slyh v. Slyh, Ohio App. 135 N.E.2d 675, 72 O.LA. 537; Burke v. Burke, 33 Ohio
App. 551, 173 N.E. 637, 8 0.L.A. 682, 33 Ohio Law R. 115.
28Waymire v. Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271; Nelson v. Nelson, 108 Ohio App. 365, 154

N.E.2d 653, 9 0.O.2d 318, 79 O.L.A. 602.
29

Petersine v. Thomas, 28 Ohio St. 596 (1876); Durham v. Durham, 104 Ohio St. 7,
135 N.E. 280 (1922).
3o Historically, divorce "vinculo matrimonii" was legislatively granted only for impediments that existed before the marriage, 1 Nelson on Divorce, § 1.01.
31 Such decree effected a temporary legal separation preserving other marital rights
and obligations during the lifetime of the parties and was terminable by reconciliation.
Divorce "a mensa et thoro" was abolished in Ohio in 1833. Hesler v. Hesler, Wright
210 (1833).
32
Cummings v. Cummings, 111 Ohio App. 447, 173 N.E.2d 159, 15 O.O.2d 64 (1959).
33
See § 4501 et seq.
34 See § 4732 et seq.
3
.
5 See § 4758 et seq.
38 In this sense, an annulment in Ohio is similar to an ancient divorce "a vinculo
matrimonii," in that the cause for such an order was an impediment to marriage
pxisting at the time of the marriage.
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1974, is unique in domestic relations practice. It may be considered
37
comparable to the proceedings for compromise in a bastardy action.
between the husband and the
The process contemplates agreement
38
wife at every stage of the proceedings.
Jurisdiction of Subject Matter-Dissolution of Marriage
It seems clear that the Legislature has now established a continuum
of ways in which parties may deal with termination of their marriage. The
quickest remedy is when parties agree and file a joint petition for dissolution of marriage. If the parties do not agree, either of them is left to the
routine, historic ground for divorce in the adversary process. Obviously,
this process takes longer to conclude. The ultimate option is for the parties
to separate and seek a divorce on the grounds of living apart for two years.
It is submitted that a standard divorce proceeding would abate
upon the filing of a petition for dissolution. By like token, if a petition
for dissolution has been filed and either party thereafter files a complaint
for divorce, such complaint would act as a repudiation of the dissolution
process and would abate such process.
Consolidation of Pending Cases-Dissolution of Marriage and Divorce
Historically, most adversary divorce proceedings have been resolved
by the execution of a separation agreement during the pendency of
the action, and the proceeding in the cause is an uncontested divorce.
The provisions for dissolution of marriage offer a potential alternate
and less offensive way of solving such questions.
It is submitted that the parties may file a petition for dissolution
of marriage in the same case in which a divorce is pending, or such
petition may be consolidated with the pending divorce action. Thereupon,
the court may proceed to treat the matter as a dissolution of marriage
and grant relief without putting either of the parties through the
"charade" of producing uncontested evidence of a ground for divorce.
This procedure will preserve a higher level of dignity in the relationship
39
between the parties and should be encouraged.
Jurisdiction Over Parties-Dissolution of Marriage
of Ohio at least
One of the spouses must have been a resident
40
six (6) months immediately before filing the petition.
Courts of Jurisdiction-Venue
The enabling provisions establishing procedure for dissolution
of marriage recite only that the matter may be heard by the "court of
37R1C.§ 3111.07. See Chapter 3.

38 R.C. § 3105.61.
39 The Civil Rules contemplate liberal joinder of causes and consolidations of actions.
See Civ. R. 18 and 42.
40 R.C. § 3105.62
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common pleas." ' 41 It may be contemplated that divisions of domestic
relations, separately established, will be expected to hear such cases."
Constitutionality and retroactive application. It is submitted that the
dissolution of marriage provisions are constitutional and that they
may be applied to states of facts existing on the date the act becomes
effective September 23, 1974. 43
Venue for purposes of processing a dissolution of marriage is the
same as for other civil actions." As a practical matter, however, since
the action depends upon agreement of the parties, it will most often be
venued at the place of residence of one of the parties.
It is submitted that the procedure will be properly venued in
any county where the parties have sufficient contacts pursuant to
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.45
Parties
The parties to this procedure are
the statute contemplates that both of
stage of the proceeding, including the
such thing as dissolution of marriage by

the husband and the wife, and
them will be involved at every
final hearing. There will be no
default.
46
The parties are designated as "defendants" in the action.

Petition
In what appears to be a continued disagreement between the
Legislature and the Supreme Court over the use of the word "petition" or
"complaint," the Legislature denominates the written document by which
the action is commenced a "petition for dissolution of marriage."
Both parties (defendants) to execute. The husband and wife both
47
must execute the petition.
By a curious legislative fiat, the husband and wife, in a proceedings
4
to dissolve a marriage, are each denominated "defendant. " 8
Inasmuch as both spouses are petitioning the court for relief, it
is submitted that a proper style for the case will be: "In the Matter
of Mary Brown and John Brown."
41R.C. § 3105.16
42 R.C. § 2301.03.
43Compare Chapman v. Chapman, Ky., 498 S.W.2d 134 (1973), holding that
Kentucky's marriage dissolution act was unconstitutional and applied retroactively;
"Kentucky-New Dissolution of Marriage Law," 61 Ky. Law. Journ. 960 (1972-73).
44 R.C. § 3105.62.
45 Civ. R. 3 will apply. See R.C. § 3105.62.
46 R.C. § 3105.62.
47 R.C. § 3105.63.
48 R.C. § 3105.62.
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Dissolution of Marriage-Petition-Form
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION

COUNTY, Oro

In the matter of:
PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION
OF MARRIAGE

and

Defendants

.-and

1.
they were married at

,

,

defendants herein, say that

on the

day of 19-.

2. The parties have______minor children born issue of this marriage,
, aged
-.
aged_
;
- , aged.;
and
to wit:
-,
3. The parties have entered into a Separation Agreement providing
for a division of all property, custody of the minor children, alimony,
child support, and visitation tights--said Agreement being a full and
complete settlement of all issues between them. Copy of said Separation
Agreement is identified as "Exhibit A," attached hereto, and incorporated
herein as if fully rewritten.
4. The parties pray that, upon hearing, the Court finds said
Separation Agreement to be fair and equitable; to have been voluntarily
entered into by and between the parties; and that their marriage be
dissolved by law.
[Signature]

Defendant-Wife
Defendant-Husband
WAIVER OF SERVICE OF PROCESS

Each of the parties hereby voluntarily waives service of process in
this cause and voluntarily enters his appearance, pledging that he will
appear at any and all hearings scheduled by the court during the
pendency of this action.
,19.
.day
Dated this
[Signature]

Defendant-Wife
Defendant-Husband
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APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

appearance on behalf of

Attomey-at-law, hereby enters his
, defendant-wife.
[Signature]

appearance on behalf of

Attorney-at-law, hereby enters his
, defendant-husband.
[Signature]

Inasmuch as the essence of proceedings to dissolve a marriage is a
valid separation agreement between the parties, it follows that each of the
parties must be of full capacity to enter such contract. It is submitted
that one of the primary responsibilities of the court upon hearing such
cases will be to determine whether each of the parties has the capacity
to understand the nature and consequences of his agreements.
It is not difficult to speculate about problems that will be encountered
when one of the parties to a dissolution of marriage proceedings is
incompetent. It is submitted that the remedy is personal to the party
to the extent that a legal representative, such as a guardian, may not
file such an action. Further, if a party is incompetent at the time of
the hearing, the court will likely find that there is no valid separation
agreement forming the basis of a decree of dissolution of marriage.
The enabling legislation makes no reference to the age at which
married persons may enter into a separation agreement as a part of
dissolution of their marriage. It is submitted that the same criteria
should apply as in compromise of paternity cases, where the court is
obliged to diligently inquire into the fairness of the agreement and the
extent of voluntariness of the under-age party.
It is submitted that, by the filing of a joint petition, both parties submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, and no formal service of process
is necessary. To avoid any possibility of error on that basis, the petition
form should contain a waiver of summons and voluntary appearance.4
The petition is the only pleading contemplated, and no other pleading
would be appropriate, unless it be a motion to dismiss, containing disclaimer
of the agreement. In that case, the court should summarily dismiss the cause.
This procedure, being consensual, does not contemplate any ancillary
or temporary relief, and the parties should provide for the care and
support of each other and the children during the pendency of the
action in their separation agreement.
The most critical facet of this procedure is the development
49RC. § 3105.62 and § 4468.
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and execution of an appropriate separation agreement. It may be
contemplated that attorneys will devote additional effort to the drafting
of comprehensive separation agreements.
The dissolution of marriage process requires that the separation
agreement be incorporated with the petition to be filed with the
clerk of courts. 50
Although it is the current practice, in many divorce cases, to simply
refer to the agreement in the judgment entry of the divorce, it is
submitted that this practice will not be possible where the remedy
is dissolution of marriage. This may be unfortunate, particularly as
relates to those agreements where public disclosure is contra-indicated.
The statute contemplates that, during the maximum ninety-day
waiting period, the parties may execute and file an amended separation
agreement. It would appear that such agreement may be filed without
any further amendment of the petition for relief. 51
The separation agreement is to be incorporated with the judgment
of dissolution. To this extent, it would appear that the separation
52
agreement must appear twice in the record of the case.
The court, after granting a decree of dissolution, has "full power
to enforce its decree, and retains jurisdiction to modify all matters of
custody, child support, visitation, and periodic alimony.' ' 5 It thus
appears that the parties, by their agreement, cannot oust the court of
its continuing jurisdiction, both as to enforcement and modification
in the limited areas of child welfare and periodic alimony.
Motion. The proper manner by which the continuing jurisdiction
of the court should be invoked is the same as in a divorce: by motion
54
fied in the original cause.
The use of the investigative resources of domestic relations court
takes on added significance with the new procedure for dissolution of
marriage. The elimination of an adversary stance by the parties opens
the possibility-indeed the probability-that some parents will execute
separation agreements contrary to the best interests and welfare of
their children. In this context of lack of advocacy, the investigator
may be the only person who can identify for the court areas of
improper agreement or planning.5

Hearing
A clear advantage of this new procedure, in addition to the value of
§ 3105.63.
511RC. § 3105.63.
52RKC. § 3105.64.
53 .C. § 3105.65(B).
54
Civ.T. 75 (J).
50 R.C.

55Civ. R.75(D) and (P).
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the parties' agreeing, is the time within which the matter can be concluded.
Not less than 30 nor more than 90 days after the filing of the
6
petition, the hearing must be had.1
Conciliation. The time for hearing can be extended to the extent
conciliation process is initiated after the filing of the petition. In
may be postponed an additional 30 days from
that event, the hearing
57
the date of referral.
It will be necessary for the court to notify the parties of the time
and date of the hearing upon the petition for dissolution. It is submitted
that this notice should conform to the practice of notifying parties
of the hearing for divorce.5
The statute provides little in the way of guidelines to the court
about the conduct of the hearing upon the petition to dissolve the
marriage. It is submitted that the following items should be inquired
into by the court of each of the parties, in the presence of the other, in
open court, upon a record:
1. Each party should be placed under oath and questioned by
9
counsel or the court;5
2. The court should receive the report of the investigator;
The court should receive the separation agreement and any
amended agreement;
4. The court should satisfy itself, from questioning, that each of the
parties is competent and understands the nature and consequences
of his acts, together with the meaning of his agreement;
3.

5. The court should determine whether each of the parties, by
answer under oath, is satisfied with the terms of the agreement
or amended agreement;
6. The court should determine from each spouse whether he seeks
a dissolution of the marriage;
7. The court should determine whether the execution of the separa60
tion agreement, or amendment, was voluntarily entered into.
May the court entertain the testimony of each of the parties
separately, or must they both be present during the testimony of each?
The statute does not make this clear, but it would seem that the
court, on motion of either party or upon its own motion, could order
testimony separate and out of -the presence of the other party. In such
5 R.C. § 3105.64.
57 R.C § 3105.091.
58 See Civ. R. 75 (L).
59R.C. § 3105.64(B) contemplates "testimony of both spouses."
e0 R.C. § 3105.64 and § 3105.65.
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case, it would be advisable for counsel for both parties to be present
during the testimony of each.6 '
The code is not clear as to whether the parties must be living
separate and apart at the time of the filing of their petition, or at least
at the time of the hearing on the petition. Although the Legislature
went to considerable effort to provide that living separate and apart
was not a necessary precondition of divorce or alimony relief 62 they
made no provision to this effect as to the dissolution of marriage.
There remains the question of whether the parties can, for any
purpose, enter into a valid separation agreement without immediately
and physically separating. 63 Until this provision is amended, it is submitted
that the parties must "immediately separate" and remain separate during
the proceedings.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court has the responsibility
of determining whether it should grant the requested decree of
dissolution of marriage.
If, upon the testimony and the report of the investigator, the
court determines that one of the parties does not continue to request
dissolution, or the separation agreement is not satisfactory to each
spouse, or the provisions of the agreement are not approved by
the court, the court must dismiss the petition and refuse to validate the
64
proposed separation agreement.
It is submitted that the court does not have the authority to order
modification of the submitted separation agreement or its amendment
at the time of hearing the petition. The court is limited to approving or
rejecting the petition and agreement.
As a practical matter, under the circumstances, the parties may well
be given a choice 'by the court as to whether or not they will voluntarily
amend the agreement to conform to the court's wishes as to its provisions. 65
If the court approves the agreement, it must grant a decree of
"dissolution of marriage," incorporating the separation agreement.
Effect of decree. The judgment of dissolution of marriage is to have
"the same effect upon the property rights of the parties, including rights
of dower and inheritance, as a decree of divorce."
a' Private or separate inquiry may be desirable where there is some question about the
voluntariness of a party's acquiescence in the agreement-or a question of undue
influence.
6
2 See R.C. § 3105.17 and § 3105.17(D), where "separation in consequence of ill treatment" was eliminated.
WSee R.C. § 3103.06, providing that a husband and wife cannot, "by any contract with
each other, alter legal relations, except that they may agree to an immediate separation
and make provisions for the support of either of them and their children during the
separation."

" R.C. § 3105.65.

65 R.C. § 3105.64.
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CONCILIATION

Domestic relations courts have been reluctant to become involved in
marriage counseling or referral or diversion from the justice system. The
traditional view is that the court's responsibility is to process those matters
properly brought before the court upon legally sufficient complaint with
fairness and justice. Although most judges are sensitive to the tragic implications of divorce and will often allow the parties opportunities to seek
help in resolving marital conflicts, they are reluctant to become involved,
as a court, in social-work type programs of case-work service. Thus, the
provisions of R.C. Section 3117, calling for conciliation judges and conciliation process, have not been implemented since their passage in 1969.66
The 1974 passage of comprehensive revision of divorce laws, making
termination of marriage more permissive and minimizing the effect of
fault, calls for increased recognition of the need, in many cases, for
marriage conciliation or counseling. The court is given the authority to
order conciliation during the pendency of the action -for a period not
to exceed ninety (90) days. 67 The critical question will be whether
domestic relations courts around the state are willing to broaden their
concern and implement these new provisions. It is submitted that the role
of the court has been vastly changed by these revisions. The court will
become more of a facilitator or engineer of the process by which
marriages in trouble are dealt with by the public and private sector of
society. Domestic relations judges now have an excellent opportunity
to put into practice some of the ideas they have long had for dealing
realistically with troubled marriages. History will write the verdict.
The new provisions for conciliation orders apply only to pending
actions. In pending actions for divorce, annulment, or alimony-alone, the
process may be initiated only after 30 days from the service of summons
or first publication of notice. 68 Notice that this is generally after answer
day so that it will be necessary for the adverse party to file his answer
before the court can order conciliation referral. It may have been the

66 R.C. ch. 3117, Conciliation of Marital Controversies.
67 R.C. § 3105.091, a new section, provides:
(A) At any time after thirty days from the service of summons or first publication of notice in an action for divorce, annulment or alimony, or at any time
after filing a petition for dissolution of marriage, the court of common pleas,
upon its own motion or the motion of one of the parties, may order the parties
to undergo conciliation for the period of time not exceeding ninety days as the
court specifies. The order requiring conciliation shall set forth the conciliation
procedure and name the conciliator. The conciliation procedures may include
without limitation referrals to the conciliation judge as provided in Chapter
3117, of the Revised Code, public or private marriage counselors, family service
agencies, community health services, physicians, licensed psychologists, or
clergymen. The costs of any conciliation procedures shall be paid by the parties.
(B) No action for divorce, annulment, or alimony, in which conciliation has
been ordered, shall be heard or decided until the conciliation has concluded and

been reported to the court.
68 R.C.§ 3105.091.
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intent of the legislature that this delay would permit the parties to get
into court and state their respective claims before referral. As a practical
matter, it might have been better had the referral been allowed before
answer date, perhaps at the time of temporary hearings, and the time for
filing responsive pleadings to be extended during the period of referral.
The 30-day limitation does not apply to referral of the parties for
conciliation where the action is one for dissolution of marriage. The
author questions whether there will be many such referrals in these
kinds of cases, since the maintenance, continuance, and conclusion of
the action depends upon continued mutual agreement of both parties.

CONCLUSION*
IVORCE BY AGREEMENT, still an "infant" in Ohio, comes as a breath of
fresh air into an area of law where deceit, dishonesty, blackmail, and
hypocrisy had become the rule rather than the exception.' The uncontested
divorce virtually required many persons to commit unchallenged perjury
in order to get divorce relief. When it is realized that domestic relations
cases account for the second largest category of cases of citizen contact
with the justice system (traffic cases rank first), it can only be concluded
that scores of people left the courtroom with a diminished respect for
2
law and the system.

D

A judge hearing dissolution-of-marriage cases now finds himself
dealing with reality in a situation where integrity can be demonstrated and
preserved. With a little imagination and human concern, it is possible to
create an atmosphere of compassion and wisdom, particularly as relates
to potentials of conciliation and provision for children. Although the
fondness of the author for the procedure may be the result of "young
love" and the procedure might eventually lead to the same kind of feelings
as previously held about divorce, it is submitted that the greatest danger in
the system is social, not legal. The entire fabric of marriage is becoming
"biodegradable," i.e., an increasing portion of the population rejects
marriage as a lifetime commitment. Easier and quicker legal methods of
terminating marriage facilitate this notion and allow proliferation of the
3'
modern practice of "serial monogamy."
* The following text is a separate contribution by Judge Milligan, not part of the
reproduction from WEST's OHIO PRACTicE, FAMILY LAW volumes 13 and 14, Copyright
1975, by West Publishing Company.
1See Newell v. Newell, 21 Ohio Misc. 239, 257 N.E.2d 90 (Stark County C.P. 1969).
2A courthouse elevator operator used to make the point graphically. When the
elevator would stop on the third floor, on the way to divorce court on the fourth, he
would say, "Third floor, where the truth gets off."
3
Serial monogamy is the practice of being married to only one person at a time, but
in sequence.
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It seems clear that the Ohio legislature prefers dissolution as the
method of terminating marriage. Such cases are granted priority in
assignment and are to be relatively uncomplicated. 4 The role of the judge
is to be monitor and overseer, rather than decision-maker, as in matters
of advocacy. This preference is consistent with the prevalent psychological
notion that peoples' actions are always more committed and accepted
if they are the result of agreement, as opposed to imposed or inflicted
judgment. I believe several steps are necessary by a court that seeks
to move its domestic relations caseload in this direction:
1) A clear judicial pronouncement of preference for this procedure
with the local bar will set the stage for implementation.
2) Development of simplified methods of filing, investigation,
assignment, and hearing will encourage its use. In Stark County, we are
finding that automatic assignment of the case exactly six (6) weeks from
the date of filing at 10:00 a.m. puts the matter on a track that eliminates
much extra effort by court employees and attorneys. (If the assigned date
falls on a holiday, the next regular court day at the same time is the
hearing date.) If such trial date is inappropriate, the attorney need only
present a judgment setting a different date within the statutory limit prior
to the hearing day. If there is no such judgment, the case is automatically
dismissed if the parties fail to appear.
3) Uncontested divorce cases should become the exception rather
than the historic rule. Most uncontested cases are the result of agreement
between the parties. When agreement is reached in a pending divorce case,
the better procedure is to allow a petition for dissolution (or amended
petition, if you like) to be filed, without additional deposit for court
costs, and to be heard upon the same automatic hearing date as if filed
originally as a dissolution-of-marriage action.5 If courts allow counsel to
continue the comfortable practice of a separate, early assignment of
uncontested cases, dissolution will not be appropriately used. It makes
little sense to allow a divorce to proceed with only one party present,
claiming an agreement under circumstances of fault; and require both to
be present and interrogated in a dissolution, where fault is not an issue. In
Stark County, we have resolved this problem by holding to the general
proposition that uncontested cases are a thing of the past; that all divorce
cases are to be decided as nearly as possible in numerical order; and that
6
divorce cases may be "advanced" only for specific, good cause shown.
4See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.64 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), fixing hearing between
30 and 90 days.
5 Most courts have determined to allow amendment of a divorce case to one for
dissolution, but have refused to allow a dissolution to be amended to a divorce. The
theory is that the remedies available in dissolution cases are specific: either grant,
continue for not more than 90 days, or dismiss. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 310.65 and
§ 3105.091 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
6 Reasons for advancing such a divorce may include unavailability of a party, health
of a party, employment or custody exigencies,
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4) The dissolution hearing must be held with dignity and a sense of
purpose and concern. At this point, our court has adopted the following
general format: counsel introduces the parties to the court, identifies the
case, and represents that the statutory, jurisdictional conditions have been
met and that he believes the parties are still requesting a dissolution of the
marriage. Thereupon, the judge administers an oath to the parties, who
are allowed to remain at counsel table. The judge questions each of the
parties to whatever extent he deems necessary. Generally, the questions
go to the fact of separation, agreement, disclosure, voluntariness, fairness
to the parties, fairness to children, and whether the agreement deals with
all of the issues in the marriage. In every event, the judge should carefully
advise the parties of the availability of marriage counseling and his
willingness to postpone the case for up to ninety (90) days for this
purpose. (Occasionally, the parties will surprise counsel 'by asking for
such postponement.) If the judge has any reservations about any of the
matters of inquiry, he should continue the case and give the parties an
opportunity to come to a full and complete understanding. The bar and
bench of Ohio have been given a valuable legal tool and remedy for
dealing with the tragedy of marital breakdown. Conscientious use of it
should raise domestic relations proceedings to a new level of integrity.
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SPACE JOINT VENTURES: THE UNITED STATES
AND DEVELOPING NATIONS*
CARL Q. CHRISTOLt

T

as one looks at man's involvement with
space. First, in all of his continually expanding activities, man has
placed himself at the focal point. He has always considered that space
activities must serve the needs and interests of mankind. Second, there
has never been any doubt that man's activities in space are subject
to the rule of law.
WO DEVELOPMENTS STAND OUT

Moreover, all of the forces of the social complex have allowed man
by the mid-1970's to move beyond mere exploration and into an era of
beneficial and man-oriented exploitation of the space environment. The
natural consequence was the birth of a host of new and challenging
personal interrelationships-the grist of the lawyer's mill.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT JOINT VENTURE

At the outset it is necessary to ask: What is meant by the term
space environment joint venture (SEJV)? For present purposes, it can be
considered as a form of international cooperation which involves more
than the provision by one state of opportunities to foreign states for
participation in space activities planned and implemented by the providing
state. Thus, a general invitation by the United States to a single foreign
state or to foreign states to provide suggestions concerning space activities
or experiments to be conducted on a United States space object would
not constitute a SEV. Rather, a SEJV requires substantial participation
by way of planning, and implementation of those plans based on a formal
or informal agreement, in which the parties seek collective mobilization of
a portion of their respective capabilities, resulting in the exploration and
use of the space environment for peaceful purposes. Such an approach
emphasizes more than casual collaborative efforts in practical space
oriented undertakings.
A SEW may result from bilateral arrangements between two states
or between a state and a public international organization. It may also be
the product of a multilateral arrangement, whereby the members of a
public international organization are given the special function of
allocating time, efforts, and resources to a specific space venture, or by
the creation of a public international organization to engage in generalized
space activities. The role of the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) in supporting and assisting a state in the development and
* This article was presented as part of the Symposium on the Law in Outer Space held
at the University of Akron School of Law on October 24, 1974.
t A.B., University of South Dakota; A.M., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy;
Ph.D., University of Chicago; L.L.B., Yale Law School; Professor of International

Law and Political Science, University of Southern California.
[3981
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conduct of its space program offers an excellent example of such
multilateral and multinational activities. A second illustration would be
the multi-membered European Space Research Organization (ESRO),
which is now being replaced by the European Space Agency (ESA).'
THE HISTORY

Proposals for bilateral SEJVs date back to 1962. In March of that
year, President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev considered a United
States-Soviet joint venture to the moon; the proposal2 was later repeated
by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in the United Nations on December 2,
1963. 3 This first moon proposal was followed by an intergovernmental
agreement in Geneva, on June 8, 1962, between A. A. Blagonravov of the
Soviet Academy of Science and Hugh L. Dryden of NASA. This agreement covered joint cooperation in three space activities, namely meteorology, a world geomagnetic survey, and satellite telecommunications. 4
INVENTORY OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL
SPACE ENVIRONMENT AGREEMENTS

An inventory of international agreements affecting major space
resource states has disclosed, so far as SEJVs are concerned, an interesting
1 The United States, through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), entered into an agreement with ESRO on August 14, 1973, for cooperative
activities concerning the development of Spacelab and a space shuttle system. Bearing
the title Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the European Space Research Organization for a Cooperative
Program Concerning Development, Procurement and Use of a Space Laboratory in
Conjunction with the Space Shuttle System, the agreement in its 16 articles identifies
the contractual obligations of the respective parties, ie.: "Objectives" (Article 1);
"Respective Responsibilities" (Article V); "Funding" (Article VII); "Principles
Concerning Access to and Use of Shuttle/SL" (Article XI), and, with attention given
to the legal rights of flight crews, "Patents and Proprietary Information" (Article
XIII), and "Statement of Disputes" (Article XIV). See Hearings on Space Missions
Payloads and Traffic for the Space Shuttle Era Before the Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 121-134 (1973), as cited
in 2 J. SPACE L. 31, 40-52 (1974). This agreement is based on the principle of
no exchange of funds between agencies. See Hearings on S. 2955 on NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1975 Before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 835 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NASA Authorization
Hearings for 1975].
The Memorandum of Understandingbetween the United Kingdom Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry and the United States National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Concerning the Furnishing of Satellite Launching and Associated
Services, approved Dec. 18, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7544, as cited in 2 J. SPACE L. 31,
32-38 (1974), also identifies the contractual obligations of the respective parties. The
agreement deals with "Responsibilities" (Article I); "Implementation" (Article I1);
"Financial Principles" (Article Ill); "Liability" (Article IV); "Documentation and
Reports" (Article V), and "Confirmation" (Article VI). Attached to the agreement
was a statement entitled "United States Policy Governing the Provision of Launch
Assistance." Id. These agreements identify some of the legal issues which are likely to
need resolution in future SEJVs.
2 46 DEP'T STATE BULL. 537 (1962).
3 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1011 (1963).
4 U.N. Doc. A/C.I/800 (1962). See also C. CIRISTOL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 482-88 (1966); M. Whiteman, 2 DEsT INTL. LAW 1320 (1963).
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pattern. Such international agreements make provision for fairly intensive
international cooperation in a variety of fields, including joint launches,
joint scientific and technological activities, as well as supporting activities
frequently restricted to ground involvements (e.g., agreements relating to
tracking facilities). Leaving aside the historically numerous international
agreements relating to tracking facilities, which have involved as many as
100 bilateral commitments, the most universal of the space agreements
have been:
(1) The Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization of August 20, 1971, 5 which had
entered into force among 86 states as of January 1, 1974;
(2) The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies of January 27, 1967,6 which had
been signed by 90 states as of May, 1974;
(3) The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space of April 22, 1968, 7 which had been signed by 79 states
as of May, 1974;
(4) The Convention on the International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects of March 29, 1972,8 which had been
signed by 71 states as of May, 1974.
Aside from the tracking facilities agreements, a current count
indicates that the United States is now a bilateral treaty partner with
only 17 other nations in space matters. These are Argentina, Australia,
10
Brazil, Canada, 9 Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India,
514 U.S.T. 1278, T.LA.S. No. 5431.

6 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
7 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599.
DEP'T STATE BuLL. 949 (1973); 1 J. SPACE L. 86 (1973).
9 Two projects are being conducted by the United States and Canada. The first is a
Communications Technology Satellite (CTS), which has also been identified as the
Cooperative Applications Satellite (CAS-C). This program was undertaken to develop
broadcasting technology, which will make satellite communications with small ground
stations feasible in the 12 GHZ frequency band. The second is the Transmitter
Experiment Package (TEP), which has been in development since 1971. Canada is
responsible for the space object and NASA is responsible for the basic technology.
NASA also has the responsibility for the Delta launch vehicle, and for placing the
space object into geostationary orbit. Canada has the responsibility for the operations
of the object after launch. NASA Authorization Hearings for 1975, supra note 1, at
676-78.
10In 1966, the United States and Germany entered into an agreement for the Helios
solar probe. Under the terms of this agreement, the United States supplied a part of
the science instrument payload, provided technical support, and undertook to launch
two space objects. The United States and Germany have also agreed to cooperate in
the launch and use of the Aeros-B space object, which is designed for aeronomy
experiments. NASA Authorization Hearings of 1972, supra note 1, at 741.
The Aeros-B space object was proposed, designed, built, instrumented and
funded by Germany. It was one of the ten NASA 1972 international space missions

8 T.IA.S. No. 7762. See also 68
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Italy, Japan," Malagasy Republic, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom,'12 and the U.S.S.R.13 In some instances there
is more than one such bilateral arrangement with such countries.
The United States has entered into special multilateral agreements
with 29 national treaty partners.' 4 The United States has also entered into
a multilateral agreement where its partners are a nation, e.g., Canada,
and an international organization, e.g., ESRO. This particular venture
calls for the use of the Application Technology Satellite-F (ATS-F) space
in which "both sides assumed financial responsibility for their contributions to joint
projects." H. Reis, U.S. Reviews Year's Activities of the United Nations in the Field
of Outer Space, 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 231 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Reis]. For
recent statements concerning United States cooperative efforts in the space field, see
M. Evans, U.S. Cosponsors Resolution Setting 1974 Work Program for U.N. Outer
Space Committee, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 64 (1974); W. Bennett, Jr., United States
Discussed Major Issues Before U.N. Outer Space Committee, 71 DEP'T STATE BULL.
323 (1974).
11 In 1969, the United States and Japan entered into a Space Cooperation Agreement
involving the supply by the United States to Japan of space hardware and technology
so that Japan could develop a space launch vehicle allowing for scientific and
applications satellites by 1975. See NASA Authorization Hearings for 1975, supra
note 1, at 740.
12 Supra note 1.
13 Agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union have taken the form
of: The Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, May 24, 1972,
T.I.A.S. No. 7347, reprinted 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 924-25 (1972); The Agreement
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges and Cooperation in
Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, Apr. 11, 1972, T.I.A.S.
No. 7343. See Summary of Results of Discussions on Space Cooperation Between the
Academy of Science of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Jan. 21, 1971, 10 INT'L LEG. MAT.
617 (1971).
These discussions and the agreements subsequently arrived at, resulted in the
joint Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), which is scheduled for a July, 1975, launch
date. Since 1972, this United States-Soviet Union group on space has dealt with
medical research, on-board equipment and regimens, common laboratory and pre-flight
and post-flight procedures for determining the physical condition of flight crews.
Moreover, in the space science and application areas, there has been:
Continuing exchange of operational and scientific weather data, coordinated
oceanological studies, a joint experiment in coordinated microwave measurements
in the Bering Sea, efforts to define projects in the study of the national environment, interplanetary data exchanges, physiological data obtained from manned
spacecraft exchanges, lunar sample scientist visits, and a joint meeting of lunar
cartographic experts to consider basic principles for compiling lunar maps.
NASA Authorization Hearings for 1975, supra note 1, at 740.
14 The combinations include: (1) two other nations-Australiaand Italy; Canada and
Mauritania; (2) five others-India,France, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the Soviet Union; (3) six others-Argentina, Australia, Brazil, France, Italy, and
the Federal Republic of Germany; Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Indonesia, Japan, and the Netherlands; Argentina, Australia, Brazil, France,
Japan, and Spain; (4) seven others-Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union; (5) nine
others-Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, and (6) eighteen othersArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, the United Kingdom,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. See 2 J. SPACE L. 53-63 (1974).
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object in order to demonstrate the practicality of real time communications
among central ground stations, aircraft, and maritime vessels by
satellite. The experiment has been designated the Position Location and
Communication Experiment (PLACE).15
In addition to the August, 1973, spacelab-space shuttle treaty
between ESRO-ESA and the United States,' 6 there are agreements between
the United States and other international organizations. In 1972, for
example, NASA "[l]aunched six satellites for international organizations
and other governments on a nonprofit cost basis.' 17
A number of treaty arrangements exist among states relating to space
activities to which the United States is not a party. There are special
separate agreements between the Soviet Union on the one hand and
France, Poland, and Romania' 8 on the other. The Soviet Union's
multilateral treaty partners include Czechoslovakia, the Democratic
Republic of Germany and Poland.1 9 India has as separate treaty partners
Australia and France, and also the Federal Republic of Germany and
France.go India, as will be mentioned later, has entered into a space
oriented agreement with UNDP. Hungary's space partners consist of
France, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Intercosmos,
and Intersputnik.21 Colombia also has an agreement with WMO. 2 ESRO
had entered into bilateral agreements with Canada, the Federal Republic
of Germany, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom.
NATURE OF UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS

The United States has entered into international agreements
containing general principles of space law, the principles of which have
made it more feasible to formulate specific agreements involving joint
ventures. Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the commitments contained in these specific joint venture treaties, it is advisable to
identify the critical provisions of the 1967 Principles Treaty 23 which set
the tone for the more particularized agreements. "
International cooperation in space activities is mandated by Article I
of the treaty. This article establishes as a norm of positive international
15 NASA AuthorizationHearingsfor 1975, supra note 1, at 671.
16T.I.A.S. No. 7722; 2 J.SPACE L. 53 (1974).
17 See Reis, supra note 10.
18 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/123 (1973).

19 NASA AuthorizationHearingsfor 1975, supra note 1, at 789-90.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/123 (1973).
211d.
20

22 Members of the United Nations are called upon to make annual reports to that
organization on their respective space activities. See e.g., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/123

(1973).
23 1818 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
24 M.

MARcoFn, TR rTS DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DR L'ESPACE (1973).
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law, the proposition that "[t]he exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the
benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree
of economic and scientific development, and shall be the province of
mankind." 2 This is a new and challenging concept and its operational
import is just now beginning to be seen.
The foregoing provision is linked to other provisions contained in
the treaty which mandate, as in Article III,2 that parties carrying on
activities in the exploration and use of the space environment, will act "in
the interest of... promoting international cooperation and understanding,"
and in Article IX, which provides that the "[p]arties shall be guided by
the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance...."2
Moreover, Articles X and XI provide for the promotion of
international cooperation by allowing parties to observe the flight of space
objects launched by a state or to be made aware of the "nature, conduct,
locations and results" of a state's peaceful exploration and use of the
space environment. 28 At the very least these provisions suggest the duty
of international cooperation in order that all countries may benefit in man's
increasing exploitation of the space environment. Additionally, these
provisions contain the expectation that such gains will flow to countries
irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development.
When one takes into account the foregoing commitments relating to
cooperation and sharing in the results of space activity, as well as the
political expressions contained in the United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions relating to national sovereignty over natural resources,29 there
may be some reason to believe that even the non-space resource states
have an inchoate interest in a share of the benefits derived from space
activity. One way for such states to obtain such benefits is through the
implementation of the general concept of "international cooperation."
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)
The United States has cooperated with states in an effort to share the
scientific and technological information gathered in its space activities.
Some 50 foreign investigators were invited to participate in the lunar
sample program, and some of these were from the LDCs. Indeed, when
plans were being made for the Earth Resources Technology Satellite
25 1818 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 63647.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See G.A. Res. 3016, 27 GAOR Supp. 30, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8963 (1972); G.A.

Res. 1803, 17 GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). See also 12 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 226 (1973); 57 AM. J.Ir'L L. 710 (1963). Resolution 3016 was adopted
by a vote of 102, no dissenting votes and 22 abstentions. The United States and a

majority of the Western European nations abstained.
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(ERTS-1), s° requests were affirmatively solicited from many nations
concerning the gathering of data. Among the experiments proposed by
scientists from the LDCs were land use and soil erosion in Guatemala
and the hydrologic cycle of the Santa River Basin in Peru. In addition
to the requests received from the more advanced nations, the following
additional LDCs also submitted proposals: Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, India, Republic of Korea, Peru, and Venezuela. Some 23
countries supplied more than 100 participating scientists for the ERTS-1
program, with each country obliged to fund its own experiments.
The United States has established few SEJV treaty contacts with the
LDCs. The participation by the United States with 18 other states,
identified in the preceding inventory, 31 consisted of a joint evaluation of
natural resources in Argentina. When one turns to an identification of the
LDCs with which the United States has embarked on SEJVs, it is possible
to find but seven such arrangements. The nations involved are Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, India, the Malagasy
Republic, and Mauritania. Moreover, the areas of joint involvement are
relatively unsophisticated and extremely restricted. For example, the
principal purpose of the treaty with the Malagasy Republic was to allow
for the installation of a tracking station for Skylab. Yet, the United States
may be viewed as having taken the lead in such activities since, by
comparison, none of the space treaty partners of the Soviet Union are
developing states.
JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

The interest of the United States in perfecting the use of space
objects for educational purposes has resulted in a specific and pragmatic
international agreement with India.32 Undoubtedly India, through its own
preparatory efforts, made it possible for these two nations to embark upon
a mutually beneficial SEJV. India, as well as a few other developing
nations, realizing their own limited capabilities in the space field, looked
first to international organizations for guidance and assistance in the
development of national space activities. World institutions taking an
interest in the exploration and use of the space environment have
principally been the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
and UNESCO, but also include FAO, ITU, WMO, IBRD, IDA, IFC,
IAEA, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), and the
33
United Nations itself.
30 NASA AuthorizationHearings for 1975, supra note 1, at 25-26, 110-15, 741.
S1 Supra note 14.
32 NASA Authorization Hearingsfor 1975, supranote 1, at 768.
33 See generally REPORT OF TYPES OF AssISTANCE EXTENDED BY THE UNrrED NATIONS
SYsTE Ms TO DEvEtOPNo COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/124 (1974). By General Assembly Resolu-

tion, G.A. Res. 3182 (XXVIII), Dec. 18, 1973, it was decided to increase membership
of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space from 28 to 37 nations. Prior to

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/1

22

Milligan: Dissolution of Marriage

Spring, 19751

SPACE JOINT VENrURES

Since India and UNDP have collaborated extensively in the practical
mobilization of their respective space interests, attention will be
concentrated on their space relationships. However, it should be noted
that India and UNESCO have carried on important discussions focusing
on UNESCO's interest in broadcasting from satellites and remote
sensing.3 4 UNESCO's space related activities have resulted in the
preparation of studies and reports on space experiments; conducting
seminars and the preparation of feasibility studies concerning the
potential of regional cooperation; holding space-oriented seminars
involving developing nations; conducting survey missions dealing with the
prospective use of satellites for education and development; conducting
simulation exercises relating to potential use of satellites for educational
purposes, and coordination with other specialized agencies of the United
Nations. UNESCO and ITU, for example, have jointly compiled data
relevant to the use of satellites for educational purposes. Such data will
have utility for nations having to make financial, organizational, and
operational decisions concerning the use of such space objects for
both national and regional areas. The joint effort is intended to provide
characteristics of the systems offering
data on the practical and technical
35
optimum broadcast coverage.
UNESCO's general interest in the use of the space environment for
broadcast purposes is reflected in the UNESCO Declaration of Guiding
Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of
38
Information, the Spread of Education, and Greater Cultural Exchange.
The Declaration was adopted by a vote of 55 to 7, with 22 abstentions. The
United States opposed the Declaration. The reasons for the United States'
opposition are set forth in a Department of State communication to the

the appointment of the nine new members by the President of the General Assembly,
who

took into account the principle of equitable geographical

distribution,

the

Committee was composed of Albania, Argentina. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy,

Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sweden,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The newest members
are Chile, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, and Venezuela.

34 India played an important role in the formulation of UNESCO's Declaration of
Building Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of
Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange, NASA
Authorization Hearings for 1975, supra note 1, at 769-71.
35 Space Activities and Resources: A Review of the Activities and Resources of the
United Nations, of the Specialized Agencies and of other Competent International
Bodies Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/100/
Add. 2, at 22-23 (1974); United Nations/UNESCO African Regional Seminar on
Satellite Broadcasting Systems to Education and Development Final Report, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/120, at 14-16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as United Nations/UNESCO
Final Report].
36 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/104 (1972), reprinted In 1 J. SPACE L. 161 (1973).
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Chairman of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science Committee
37
of the United States Senate, dated April 3, 1974.
With this background, it will be possible to understand the more
active role of UNDP in supplying tangible resources to India as the two
jointly ventured to improve India's practical space capabilities. In focusing
on this particular joint venture, the fact that other international organizations have provided financial assistance to nations interested in the
development of telecommunications facilities should not be overlooked.
The World Bank, IDA, and IFC have assisted such LDCs as Ethiopia
and Yugoslavia in such efforts.
But, in 1964, India was the first beneficiary of UNDP's involvement
in the space field. India proposed the establishment of a Center for
Research and Training in the Use of Satellite Communications to be
implemented with the assistance of the ITU. This proposal has resulted
in three programs.
The object of the first project was "to track satellites in orbit,
participate in practical tests and conduct training and investigation in
satellite communication techniques. The Center has provided training to
Indian engineers, scientists and technicians both in all phases of the design,
construction, operation and maintenance of a communication satellite earth
station and in the technology of the communication satellite systems." ' 38
The second project contemplated "an experiment on mass education
television programs would be beamed via the satellite" which
was to be known as the Experimental Satellite Communications Earth
Station (ESCES). In proposing UNDP financial assistance for such a
project, India pointed out that "though the experiments using communication satellites would be conducted in India, the experience gained will
be made available for the benefit of all other developing countries and
may well provide very useful guidelines for the widespread application
of direct broadcast satellite techniques to the problems of mass education
' 39
throughout the world."
...whereby

The third project was India's proposal to UNDP "for assistance
in establishing and operating a Television Production and Studio
Technical Training Center." 40 This phase would provide trained personnel
and program material for the educational program. It was India's view
that it would be able to contribute $600,000 to this effort if it could
be assured of receiving $1 million from UNDP.
NASA Authorization Hearings fot 1975, supra note 1, at 766-67.
38 Review of the Activities and Resources of the United Nations, of Its Specialized
Agencies and of other Competent International Bodies Relating to the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space-United Nations Development Program and the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/77/Add. 1, at 4 (1970).
39 Id. at 4-5.
40 Id.
37
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By 1970, UNDP viewed the proposal as having a profound impact
on "education, agricultural training, family planning and many other
aspects of development." 4' In 1970, UNDP reported its desire to "continue
to do all it can to promote the development of direct broadcast satellite
techniques and their application for the benefit of developing countries." '4
The results of the above projects were so favorable that NASA
concluded that a profitable joint venture with India might be undertaken.
Thus, in September, 1969, NASA and India entered into an agreement
whereby the ATS-F would be made available to India for broadcast
purposes. The title given the project was Satellite Instructional Television
Experiment (SITE).43
The United States-Indian joint venture foresaw the launching by the
United States of ATS-F in May of 1974, with the expectation that
the SITE project would be operating for the benefit of India by mid-1975.
The plan is for India to have the benefit of the satellite for nine to 12
months. While serving Indian educational needs, this space object will be
positioned over Lake Victoria in central Africa, where it will be "visible"
to the Indian sub-continent. NASA has been charged with providing the
use of the 860 megahertz transponder and will operate transportable
ground control facilities situated in Western Europe. India has assumed
the responsibility for providing the ground transmitter receivers and
software, including the programming of the television broadcasts. 44
Program content will emphasize agricultural techniques, family planning
and hygiene, school instruction and cultural integration.
India's plan calls for the use of direct reception community receivers
in 2,000 villages, with benefits accruing to an additional 3,000 villages.
The broadcasts will last from four to six hours a day. The community
receivers would be situated in schools, community centers, and other local
institutions. By March, -1974, India had successfully completed the qualification testing for engineering models of ground receiving stations, and
production had been initiated for the quantity delivery of such stations by
early 1975. Moreover, India had completed the full receiver deployment
plan, including the selection of all site locations. Software production has
gotten underway, and logistic support planning is moving forward.4 '
India is also considering the possibility of developing home receivers
in anticipation of a direct or individual, as opposed to community,
reception. It should be noted that the legal and practical aspects of direct
satellite broadcasts, both with and without the consent of a receiving nation
41 Id. at 5.
42 Id. at 5.

This document also declares that the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) maintains resident representatives in over 90 developing countries.
43 NASA Authorization Hearings/or 1975, supra note 1, at 670-72, 742.

44Id. at 670.
45 Id. at 671,768.
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when the broadcast emanates from the space object of another nation, has
received much attention at the United Nations, UNESCO, and at the
International Telecommunications Union. Since in the SITE project India
will control the content of the broadcasts, and since the broadcasts will be
received only in India, the foregoing problem has not arisen. Technical
experts now generally hold the view that the state of the art for
direct-to-the-home broadcasts will not allow for such broadcasts until the
late 1970's or early 1980's. 46 However, when it is feasible to provide
greater satellite power and when low cost augmentation devices which
attach to the family TV set have been developed, the larger legal and
political problem of direct satellite broadcasts will have to be met 47
In 1973, the United Nations appraised the proposed joint venture
between India and the United States as follows:
Under an extension of the earlier mentioned UNDP Indian
telecommunications project, UNDP is providing assistance in the
modification of ESCES to enable it to play its part with the ATS-F
satellite expected soon to be launched by the United States National
Aeronautical and Space Administration. The ESCES is presently
being modified to enable it to transmit and receive television signals.
Television transmitting and studio equipment are being added to
it and development work is being carried out on the production
of television receivers suitably modified to accept signals from the
satellite. It has been pointed out by the Indian Government that
the experiments using communication satellites which are conducted
in India will provide experience which can be made available for the
benefit of all other developing countries and may well provide useful
guidelines for the widespread application of direct broadcast satellite
48
techniques to the problem of mass education throughout the world.
UNDP engaged itself to "do all it can to promote the development
of direct broadcasting techniques and their application for the benefit of
developing countries." 49 UNDP also noted that it was aware that
Id. at 722. Other experts have set the date for the mid-1980's.
47 A considerable amount of literature has developed on this subject. Aside from the
discussions in the foregoing international organizations the International Institute of
Space Law at its Amsterdam meeting in October, 1974, considered papers from
J.Busak, La Radiodiffusion Directe par Satellite; M. Dauses, La Liberte de l'Information en Matlere de la Television Directe par Satellites; E. Galloway, Direct
Broadcast Satellites; J. Gehrig, Broadcasting Satellites-Prospects and Problems, and
S. Lay, A. Gribble, R. Copeland and K. Kind, PreliminaryDraft Study of Censorship
Provisions of a Proposed Telecommunications Satellite Treaty and the Constitution of
the United States of America. These papers will be published in the PRocEEDiNGs oF
THE XVIITM COLLOQUIuM ON THE LAW OF OuTER SPACE (M. Schwartz ed., 1975).
Compare the contributions contained in the XVth COLLOQUIUM, published in 1973,
46

with the XVIth COLLOQUiuM, published in 1974.

Space Activities and Resources: A Review of the Activities and Resources of the
United Nations, of the Specialized Agencies and of other Competent International
Bodies Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/100/Add.
1, at 12 (1973).
49 d. at 13.
48
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training in the use of computers was essential to the handling of
communications data. Thus, it was willing, together with its cooperating
agencies, to provide "practical training in computer programs and
operations in developing countries on every continent."Bo
By 1974, UNDP was able to report that it had been able to make
available to India for the expansion of the ESCES project the sum of
$1,043,300; India, in turn, had contributed the sum of $1,066,514.51
One means employed by the United Nations to assure itself of the
progress being realized through such ventures was the appointment of an
expert on space applications, H. G. S. Murthy. He has assisted in seminars
and workshops held in many parts of the world. One such program of
meetings was held in India, in December of 1972, at which time very
careful attention was given to technical problems involved in the use
of space objects for the purposes of communication. All the meetings
related to the operational phase of the Indian Experimental Satellite
Communication Earth Station. 52 Thus, UNDP has assisted in feasibility
studies for satellite communications. It has provided technical assistance
in the form of seminars and workshops. It has also funded fellowships
and scholarships.
While the hope has been expressed that the Indian project would be of
help to other developing countries, the United States has indicated that:
[O]pportunities for experiments by other nations with ATS-F after its
use by India are very limited. The current [1974] expectation is that
the satellite will be returned to the Western Hemisphere so that the
U.S. can realize an additional return on its investment by utilizing
the satellite for further experiments. Thus, any additional opportunities
will have to fit into planned U.S. uses in the Western Hemisphere. 3
UNDP, THE UNITED STATES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

UNDP has endeavored to facilitate international cooperation in the
development of regional communications satellite systems as well as to
assist in other joint ventures. In 1973, it assisted eight Latin American
countries in making a feasibility study of a regional system. The proposed
BOld.

51 Report on Types of Assistance Extended by the United Nations System to Developing Countries in the Field of Practical Applications of Space Technology, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/124, at 5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Report on Types of Assistance].
52
Report on the United Nations Panel Meeting in India on Satellite Instructional
Television Systems, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/114, at 7-8 (1973).
53 NASA Authorization Hearings for 1975, supra note 1, at 769. The inability of the
United States to extend this particular project should not be construed as a general
unwillingness to share space-derived benefits with the lesser developed countries. For

example, during 1974, ERTS and other United States remote sensing technologies

were used to assist the West African states of Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta. During

and following the extended drought in these countries, the United States provided
immediate and accurate information to them concerning their natural resources. They
were thus enabled to "expedite an expanded resource management program." Id. at
735.
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system would attempt to accelerate educational and cultural development. 54
Because of the many inaccessible mountain regions, conventional
educational methods are impractical in the Andean area. As a result of
this factor and the sparsity of teachers, the rate of illiteracy is high in this
sector. UNESCO and ITU have, therefore, undertaken investigations of
teaching opportunities. According to the 1973 United Nations review:
The project report will enable the Governments concerned to make
decisions on the financing, ownership, organization and operation
of educational television broadcasting systems on both a national and
a regional basis. They will also be provided with a wealth of data
on the most practicable technical characteristics of the system needed
to provide adequate coverage of the region.5
As a result of the foregoing reports, UNDP has contributed $913,786
to the feasibility study of the Latin American regional educational
television satellite system, and the affected nations have contributed
$360,000. By 1974, UNDP had contributed $4,042,440 to projects
in 11 developing countries and the nations involved had contributed
$4,519,955 of their own funds.-4
As ATS-F continues to demonstrate its significant capabilities, there
is an encouraging possibility that the United States will enter into bilateral
joint ventures for ATS-F use. Brazil requested approximately 50 hours of
satellite time for educational broadcast experiments during 1974-1975 and
NASA viewed the proposal favorably. The agreement calls for Brazil to
be responsible for providing ground transmitters, ground receivers, and
to engage in the programming for the experiment. This joint venture will
provide for audio-video broadcasts to approximately 500 schools in the
Rio Grande de Norte region of Brazil.5 7 Indonesia has indicated informally
that it has an interest in sharing in the use of the ATS-F. Since plans have
been made for the return of the ATS-F to be used by India during 1975
to the Western Hemisphere, the United States Department of State has
suggested that it might be able to find another satellite suitable for a joint
venture with Indonesia. 5 8 However, such potential users are obliged "to
pay for the planning, execution and analysis of results of their experiments
as well as the cost of experimental ground equipment." 59
REASONS FOR

SEJVs wiTH THE LDCs

Effective joint space ventures between the space resource nations and
the LDCs give promise of substantial common benefits. The LDCr can be
strengthened in their capacity to communicate those very ideas which
4

5

Supra note 48.

55Id.
5
6 Report on Types of Assistance, supra note 51, at 5.
57 NASA Authorization Hearings or 1975, supra note 1, at 768.

5 Id. at 769.
59 Id. at 672. The United States investment in the Application Technology Satellite-F
is approximately $35 million.
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have heretofore prevented their development. The space resource states
will have the opportunity to further maximize the myriad capabilities of
present-day space objects. For the LDCs, any thought of proceeding
unilaterally in the development of a space program is confronted with the
problem of prohibitive cost and the need for an enormous reservoir of
highly trained specialists. Just as the average individual cannot afford a
$33,500 Rolls Royce automobile, it would be a mistake for an LDC to
commit its limited resources to an extensive space program. For their
general involvement, they can participate in broad and unspecific
cooperative activities. However, more direct space benefits will unquestionably follow if they are able to participate in particularized bilateral
or multilateral efforts.
One of the advantages to the LDCs' participation in joint ventures
includes the choice by the LDC of the areas of action best suited to their
needs. As noted in the case of India, such action has been directed toward
essential educational, developmental, and social programs. With the space
resource state being willing to take the principal responsibility for the
construction and launch of the space object, the LDC will be permitted
the opportunity to move into soft-ware manufacture and applications.
They would additionally be able to embark on ground-based projects
which would produce specific expertise at relatively low costs. Such
commitments would permit the development of enormous motivation and
would contribute to the ultimate success of the joint venture.
In addition, the commitment by an LDC to a joint venture would
greatly increase the probability of assistance from UNDP, UNESCO, ITU
and other international bodies. So equipped, the LDCs might find that the
space resource states would be more inclined to supply scholarships and
fellowships to deserving nationals of the LDCs. With an enlarging
technical expertise on the part of the LDCs the advanced states would
make data collected through such national efforts as ERTS more readily
available to deserving LDCs. This kind of information exchange, when
coupled with the data received through the ATS-F type space object,
would also help to fortify the LDCs in their ability to grow in the areas
of education, communications, and the manufacture of software items, as
well as the perfection of their capacity to provide logistic support for
ground-based activities. Moreover, such collaborative efforts could
inculcate confidence and contribute to rational decisions on the part of
government officials.
The advantages which are made available to the space resource
nations as the result of such a joint venture with LDCs are equally
impressive. The space resource states could receive the benefits of
suggestions and proposals relevant to future space activity and, in addition,
the LDCs would share the monetary and scientific resources and
responsibilities in these particular activities. As a result of such
collaborative efforts, the advanced nations would be relieved of the
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975
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assertions-particularly in the area of data collection relating to earth
resources-that such collection and subsequent dissemination constituted
an interference with the sovereignty of the sensed nations. This type of
understanding and cooperative consultation could contribute to the
molding of a firm policy by the United States regarding an open and
unimpeded exchange of space object information on an international basis.
The bilateral SEJVs would serve as cautionary advice to those international
organizations which may wish to become involved in fixing the substantive
content of data which can be transmitted via space objects.
This pooling of special talents and capabilities would have a valuable
impact upon the identification of new ideas and processes. Through the
widening of the list of participants and the sharing of costs incident
thereto, there would also be a reduction in costs to the principal actor.
Moreover, United States space objects will be able to contain components
manufactured or assembled in other nations. The United States would
also be able to derive immediate benefits from an agreement with
an LDC allowing the United States to employ, on a cooperative basis
and during the lifetime of the joint venture, a radio frequency assigned
to the foreign nation.
There is a general awareness that radio emissions from space objects
have produced interference with emissions from other satellites. The
seriousness of this situation has been reflected in the statement relating
to ERTS-1 that "fortunately, no mission failures have occurred, but
the chances of this happening will increase as the number of satellites,
' ' 60
Such interference has resulted
sensors and ground emitters increase.
ATS-6, while situated over
the
that
1974,
in a charge in September,
the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific, west of Ecuador, and the Synchronous
Meteorological Satellite (SMS), while situated over the Atlantic, east
of Brazil, had blocked parts of the heavens from more than a dozen
radio telescopes situated in the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. Both of the United States satellites were situated at an
altitude of 22,400 miles, allowing them to orbit the earth at the same
rate of speed as the rotation of the earth. Through the sharing of
assigned radio frequencies it may be possible for joint venturers to
reduce or eliminate such interferences.
Through joint ventures, the United States would be able to use
an orbit position on a cooperative basis for the term of the agreement, an
orbit which might be assigned to a nation by the effective instrumentality
of the world community. NASA has seen the importance of clarifying
its future orbit position needs. In commenting on both the matter of radio
frequencies and orbit positions, NASA has indicated
[Wie will also examine NASA's future frequency allocation, bandwidth and orbit position needs and, where necessary, find ways of
60

NASA AuthorizationHearings lot 1975, supra note 1, at 680-81.
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sharing existing frequency allocations more efficiently and strive
to open up higher frequency bands, particularly above 10 GHZ, to
alleviate radio frequency and orbital space crowding problems.6 1
National competition for these valuable assets is already a lively
issue. As early as 1973, the United Nations/UNESCO African Regional
Seminar on Satellite Broadcasting Systems recommended that the ITU be
made aware of the "future requirements for satellite positions on the
geostationary orbit for satellite broadcasting in Africa. In particular,
the orbital positions between 151E and 151W longitude are of interest
for the African continent.162 The Report also noted that "the Seminar
recommended that all African nations be made aware of the need to
reserve the frequency band 2500-2690MHz for the possible future use
of satellite broadcasting in Africa." 63 If assignments of these or similar
orbital positions or frequency bands were to be made to the LDCs, the
need for joint ventures would become exceedingly clear. The preceding
reasons for establishing mutually beneficial SEJVs between an advanced

state and an LDC would also seem to apply with equal force to
joint ventures between space resource states and between such states
and international organizations.
The successful negotiation of bilateral agreements will allow for an
increase of experience and insight as to the possible benefits derivable
from multinational space operations. From the perspective of the LDCs
it is entirely possible that they will derive advantages from creating
regional programs. The advanced nations of Western Europe have found
it more expedient to proceed by way of an international organization
consisting of 10 countries than to go it alone or rely exclusively on
bilateral agreements. Perhaps the LDCs could establish their own
equivalent of ESA.
As the LDCs consider their space future, they may wish to direct
inquiries to ESA concerning the likelihood of the formation of "associate"
or some other subsidiary form of membership in that body. In looking
toward the future they will be aware that ESA is likely to be highly
performance oriented, whereas both the United Nations and UNESCO
have demonstrated that they possess more politically directed capabilities
and characteristics. On the other hand, attention should be given to
the fact that ITU, up to the present, has been more technically oriented.
Thus, the options of the LDCs are many. Presumably they will find
situations and combinations of situations in which they will be able to
derive maximum benefits from the wonderful innovations of the space age.

61 Id. at 681.

e2 United Nations/UNESCO Final Report, supra note 35, at 15.
a1L
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CONCLUSION

Unquestionably as man seeks to maximize the exploration and
exploitation of the space environment for peaceful and beneficial
purposes, there will be a need to engage in an enormous variety of
cooperative activities. A pattern allowing for the assumption of specific
obligations has already emerged. This consists of agreements between
nations, between a nation and an international organization, and among
several nations and an international organization or organizations. Such
agreements now exist between space resource states, and to a lesser degree
between a resource state and a non-resource state. The non-resource states
have been assisted in their efforts to advance their genuine national
interests by a number of international organizations. Of particular help
to them at this time have been the United Nations, especially through the
UNDP, and UNESCO. The non-resource states, as it turns out, are
essentially the less developed countries.
All of the cooperative activities which have been taking place-whether
taking the form of general programs of cooperation or more specific joint
ventures-have produced benefits to the participants. So far the benefits
have varied depending on whether a nation is a space resource state,
an advanced state, or an LDC. Thus, the space resource states and the
advanced states have been able either to engage in, or plan, for a number
of activities having wide-ranging aspects; the launching of a wide variety of
space objects, complex scientific and technological experiments, medical
tests, applications involving broadcasting and sensing, and the preparation of
multinational crews with diverse backgrounds, with the attendant need to
work out legal codes to govern the manning of multinational space missions.
While the space resource and advanced states were much concerned
with the activities of man in space, the LDCs have concentrated on space
applications designed to improve the quality of life on the surface of the
globe. Thus, they have sought out cooperative activities and ventures which
would allow for higher educational, health, and living standards, which can
be realized through improvements in communications. On the part of
some of the LDCs there has been a disposition to question the unilateral
activities of space resource states, particularly where the latter have had
the capacity to broadcast into the LDC or to obtain data from within the
LDC by way of sophisticated sensing procedures. At the same time, some
of these non-resource states were deriving benefits from the highly practical
space programs being pursued by the resource states.
In order that the fears of some nations may be alleviated concerning
the capabilities of the space resource states, there is a need to make use
of the joint venture process to achieve mutually desirable results.
Experience with this process has demonstrated that it is one means to
ameliorate fearful concerns on the part of some nations. It is a process
for realizing mutually beneficial gains for countries willing to embark on
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such ventures. As states embark more intensively upon the exploitation
of the space environment, both the specific joint venture and the more
generalized cooperative efforts of nations will have to be utilized so that
there will be a suitable distribution of the benefits of the space
environment-the newly found "province of all mankind." Law and the
legal process have the capacity to provide an infinite number of principles,
standards, and rules so that genuine national interests can be satisfied
and world community values can be assured. As with a number of
major issues now confronting the welfare of man, the principal need
is to find the political will to obtain such values.
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THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ACT: A PROMISE THAT FAILED

HowARD M.

METZENBAUM*

W (OSHA) in 1970,' it commanded
the Occupational Safety and Health Act
HEN CONGRESS PASSED

industry to provide its employees
with workplaces free from recognized dangers. The legislation declared
that the safety of workers is a public concern, a concern vital to the
community at large. Spokesmen for the then-presiding Nixon Administration praised the Act heartily and vowed to implement it energetically.
"This bill opens up a whole new vista for the Labor Department," said
the Secretary of Labor. "We plan to launch the administration of the Act
2
with all the vigor and momentum we can generate."
Four years later, the "vigor" is exhausted, the "momentum" has
fizzled, and the "vista" ahead is the same bloody stream of injuries and
fatalities that has marred the past.
Some 100,000 workers are still dying every year from diseases
contracted while trying to earn a living; 3 in contrast, ten years of fighting
4
in Vietnam took 46,000 American lives.
Still being killed in work accidents every year are 14,500 workers; 5
exactly the same number of American soldiers, 14,500, were killed in
6
the deadliest year of the Vietnam war.
Two million workers are still disabled, permanently or temporarily,
every year at work;7 the full Vietnam war wounded fewer than 304,000.
Americans. 8
Behind these aggregate statistics are grim stories of human tragedy
exacerbated by official indifference.
In Norco, Louisiana, a worker at the Shell Oil Company was burned
and permanently disfigured in 1973 when a container of sulphuric acid
broke. There should have been safeguards, but there were not. OSHA
* BA., L.LB., Ohio State University; United States Senator from Ohio, 1974; presently a senior partner of the law firm of Metzenbaum, Gaines, & Stem Co., L.P.A.
1 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1970).

2 Statement made by Secretary of Labor, James D. Hodgson, December 29, 1970, on
occasion of signing the Act.
SHEW, PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, Ill (1972)
[hereinafter cited as PRESmENT'S REPORT].
4 DEPT. OF DEFENSE, SELECTED MANPOWER STATIsTIcs, 63, Table No. P82.2 (May
15, 1974) [hereinafter cited as DEPT. OF DEFENSE].
5 NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcn. ACCIDENT FACTS, 23 (1974).
6DEPT.OF DEFENSE, supranote 4, at 63.
7

PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note

3, at 111.

8DEPT. OF DEFENSE, supranote 4, at 63.
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issued no citation. The inspector felt that a citation was unnecessary
because the employer repaired the defect after the accident. However, the
worker's scars remain.9
In Tyler, Texas, almost 900 workers at an asbestos products plant
were exposed, over an 18-year period, to some of the highest levels of
asbestos dust ever recorded. The plant closed in 1972, but at least 300 of its
workers are now dying of asbestosis, lung cancer, or cancer of the colon,
rectum, or stomach. Prior to the closing, OSHA responded to the plant's
threat to all life in it by issuing one citation for a non-serious violation.
The penalty: $210, or 70 cents for each of the 300 dying workers. 10
In Marietta, Ohio, Union Carbide operates a plant that was cited by
OSHA in 1972 for over-exposing employees to ammonia and sulfuric acid
fumes, fumes which can dissolve the lungs. First, the OSHA citation set
no period at all for Union Carbide to eliminate the deadly gases; then it
gave the company five months to submit a plan for abatement; then
OSHA permitted the employer seven months (or a full year from the
first citation) for abatement; and, finally, when the Oil, Chemical, and
Atomic Workers Union contested the length of this abatement period,
OSHA withdrew it.' So far as is known, while OSHA and Union Carbide
politely take their time, plant workers are still breathing deadly acid fumes.
The repetition of such tragedy is not what Congress had in mind in
1970 when it enacted work safety legislation. The law directed the
Secretary of Labor to prescribe safety and health standards for virtually
all employers to meet. To enforce these standards, a basically simple
procedure was established. An inspector examines a workplace. If he finds
a violation, he issues a citation specifying an "abatement period"--an
interval during which the violation must be corrected. OSHA may assess a
penalty up to $1,000 for a violation, 12 and up to $10,000 for willful or
14
3
repeated violations.' Even imprisonment may be imposed in some cases.
For hearing contested cases, the law allowed for a three-man, presidentially
appointed agency, 15 the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, whose decisions are reviewable in the U.S. Appellate Courts.' 6 And
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) was
9 Prepared statement of Anthony Mazzochi, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Worker's
International Union, AFL-CIO, submitted for Hearingson Review of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 792 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
OSHA Review Hearings].
10 OSHA Review Hearings, supra note 9, at 794. See also, Brodeur, Annuals of
Industry, 49 THE NEw YORKER, 92 (Nov. 5, 1973).
11 Id. at 794, 795.
1229 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1970).
13 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1970).
1429 U.S.C. § 666(e), (f), (g) (1970).
1529 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
16 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1970).
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created 17 to conduct research into occupational disease and to develop
appropriate safety standards.
The record of enforcement, however, is riddled with subtle and
blatant neglect, resulting in little increase in safety and no decrease
in deaths and disability. Administration policy and Labor Department
practice have sought to vitiate the intent of Congress. Budgets have
been too low to support any agencies of the Act effectively. Research
is insufficient, underfunded, skewed by political and economic considerations, and badly monitored.
Both OSHA and NIOSH, according to the AFL-CIO, have been
enfeebled by the "systematic replacement of career civil servants with
8
many of whom seem to be bent upon
unqualified appointees,"'
undermining rather than upholding the law. The OSHA Review
Commission shows a penchant for vacating and weakening those penalties
that are levied. In the field, the contact point of enforcement, there
are too few inspectors, making superficial inspections, and issuing weak
and compromised citations.
An atrocious example of how the intent of Congress is being
subverted showed up in public print recently. According to The New York
Times, there was a wide variance among the states in the enforcement and
recording of OSHA violations. The Times report further indicated that in
Ohio only 3% of all violations recorded were major violations, while
in other states the percentage was as high as 25%.9 Enforcement in
Columbus has been such that a major union, the Oil, Chemical and
OSHA
Atomic Workers, has labeled the Columbus office as one of the two 20
regional operations least responsive to unsafe industrial conditions.
Regional administrators who believe it is better to be safe than sorry,
who fear an adverse decision on contested citations by the Review
Commission, and whose sympathies lie strongly with the problems of
employers rather than the rights of employees, cannot enforce the law
honestly or forcefully. Step by step, the process of inspection, citation,
penalty, and correction of violations becomes compromised.
Nationally, OSHA has a staff of 700 inspectors. In the last three
years, they have inspected less than 3% of the nation's businesses.21 They
fine a few at an average rate of $16 per non-serious violation.22 At
17 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1970).
18 32 CoN. Q. W. REP. 1972 (July 27, 1974).

19 N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1974, at 42, col. 2.
20 Letter from Anthony Mazzochi of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, to John Stender, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Sept. 6,
1974, on file AKRON LAW REvmw office.
21 Scott, What Work Can Do for You, N.Y. Times, Sept 16, 1974, at 35, coL 1.
22OSHA Review Hearings, supra note 9, ISSUE PAPERS PREPARED BY LABOR SUBCoMM.
STAFF wrT ASSISTANCE FROM GAO AuDrroRs, APPENDIX II at 963 (1974)
after cited as IssUE PAPERS, APPENDix HI].
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that rate, it is cheaper to pay the fine than to make the plant safe. With
enforcement notoriously weak, employers could probably take more
advantage of the law than they do.
Not all employers are culprits. It is a fact that many companies
have spent a lot of money and effort on safety. DuPont, for instance, has
developed a safety manual for the construction industry which serves
as a model for other industries.
But such conscientious initiative may well be the exception rather
than the rule-a condition for which responsibility must be placed on
the drooping shoulders of the lackadaisical federal enforcers.
The Senate Subcommittee on Labor, chaired by Sen. Harrison
A. Williams of New Jersey, has recently reported the results of a General
Accounting Office investigation of OSHA enforcement. The Subcommittee
issued the following bill of indictment against the inspection system:
Inspectors often see violations but issue no citations; when inspectors
do issue citations, they classify an incredibly low 1.2% as serious, and less
than 1% more as willful, repeat, or imminent dangers; and, they fine the
"serious" violations an average of $648, a sum that mocks the law's intent.2
Inspectors also may respond to employee complaints only weeks or
months later; delay citations weeks or months beyond the 72-hour limit
set by law; permit abatement periods far longer than reasonable or
necessary, and fail to make mandatory follow-up inspections-among
other shortcomings.
Some inspectors try to rationalize their behavior. Though their
explanations cannot be found in the inspectors' own compliance operations
manuals, they are instructive about the unwritten rules in OSHA field
offices. When an inspector refuses to issue a citation for a clear violation,
it may be because he did not see a worker near the hazard at the instant
of the inspection, or because he could not locate the responsible
subcontractor-so he pursues the matter no further.
If an inspector rates virtually all violations as non-serious, it may
be because it takes more time and effort to document a serious citationan expenditure he is not motivated to invest because he is not getting
much encouragement from his superiors.
As inadequate as the inspection process is, the review procedures
does not hold much more promise for the employee. When a citation is
issued, an employer may choose to contest the fact of violation, or the
specified abatement period, or the amount of penalty assessed, before
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The employee,
however, may contest none of these actions (with one exception) ,24 nor
may he contest inaction; the failure to issue a citation or to impose
23 Id.
2429 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
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a penalty. The sole parties to an OSHA action are the Secretary of Labor
and the cited employer.
The single exception is that employees do have direct statutory
standing to contest the length of the period permitted for abatement of
penalties.25 In cases in which the employer has himself contested a
citation, employees may file for party standing. OSHA has informal review
procedures as well. But none of these avenues give employees a mechanism
of any force, either within OSHA or in the courts, to counter either OSHA
inaction or any irregularity if the employer chooses not to contest citations.
There is an eminently reasonable premise for this legislative design:
that the Secretary of Labor can be counted upon to observe and enforce
the law, a law written solely to protect workers. The Secretary has the clear
duty to pursue the required adjudicatory and judicial procedures.
But this pursuit has not happened. Administration policy and OSHA
practice have reflected not concern for the letter of the law, but concern
for the employer's wallet. OSHA penalties tend to be laughably weakbut even so, the Review Commission has habitually reduced them or
vacated citations altogether. A computation made- from a 1973
compendium of Commission cases showed that employers were given
2
relief in 93 cases-and fines were increased in only 13 cases. 6
One trade union leader has labeled the Review Commission a
"needless employer protection operation."' Many union leaders are
calling for abolition of the Review Commission as an "additional
bureaucratic layer between the Department of Labor and final appeal to
the courts." 28 Organized labor's disenchantment with OSHA's ineffectual
enforcement practices has led to demands by labor for equal administrative and judicial review rights for employees and employers.
In 1972, a top OSHA administrator in Washington wrote a memo to
the Undersecretary of Labor in which he proposed to use OSHA as "a
great sales point for fund raising" in the Nixon campaign. He wanted to
assure Nixon supporters in the business community that OSHA would
issue no controversial standards during the presidential campaign.29
It is not known whether the plan was carried out, and whether
new standards were deliberately withheld. Labor Secretary Peter J.
Brennan, appointed in 1973, did not deny that such may have been
the case. He testified before the Senate Labor Subcommittee that
"at the present time there is no hanky-panky going on... I don't
5 Id.
28 Statement by Pat Greathouse, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace,

and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, OSHA Review Hearings, supra note
9, at 317.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29
See note 18 supra.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/1

38

Milligan: Dissolution of Marriage

Spring, 1975]

OSHA: A PROMISE THAT FAILED

know what went on in the past, but I can assure you that it won't
happen in the future."' 30 (emphasis added)
To Senator Williams of New Jersey, the subcommittee chairman, the
memo "strongly suggests that the administration never attempted to effectively implement" the act; and, to an AFL-CIO representative who testified,
the memo "explains the attitude that permeated OSHA" since 1972.31
Whether or not the memo was acted upon, the willingness of
presumably responsible officials to play this kind of game means that
union demands for full legal rights to challenge OSHA decisions and
non-action must be taken very seriously indeed. Fears that such rights
would permit frivolous harassment of employers by employees, and either
turn OSHA into a union tool or drain OSHA's resources on investigating
numerous minor complaints, have not been confirmed by OSHA's experience so far. No union efforts to exploit the agency have been made since
the passage of the Act. In any case, between a hypothetical danger of
improper pro-employee bias, and a real and demonstrated danger of proemployer politics, it is essential to confront the demonstrated danger first.
On the research side of the ledger, OSHA's record is no better than
it is in enforcement and review. OSHA derives safety standards from
several sources. These include federal laws or contracts bearing on
safety standards for using specific substances, and recognized standards
from industrial and professional organizations.
As useful as these guidelines may be, the fact remains that extant
guidelines are addressed to a limited number of substances-in many cases,
materials in wide enough use to have been evaluated routinely, or those
whose properties are obvious. There are literally thousands of substances
of known or unknown danger for which no standards exist anywhere.
For this very reason, the Act that created OSHA also created a
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), within
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. NIOSH is expected
to conduct research and to recommend safe standards for using harmful
substances to OSHA. 32 NIOSH submits its recommendations in the form
of a "criteria document" for each hazard, setting forth both data and
a comprehensive standard for use.
The 1973 Annual Toxic Substances List includes 25,000 chemical
substances and physical agents.33 Of these, three to five percent are
covered by OSHA standards. 34 NIOSH estimates, however, that another
30

Id.

31 Id.

32 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1970).
33 HEW, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
SUBSTANCE LIST (1973).
34
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See note 26 supra.
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1,000 to 2,000 are dangerous enough to require the development of
list" of 471
standards.35 Of that number, NIOSH has sifted a "priority
36
substances which have the most effect at the workplace.
From February, 1971, to November, 1974, NIOSH submitted to
OSHA exactly 21 criteria documents and two letters of recommendation.
OSHA had promulgated final standards for just three of the documented
hazards by November, 1974. Just three--asbestos, carcinogens, and
37
vinyl chloride-in four years.
When the Secretary of Labor receives a criteria document from
NIOSH, he must first determine that a rule is necessary, and then he may
request a recommendation from an advisory committee on the rule.
Recommendation in hand, he publishes the proposed rule in the Federal
Register, allowing an opportunity for objections and hearing requests
to be filed. After hearings are held, the Secretary promulgates the
final, enforceable standard.
Twenty criteria documents remain for which no standard has been
adopted. Although 12 of these were submitted from one to two and a half
years ago, OSHA has not as yet published a proposed rule in the Federal
Register for even one of them. 3 8 It has not appointed an advisory committee for most of them. In fact, until recently OSHA had taken no discernible action whatever on many criteria documents submitted years ago.
Because the above dozen criteria documents have resulted in no
standards, over five million American workers remain unprotected.
Millions more may be in danger from the hundreds of substances on
NIOSH's "priority list" whose properties remain undescribed in criteria
documents. In effect, substances used without standards, and without proper
research into their properties, make guinea pigs of their users. If the users
die, the substances must be lethal. As a congressional committee witness
39
remarked, "We sit back and wait for 20 years and we count the bodies."
NIOSH suffers many of the same afflictions that OSHA does:
conflicts of interest, badly trained, undertrained and poorly supervised
personnel, undermanned and inadequate facilities, and, in NIOSH above
all, starvation budgets.
An AFL-CIO official has testified: "We made a special plea for

35 IssuE PAPERS, APPENDIX II, supra note 22, at 1061.

s Id.
57 Id.
38id.
39 Testimony of Dr. Samuel Epstein, Hearings on Occupational Standards Before the
Select Labor Subcomm. on OSHA of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Unpublished transcript.) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings on Occupational Standards].
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field studies [of petrochemicals] in NIOSH . . but research programs
specifically aimed at the study of petrochemicals such as-and includingvinyl chloride were not funded and staffed. The studies were eliminated
from the program plans of these agencies.... The task is mammoth, so
mammoth that it is impossible to estimate what should be spent." ' 40
On the same subject, a medical expert said that "Fire fighting is all
that is happening. Vinyl chloride is a good example.... Five to 15% of
all vinyl chloride workers will die with hemangiosarcoma of the liver, which
is always fatal. This disease is extremely rare elsewhere. [But NIOSH has
done no research on it], not because NIOSH officials are callous or don't
understand what is going on. They are simply too busy putting out fires in
other areas," a limitation required by their inability to recruit enough
professional staff and by an inadequate budget, the expert added. 4'
NIOSH requested $30,000,000 for fiscal year 1975. This budget
would permit NIOSH to generate 18 to 20 new criteria documents on the
use of potentially dangerous substances. The Office of Management and
Budget cut the request by $4 billion. This would mean that only 14 new
studies could 'begin.42 Fortunately, Congress added to the OMB budget
figure new funds specifically earmarked for criteria documents, but the
number will remain a pitiful record when matched against the need for
standards for as many as 2,000 chemicals.
The fund shortage has affected the quality as well as the quantity of
research at NIOSH. Since NIOSH does not have either the facilities or the
manpower to do much in-house research, most work must be done by
contractors. Contractors currently produce 80% of all criteria documents.
Clearly, then, contract monitoring is a major NIOSH function, but
when GAO investigators reviewed NIOSH contract files for the Senate
Labor Subcommittee, they found many irregularities. 43
Among other things, the investigators learned that numerous
contractors had not submitted one or more of the required periodic
progress reports and that some contractors submitted no reports at all.
The GAO also learned that contractors' final reports to NIOSH were
often submitted long overdue and that a few were not delivered at all. On
occasion, project officers kept this information to themselves, maintained
contract files with documents missing, and wrote no reports of visits to
evaluate the contractors' performance.

40 Testimony of Jacob Clayman, AFL-CIO, OSHA Review Hearings, supra note 9,
at 111.
41 Testimony of Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, House Hearings on Occupational Standards,

supra note 39.
42

IssuE PAPERS, APPENDIX II, supranote 22, at 1064,
4Id. at 1066-1070.
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These deficiencies can presumably be corrected. Another problem,
conflicts of interest among contractors, is far more serious. Despite
OSHA's claim that NIOSH is concerned only with basic research, there is
evidence that some contractors have business loyalties in conflict with their
obligations to NIOSH. For example, the medical director for NIOSH is
also the medical director of a second corporation which has a direct,
commercial interest in manufacturing and using the same chemicals."
Furthermore, a variety of observers have expressed serious doubts
about the reliability of NIOSH results. The AFL-CIO representative
testified that OSHA has been "pressing NIOSH to compromise the
integrity of its criteria documents by covertly placing economic issues
before health. In essence, they are being asked to twist scientific data
into molds prescribed by the selfish interests of the lowest common
4
denominators in the trade associations." 5 Another commentator, a
quality of these reports is
"The
said
that
medical school professor,
very mixed and recommendations are usually based on technological and
economic feasibility more than health factors." 46
This testimony casts some doubt on the accuracy of a statement by
John H. Stender, Assistant Secretary of Labor, before the Senate Labor
Subcommittee:
NIOSH is a research oriented agency. It is composed of experts in
various disciplines whose research is purely scientific. As a result,
criteria packages are the product of what is fundamentally basic
research. NIOSH does not consider economic feasibility. OSHA, on
the other hand, must consider the technical and economic feasibility
of translating the criteria package into standards which are adequate
to protect workers and at the same time can be feasibly put into
law and enforced. 47
Mr. Stender notwithstanding, it is often hard to believe that NIOSH
standards are based on "purely scientific" criteria. In California, for
instance, state law sets lead standards for the population in general which
4
are 100 times stricter than what NIOSH recommends for workers. 8 Does
science or business explain the disparity?
We may have an answer to this and some other questions about
NIOSH and OSHA when the Department of Labor responds to the

44

Testimony of Dr. Samuel Epstein, House Hearings on Occupational Standards,
supra note 39.

45 See note 18 supra.
46 Testimony of Dr. Samuel Epstein, House Hearings on Occupational Standards,

supra note 39.

47 Testimony of John H. Stender, OSHA Review Hearings, supra note 9 at 221.
48 Testimony of Dr. Samuel Epstein, House Hearings on Occupational Standards,
supra note 39,
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Report of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor. Secretary of Labor Brennan
has promised a detailed response.
But it will not be enough to draft detailed executive reports. Urgent
reforms are required in OSHA's enforcement, review, and research
functions-reforms that can be achieved only by de-politicizing OSHA's
administration. Only when this occurs can the workers of America look
forward to fulfillment of the congressional intent in enacting the
Occupational Safety and Health Act: a national effort, pursued with
"vigor and momentum," to protect their safety and health.
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THE PREVAILING PARTY SHOULD
RECOVER COUNSEL FEES*
MICHAEL F. MAYERt AND WAYNE STIXt

INTRODUCTION

T

HE TIME HAS COME when our judicial system should make compensation to the prevailing party for expenses incurred in litigation a
meaningful right, as opposed to a valueless gesture. In brief, this means
that in the bulk of civil cases a successful party should no longer have to
bear the full burden of his own counsel fees, and conversely those who
take to our courts in vain should no longer be permitted to avoid the
justice of substantial participation in the costs they have occasioned. To
do this requires considerable alteration of the present cost structure applied
by our rules as well as a change in our philosophy of compensation for loss.
It has, of course, long been theorized that the essential element of
our damage rules is to make the injured party "whole." No party in a
breach of contract situation, for example, should be left following the
breach with less in hand than he would have had if his adversary had lived
up to his bargain. -But realistically speaking, this is precisely what happens
under the present cost and damage structure when litigation occurs.
I recently won a modest recovery for an abused client who had
rendered services without being compensated. Alas, after collection of a
full judgment for him with interest and costs, as presently defined, the
total recovery was less than a fair and appropriate statement for services
rendered. Has this client been made "whole" for the losses he suffered?
Has the judicial machinery treated him with even elementary fairness? I
submit that it is self-evident that it has not.
It is not recovering plaintiffs alone who suffer fantastic losses.
Consider the party unjustly sued, whose contentions ultimately prevail in
the judicial test. Does the system make him "whole"? The answer to this
rhetorical question is again, "no." Except in the rarest instance, no counsel
fee can be recovered, not even the slightest part of it. Not only has this
defendant been unjustly required to waste time in litigation, but he must
also bear his own counsel -fee and numerous other costs uncompensated
*Portions of this article appear in Mayer, Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel
Fees, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1971.
f B.S., Harvard University; L.L.B., Yale University; partner in Mayer & Bucher of
New York, N.Y.; author of WHAT You SHOULD KNOW ABOUT LIBEL AND SLANDER
(1968), RIGHTS OF PRIVACY (1972), THE FILM INDUSTRIEs-PRACTICAL BUSINESS,
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN PRODUCTION, DISTRmIBUTION AND EXHmIBITION (1973), and numer-

ous articles in legal periodicals.
* J.D., New York Law School; currently practicing in White Plains, New York, and
L.L.M. candidate at New York University School of Law.
[4261
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for by an obsolete system of awards that covers only a small fraction
of his out-of-pocket expense.
While the transfer of the cost burden to the unsuccessful litigant is
basically desirable because it compensates the innocent party, as a system
of justice should, it also has an added advantage. Our inundated judicial
machinery needs some relief from clogged courts and calendars.
Is it not likely that windfall-minded claimants lacking a true cause of
action, but anxious for a "strike" settlement, will be a little less anxious
to enter our courts if they knew that at the end of the judicial road a
sizable judgment for costs, including all or a substantial part of an
opponent's legal fees would be waiting for them? Or, in the matter of less
doubtful claims, is not settlement or fair adjustment far more likely when
each side knows there are real and substantial risks in defeat and not
just the danger of minimal costs? Under such circumstances, dubious
plaintiffs should prove less anxious to sue and intransigent defendants
more prone to settle. If for no other reasons than these, judicial
housekeeping requires a new attitude toward costs.'
COST STRUCTURE, PAST AND PRESENT

The ancient rule of minimal costs would appear to be based at least
partially on historical factors. Despite an early tendency to follow English
practice in the colonial period, there were fears in America that the court
system would be operated contrary to the interests of the common man.
To grant legal fees as costs might, some thought, discourage the poor
man's use of the court machinery. There was also the fear that wealthy
landed interests might dominate the law and that somehow or other a
grant of legal fees could perpetuate that power. These fears have vanished
with the years, but not the policies that accompanied them.
In the formative years of this country the total population of
3,929,214 people 2 lived mainly on farms. Legal disputes were few, usually
over land boundaries. The courts were discovering the law rather than
interpreting it. Poor or rich, a litigant could go before a court himself and
achieve the same verdict as that gained by a lawyer representing him. The
founding fathers, realizing this, stamped the American attorney a luxury.
Frowning on extravagance and fearing the result of high court costs,
America broke judicially from the English tradition of allowing legal fees
as costs to the prevailing party.

1A

look at the New York statute is revealing. Assume that one can locate the
appropriate provisions specified in the Civil Practice Law & Rules, and that a grant of
costs would not be inequitable "under all the circumstances." The prevailing party may
then recover $25 before note of issue; after note of issue, $50, and following trial or
inquest, $75. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 8101, 8201 (McKinney 1974). Counsel fees, except
in the extraordinary case, remain uncompensated. See notes 73-75, infra, and
accompanying text.
2Official 1790 total United States population, United States Official Census, U.S.
Bureau of the Census.
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The public policy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dictated
that Americans take their disputes to court. The theory was twofold. By
so doing, the litigants would have their issue decided in a fair and
compulsory manner and American jurisprudence would be advanced by
increased exposure. America was a noble experiment. For the first time
in recorded history the poor and common 3man could seek the protection
of a tribunal of justice on a universal scale.
As American jurisprudence matured, the noble experiment continued
with the same public policy dictates and procedures as set down in
1776. Concurrently, population exploded, cities grew, the industrial
revolution shook the Jeffersonian Utopia to bits, and the problems of
the citizenry changed.
Today, we still do not allow attorney fees as part of court costs. The
4
American population has grown to 205,614,000, mostly living in urban
areas. This phenomenon has resulted in substantial overloading of the
court calendars with pending suits. Instead of speaking in terms of trial
by jury, we think in terms of revolving door justice and plea bargaining.
In an attempt to alleviate the procedural problems and the abuse of the
judicial system, jurists idealistically ask that disputants settle their
5
differences without the aid of the courts. But still thousands of suits are
and
with no legal issue. As the abuse
merit,
brought with doubtful intent,
continues the common man of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has
become the poor urban dweller of the twentieth century, a man who is
barred from litigating his problems because of high legal costs and an
antiquated system. His wrong cannot be made right. Paradoxically, the
reason for the procedural breakdown of our courts and the exclusion of a
large percentage of the population is that we are trying to help the poor
and the judicial problems of today with 200-year-old methodology.
It is time for the judicial fraternity and lawmakers to admit to the
reality that attorneys are no longer an embellishment in the nation's
courtrooms. Our laws are vast and complex. A layman must seek
legal advice to guide him through the maze of legal procedure and
substance of all litigations.
The present cost structure is geared to support large damage litigation
to the exclusion of small claims of the poor and common man. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that small dollar claims represent small legal
and humanitarian issues, and that high dollar actions represent complex
and worthy questions. 6 The unfortunate consequence of this situation is
3 See generally Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA
L. REv. 75 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kuenzel].
4
Official 1970 total United States population, United States Official Census, U.S.
Bureau of the Census.
5 See, e.g., White v. Flood, 258 Iowa 402, 409, 138 N.W.2d 863, 867 (1965); Bakke
v. Bakke, 242 Iowa 612, 618, 47 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1951).
6
Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 84.
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as obvious as it is socially unjust and dangerous. The legal problems of the
common citizen are often complex and personally humiliating, but
monetarily too insignificant to have a judicial remedy. The result often is
frustration, alienation from society, and desperation. A victim of such
a plight frequently becomes the violator in search of revenge. And so
the cycle makes another turn; crime rates and the number of civil
rights infringements rise.
The entire difficulty with our present but antiquated cost structure is
simply that it fails to make the injured party "whole." For example, in a
negligence action an attorney will work on a basis of a one-third contingent
fee. 7 If he prevails his client will be made two-thirds "whole" and
it is quite possible that the attorney has earned only a percentage of
the reasonable value of his services.
There are many similar situations of injustice. The court will award
only nominal damages for violations to civil rights, reputation, and for
assaults and batteries not accompanied by bodily injury or financial
loss. The legal fee remains high. The victim prevails in name only; he
still must suffer financial injuries and the cost of securing his civil rights
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 8 The poor man who is most
susceptible to this type of injustice cannot afford to win.
The conclusion can be but one: In our noble attempt to keep the
doors of justice open to all, in our desire to make the court machinery
effective, we have accomplished the opposite by clinging to an agrarian
solution to a now urban problem. Why do we refuse to recognize that this
procedure is not only unadaptable to modern problems, but also it is acting
as its own catalyst in advancing those very evils that we try to prevent.
THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF COSTS

9

The obvious and simplest remedy for curing the overcrowding of our
courts, while at the same time opening the doors of justice to all citizens, is
to rejoin England in the policy of awarding reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party as part of court costs.
Allowing attorney fees as part of costs would join reality and theory
by making the injured party "whole." It would alleviate the situation
where an attorney working on a contingent basis must accept less than his
reasonable value. The court calendar would not be as populous with the
disappearance of strike actions and groundless claims of would-be
plaintiffs who now bring actions with no chance of winning. This legal
blackmail which forces the defendant to settle for an amount that is not
7 This is true only if the prognosis for a recovery is at least large enough to cover his
costs. Obviously this does not help the indigent person.
8 Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 84.
9 For an American comparative view, see Greenberger, Appellate Review in England
and the United States--Who Bears the Ultimate Burden? 1 DUQ. U.L. Rav. 161 (1963).
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justly owing the plaintiff would be unable to achieve its economic goal. A
defendant would not be able to force a prevailing plaintiff into time-wasting
litigation by groundless appeals.
In other words, with attorney fees awarded to the prevailing party,
legal blackmail and the necessity to balance the cost of settlement against
the expense of litigation will cease to be a potent tool to prevent justice. 10
In England the court has the discretionary authority to award counsel
fees to the prevailing party in a lawsuit. This has been the rule for
hundreds of years. The English system of court costs was not planned
or designed to prevent misuse and abuse of the judicial system and is not
directed toward such ends today. The beneficial effect that this cost system
has on limiting the court congestion, holding down costs and discouraging
nonmeritorious suits has contributed to the efficiency and quality of
British justice and should continue to do so in the future."
In the face of this fact it is noteworthy that their judicial manpower
has remained comparatively stable for ninety years [as of 1964],
despite the fact that the total population of England and Wales
has increased from 22.7 million people to 43.5 million during
the period in question. 2
The cost system was designed and is used for the purpose of making
an injured party "whole." In 1858 Lord Cranworth expounded the
underlying philosophy: "I think that the general principle upon the subject
of cost is, and ought to be ... that the cost ought never to be considered as
a penalty or punishment, but merely a necessary consequence of a party
' 13
having created a litigation in which he has failed."
After successful litigation, barristers and solicitors submit a document
of cost items into court. Either the unsuccessful adversary consents to pay
these enumerated costs or if a dispute develops a special taxing master
makes a determination of what items and amounts are necessary,
reasonable and proper. "Moreover, if the tortfeasor or contract breaker
refuses to honor the legitimate demands of the ultimately successful party
and forces the latter to resort to litigation, he is considered to have
14
increased the damages inflicted.'
Under the English rules the trial judge has the discretion to deny
costs, or even award them to a losing party in a case (as happens) where

10 Kuenzel, supra note 4,

at 79.
11 Greenberger, The Cost of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution,
9 VILL. L. Rnv. 400, 401 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Greenberger].
12 Id. at 400-01. The ratio of Queen's Bench Division Judges per million in population
has increased from 1 to 1.26, to 1 to 2.18. INrTIAL REPORT OF THE CoMMrrrEE ON
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CMD. No. 7764, Appendix C, p. 59.
13 Clark v. Hart, 6 H.L.C. 633, 667, 10 Eng. Rep. 1443, 1457 (1858).

14 Greenberger, supranote 12, at 401.
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the "loser" has really won or the successful suit is unjustified. In other
unusual circumstances, fees may be denied or even charged to the
prevailing party where, for example, a plaintiff refuses a fair settlement
offer and recovers less after trial.'5
The taxing master allows only necessary and reasonable costs that
were directly incurred preparing and attaining justice. Allowance is not
permitted for money spent by maintaining an overcautious position, or
for a mistake which results in excessive court time, or extravagant
or special charges of a witness. 16 A person who abuses the system and
increases the cost of litigation above the essential cost does so at the risk of
having to pay the burden of the entire cost or that portion which the court
considers excessive. The thrifty English litigant rarely abuses the system.'7
Even with the cost control legislation and three methods of
determining the reasonable attorney fee,' 8 the court has awarded generous
allowances. In Graigola Merthyr Co. v. Swansea Corp.,' the court
awarded the prevailing defendant $350,000. The high absolute dollar
awards, however, serve to keep the teeth of the legislation sharp. Would-be
abusers know that it will be unprofitable to bring an unjustified suit and

persons with legitimate claims, even for small dollar amounts, can proceed
assured that the contract-breaker or tortfeasor will pay the costs.
The American dream of equal justice for all exists in England. By
incorporating into our state and federal statutes similar legislation allowing
reasonable attorney fees for the prevailing party in the discretion of the
court we can -bring that dream to America and merge reality with theory.

15 For an excellent discussion of the exception to the rule of allowing attorney fees as
court costs to prevailing party, see Greenberger, supra note 12.
16 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo.5, c. 43, § 50.
17 See Smith v. Buller, L.R. 19 Eq. 473, 475 (1875).
18 The Evershed Report Committee on SUPREME COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
FINAL REPORT, CsD. No. 8878, § 720-72 (1954), recommended three taxing methods:

"party and party" taxation, "common fund" taxation, and "solicitor and own client"
taxation.
''Party and Party taxation" is the most common method. The costs to litigate the
suit are kept to a reasonable minimum. The procedure is controlled by a taxing
master, who is similar to a referee in a bankruptcy proceeding, who determines what
costs are necessary and reasonable to achieve justice.
"Common Fund Standard" method is a rich man's "Party and Party." Under
this liberalized cost method fees and charges that would be ruled excessive under the
"Party and Party" taxation are allowed, and certain items that would be stricken as
luxuries are acceptable to the taxing master. This method of taxing is allowed only
under special circumstances. The "Solicitor and Own Client" taxation method is
comparable to the present American system. The lawyer and client determine the fee;
however, to prevent abuse, the court and taxing master reserve the power to rule on
the propriety of the fee.
See 30 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, pt. 2, § 6 (3d ed. 1959), for complete

discussion and related case application.
19 45 T.L.R 219 (K.B. 1929).
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THE FEDERAL STATUTES

Copyright
20
Under the Federal Copyright Law, reasonable attorney fees are
21
permitted in the court's discretion. "In all actions, suits, or proceedings
under this title, except when brought by or against the United States or
any officer thereof, full costs shall be allowed, and the court may award
22
to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
The effect of this section, which allows the court to award reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party, has acted as an incentive for those
who have valid claims of copyright infringement to seek the aid of the
judicial machinery. It has not justified the fears and predictions of
the opponents of such a proviso that the courts will become the private
domain of the rich, that the poor will be discouraged from seeking the
court's protection, and that legitimate claims will go unredressed. In fact
the opposite conclusion would seem more valid.
The courts have advanced several predominant theories in copyright
cases favoring the awarding of counsel fees as part of court costs. The
most prevalent of these theories is to make the winning party "whole."
The explanation basically is that the losing party to an action, be it the
plaintiff or the defendant, must bear the burden of paying the opponent's
counsel fees as a direct and proximate result of his infringement of the
plaintiff's copyright. Or, if defendant prevails, the proximate result is
the securing to the defendant of full use and enjoyment of the profits
and benefits of his creative work unmolested by others.
The classes of situations that fit in this discretionary category
are based on some moral wrong in instituting the action. One such23
target is the deliberate copyright infringer, such as in Stein v. Rosenthal.
In this case the
...defendants unconscionably invaded plaintiffs' copyright and in
their solicitation of customers for their infringing merchandise,
harassed the plaintiffs' customers and resorted to such devices as
impersonation of federal agents in an attempt to gain a view of the
tradesmen's records of business with plaintiffs. Where the techniques
20 Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1947).
21 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1964); Orgel

v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962); Leo Feist, Inc., v. Apollo

Records N.Y. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd 418 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.
1969); Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 271 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); C. S.
Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Jerome v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 71 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
2
2Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1947) (emphasis added).
23 103 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See Leo Feist, Inc. v. Apollo Records, N.Y.
Corp., 300 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Johnson v. Maryland, 283 F. Supp. 929
(D.C. Md. 1968). See also C. S. Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc.,
210 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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of copying and vending infringing articles are so tinged with bad
faith, plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees...24
The court's discretionary wrath in copyright cases is also turned toward
the plaintiff who institutes an action in bad faith merely to vex and harass
the defendant, where the claim is so lacking in merit that it is unreasonable. Such was the case in Cloth v. Hyman,25 where the court said that
[a]n attorney's fee is properly awarded when the infringement action
has been commenced in bad faith, as where the evidence establishes
that the plaintiff's real motive is to vex and harass the defendant or
where plaintiff's claim is so lacking in merit as to present no
arguable question of law or genuine issue of fact.28
In the actions where counsel fees were awarded there has been an
element of bad faith. In these cases the award was used as a penalty
as well as compensation to the prevailing party. Bad faith is an element
weighted heavily by the court when exercising its "discretion."
The fact that counsel fees are awarded as a penalty in some cases is
blatant, such as, where the prevailing party is disallowed counsel costs
because of bad faith on his part. In United Artists Television, Inc. v.
Fortnightly Corp.,2 the prevailing defendant was denied $40,000 attorney
fees, because the court felt that such awards are to be made only for
"penalization" of the losing party. In Jerome v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.,28 the prevailing defendant's application for $30,000 attorney
fees was disallowed, to penalize him for his over-technical attitude which
forced plaintiff to unnecessary litigation and expense.
The courts have also disallowed attorney fees where the question
litigated is unique, novel, complex and of a genuine issue accompanied by
no moral guilt or blame. An excellent discussion concerning this subject is
Judge Feinberg's decision in Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.'s
In Breffort v. I Had A Ball Co.,30 the court summed up the theory
that reasonable attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing defendant to
deter copyright infringement by making it more expensive to do so and
to shift the burden of protecting the copyright property to the infringer.
The theory for awarding a successful defendant reasonable attorney fees
is to impose a penalty upon the plaintiff for instituting a "baseless,
s
frivolous, or unreasonable suit, or one instituted in bad faith."'
24103 F. Supp. at 231-32.
25146 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See Burnett v. Lambino, 206 F. Supp. 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165
(D.C.Cal. 1955).
26 146 F. Supp. at 193.
27300 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
28 71 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).

29 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
30271 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

31 id.at 627.
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The Copyright Act 3 2 makes it possible for individuals, groups and
corporations to bring action in the courts to defend their rights to exclusive
use of their creative property from infringers regardless of the size of
damages to be expected. Unlike other areas of law where reasonable
33
attorney fees are expressly denied as part of the costs, parties involved
in this branch of law can bring actions for even a small, but frustrating,
infringement because they can be made "whole." It also prevents claims
that are intended to harass and blackmail on groundless allegations.
There is no reason why such a rule should not be established to apply
uniformly to other branches of civil law. The doors to the judicial
machinery will then be reopened to the monetarily weaker litigant who
will find relief for his injuries suffered, although compensatory damages
are small and legal fees high.
Section 1'16 of the Copyright Act does not authorize or speak to the
4
allowance of the actual attorney fee, but to a "reasonable" attorney fee.3
Apparently the difference between an actual allowance and a reasonable
allowance escapes the detection of critics, accounting for the fears of such
an award. Allowing reasonable attorney fees would not inflate actual
fees because any extravagance, waste or excessiveness would not be
compensated for in the court's awarding of attorney fees. Costs which
increase the prevailing party's legal fee will be his own responsibility.
Abuse of the system could only be self-defeating.
In most cases, the court has been generous in awarding counsel
fees. The allowances are often large, both in absolute dollar amount
and also in percentage of damages awarded. In rare instances the
court has allowed attorney fees even to the extent of 100% of damages,
35
where the award was modest.
Once the court has decided to award a reasonable counsel fee, it
next applies a second test to determine the dollar amount. Most courts
follow -the same test of relevant factors, but each court considers certain
individual elements more important than others.
The elements most commonly considered important in determining
36
the dollar amount of attorney fees are amount of work necessary,

32

17 U.S.C. 116 (1947).

E.g., N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. § 8304.4 (McKinney 1974).
34 See 2 NIMM:RR, NImmER ON COPYRIGHT § 161 (1974).
35
In M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1927), damages

33

awarded were $250 and counsel fees were $250.

36 In determining what is a reasonable attorney's fee, the court considered amount of
work necessary, the amount of work done, the skill employed, the monetary amount
involved, and the result achieved. Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
See afso Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962); In Re
Continental Vending Machine Corp., 318 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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amount of work done, 37 amount of skill employed,38 amount of damages
4
4

involved, 39 result achieved, 40 distance traveled, ' amount of time involved,
and the attorney's professional standing and reputation. 43 It should be
emphasized that actual attorney's fee is irrelevant in the determination.
The actual dollar awards have been large, both in absolute amount
and percentage of damages awarded. In Davis v. E. 1. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 44 for example, the counsel fee of $15,000 was 60%
45
of the $25,000 damages awarded.
Antitrust

The Federal Antitrust Law states that "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefore,... and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."'
The purpose of this statute is to put teeth into antitrust regulations as
they affect private individuals and corporations. Although recovery of the
reasonable attorney's fee is awarded only to the prevailing plaintiff in a
3

7See cases cited note 36 supra. In Cohan v. Richmond, 86 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1936),
the attorney for the plaintiff submitted a brief of only seven pages with only 10 or 12
citations. The court felt that this showed little effort, work or ingenuity. The attorney's
fee was, therefore, limited to $400.
38
The case is in some respects novel and was difficult and extraordinary, requiring
careful, extended and painstaking preparation, original investigation and exploration of a subject in certain aspects with few landmarks for guidance.... Upon
the motion for costs, plaintiff's counsel sets up a detailed statement of services
rendered and indicates that if he were reasonably compensated by his client
there would be nothing left out of the award.
Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 986 (W.D.N.Y. 1936). "In the case at
bar, while a substantial amount of time was spent by plaintiffs' counsel, much of it
was necessitated by counsel's unfamiliarity with the field." Orgel v. Clark Boardman
Co., 301 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1962). As a result, the attorney's fee was reduced
from $10,000 to $5,000.
39
See cases cited note 36 supra. See also Burnett v. Lambino, 206 F. Supp. 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), wherein the court stated: "In fixing these amounts I have considered
the time necessarily spent by defendants' attorneys in thorough trial preparation...
skill demonstrated by defendants' attorneys, their professional standing and reputation,
and the monetary amount potentially involved [$9,000,000]." 206 F. Supp. at 519.
4
o See cases cited note 36 supra.
41 In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1939), the
court considered the extremely large amount of work done, the long and intricate
computation, the fact that the plaintiff made a trip to California, and that the case
had been pending for seven years.
42
See cases cited notes 38, 41 supra. In determining the counsel fees for the prevailing plaintiff, the court considered the lawyers' high degree of skill and the "amount of
work they did during more than six years which was considerable, occupying over
2,000 hours of partners' time." Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 F.
Supp. 729, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
43 See cases cited note 39 supra.
44 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
45 Id. at 732. See also Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950);
Lewys v. O'Neil, 49 F.2d 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
46 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914).
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private litigation, it does make the courts available to an injured party.
The beneficial effect this statute has had in protecting parties from
violation of the antitrust regulations is best illustrated by the results of
antitrust suits brought by the United States against private parties. In
actions brought by the federal government no allowance is permitted.
Because of the immense size of legal fees in bringing or defending an
antitrust litigation it is common practice for corporations to plead "no
contest" and pay the penalty to avoid the cost of litigation. In the private
sphere, prior to the regulations concerning attorney fees, one corporation
or person could bring such an action to harass, being reasonably confident
that a "no contest" plea would be entered and that actual litigation would
had
never be commenced. The overall effect is clear: the antitrust infringer
47
a green light because his victim could not afford to bring an action.
Unlike the Copyright Act, the Antitrust Act states that court costs
shall include a reasonable attorney fee; court discretion plays no part in
determining if the plaintiff will recover this cost. The unsuccessful
plaintiff in an antitrust action is not awarded his attorney's fee, except
in the "case of a derivative suit brought on behalf of a corporation, where
it is shown that the corporation has received substantial benefit." 48
The dollar amount to be awarded as attorney fees is solely within the
court's discretion, if reasonably exercised.4 9 In determining the amount of
this cost, the court looks to the following elements: the nature of the
question, its novelty and difficulty, the skill and competence of counsel, his
reputation in the community, amount involved, the result in relation to
the pleading, counsel experience and customary charges for similar
actions.50 The size of the attorney's fee awarded by the court is realistic
47

The primary purpose of Section 4 is to grant private parties the right to recover
treble damages for injuries to their property by reason of a violation of the
antitrust laws.... It was now so enlarged as to give much broader rights to a
private party injured so that such party would not only be more adequately
protected, but the law itself be in fact made more effective.

2 VON KALiNowsKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 11.04 & n.7 (1974).
482 VON KALNOWsKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REOULATIONS § 11.04(1) (1974).
See Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
The modem equity practice is to allow counsel fees to successful prosecutors of
derivative suits although no judgment has been obtained if they show substantial
benefit to the corporation through their effort. [Citing cases.] But there should be
some check on derivative actions lest they be purely strike suits of great nuisance
and no affirmative good, and hence it is ruled generally that the benefit to the
corporation and the general body of shareholders must be substantial.
244 F.2d at 540. See also Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
49 In South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970),
the court awarded the plaintiff $2,410,452 in damages before tripling as required

by the Sherman Antitrust Act and Clayton Act. In answer to the defendant's
contention that the award of a $335,000 attorney's fee was unreasonable, the court
said: "A party seeking review of an award of attorney's fee in an antitrust case has
the burden of clearly demonstrating error in the factual basis of the award or an

abuse of discretion." 434 F.2d at 794.

50 Bal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708, 716-18
(N.D. Calif. 1962). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478
(S D.N.Y. 1970); Farmingtop Dowel Produgts Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp.
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and covers, in most instances, a large part of the actual legal cost. Usually,
the award is held to less than the actual damages awarded, before
tripling. An exception to this rule is in cases where the actual damages
are small. In such cases the court will award an attorney's fee that
is based on the above criteria, regardless of the fact that it amounts to
more than the actual damages. 51
The usual attorney fees awarded pursuant to the antitrust regulations
are large both in actual dollar amount and in percentage of trebled
damages. 52 As one would expect, as the damages awarded increase, the
53
reasonable attorney fees also increase, but at a slower percentage rate.
The net effect of the generous and realistic awards that reflect the
purchasing value of the dollar is that, in both the antitrust and copyright
areas of the law, the basic theory of the founding fathers is being
put into practice.
The concepts of poverty and expense are, among other factors,
relative to one's neighborhood, social position, and needs. A corporation
is poverty stricken in relation to the federal government; the lone novelist
is poor compared with a major motion picture corporation. Before the
copyright and antitrust regulations allowing reasonable attorney fees were
passed, victims of powerful violators were also the victims of legal
blackmail, strike actions and remediless violations that thrive under the
present system of torts and contracts.
Other FederalLegislation
The Copyright and Antitrust Regulations are not the only federal
924 (S.D. Me. 1969). In the exercise of its sound discretion the Farmington court
sustained an attorney's fee of $327,300 based on the following factors:

(1) whether plaintiff's counsel had the benefit of a prior judgment or decree in
a case brought by the Government; (2) the standing of counsel at the bar... ;
(3) time and labor spent by counsel; (4) the magnitude and complexity of the
litigation; (5) the responsibility undertaken by counsel; (6) the amount recovered;
and (7) the knowledge the court has of the conferences, the arguments that
were presented and the work shown by the record to have been done by the
attorneys for the plaintiff prior to trial.
297 F. Supp. at 925-26.
51 Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 70 (4th Cir.
1969) (counsel fees $35,875, damages before trebling $16,714); Osborn v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 207 F. Supp. 856, 864 (D. Md. 1962) (single damages-325.00,

attorney fee allowed-$14,000, percentage of single damages-43%, percentage of
trebled damages-14.4%).
52For instance, in Twentieth Century Fox Film v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1964), the court awarded trebled damages of $300,000, and $100,000 for attorneys'
fees, or 33.34%. See also Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc.,
218 F. Supp. 490 (D. Mass. 1963) (single damages-29,441.99, attorney fee allowed$68,000, percentage of single damages-235%, percentage of trebled damages-78%);

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)

(single

damages-$45,870,478, attorney fee allowed-$7,500,000).
3For instance, in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587 (10th

Cir. 1961), where trebled damages were $4,400,000, and attorney fees were $500,000,

or only 11.36%.
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statutes providing for reasonable attorney fees. Without exhausting the list
of such statutes, the following acts parallel the Antitrust Regulations in
allowing a reasonable attorney's 'fee for the prevailing plaintiff: Fair Labor
Standard Act,54 Interstate Commerce Act,58 Railway Labor Act,56 Packers
and Stockyard Act,5 7 Merchant Marine Act,58 Communication Act, 9 and
the Tort-Claim Act.60 The Securities Act of 1933,61 like the Copyright
Act, allows either prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee.
With the knowledge of the above federal statutes and the state
statutes to be discussed below, it becomes difficult to justify the argument
against allowing reasonable attorney fees in other areas of law. The
success of these statutes in providing remedies for all wrongs, regardless
of monetary amount, in making injured parties "whole," in eliminating or
decreasing abuse of the legal system and in clearing the court calendars
of actions that have no merit or that can be settled without court
5429 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1938): "The court in such action shall, in addition to any
judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be
paid by the defendant..." (emphasis added).
The awarding of reasonable attorney's fees under the statute is made mandatory
by the replacement of "shall" for "may." Wright v. Carrigg, 275 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.
1960). See also Snelling v. O.K. Service Garage, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 842, 847 (ED.
Ky. 1970); Retail Store Employees Union v. Drug Fair-Community Drug Co., 307
F. Supp. 473, 480 (D.C. D.C. 1969); Foster v. Irwin, 258 F. Supp. 709, 712 (E.D.
La. 1966). The dollar amount of the mandatory attorney fee, however, remains in the
discretion of the court. Montalvo v. Tower Life Building, 426 F.2d 1135, 1149 (5th
Cir. 1970).
55 49 U.S.C. § 16 (1906): "If the plaintiff shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a
reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as part of the cost of the suit."
5645 U.S.C. § 153 (1926): "If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed
a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of costs of the suit."
See United Transportation Union v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 457 F.2d 285, 288 (7th
Cir. 1972); Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
& Engineers, 442 F.2d 812, 823 (D.C. 1971); Laday v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
and Pacific Railroad Co., 299 F. Supp. 580, 582 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
577 U.S.C. § 210 (1921): "If the petitioner finally prevails, he shall be allowed a
reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit."
5846 U.S.C. § 1227 (1936): "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden by this section... shall recover threefold
the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
)
fee."

59 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1934):

In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to be done, any act,
matter or thing in the chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful... shall be
liable to the person.., injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained
...together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court
in every case of recovery....
6028 U.S.C. § 2678 (1948).
61 15 U.S.C. § 77(E) (1970):
In any suit under this or any other section of this subchapter, the court may, in
its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees, if judgment shall be rendered against a
party litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be
assessed in favor of such party litigation if the court believes the suit or the
defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient to reimburse him
for the reasonable expenses incurred by him.
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assistance, is evident by reading court opinions dealing with these
statutes. Why opponents of such legislation cling to their unsubstantiated
fears is a mystery. Those who maintain that such a cost system would not
work in civil cases of tort and contract are closing their eyes to the
English system and the statutes which reflect its success with mathematical
clarity. These opponents must also discount or explain away the success
that Alaska, Washington and Oregon have had with statutes similar
to the federal legislation.
STATE STATUTES

Alaska, Washington and Oregon all have statutes that grant attorney
fees to the prevailing party in a lawsuit. 62 These statutes, although not in
agreement with the present legislation of the original 13 colonies, do
offer, in fact, judicial protection to all citizens. The concept of reasonable
attorney fees, which is a matter of heated scholarly debate and of
questionable merit in the east, is commonplace in the courts of the
aforementioned western states. It is the authors' opinion that if we stop
talking and look to the practical results achieved by these three western
states and England, the answer will be self-evident. The three questions
that should be posed are: Does our system today offer the protection of
legal justice that the founding fathers described? Do Alaska, Washington,
Oregon and England offer such protection? What do these jurisdictions
have that we do not? The answer to the third rhetorical question is, of
course, in large part, that these jurisdictions include reasonable attorney
fees as part of court costs.
To illustrate, under the Alaska law in Varnell v. Swires,63 where an
employee-appellant sought judgment against his employer in the United
States District Court without pursuing his remedies under the local
workman's compensation law, a legal fee was awarded to the respondent
in the sum of $150.00. The case clearly followed the rule of McNeill &
Libby v. Alaska Industrial Board,64 where a $200.00 fee was similarly
allowed the prevailing party.
62

ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010-.060 (1973). "Except as otherwise provided by statute the
Supreme Court shall determine by rule or order what costs, if any, including attorney
fees, shall be allowed the prevailing party in any case." Id. at § 09.60.010.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.010-.020 (1962).
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors, shall be
left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, but there shall be
allowed to the prevailing party upon judgment certain sums by way of
indemnity for his expenses in the action, which allowances are termed costs.
Id. at § 4.84.010.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 20.010 (1973):
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys shall be left to the
argument, express or implied, of the parties, but there may be allowed to
the prevailing party in the judgment or decree certain sums by way of indemnity
for his attorney fees in maintaining the action or suit, or defense thereto, which
allowance are termed costs.
63261 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1958).
64 191 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952).
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In Jonas v. Bank of Kodiak,65 a dispute arose over whether travel
expenses were allowable to an attorney for a successful party under the
Alaska Statute. There was only one attorney then resident in Kodiak at
this time and he represented the unsuccessful plaintiff in the case. While
counsel fees of $500.00 were allowed the successful defendant, the
necessary travel expense was denied as outside the scope of the statute.
Under a pre-statehood Alaska rule, evidence need not be submitted
to the jury as to the reasonableness of an attorney's fee. The appellate
courts have found the local judge to be fully capable of66 determining
a reasonable fee without the need of testimony being taken.
Similarly, in Columbia Lumber Co. v. Agostino,6 7 the appellate court
refused to interfere with the trial court's discretion in awarding a $250.00
counsel fee to the successful party. The respondent had considered
it insufficient.
In the State of Washington, under a statutory rule, attorney's fees
are allowed only in modest specific amounts to the prevailing party other
than in cases which are recognized exceptions. 68 A more substantial grant
will be made where the matter of fees is covered by contract, a note, or
where litigation has been caused by a malicious third party.69 This section
limits fees to rather nominal amounts. While the principle is properly
established by the statute, we feel this minimal approach is not sufficient.
Oregon is similarly modest in its approach to the problem. Under the
statute7" and case law,71 a reasonable counsel fee to the prevailing party
is permitted in cases where the amount in controversy is less than
$1,000.00, and a demand has been made for the same at least 10 days
before suit was instituted.
It should be said that these three states are not the only jurisdictions
allowing such costs. New York, for example, has granted a certain class
of persons under limited circumstances such costs in Section 64 of the
General Corporation Law. 72 It should be noted that this statute more
65166 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Alaska 1958).
66
See Forno v. Coyle, 75 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1935).
67 184 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1950).
68 WASH. REv. CODE § 4.84.060 (1962).
69 See Vincent v. Parkland Light & Power, 5 Wis. App. 684; 491 P.2d 692 (1971);

Armstrong Construction Co. v. Thompson, 64 Wis. 2d 191, 390 P.2d 976 (1964).
70

ORE. REV. STAT. § 20.080 (1973).

71 See Hollopeter v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Co., 225 Ore. 73, 464 P.2d 316 (1970);
Draper v. Mullenex, 220 Ore. 1, 357 P.2d 519 (1960).
72 N.Y. GEN. CORP. § 64 (McKinney Supp. 1972):

Any person made a party to any action, suit or proceeding by reason of the fact
that he, his testator or intestate, is or was a director, officer or employee of a
corporation shall be entitled to have his reasonable expenses, incurred by him in
connection with the defense of such action, suit or proceeding, and in connection
with any appeal therein, assessed against the corporation or against another

corporation at the request of which he served as such director, officer or
employee, upon court order...
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closely follows the English system of solicitor and barrister taxation than
its American counterpart. The New York General Corporation Law says
"actually and necessarily," not "reasonable." It has been shown that
"reasonable costs" have been liberally construed by courts based on time
involved, skill employed and other subjective criteria, while the British
courts, although also rendering large allowances at times, look more to
basic necessities. The English system thus interpreted and employed in
the New York General Corporation Law is an excellent compromise
between the two systems that could reap all the benefits outlined above
and still be more acceptable to opponents of such legislation.
In New York, in limited classes of exceptional cases, counsel fees
may also be imposed on the unsuccessful party. These would include
instances where a contract sued upon specifies the obligation to pay
counsel fees as a matter of right. Actually, the recovery if allowed, is upon
the contract and not a matter of costs. Similarly, where there is fraud
or malice or where a party is obliged to litigate with a third person due to
defendant's bad faith, legal fees may be allowed.
In the case of Chatham Nameplate Inc. v. Pleffer,Th the Supreme
Court of Queens County allowed counsel fees to the plaintiff where the
defendant had forced the plaintiff to litigate with a controlled corporation
while diluting its assets to himself. The court found fraud and bad faith
on the defendant's part, as well, and felt that the case fitted within "the
recognized exception to the rule that attorney fees incurred in litigating
74
a claim are not recoverable as an item of damage.
As an alternative theory, the court 'found a right to assess counsel
fees as part of "punitive damages" for wanton conduct. By this test, as
well, the defendant was found responsible.
Where an attachment against a defendant's property has been
improperly issued and is set aside, counsel fees in securing the vacatur
may also be recovered. 75
The approach of these decisions is not the approach that your authors
submit for your consideration. There should be no requirement of fraud
or bad faith before an allowance of fees is permitted. But these cases do
refute the argument made by our opponents that the courts cannot
responsibly set fair compensation to prevailing counsel and that to impose
such a duty would overwhelm the judiciary.
We suggest, for your consideration, a proposed state statute to
read as follows:
Any court of record with appropriate jurisdiction of any action or
proceeding is hereby authorized and directed, effective
168 N.Y.L.J. No. 13, at 10, July 20, 1972.
See Russian Church v. Dunkel, 67 Misc. 2d 1032, 326 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1971).
75A. C. Israel Co. v. Banco de Brasil, 50 Misc. 2d 362, 270 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1966).
73
74

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

59

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 1

AxEON LAw REVIEW

[VoL 8:3

197-, to order payment to the prevailing party or parties in said
action or proceeding pending before it, upon the entry of any order
or judgment therein, of counsel fees in a sum to be determined in
the court's reasonable discretion, as well as costs and disbursements
as provided by law. Such fees may be determined by the court on
stipulation of the parties or otherwise by the court, or if found
necessary, referred to a referee for hearing and report. Where the
matter of such counsel fees is contested, it shall be determined with
a view to such criteria as results achieved, time expended, novelty of
legal problems involved, experience of counsel, public benefit and
other relevant factors. No such listing of criteria is to be regarded as
exclusive. While the matter of good faith of the nonprevailing party
in instituting such action or proceeding may be considered as relevant
as to the size of any such counsel fee so awarded, a finding of such
good faith shall not in itself bar or limit the granting of reasonable
counsel fees to the prevailing party or parties. Provided, however,
that in the event that the court finds that the action or proceeding
brought or defenses asserted, were frivolous in nature or for damages
in excess of any reasonable demand or otherwise unjustified, then
and in such event the court shall have the discretion to deny counsel
fees to the prevailing party or parties in part or in toto.
CONCLUSION

There are a host of other examples authorizing the granting of fees
to the prevailing parties. These fees have been administered without huge
windfalls to lawyers or anyone else. Judicial techniques can easily be
utilized to meet this problem. They have overcome far more serious
difficulties in legal administration.
Logic, fairness and equity now clearly require discretion in our courts
to permit the granting of a counsel fee to a prevailing party where
litigation has been instituted. The precise manner to accomplish this
purpose and the methods and techniques to be utilized should be fully and
promptly investigated. While there are problems to be dealt with, the
principle should be quickly established which will allow damaged parties
the assurance of reasonable indemnity. The legal profession, society and
justice would be the beneficiaries. Counsel fees should be considered as
the direct and proximate result of the damages litigated. The victim of a
wrong should not be forced to weigh the cost of attaining justice against
the cost of putting the judicial machinery into operation.
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ADVERSARY JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS: IMPEACHMENT OF JUVENILE
DEFENDANTS BY THE USE OF PREVIOUS
ADJUDICATIONS OF DELINQUENCY
DAVID

L. HERBERT*

V. LEE SINCLAIR, JR.t

INTRODUCTION

N ADULT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, any defendant who wishes to testify'
faces certain risks 2 when he steps into the witness box. The risks such
a defendant engenders certainly include the possibility of having his prior
criminal convictions brought up by the prosecution, for purposes of
impeaching his testimony. 3 In essence, the defendant who takes the
stand, like any other witness, places his reputation for truth and veracity
into issue. 4 The theory behind this general rule emanates from the belief
that the defendant's testimony can be no more credible than the defendant
himself. 5 Therefore, the prosecution is given the right, under certain
*Assistant Stark County Prosecuting Attorney; J.D., University of Akron School of
Law; B.B.A., Kent State University.
t Legal Intern in the Stark County Prosecutor's Office.
1 Every criminal defendant has an absolute right to remain silent and hence, to decline
to testify, U. S. CONST. amend. V. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2 See Stone, Cross-Examination by the Prosecution at Common Law and Under the
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898: A Commentary on Maxwell v. Director of Public
Prosecutions,51 L.Q. REv. 443 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Stone, Cross-Examination].
3 At common law persons convicted of certain crimes were disqualified from testifying
as witnesses, 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 373, at 514 (16th ed. 1899); 2 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 519, at 608 (3d ed. 1940). Modern statutes, however, now permit the
previously convicted witness or defendant to testify, but grant the prosecution
the opportunity to attack the witness' credibility by the use of the individual's
previous convictions, those convictions to weigh inferentially upon the believability of
the testimony given. McCORMICK's HANDBooK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43, at 85
(2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICKI.
4 Stone, Cross-Examination, supra note 2, at 454:
The defendant who goes into the witness box acquires a new role in the
proceedings, that of a witness... entirely separate from his role as defendant,
and when he assumes it, he assumes ... the burdens and benefits attaching to
the role of witness.... Among the burdens is the risk of being examined as to
credibility.
See also 2 WHARTON's CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 478, at 444-45 (13th ed. 1972):
A defendant who testifies in his own behalf puts his credibility in issue the
same as any other witness, even though no evidence has been adduced of his
good character or reputation. In general, the same rules relating to impeachment,
which are applicable to an ordinary witness, apply to the defendant.
5 MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 41, at 81: "The character of a witness for truthfulness
or mendacity is relevant circumstantial evidence on the question of the truth of
particular testimony of the witness."
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limitations,6 to attack the credibility of the defendant and his testimony
by inquiring into his past criminal "conduct."
While the foregoing discussion may be regarded as a generally
acceptable statement of the law, jurisdictions throughout the United States
vary greatly on the specific point regarding which particular criminal
7
convictions may be raised for the purposes of impeachment. Many
jurisdictions allow inquiry as to any conviction for a crime involving
9
moral turpitude.8 Others permit inquiry as to convictions for felonies, or
"infamous crimes"'" which may be classified as crimes involving crimen
jalsi."1 Still others permit the trial judge at his discretion to determine
whether or not the defendant's prior criminal convictions affect his
credibility as a witness.1 The Uniform Rules of Evidence l 3 provide for
the impeachment of a witness by the use of prior convictions for crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement. If the witness also happens to be
the defendant, no evidence of his prior criminal convictions is admissible
under the Uniform Rules, unless he has first introduced evidence tending
5
to support his own credibility. 14 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
defendant's credibility may be attacked by the use of prior criminal convictions punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year (i.e.,
6
felonies), or by the use of those involving dishonesty or false statement.'
Irrespective of the particular rule followed, courts permit inquiry into
this area because of a rather strong belief that it would be misleading to
the fact finder, to allow a previously convicted defendant to testify as if he
were a "witness of blameless life .... ,,17 While it is true that every
6 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 242, at 751 (6th ed. 1973). The right to attack

the credibility of a defendant or witness is granted for the purpose of enabling
fact finder to weigh his testimony in light of his previous actions. It can serve
other purpose, and in the case of a jury trial, the jury must be instructed as to
limited purpose that the evidence is to serve. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,

the
no
the
561

(1967).

7 See McCoamicK, supra note 3, § 43, at 85-86.
8 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 434 (1960).
9
See, e.g., CAL. Evi. CODE § 788 (West 1968).
10 See, e.g., People v. Birdette, 22 11. 2d 577, 177 N.E.2d 170 (1961).
3 See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 43, at 84-85.
12 See Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 155 A. 153 (1931). See also Gordon v. United
States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968), modifying
Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Both Gordon and Luck were
legislatively overruled by D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (Supp. 1972), and the judicial
discretion theretofore exercised was removed.
13The Uniform Rules of Evidence were drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved at its annual conference in 1953.
14UInFORM RULES oF EVIDENCE, Rule 21 (1953). See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 106 (1942).
15 The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted into law on January 2, 1975, to take
effect 180 days from the date of enactment, See Pub, L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975).
16 FED. R. EvED. 609(a).
17 McCORMICx,

supra note 3, § 43, at 89.
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defendant who enters the courtroom starts his life "afresh,"' 8 it is equally
true that every such defendant brings with him his past, no matter how
haunting or insidious it may be.Y9 Therefore, insofar as it affects his
credibility, past criminal convictions may be revealed to enable the fact
finder to weigh the defendant's testimony in light of his background.
IMPEACHMENT IN JUVENILE COURT ON THE BASIS OF
PRIOR JUVENILE COURT RECORDS

In adversary juvenile delinquency proceedings, the impeachment of
any juvenile who wishes to testify, 20 by the use of the witness' previous
adjudications of delinquency,2 1 is somewhat more clouded than the
aforementioned situation involving adult defendants.2 2 This confusion

arises, in part, from modern statutes relating to juvenile proceedings
which typically provide that a judgment, finding, disposition, or any
evidence given in a juvenile court shall not be used against a child
in any other court, and that a finding of delinquency shall not be
deemed to be a criminal convictionY3
An analysis of the various statutes leads to several possible conclusions:
1) They were designed to protect juvenile offenders from any
subsequent use of their delinquency records except for dispositional
,24
or sentencing purposes;
2) They were designed to protect juveniles from the possibilities of
having their juvenile records or any evidence given in juvenile court
revealed or used when such juveniles were transferred l to criminal
18 People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 197, 172 N.E. 466, 469 (1930).

19Any individual's past conduct obviously sheds some light upon his make-up. If the
past conduct involves acts of a criminal nature, those acts are relevant circumstantial
evidence of his inclination to speak the truth, MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 41, at 81.
Therefore, since all relevant evidence should be admitted at trial, 1 J. WIOMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 57, at 650 (3d ed. 1940), past criminal conduct can be revealed to inform
the fact finder of all relevant data.
20 As in the case of adult criminal defendants, juveniles have the constitutional right
to remain silent. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21 As used in this article, the term "adjudications of delinquency" includes only those
adjudications for some violation of criminal law.
22 Inasmuch as there is very little case law on the question, there is room for
confusion and disagreement as to what the law is or should be. Compare 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980(7), at 834 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970) with MCCORMICK,
supra note 3, § 43, at 86 and 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 242, at 751 (6th
ed. 1973). Cf. 4 JoNEs ON EVIDENCE § 26.20, at 223 (6th ed. 1972).
23
E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2L5'1.358 (Page Supp. 1973). See 1 J. WIOMoRE
EVIDENCE § 196, at 673 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1972) for a voluminous collection of the
statutes. See also Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-63 (D.C. Cir. 1959) for a
copious list of authorities holding that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal
cases. But see GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE JUVENILE COURT (V. Nordin ed. 1968).
24
See 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 26.20, at 223 (6th ed. 1972); MCCORMICK, supra note 3,
§ 43, at 86; 1 UNDEm L'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 242, at 751 (6th ed. 1973). See
also Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
25Almost all states provide for the transfer of juvenile offenders to criminal court to
be tried as adult defendants, see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page Supp.
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court to be tried as adultsF6 or when they later became adult
2
defendants,2 or when they testified outside of juvenile court;
3) They were designed to protect juvenile offenders from the
possibility of having their prior juvenile records brought up for
as habitual criminals, after they
purposes of treating such offenders
2
reached the age of majority. 9
Each of these possible interpretations has received some support from
31
30
highly respected commentators, and various writers. In addition, a few
in reference to this
statutes
the
construe
to
courts have had the opportunity
32
conclusions.
different
somewhat
reached
have
and
question,
impeachment
For example, one Ohio court has recently interpreted a typical juvenile
statute, such as that mentioned previously,33 and has determined that a
juvenile defendant's previous adjudications of delinquency may be brought
up when he testifies in his own behalf at an adjudicatory hearing, for the
purpose of discrediting his testimony. The court held that these prior
offenses are admissible to show the juvenile's previous criminal behavior,
of the litigation.3r
and to demonstrate his possible interest in the outcome
In contrast to this decision, one federal court in interpreting a
1973). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966); Schornhurst, The
Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583 (1968).
26See Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St. 443,200 N.E. 473 (1936).
27 See 1J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 196, at 673-74 (3d ed. 1940).
28 See

Brown v.United States, 338 F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But cf. 3A J.

WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980, at 834 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970).
29See 1 J. WI Omm, EVIDENCE § 196,at 673-74 (3d ed. 1940).
SOCompare 1 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 196, at 673-76 (3d. ed 1940), and 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 980, at 834 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970) with MCCORMICK, supra

note 3, § 43, at 86, and 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EviDENCE § 242, at 751 (6th ed.
1973).
31See Comment, Inferential Impeachment: The Presence of Parole Officers at
Subsequent Juvenile Adjudications, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 349 (1972); Comment,
Evidence-Impeachment of Witnesses-Use of Adjudications of Juvenile Delinquency
and Specific Acts of Misconduct Committed by Juveniles, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 406
(1958); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 443 (1943).
32
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Thomas v.
United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941); State v. Kelley, 169 La. 753, 126 So. 49
(1930); People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303 (1943); State v.
Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942); Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St.
443, 200 N.E. 473 (1936); In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio,
Nov. 18, 1974); State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 256 N.E,2d 239 (1969).
S3See text accompanying note 24 supra. See also Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358
(Page Supp. 1973), which provides in part:
The judgment rendered by the [juvenile court... shall not impose any of the
civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction of crime in that the child is
not a criminal by reason of such adjudication .... The disposition of a child
under the judgment rendered or any evidence given in [juvenile] court is not
admissible as evidence against the child in any other case or proceeding in
any other court....
S4In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio, Nov.18, 1974).
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juvenile statute 3 very similar to the Ohio law, determined that the overall
rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court system forbade any use of
previous adjudications of delinquency to impeach the testimony of a
juvenile witness in juvenile court.3 6 The court expressly held:
As the language of the statute expressly forbids the interpretation
that the disposition of a child in a juvenile court proceeding
constitutes conviction of a crime, and as nothing short of conviction
of crime is sufficient to warrant the inquiry which appellant was
forbidden to make, his contention [that impeachment on the basis
of previous adjudications of delinquency should have been allowed]
is completely devoid of merit.Y
A close reading of the statute interpreted by the federal court raises
serious doubts as to the propriety of the court's analysis. As the dissent in
the case poignantly indicated, the statute did not expressly forbid "[t]he
juvenile court itself... [from considering] previous misconduct... of a
witness ... where that misconduct is of such a character as will bear upon
the credibility of that witness."3 The dissent certainly believed that a
juvenile court's consideration of the previous misconduct of a child did
not "impose upon a witness any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed
by conviction, or treat a witness as a criminal, or constitute admission
of evidence against a witness, contrary to the [juvenile statute in
question.] .. ."39 The dissenter could not "conclude that it was the
intention of Congress, when it laid down the wholesome protections
of the Juvenile Court Act against treating children as criminals, to
blind the eyes of the juvenile judge or of a jury in the juvenile' 4court
to considerations vitally bearing upon the credibility of testimony."
The plain meaning of both the Ohio and the District of Columbia
statutes 4 ' indicates that they were designed to protect juveniles from the
use of their prior juvenile court dispositions, or any other evidence given
in a juvenile court, in any court other than a juvenile court.q The statutes'
35

Juv. Act of June 1, 1958 § 14, 52 Stat. 599, 600, D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-264 (Supp
V 1939): "The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the court shall not be
admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other
court...."
36
37

Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 908-09 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
Id. at 909 (emphasis added).

3S Id. at 911.
39 Id.
40Id.

41 See statutes cited notes 33 and 35 supra. The wording of both statutes is virtually
identical.
42The language of the statutes mentioned notes 33 and 35 supra, expressly provides
that an adjudication of delinquency given in juvenile court is inadmissible in any other
case or proceeding in any other court. This language "in any other court" can not
be ignored as its wording is plain and unambiguous. As the Supreme Court stated in
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917): "ITihe meaning of [a]... statute
must, in the first instance be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and
if that is plain .... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
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clear intent is not to preclude the use of such dispositional findings
or evidence in the juvenile court itself.43 To determine otherwise would be
to completely disregard the wording of the statute and the obvious
44
legislative intent.
The Ohio court, in interpreting the previously mentioned Ohio
juvenile statute, 45 implicitly determined that an adjudication of delinquency,
while not technically defined or regarded as a criminal conviction, carried
with it sufficient probative value as to bear upon the credibility of the
juvenile in question and his testimony. 46 This interpretation of the statute
does not impose any civil disability upon the juvenile, nor does it treat
him as a criminal. 47 Instead, this interpretation faces up to the true
realities of the situation and helps to further the truth finding goals
of the juvenile courts. 4
If the interpretation herein supported is correct, juvenile courts will
have the otherwise usual opportunity to weigh the testimony of any
juvenile defendant against the juvenile's previous actions. Furthermore, if
a juvenile has had prior court adjudications of delinquency, the court in
allowing questioning as to his previous juvenile court record may be
terms." The statutes in question do not forbid the use of an adjudication of
delinquency in the juvenile court itself. To hold otherwise would be to completely
disregard the language of the enactments and the express legislative intent.
43 The expressed intent of a legislative enactment can be gleaned from the plain
meaning of the statutory wording. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.01-.03 (4th ed. 1973). The plain meaning of the juvenile statutes
being analyzed, indicates that the legislatures did not intend to forbid the juvenile
courts themselves from considering all relevant evidence, including impeachment
evidence. Had the legislatures intended some other result, logic dictates that some
other wording would have been utilized, e.g.:
A judgment rendered by a juvenile court or any evidence given in such court
shall not be admissible against a child in any other case or proceeding in any
court whatsoever, except that such an adjudication or disposition may be
considered by any court whatsoever for dispositional or sentencing purposes.
[Author's example.]
See In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio, Nov. 18, 1974). See
also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), suggesting that such language as that
offered could be constitutionally impermissible when balanced against the rights of
a criminal defendant
44
When a statute's wording is plain and clear, that language cannot be ignored, and
it is not subject to judicial interpretation but application to particular facts. See 2A
C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973). In the

words of one federal court: "There is no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what
it plainly expresses...." Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 18-19 (8th Cir. 1902).
4
5OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973). See note 33 supra.
4
6 In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio, Nov. 18, 1974).
47See Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Stephens, J.,
dissenting in part): "For the juvenile court so to consider previous misconduct does
not in my view impose upon a witness any of the civil disabilities [disqualification in a
civil service examination, etc.] ordinarily imposed by conviction...."
48 Cf. State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 216, 256 N.E.2d 239, 245 (1969): "[A]
reasonable interpretation of [juvenile statutes] ... should not deny a judicial tribunal
a reasonable search for the truth, and, in so doing, best serve the purpose of justice."
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enlightened as to the juvenile's possible interest in the outcome of the
action. 49 Thus, the impeachment questioning process should in fact support
the system's truth determinative goals by enabling the court to consider all
relevant facts and circumstances. It would be a true miscarriage of justice
to require juvenile courts to determine cases through a "tinted window." 5
IMPEACHMENT OUTSIDE OF JUVENILE COURT ON THE
BASIS OF JUVENILE COURT RECORDS

Having supported the view 51 that impeachment of a juvenile
defendant in juvenile court is proper under the typical juvenile statute, the
question naturally arises as to whether juvenile records should be used as
the foundation for impeachment questioning outside of juvenile court.
This issue could arise, after the juvenile reaches majority and faces trial
as an adult, or where a juvenile testifies in a court other than a juvenile
court, as a defendant or a witness.

With some exceptions, 52 the courts have soundly held such questioning
to be improper in light of the prohibitions found in the typical juvenile
statute.53 An analysis of the statutes lends support to this general view, as
49

See In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio, Nov. 18, 1974). In
this case, the juvenile in question had previously, on another charge, received a
suspended permanent commitment to a juvenile institution. Inasmuch as he was almost
certain to be committed if adjudicated delinquent on his present charge, the juvenile
had a great interest in the outcome of the action. The fact that he was under a
suspended commitment was relevant evidence of his possible motivation for being
untruthful. But see Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In that
case the trial court indicated in an adult criminal prosecution that persons with prior
convictions were likely to commit perjury because of the harsher sentences imposed
upon repeat offenders. The Court of Appeals reversed holding that the statement of
the trial judge was a misconstruction of the theory of impeachment. The court stated:
"One need not look for prior convictions to find motivation to falsify, for certainly
that motive inheres in any case, whether or not the defendant has a prior record.
What greater incentive [to lie] is there than the avoidance of conviction?" 370 F.2d
at 244.
50 See Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Stephens, J.,
dissenting in part); State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 560, 41 N.E.2d 387, 388
(1942); State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 256 N.E.2d 239 (1969).
51 See text accompanying notes 25, 26 and 27 supra.
52
See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), noted in 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 647 (1974)
(right of confrontation outweighs state's police power to protect juveniles from being
impeached by the use of prior juvenile records); People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49,
10 N.W.2d 303 (1943) (in a statutory rape prosecution, the credibility of a 15-year-old
prosecutrix may be attacked by the use of her prior juvenile court record); State
v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942) (once a criminal defendant
testifies on direct as to his life history including a list of the various schools he had
attended, the prosecution may in rebuttal cross-examine the defendant as to his
incarceration in a juvenile institution, where the defendant had failed to mention that
fact on direct examination); State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 256 N.E.2d 239
(1969) (once a criminal defendant introduces evidence of his good character and
conduct, the prosecution may in rebuttal, introduce evidence as to the defendant's
previous involvement in juvenile court proceedings). See also FED. R. EvID. 609(d),
Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975), which allows impeachment of a juvenile witness,
on the basis of juvenile records, in a criminal proceeding, where such would be
necessary for a fair trial.
53 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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do interpretations two and three, mentioned above. 4 These interpretations
seem to support the obvious meaning of the enactments and the overall
rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile justice system.
As opposed to the situation involving juvenile defendants testifying
in juvenile court, it seems that the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
justice system would perhaps be destroyed, if an adult could be questioned
as to previous transgressions committed while he was under the age of
majority.5 5 Assuming arguendo, that the rehabilitative goals of the system
encourage the privacy and eventual elimination of juvenile records,5 6 there
seems to be an overriding interest in refusing to allow any impeachment
of an adult as to his previous juvenile record.5 7 Similarly, a juvenile
testifying outside of the confines of a juvenile court should be protected
from the embarrassment and possibly harmful degradation of impeachment
questioning in a public courtroom.5 8
IF IMPEACHMENT IN JUVENILE COURT IS PROPER WHILE
IMPEACHMENT OUTSIDE JUVENILE COURT

Is

IMPROPER,

DOES THIS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION?

If impeachment of a juvenile in juvenile court is proper, and if
similar impeachment of a juvenile outside of a juvenile court or after
he becomes an adult is improper, the question naturally arises as to
whether this interpretation violates the constitutional safeguards of the
equal protection clause.5 9
The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution simply
protects members of the same class or grouping from unequal treatment
by a state, for an unreasonable or irrational reason.60 The clause does not
command that all persons be treated absolutely equally, but merely that
54 See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
55 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), rev'g 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965). The
Arizona Supreme Court had stated: "Mhe policy of the juvenile law is to hide
youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of
the forgotten past." 99 Ariz. at 190, 407 P.2d at 767.
56 See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973) (providing for,
inter alia, expungement of juvenile records).
57 To allow impeachment questioning would totally defeat the rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile justice system. Such a view would enable prosecutors and others to use
juvenile records to haunt a person throughout his entire life. See Kozler v. New York
Tel. Co., 93 N.J.L. 279, 281, 108 A. 375, 376 (N.J. 1919): "We see no reason why
the Legislature may not enact that it is against the public policy to hold over a young
person in terrorem, perhaps for life, a conviction for some youthful transgression."
But see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
58 See Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964): "ITlhe juvenile
himself has a protected interest [when testifying in adult court] in maintaining the
credibility of his public testimony."
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Juveniles are "persons" within the meaning of the
Constitution and are therefore entitled to the equal protection of the laws. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47, 51-52 (3d Cir. 1971).
0 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
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if there is going to be some unequal treatment, there must be some
rational basis for it.61 If a state develops some classification which results
in unequal treatment for no justifiable reason, the classification must be
struck down as being repugnant to the Constitution. Correlatively, where
fundamental interests are involved 6 2 or where suspect classifications are
utilized,6 3 not only must the classification be reasonable, but the state
must also show a compelling reason for the statute's differentiation.
As a starting point, it appears quite reasonable to say that the juvenile
impeachment issue does not involve fundamental interests.64 Furthermore,
the difference in treatment granted to juveniles testifying outside of
juvenile court, or to adult defendants generally, is not based upon what is
presently thought of as a suspect classification.6 5 Therefore, the so-called
traditional equal protection test 66 should be utilized to examine the unequal
treatment mentioned above,67 to determine whether or not that treatment
violates the juvenile defendant's right to equal protection of the laws.
The crucial question to be answered in analyzing the interpretation
herein supported, is whether the unequal treatment is based upon some
reasonable foundation. If so, there can be no equal protection violation.
The limited impeachment position favored by this article furthers the
63
supports
truth determinative goals of the juvenile justice system;
the system's objectives of eliminating juvenile records after a specified
time; 69 protects juveniles from the degradation of being impeached while
testifying outside of juvenile court, 7 and lastly, helps to further the
rehabilitative goals of the system generally. 71 These four points surely
provide a reasonable justification, if not a compelling interest, for the
Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
63 Cf. Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
64
Cases such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), have tended to define
61

62

fundamental interests as "basic civil rights" or "basic constitutional rights." See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
The juvenile impeachment question does not seem to involve any of these basic or
fundamental interests.
65
Suspect classifications as they are commonly thought of, are based upon such things
as race, religion, ethnic background, etc., See Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969). The classification, in reference to the
juvenile impeachment question, is not based upon such a classification.
66
See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). See also Trussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
6
7See text accompanying note 59 supra.
68
See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra.
69 See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
70 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
7
1From personal experience, this writer feels that juvenile court judges often consider
the first step in the rehabilitation of a juvenile offender to be one of telling the truth,
no matter what it may be. Therefore the impeachment questioning process may in
fact encourage a juvenile to speak the truth.
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unequal treatment involved. Therefore, under the traditional equal
protection test at the very least, the equal protection clause apparently
is not violated by the view espoused herein.
IF IMPEACHMENT OF A JUVENILE IN JUVENILE COURT
Is PROPER, DOES THIS INTERFERE WITH THE
JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW?

Although one possible constitutional attack to the juvenile impeachment issue has been discussed and analyzed, another constitutional
safeguard may have some application to this discussion.
72
In the landmark case of In re Gault, the Supreme Court determined
7
that the due process clause of the United States Constitution. had a vital
74
role to play in adversary juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Court
did not
Constitution
...
[the]
felt that "[I]t would be extraordinary if
in the
implied
care
of
exercise
the
and
regularity
require the procedural
' 75
phrase 'due process' [in juvenile delinquency proceedings]." Consequently,
"must
the Court held that adversary juvenile delinquency proceedings
76
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
Cases arising after Gault have generally determined that the
applicable due process standard to be applied in juvenile proceedings is
77
one of fundamental fairness. Thus, the Supreme Court has determined
that fundamental fairness includes, inter alia, the right to the assistance of
78
counsel; the right to confront witnesses; the right to remain silent; 79 the
right to an evidentiary standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; but
not the right to a trial by jury.80 No Supreme Court case to date has
specifically spelled out all the elements of a fundamental fairness-due
process standard applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings generally.
However, the Court has extended only those standards which it deems
to be essential to the general goal of fundamental fairness. So far this
has been a somewhat more restricted standard than would be applied
in an analogous adult criminal proceeding. It appears quite likely then,
that only those standards deemed to be essential to due process will
be extended to juvenile proceedings.
72387 U.S. 1 (1967), noted in, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv.
69, 173-176 (1967); Comment, Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLuM. L. Rv.
1149 (1968). See generally GAULT: WHAT Now FOR THE JUVENILE COURT (V. Nordin
cd. 1968); Ketcham, Guidelines From Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and
Reappraisal, 53 VA. L. REv. 1700 (1967).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
74 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
75 Id. at 28-9.
76 Id. at 30.

77 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
78 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
79
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
80McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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Therefore, the question to be asked in reference to this discussion, is
whether an interpretation which allows a juvenile to be impeached
in juvenile court by the use of previous adjudications of delinquency, is
so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process.
An extensive search of the available law has failed to uncover any
case discussing this specific question. 81 However, several cases involving
adult defendants have arisen which might shed some light on this problem.
These adult cases, arising at both the state8 2 and federal level,8 3 have
dealt with the question of whether due process is violated when a
defendant during cross-examination is impeached by the prosecution on
the basis of his prior criminal record. In these cases the claim was made
that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, was unable to consider
the prior convictions solely for the purpose of weighing the credibility
of the defendant and his testimony.84 Therefore as this theory goes, due
process was violated because the defendant was not afforded his sixth
amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.83 In the vast majority of
these cases, this claim has been rejected.8a
In contrast to the adult procedure, the juvenile process does not, as
a general rule, involve a trial by jury. In fact, the Supreme Court in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania8 7 held that juveniles were not as a matter of
constitutional law entitled to a jury trial.88 Therefore, the claims which
have been made in some adult cases as to jury confusion in reference to the
impeachment process, have little or no application to the juvenile situation
where a jury is rarely involved. Even assuming that the claims put forth
in the adult cases have some constitutional merit, the dangers of violating
81 But see 4 JoNEs ON EVIDENCE § 26.20, at 223 (6th ed. 1972); MCCORMICK, supra
note 3, § 43, at 86-87, n.64.
82 See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 278 A.2d 89, 92-6 (D.C. App. 1972); State v.
Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
83 See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
84See Comment, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior
Record Convictions Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the
Defendant Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. Rav. 168 (1968).
85 Id.
88See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). But see State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii
254, 492, P.2d 657 (1971). In this context, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968), overruling Deli v. Paoli, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), may have some application. In
the Bruton case, two adult defendants were jointly tried on the same charges. A
confession of one of the defendants who did not testify was introduced into evidence.
This confession implicated the co-defendant. Although the trial court instructed the
jury to consider the confession only against the confessor, the Supreme Court,
referring to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), held that such a limiting
instruction did not overcome the prejudice to the co-defendant and was in violation
of the co-defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. By analogy to the present
situation, perhaps a limiting instruction to a jury in reference to the limited purpose
of the impeachment questioning process does not overcome the prejudicial effect of
the evidence, and in fact deprives the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair
trial. This, however, is merely speculation and not the present state of the law.
87 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
88 Id. at 545.
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due process are certainly minimized and perhaps eliminated when no jury
is used, and a case is tried before the court, as is the usual situation in
the juvenile process. Surely a judge, as opposed to a jury, will have no
doubt about the limited purpose that impeachment questioning serves.
Assuming this analysis is well founded, another due process related
question arises as to whether or not all prior adjudications of delinquency
may be used for impeachment purposes. It would seem reasonable to
suppose that the fundamental fairness concept might in fact be violated
if all types of delinquency adjudications could be brought forth to impeach
89
a juvenile when he testifies.
In order for the process to remain fundamentally fair, the
impeachment questioning process should be limited to only those
adjudications of delinquency involving the commission of some crime
9
which bears upon the credibility of the juvenile defendant. Obviously,
there are many crimes which do not bear upon the credibility of an
91
actor who engages in deviant behavior. Therefore, those crimes should
not serve as the basis for impeachment questioning of a juvenile defendant
in juvenile court.
Inasmuch as the juvenile judge sits as both the trier of the facts and
applier of the law, the matter of what crimes should be used for
impeachment questioning should not be left to his discretion, because
that procedure would require some proffer of testimony before the
questioning was allowed. Even though the judge strives for impartiality,
such a procedure may have some unconscious but prejudicial effect upon
the court if the proffer should be excluded from formal consideration.
Therefore, a policy should be established to specify which particular
crimes bear upon the credibility of any juvenile defendant. The best
approach appears to be one which would allow impeachment on the basis
of only those crimes involving either crimen jalsi or moral turpitude,
inasmuch as these crimes certainly bear upon the credibility of any

89 If all types of prior delinquency adjudications were allowed, even those not really
bearing upon credibility, the process would certainly seem unfair.
90As to the probative value of different types of criminal offenses for impeachment
purposes, see Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235, 238 (9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J.,
concurring). But see Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964):
"Because of the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act and the absence of procedural
safeguards, a finding of involvement against a juvenile [in the commission of a
crime] does not have the same tendency to demonstrate his unreliability as does
a criminal conviction for the adult offender." This position, as expressed by the
Brown Court, in light of Gault, and the interpretation suggested here, seems dubious
to say the least.
91 See, e.g., State v. Russ, 122 Vt. 236, 167 A.2d 528 (1961) (conviction for traffic
misdemeanor barred from use as the basis for impeachment). See also McIntosh v.
Pittsburg Ry., 432 Pa. 123, 247 A.2d 467 (1968).
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individual who violates the law.9 2 In this manner, the juvenile court will
consider only those adjudications of delinquency which vitally bear upon
the credibility of the juvenile defendant. This approach would not
ostensibly violate the fundamental fairness-due process standard applicable
in juvenile proceedings.
CONCLUSION

When a minor commits a criminal act, the mere fact that he is
underage does not, from a practical standpoint, erase the fact that a crime
has been committed. He is not, however, classified as a criminal because
it is the law's policy to attempt to help him rather than to punish him.
Notwithstanding this fact, the criminal act that the juvenile commits still
bears upon his credibility as a witness, and when he takes the stand to
testify in his own behalf in juvenile court, the believability of his
testimony should be tested by his past criminal misconduct.
The plain meaning of the juvenile statutes in question supports this
interpretation, and in fact encourages it. Any other analysis would seem
to do violence to the statute's obvious intent while hampering the juvenile
courts' truth determinative goals.

92See 1 UNDERHILL'S CRrMINAL EVIDENCE § 242, at 750 (6th ed. 1973):

Where a crime involving moral turpitude is the standard for impeachment, it is
held that such a crime involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellows or to society which
is contrary to accepted and customary rules of conduct. Perjury, larceny,
murder, narcotics offenses, sex offenses, and filing fraudulent tax returns, all
involve moral turpitude. It is generally not involved in liquor offenses, gambling,
assault and battery, disorderly conduct, and breaches of military discipline."
See also McGee v. State, 207 Tenn. 431, 332 S.W.2d 501 (1960); Note, Impeachment
Evidence-PriorConvictions Involving Moral Turpitude, 12 ALA. L. REV. 194 (1960).
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ADVERTISING OF FOOD AND DRUGS:
CONCEALING A TRUTH, HINTING A LIE
today's copywriters avoid clearly false statements. They tend
instead to use "those less obvious forms of falsehood which in
causitry and law are called suppressio verdi and suggestio falsi,
concealing a truth and hinting a lie, methods which certain types of
'
advertisinghave carriedto pitch and skill that leaves us breathless."
...

T

HE FOCUS OF THIS COMMENT is on recent advertisements promoting
foods and drugs. Listed below are some representative ads, either
recently published in magazines, or broadcast on radio or television. The
question is whether they represent practices which, under the2 Federal
Trade Commission Act, are prohibited, or should be prohibited.
(1) The announcer narrates that "in a recent test" of pain relievers,
measuring their effectiveness against "pain other than headache," Excedrin
was found to be "significantly more effective" than common aspirin.
At the end of the ad, the announcer states, "Excedrin-more effective
against pain."
(2) The announcer states, "There's not much difference in pain
relievers that you can see, but in your bloodstream, the differences are
very real." He shows us a graph, which plots the level of pain relief of
several remedies, including Anacin. The graph shows that the "peaks" for
the "highest level" of pain relief of the other products comes earlier, but
that Anacin's peak, though coming later, is the highest. There is also a
lower level on the graph, marking what is called "effective level of pain
relief." The announcer observes that "while all three products reach an
effective level in minutes, in the final analysis, Anacin 'hits and holds the
'highest' level of pain relief. This difference is the added pain reliever that
Anacin provides." He closes the ad by stating, "Anacin relieves pain fast."
(3) An attractive young woman identifies herself as having a Ph.D.
She is shown serving Tang to her children. (Tang is a mixture that
includes sugar, orange flavoringq. vegetable gums, artificial colorings,
hardened coconut oil, and vitamins C and A. It is mixed with water, and
served in place of fruit juices.) The woman remarks that her children like
its taste, and she "like(s) the fact that it has so much vitamin C."
1 Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer Behavior: A Case for Legislative and

ludicial Reform, 17 KANS. L. REa.

625, 626 (1969)

[hereinafter cited as Pollay],

citing D. MASTERS, THE INTELLImENT BUYERS GumE TO SELLERS 171 (1965).
2 Quotations from radio or television ads are based upon notes which were made while

the ads were broadcast. The quotes have been re-checked for accuracy. Statistics
regarding ingredients and places or method of manufacture come from the package of
the product involved,
[4561
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(4) The following are representative excerpts from ads for a product
called "Sugar in the Raw":
It contains all of its natural vitamins and minerals because it hasn't
been bleached, processed, and stripped of its natural goodness. It's
naturally blonde. Nothing is added-no chemicals. No preservatives.
Sugar in the Raw is naturally sweet-naturally delicious. Get back to
nature.... It's got no refinement, but Sugar in the Raw contains all
of its vitamins and minerals. It's naturally more nutritiousFrom a printed advertisement: "It's got no refinement! Sugar in the
Raw. Organic! Unrefined! Natural! The honest to goodness sugar that
contains natural vitamins and minerals."
(5) Euell Gibbons, an author of several books on nature, describes
Post Grape Nuts Breakfast Cereal as his "back to nature cereal.... It is a
wholesome cereal.., made from natural wheat and barley. These natural
ingredients are baked into crunchy nuggets and fortified with vitamins.
Its naturally sweet taste reminds me of wild hickory nuts."
(6) Television viewers are shown a panorama of the Swiss Alps.
The announcer narrates, "From Switzerland, a land where the air is
incredibly pure, comes an old recipe" from which Alpen, a "natural"
ready-to-eat breakfast cereal, is inspired. He continues by describing the
cereal with such phrases as "full of natural goodness... pure and simple
... Alpen: wholesome and satisfying," while viewers are shown a family
of attractive, healthy looking blue-eyed blondes in a Swiss chalet-style
setting, enjoying their breakfast cereal. The ad does not disclose that
the cereal is made in England.
(7) A young wife is home, suffering from a cold. Her husband
returns with three different cold remedies. The wife objects, saying that
the first two have "an antitussive, an analgesic, and alcohol, not found in
Contac." The ad concludes by suggesting that it is preferable to take
Contac, instead of the other products, for Contac has to be taken less often.
(8) In another Contac ad, we are advised: "Give your allergy to
Contac," because one of the capsule's ingredients, an antihistamine, is
what doctors prescribe most often for hay fever sufferers.
(9) Two men are shown together in a living room. One of them has
a headache, and he asks his friend if he can give him something for it.
The friend gives him Arthritis Pain Formula. The suffering man protests,
"I have a headache, not arthritis." "Doesn't matter," his friend reassures
him, "read the label. A.P.F. is great for headaches, too." Later in the ad the
friend states, "A.P.F. has more pain reliever than most headache tablets."
(10) Whitehall Laboratories, makers of Arthritis Pain Formula, also
advertise another product, Anacin, as effective in relieving arthritis pain:
"Anacin has the pain reliever for arthritis most recommended by doctors."
(11)

One friend suggests to another, that since she is "out of sorts,"
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and "not in the swing" because she "needs a laxative," she should get
Haley's M.O., for it is a "gentle acting laxative blend." The friend,
thinking out loud, says, "A laxative blend? I'll try it!"
(12) Sominex, in its latest series of ads, shows a young wife (with her
husband, Tom, standing behind her), calling up her mother, thanking
her for telling Tom about Sominex. In another ad, a mother and married
daughter are shown sitting on porch steps. The daughter has apparently
moved to the city; the mother, who lives in the country, has come for a
visit. The daughter tells her mother that "[she] did like you said, [and]
took Sominex" when she had trouble falling asleep. The mother approves.
In a third ad, kindly old "Uncle Ned," seated at a piano, sings a song
with a young couple. Gloria, the young woman, is Ned's niece. She
thanks her uncle for telling her about Sominex, which she now takes
when she has "occasional" trouble sleeping.
(13) An announcer begins an ad with the lines, "If you have trouble
falling asleep night after night, then maybe you should see your doctor;
but if you have only occasional trouble, then perhaps you'd like to know
about Sleep-Eze. It was tested in a hospital .... "
An advertisement may violate the Federal Trade Commission Act in
one of several ways. It may be an "unfair method of competition
'3
in commerce," an "unfair or deceptive act of practice in commerce,"
or, in the specific cases of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics, an ad can
4
be considered "false" if it is "misleading in a material respect."
One author has broken down the jurisdictional requirements, for an
advertiser to come under the Act, into three broad categories: - (1) The
party to be protected: this now includes both competitors, when victims
of "unfair methods of competition,"' 6 and consumers, who can either be
victims of "deceptive acts or practices," ' 7 or "false" advertising.8 (2) In
commerce: this requirement has been held to exist under Section 45.9
Merely "affecting" commerce has been held to be insufficient. 10 While
local activity is not covered under Section 45, it is suggested that when an
action is brought under Section 52," interstate advertising without
interstate sales provides a sufficient basis for F.T.C. jurisdiction. 2 (3)
3 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1963).

15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1963). See also Slomoff, F.D.A.-F.T.C. Liaison: Teamwork
That Pays Off, 26 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 439 (1971).
5 See Note, False Advertising: The Expanding Presence of the F.T.C., 25 BAYLOR L.
REv.650 (1973).
6 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1963).
4

71d.

8 15 U.S.C. § 52, § 55 (1963).
9 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1963).
lo FTC v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
1n 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1963).
12 Mueller v. United States, 262 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1958); Shafe v. FTC, 256 F.2d
661 (6th Cir. 1958).
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Interest of the Public: Section 45 (b) 3 limits the Commission's jurisdiction

to cases in which "it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding...
would be to the interest of the public." This requirement has been called
"a prerequisite to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Commission rather
than a test of [the] propriety of issuing a cease and desist order."'1 4 Among
the factors demonstrating the public interest in "false" advertising are the
substantial volume of the advertiser's business, 15 the presence or absence
of a probability of deception of the public,'8 a threat to the health of
the public, 17 a diversion of business from those not engaging in "false"
advertising,'8 or a violation of Trade Practice Rules. 9
In addition to what is outlined in the statute, the following general
rules have been recognized: It is sufficient that the ad have a "capacity" or
"tendency" to deceive. 20 It is not necessary to prove "actual deception."21
An ad is deceptive, even if it would only deceive those who are careless
or gullible.22 "In adjudging the falsity of advertising representations,
regard must be had, not to finespun distinctions and arguments that may
be made in excuse, but to the effect which such representations might
reasonably be expected to have on the general public."'3 Ambiguous
'3
14

15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958).

See Barnes, The Law of Trade Practices: False Advertising, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 597,

656 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Barnes]. The author cites Northern Feather Works
v. FTC, 234 F.2d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1956); FrC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
15 International Parts Corp. v. FTC, 133 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1943). (Cases cited
in notes 15 through 19 can be found in Barnes, supra note 14, at 656-7.)
1
6Pep Boys-Manny, Moe, & Jack v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1951); Irwin
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 316, 325 (8th Cir. 1944); Arnold Stone Co. v. FTC, 49 F.2d 1017
(5th Cir. 1931).
'7 Koch v.FTC,206 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1953).
Is Ford Motor Co. v.FTC,120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
668 (1941); Alberty v. FTC, 118 F.2d 669, 670 (9th Cir. 1941); FTC v. Winsted
Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922).
19 Prima Products v.FTC,209 F.2d 405,407-8 (2d Cir. 1954).
20 FTC v.Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F.2d 362,364 (3d Cir. 1936)..
21FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 1928).
22 There have been many descriptions of the standard which should be used: "Laws
are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious." FTC v. Standard Educ.
Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937). The F.T.C. Act was made for the protection of
"...
the public-the vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and
the credulous." Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143, F.2d 676, 679 (2d
Cir. 1944). In FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674, the court cites
1 CALLMAN, UNFARm CoMPETrroI AND TAEMawKS § 19.2(a) (1), at 341-44 (1950)
(and cases cited therein):
The general public has been defined as "that vast multitude which includes the
ignorant, and the unthinking, and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do
not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general
impressions." The average purchaser has been variously characterized as not
"straight tn
," subject to "impressions," uneducated, and grossly misinormed; he is influenced by prejudice and superstition; and he wishfully
believes in miracles, allegedly the result of progress in science.... The language
of the ordinary purchaser is casual and unaffected. He is not an "expert in
grammatical construction" or an "educated analytical reader" and, therefore, he
does not normally subject every word in the advertisement to careful study.
23 U.S. Retail Credit Ass'n v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 1962).
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statements, susceptible of both a misleading and truthful interpretation,
will be construed against the advertiser. 24 Failure to disclose a "material"
fact will make an ad deceptive.25 "A statement may be deceptive even if
the constituent words may be literally true or technically construed so as
not to constitute a misrepresentation."' 21 It is not necessary to find a
deliberate intent to deceive.27 It is not necessary to find that the advertiser
26
had knowledge of the falsity of his claim.
The Commission has great discretion in determining the meaning of
an ad,29 but it must prove that the meaning is false. The evidence usually
30
consists of testimony of Commission experts, surveys, and trade witnesses.
While, as a practical matter, courts are hesitant to overturn a decision of
the F.T.C. as to what constitutes a deceptive practice (should the
advertiser decide to appeal the Commission decision),31 the advertiser, on
4

Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962).
tell less than the whole truth is a well known method of deception; and he who
deceives by resorting to such method cannot excuse the deception by relying upon the
truthfulness per se of the partial truth by which it has been accomplished." P.
Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
26 Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025
(1957).
27 Bokenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943).
28 D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942).
29
In Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 CoLUM. L.
REV. 439, 470 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Millstein], it is written:
A review of the cases demonstrates that generally the Commission will find that
an advertisement promises what the Commission itself believes it promises,
notwithstanding dictionary definitions, the testimony of consumers and experts,
or the results of surveys. The Commission always seems able to find one rule or
another that can justify its determination of meaning. Furthermore, the courts
seem quite willing in most instances to uphold the Commission's view of the
promise.
(For further reference, and cases cited, see Millstein at 470-78.)
01Id. at 478-80; see also Gellhorn, Proof of Deception Before the Federal Trade
Commission, 17 KANS. L. REv. 559, 563 (1969); Note, Developments in the Law:
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005 (1967).
Consumers are, quite predictably, at a disagreement over what constitutes
"false" or deceptive advertising. One study concluded that "while it is quite likely
that persons are as opposed to misleading advertising as they are to sin, it is equally
likely that they have vastly different notions as to what constitutes misleading
advertising." Pollay, supra note 1, citing Kottman, A Semantic Evaluation of Mislead2

2"To

ing Advertising, 14 J.

CoMMUmCATION

151, 154 (1964).

Travers, Foreword to Symposium: Federal Trade Commission Regulation of
Deceptive Advertising, 17 KANS. L. REv. 551, 554 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Travers], cites BAUER AND GEYSER, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA: THE CONSUMER VIEW
331, 333 (1968), which concluded that the majority of those polled "were more
favorable than unfavorable toward the institution of advertising. Significantly, the
major reason given for these approving attitudes was the informational value of
advertising." On the other hand, Anderson and Winer, Corrective Advertising: The
F.T.C.'s New Formula for Effective Relief, 50 TEX. L. REv. 312, 321 (1972), cite
sources in notes 48 and 49, which suggest that most people do not believe the claims
made by advertisements.
31In FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 375, 385 (1965), the late Chief Justice
Warren wrote: "As an administrative agency which deals continually with cases in the
area, the Commission is often in a better position than are the courts to determine
when a practice is 'deceptive' within the meaning of the [F.T.C.] Act."
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the other hand, is able to delay complying with the Commission order for
years, while his case is on appeal.3 2 During this time, he is free to continue
running his allegedly deceptive ads. The Commission, in the past few
years, has devised the remedy of "corrective advertising"
to help
33
counteract the effects of prolonged advertising deception.
Materiality: The idea that the representation must be materially
deceptive is not directly expressed in Section 45(a),34 but is mentioned
in Section 55(a)(1), in cases of "false" advertising of foods, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics. 35 It has been observed that courts have required
even "unfair and deceptive practices" under Section 45(a) to stem from
material misrepresentations.3 6 In F.T.C. v. Colgate Palmolive Co.,37 the
Courts usually uphold F.T.C. actions unless it is proved that the Commission
acted arbitrarily (Carter Products, Inc., v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 497 [9th Cir.], cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 [1959]), clearly abused its discretion (Independent Directory
Corp. v. FTC, 188 F.2d 468, 470 [2d Cir. 1951]), or failed to make an allowable
judgment in its choice of remedies (Carter Products, Inc., v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821, 826
[7th Cir. 1951]).
32 It took 15 years, for example, for the F.T.C. to take "liver" out of "Carter's Little
Liver Pills."
33 The remedies which the F.T.C. can impose are essentially the following:
(1) Cease and desist order: An order requiring the advertiser to stop publishing
or broadcasting those ads, or similar ads, which have been found to be deceptive,
unfair, or false.
(2) Affirmative Disclosure: A requirement that, in future ads, certain information be included, without which, the ad's representations would have a material
omission.
(3) Corrective Advertising: "To verbalize retractions to the effect that [the
advertiser] has falsely advertised in the past, and is now correcting the false
impression." (Definition from Note, False Advertising: The Expanding Presence of
the F.T.C., 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 650, 653-4 (1973).
For further reference on corrective advertising, see Note, Corrective Advertising,
85 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1971); Note, Corrective Advertising and the F.T.C., 70 MICH.
L. REv. 374 (1971); Anderson and Winer, Corrective Advertising: The F.T.C.'s New
Formula for Effective Relief, 50 TEx. L. Rav. 312 (1972); Note, Corrective Advertising-The New Response to Consumer Deception, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 415 (1972).
For a comparison of actions under the F.T.C. Act and the common law, see
Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the F.T.C., 24 FED. BAR J. 548 (1964).
34 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1)(1963).
35 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1963).
s6See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216-7 (1933); Pep Boys-Manny,
Moe, & Jack, Inc., v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941). See also Note,
"Extrinsic Misrepresentation"in Advertising Under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1966).
37 380 U.S. 374 (1965). This case involved the infamous Rapid Shave sandpaper
shaving demonstration. The cream could shave sandpaper, but only after soaking the
paper in water for 80 minutes. The demonstration in the ad did not disclose that
fact, and indeed, the demonstration did not show the cream actually shaving
sandpaper, ostensibly because sandpaper does not photograph faithfully. A "mock-up"
using sand and plexiglass was used instead. When is "deception" from a "mock-up" to
be considered materially deceptive? Ice cream, for example, cannot be photographed
under hot studio lights, and so mashed potatoes are usually substituted. That is not
considered to be materially deceptive. The explanation of the holding in the Rapid
Shave case is best expressed in Note, "Extrinsic Misrepresentation" in Advertising
Under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 36, at 732, as
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United States Supreme Court held that a misrepresentation can be
material not only if it relates to the product, but also if it materially
induces the purchase of the product.
Public Injury-Public Interest: Although an ad may be deceptive,
courts will usually look to see if there exists a "public interest" in stopping
the advertising. 8 This sometimes results in the consideration of a different,
though related question: what potential injury may result from the
deception? While this would usually involve financial injury, courts
have also held that there is sufficient injury when a consumer is "tricked"
into buying a product.3s
Defenses: There are certain defenses which an advertiser might
plead, when an action is brought against him under the F.T.C. Act. It
appears, though, that an advertiser may still find it difficult to prevail
against an F.T.C. complaint.1°
follows: "Rapid Shave's hypothetical ability to shave sandpaper as portrayed was
irrelevant, for only after they were led to believe that this feat was actually being
performed before their eyes did many persons decide to buy the product."
In Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246, 248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818
(1959), it was held that a material issue could be raised "at least in part upon
il-founded sentiment, belief or caprice." The case involved an advertiser's failure to
disclose, in its ads, that its motor oil was "used" oil that had been re-refined. While
the oil was identical, chemically, to "new" oil, the court held that consumers would
prefer "new" as opposed to "used" oil, and should be advised in advertisements that
the oil promoted was not "new."
Other examples of materiality based upon "popular" consumer preferences
include:
L. Heller & Son v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951), which held that it was an
unfair trade practice not to disclose in advertising that imitation pearls were imported,
since Americans were deemed to have a preference for domestically produced goods.
Purofied Down Prods. Corp., 48 F.T.C. 155 (1951), held that a producer of
goosefeathers must disclose the fact that they were used, as purchasers were deemed
to prefer new feathers.
3

8 See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.

39 See FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); FTC v. Algoma Lumber

Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1933);
Carter Prods. Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963); Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d
246 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe, &
Jack Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941); FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 620
(2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 598 (1928).
40 (1) Puffing: " 'Puffing' refers, generally, to an expression of opinion not made as
a representation of fact.... While a seller has some latitude in 'puffing' his goods, he
is not authorized to misrepresent them or to assign to them benefits or virtues they
do not possess." Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945).
(2) Truth: "Words and sentences may be literally and technically true and yet
be framed in such a setting as to mislead or deceive." Bockensette v. FTC, 134 F.2d
369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943); See also P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir.
1950).
(3) No prejudice to public:
The consumer is prejudiced if upon giving an order for one thing, he is supplied
with something else.... In such matters, the public is entitled to get what it
chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps
by ignorance.... Dealers and manufacturers are prejudiced when orders that
would have come to them if the lumber had been rightfully named, are diverted
to others whose methods are less scrupulous.
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Unfairness: Section 45(a) 41 refers to "unfair" methods, acts, or
practices in commerce. Gerald Thain, Assistant Director for National
Advertising, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission,
has observed that the Commission traditionally has attacked only unfair
42
but he urges that
methods of competition, "in the anti-trust sense,"
"unfairness" under the Act should also be used to attack advertising
which is unfair to consumers. (Misleading advertising, for example, has
been held to be "unfair" in its effect, but only in the sense that it puts
honest competitors at a disadvantage.) 43
Thain has also pointed out that actions based on simple deception
were adequate in the past, but advertisers, he observes, have become more
sophisticated in their techniques of persuasion, requiring the development
44
of new actions and remedies, to protect consumers and competitors. He
feels that actions based on "unfairness" may provide the solution. President
Kennedy, in his 1962 Consumer Message to Congress, outlined what he
referred to as "consumer rights": (1) The right to safety; (2) The right
to be informed; (3) The right to choose; (4) The right to be heard. Under
the "right to be informed" are included the following significant words of
elaboration: "... and to be given the facts [needed] to make an informed

FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 219 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1934) (selling "yellow" pine as
"white" pine).
(4) No deceit of the public: "Advertisements are intended not 'to be carefully
dissected with a dictionary at hand, but rather to produce an impression upon prospective purchasers.'" Positive Products Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
(5) Early disclosure: In Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821, 822-24 (7th
Cir. 1951), it was held that the advertiser could not claim that his product was
effective in stopping perspiration for one to three days, but then indicate on the label
directions that a person should apply the product as often as necessary-a direction
which indicated, as the court found, that the product was not as effective as the
representations had claimed.
(6) No cure claimed: Some ads strongly imply that their products will cure an
ailment. The advertiser defends by arguing that such a claim was never actually made,
but that argument is not strong, in the light of the F.T.C.'s ability to interpret an ad's
meaning. See Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 1953).
(7) Statements of opinion made in good faith: The impression left with viewers,
and not the advertiser's good faith, will determine if there is a misrepresentation.
See Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1953) at 316-17.
This list is derived from Barnes, supra note 14, and is not an exhaustive list of
allpossible defenses. For a more thorough compilation, see 2 TRADE REO. REP.
7533, and further sections cited therein.
41 15 U.S.C.§ 45(a) (1)(1963).

42 Thain, Drug Advertising and Drug Abuse-The Role of the F.T.C., 26 FooD DRUO
CosM. L.J. 487, 495 (1971).
43 In FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942), the Court held: "[W]hen the
Commission finds as it did here that misleading and deceptive statements were made
with reference to the quality of merchandise it is also authorized to infer that "trade
will be diverted from competitors who do not engage in such 'unfair methods.''
44 Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-The F.T.C. Response, 27 Bus. LAW. 891,
902 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Thain].
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choice."' 45 The White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health
46
added a fifth "right": The right to proper food and proper nourishment.
The idea of unfairness has thus been described to be a broad
concept, 47 and it has been interpreted to mean that advertisers should give
consumers adequate information about their products, to enable consumers
to make rational choices. This usual lack of information upon which to
make a rational decision is also related to the idea that, in many fields
(and certainly including food and drugs), advertisers seek to "create"
48
through their ads differences between virtually identical products.
Also condemned are ads which are said to evoke "moods"; ads
which are capable of persuading consumers to ignore such "rational
49
considerations as the price, or quality of the thing which is promoted.
45

Morse, A Consumer's View of F.T.C. Regulation of Advertising, 17 KANS. L. REv.

639, 640 (1969),

cites CONSUMERS' PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAMS,

H.R. Doc.

No. 364, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
4 See Thain, supranote 44, at 610.
It is ironic to recall FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
The F.T.C., in contemplation of bringing actions against various drug manufacturers
for their advertising of analgesics, conducted an independent study which suggested
that aspirin was as effective as other more elaborate "combination of ingredients"
products. The makers of Bayer Aspirin attempted to publish the study, to promote
their product. The F.T.C. attempted to stop them, claiming that such a study might
be interpreted by some consumers as an official endorsement of aspirin.
47
See Note, Corrective Advertising, 85 HARv. L. REv. 477, 495 (1971).
48Ralph Nader describes this as "competitive ferocity over profound trivia." See
Austern, What Is Unfair Advertising? 26 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 659, 665 (1971).
It is revealing to examine the advertising/sales ratios of different commodities,
as compiled by Greer, Product Differentiation and Drug Mergers (I1), 4 ANTI-TRUST
L. & EcoN. REV. 63 (1971):

Advertising/Sales Ratios in Non-Drug Industries (of products capable of
"product differentiation"):
Beer ............... 9%
Breakfast cereals ....... 15-18%
Cigarettes ............. 10%
Soft drinks ..........
about" 10%
Soap ............... 10%
Electrical appliances ....... 13%
In Drugs:
Bristol-Myers
Sterling Drug
(Bufferin) ........... 27.6%
(Phillips, Bayer) ...... 21.6%
Warner-Lambert
Miles Laboratories
(Pharmaceuticals) ..... .16.8%
(Alka-Seltzer) ........ 24.0%
In Travers, supra note 30, at 555, it is observed:
According to Cox, FELLMUTH, AND SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE F.T.C.
App. 3 (1969), the following were the first-quarter television advertising
expenditures of 1968 for the following products:
Anacin .....
..
...................
$4,618,500
Bayer Aspirin ......
.................
3,110,500
Bufferin .......
...................
2,929,500
In 1967, the F.T.C. received an appropriation of $14,378,000. Of this
amount, $6,846,000 was allocated to stopping deceptive practices (ld. App. 1).
This latter figure is less than the combined television advertising budget for
Anacin and Bayer during the first quarterof 1968.
49
See Thain, supra note 44, at 902.
No F.T.C. actions against an advertiser for using "mood" to promote a product
have been found, but possible examples of such ads might be:
Sominex (ad number [12]): These ads promote a "mood" of respectability, in
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Some "non-rational" ads have been characterized as ads which play
on consumers' emotions, needs, and fears. 50 One case which has been
cited to show the F.T.C.'s new disposition to attack advertisements which
use such techniques is the "Vivarin" decision. 51 J. B. Williams was
promoting its caffeine stimulant as a "new" product which housewives
should take, to prevent feeling tired, so that they could become more
The ads did not even disclose that
sexually alluring to their husbands.
52
caffeine was the active ingredient.
In F.T.C. v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co.,5 a case not directly dealing
with unfairness in advertising, there is printed, in a note, a set of guidelines
for unfairness which seem to be applicable to advertising:
The Commission has described the factors it considers in determining
whether a practice which is neither in violation of the antitrust laws
nor deceptive is nonetheless unfair:
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwisewhether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some
common law, statutory, or other established concept of fairness;
(2) Whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
(3) Whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or
competitors or other businessmen).'
The list of factors, particularly in (2) and (3), might be interpreted
as very broad indeed.5
promoting a sleeping aid, a product which many people undoubtedly have negative

feelings about.
Alpen: (ad number [6]): An idyllic mood of mountainous Switzerland seems to
be stressed as much as the breakfast cereal.
50 See Thain, supra, note 44, at 902.
51 J.B. Williams Co., 81 F.T.C. 238 (1972).
52 Gerald Thain, in Thain, Drug Advertising and Drug Abuse-The Role of the

F.T.C., 26 FooD DRuG CosM. L.J. 487, 499 (1971), remarks:
Although the Vivarin complaint proceeds on the theory that the advertising is
false and misleading, I personally feel that the use of the challenged ads comes
very close to what I would define as an unfair practice. I would question the
fairness of any ad which exploits the aspirations of married women by
representing that a product such as Vivarin, can and will be effective in making
them attractive and exciting to their husbands.
53 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
54Id. at 244-5, n.5.
WFor a less optimistic assessment of the value of the enumerated factors, see Note,
Psychological Advertising: A New Area of F.T.C. Regulation, Wisc. L. Rav. 1097,
1108 (1972). Thain, supra note 44, at 899, argues:

In the past, the "Unfairness Doctrine" has been used mainly to attack actual

practices, rather than advertising, and usually these practices have been so
blatantly inequitable or coercive as to evince actual intent to defraud consumers.

.. There is nothing inherent in the meaning of the term "unfair act or practice,"
however, that limits it to this type of activity. Just as the term "deceptive acts
or practices" has been construed to include false advertising, so the term "unfair
acts or practices" may be construed to include unfair advertising. (emphasis

added).
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(1) THROUGH (13) IN RELATION TO F.T.C. STANDARDS
Food and drugs, when taken wisely, will promote good health, but
misleading or unfair advertising of food and drugs resembles an infectious
disease in some ways. Like any other disease, such advertising is all too
capable of impairing one's health. Such advertising, with its half truths,
incorrect conclusions, enticing pictures and jingles, attractive settings,
layouts, models, contagious humor, and exaggerated claims, attacks
unwary consumers, with the likely result that they will be persuaded
to buy products for the wrong reasons. Advertisers may convince a
consumer to buy or take a drug for an "ailment" that needs no treatment
with drugs. Consumers, by buying one product, may be precluded from
getting something else which would actually be better.56 Consumers,
by "treating only a symptom" which they have been encouraged to
57
self-diagnose, may mask the seriousness of their afliction.
ADVERTISEMENTS

Misleading advertising of food and drugs is also much like a disease
in the sense that it constantly appears in new forms. The possibility
exists, that with each new advertising campaign for a product, an
advertiser can portray the product in some misleading or unfair way. As
medical researchers constantly attempt to identify new strains of diseases,
and develop new vaccines to immunize against them, so, it seems, that
it is necessary constantly to examine food and drug advertising, to see if
some new strain of some old advertising malady is present, and to
determine what measures are appropriate to deal with the "infection."
One further point should be emphasized: The F.T.C., in its
deliberations, is concerned with questions of fact, as opposed to questions
of law. The Commission, in advertising cases, seems to concentrate most
For criticisms of the idea of an expanded doctrine of unfairness, see Austern,
What Is Unfair Advertising? supra note 48; Austern, What Is Unfair Advertising?
A Discussion of Consumer Advertising from the Point of View of the Consumer, the
Government, and Industry, 27 Bus. LAW. 883 (1972); Charlton, Food Advertising

Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 27 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 226 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Charlton].

56 See, e.g., Note, Corrective Advertising and the F.T.C., 70 MiCH. L. REv. 374 (1971).

For a collection of surveys which suggest how poorly fed Americans are, see
Baxter, NutritionalLabeling: An Analysis, 26 FooD DRUO CosM. L.J. 82 (1971).
Peterson, Informative Labeling as a Consumer Guide, 27 FOOD DRUO CosM.
L.J. 70 (1972), offers statistics which suggest that children see only ads for "fun" or
"junk" foods. The question which this suggests is whether parents see ads for foods
which are nutritionally much better.
Charlton, supra note 55, complains, on behalf of the food industry, that the
F.T.C. hasn't given the industry any guidelines in the past, and did not even have
until recently a nutritionist on its scientific staff.
"The gaps in our public knowledge about nutrition, along with actual misinformation carried by some media, are contributing seriously to the problem of hunger

and malnutrition in the United States.' Thain, supra note 44, at 892, citing WHITE
HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FOOD, NuTrrIoN, AND HEALTH: FINAL REPORT (1969) at 179.
5

7See, e.g., J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481, 549 (1965). Brennan, Affirmative
Disclosure in Advertising and Control of Packaging Design Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 20 Bus. LAW. 133 (1964).
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on determining the meaning or implication of the representations. It then
usually refers to the F.T.C. Act, to hold that the representations violate
some portion of the statute. The Commission rarely if ever cites to court
decisions, or to prior F.T.C. decisions, for it is unnecessary to cite any
precedent to make a factual finding. Questions of law, and the issue of
possible abuse of discretion by the Commission, are appealed to the
federal courts, if the advertiser wishes to pursue his case. Most of
the F.T.C. decisions are not appealed, and thus it would seem that many
questions of law that are raised in them are left unanswered.
The discussion of the ads that follow concentrates on finding the
meaning or implication of the ads, for that is the way that the F.T.C.
would consider them. Unlike in F.T.C. decisions, comparisons are
provided with F.T.C. cases dealing with similar advertising problems. The
other cases also 'help to point out that certain kinds of advertising practices
have not been, but probably should be considered by the Commission.
Each of the 13 ads described earlier, in this writer's opinion, is either
misleading, or is otherwise unfair. Others may not agree with some of the
writer's assessments, 58 but this Comment will hopefully offer strong
reasons why these ads should be construed as in violation of the F.T.C.
Act. The fact that these ads, and similar ads, have been permitted to be
published or aired, strongly suggests that the F.T.C. still has much
unfinished work ahead of it before food and drug advertising is free
of serious improprieties.
Faulty conclusions: In the first two examples, the ads reach, on the
basis of information given to viewers, conclusions which hardly seem
warranted. Number (1) is just one of several ads in a series which
seem to try, consistently, to confuse viewers into believing that the tests
concluded that Excedrin was proved to be "significantly more effective"
against any kind of pain, compared against any other product. For those
who will remember the vague qualification, "pain other than headache,"
the ad might still be potentially dangerous. A mother, for example, might
take the ad to mean that Excedrin is suitable to use to relieve her child's
pain from an upset stomach. A product containing aspirin, as Excedrin
does, may actually increase stomach pain, rather than relieve it, as aspirin
often upsets the taker's stomach, as a side effect. The argument, that the
user should read the directions on the label, should be no defense in this
instance. 59 A person could conceivably buy the product for stomach upset,
only to realize later that it is not the right medication to take.
The Anacin ad (Number [2]) is puzzling on its surface, and becomes
even more confusing as it is considered further. It suggests that viewers
should not be satisfied merely with a pain reliever which gives them an
"effective level of pain relief" in minutes. Instead, we should take Anacin,
58 See Barnes, supra note 14, at 618.
59 See Travers, supra note 30.
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because it, later on, "hits and holds the highest level of pain relief." Whether
that means that it is any more "effective," by Anacin's own definition, is
not clear. The reason why Anacin reaches its "higher level," we are told,
is apparently because it contains more pain reliever per dosage. The
difference, then, is one of strength, as opposed to "effectiveness." Presumably, if Anacin is better because it is stronger, we could achieve the same
60
result with the other products, simply by taking more of them. The ad
closes, paradoxically, with the old familiar slogan, "Anacin relieves pain
fast," but the graph shown in the ad, on the other hand, proved that the
6
other two products reached an "effective level" before Anacin did. '
The question not answered is: of what significance is it that Anacin
60

See Carter Prods. Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963).

-...
and
Anacin relieves pain fast." Even with the conjunctive, this statement can hardly be
said to follow logically from the data on the graph.
(Anacin recently introduced a new series of ads, which features endorsements
from professional people. In one ad, Mrs. Loftus, who identifies herself as a college
teacher, says that she takes Anacin when "[she] has a headache... [for] there's
something in it that works [emphasis added]." The announcer interjects, "That's right,
Mrs. Loftusi" and he then gives the same confusing explanation for Anacin's
"superiority" that was used in ad number [2]. Anacin's supposed "superiority," of
course, is due to its greater strength per dosage, and is not due to any "miracle
ingredient" which Mrs. Loftus infers is present.)
The most recent, comprehensive action by the Commission against advertisements
of pain relievers was taken, astonishingly, over 13 years ago. See American Home
Products Corp., 67 F.T.C. 430 (1961). The F.T.C. there found that drug manufacturers had made the following false representations:
Speed:
(1) "Anacin acts with such incredible speed as to provide relief of [sic]
pain faster than any other analgesic preparation available and offered to
consumers."
(2) "Bufferin provides relief from pain twice as fast as aspirin."
(3) "St. Joseph Aspirin provides relief of [sic] pain faster than any other
analgesic preparation available and offered for sale to consumers."
(4) "Bayer Aspirin works faster than any other analgesic preparation
available and offered for sale to consumers."
(5) "Bayer Aspirin for Children works faster than any other children's
analgesic preparation available and offered for sale to consumers."
Tension:
(1) "Anacin relaxes tension."
2) "Bufferin relieves tension."
3) "Excedrin relieves tension."
Depression:
(1) "Anacin helps overcome depression."
(2) "Excedrin acts as an anti-depressant."
Strength:
"Excedrin is an extra-strength pain reliever, is 50% stronger than aspirin,
and that two Excedrin tablets equal three ordinary pain tablets."
Relief from Swelling:
"Excedrin will combat the cause of pain by reducing the swelling of tissue."
The Commission decided to withdraw the complaints in 1965, apparently
because it felt that the proceedings had become bogged down from delays (see 67
F.T.C. at 448-449). The claims made in ads (1) and (2), cited in the text, are much
more subtle than the claims made in the ads cited in the Commission's complaint:
Excedrin no longer claims that it relieves tension, acts as an anti-depressant, or relieves
tissue swelling; Excedrin now simply is claimed to be "more effective" against "pain
other than headache." Anacin does not claim now that it works faster than other
over-the-counter analgesics, or that it relaxes tension or helps overcome depression;
Anacin is promoted simply as "better" because it is "stronger."
61 After running this ad for several months, it was revised slightly to end
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is stronger? What the ad really implies, is that a "stronger" medication is
a "better" medication. A weak remedy is an inferior remedy. More
strength means more relief. 62 (It is worth noting generally, also, that ads
which boast of a drug's monumental "strength" per dosage, do not seem

The F.T.C. apparently does not share this writer's opinion, that drugs should not
be advertised as more "effective" because they are stronger. Thain, Drug Advertising
and Drug Abuse-The Role of the F.T.C., supra note 52, at 491, cites the F.T.C.
Proposed Rule of July 5, 1967, for the advertising of non-prescription analgesic drugs.
Proposed Rule number (2) seems to say that it is permissible for an ad to claim that
a drug is "more effective" because of its greater strength, as long as it is disclosed
that its greater "effectiveness" is attributable to the increase in dosage. This position,
it is submitted, enables drug advertisers to reenforce the notion, in consumer minds,
that "stronger" is always "better."
What then, are the limits which the F.T.C. has imposed on drug advertisers?
The answers are found in bits and pieces, in F.T.C. Complaints. In the last ten
years, the Commission has decided the following:
(1) No drug ad should encourage consumers to "self-diagnose" an ailment.
J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481 (1965). The makers of Geritol encouraged people
to diagnose tiredness as iron deficiency anemia, when only a physician could
accurately determine if a person is suffering from such anemia.
(2) Ads should not imply that a product will "cure" an ailment, if the product
in fact only treats its symptom(s). Merk & Co., 69 F.T.C. 526 (1966). The makers of
Sucrets represented that their lozenges would kill "even staph and strep germs on
contact." The Commission decided that statement implied that Sucrets would cure
diseases caused by those infections. The Commission found that while the lozenges did
kill staph and strep "germs" on contact, the lozenges only killed them on the surface
of the throat. Therefore, the preparation could only provide temporary relief.
(3) Drug ads should not encourage "self-medication." Bristol Myers Co., 74
F.T.C. 780 (1968). The F.T.C. found that the makers of Bufferin advertised that
medical tests showed that Bufferin reduced swelling and inflamation, increased joint
movement, and improved grip strength of arthritis sufferers. The ad continued, "If
you have arthritis, you should be under a doctor's care, even in the early stages.
If your doctor prescribes Bufferin, it's good to know you can take it without the
stomach upset other drugs often cause. Bufferin, a leader in arthritis research."
The Commission complained that the ad failed to disclose that, in the tests, the
drug was administered in "near toxic doses" (74 F.T.C. at 853) to achieve the results
indicated. The Commission went on to conclude,
Despite its carefully hedged language, there can be little doubt that this advertisement was not intended solely to report the conclusions [of the tests] but was
also intended, or at least would tend, to induce arthritis sufferers to purchase
Bufferin-that is, to encourage arthritics to engage in self-medication.... The
advertisement was published in two magazines of general circulation; and,
despite its studied ambiguity, its principal impact is to suggest that costly
treatment may be unnecessary since Bufferin, a product available over the
counter, is useful for treating the disease.
(4) Advertisers must be prepared to substantiate all claims made in their ads.
62

Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). For a detailed analysis of this decision, see Note,

The Pfizer Reasonable Basis Test-Fast Relief for Consumers but a Headache for

Advertisers, 1973 DuKE L.J. 563 (1973).

(5) It may be "false" advertising to imply that a product designed to treat one
kind of symptom, will bring benefits to the user in other, unrelated ways. J. B.
Williams Co., 81 F.T.C. 238 (1972). The makers of Vivarin, a caffeine stimulant,
were found to have represented falsely that their product would "make one more
exciting and attractive, improve one's personality, marriage and sex life, and will solve
marital and other personal problems." (81 F.T.C. at 242). One F.T.C. official has
argued that the ad should have been attacked as "unfair," instead of as "false and
misleading." See note 52 supra.
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to emphasize the risk of overdosage as prominently.63) The Anacin ad
would have made more sense, and would have avoided reinforcing the
dangerous myth about "strength" always being desirable, by stating, for
example, "Don't buy Anacin simply because they're stronger, but if you
find that you need a stronger pain reliever than the type you may
64
presently be using, then try Anacin."
Testimonial: Ad number (3), for Tang Instant Breakfast Drink,
involves a very unusual kind of testimonial. The housewife identifies herself
as having a Ph.D., and then tells viewers about the supposed virtues of
Tang. How should viewers react to the disclosure of her educational
status? Would it in any way encourage them to buy the product, and if
so, for what reasons? Would those reasons be valid or "rational" ones?
Has anything been misrepresented in the ad, assuming that the woman
that the
does, in fact, have a Ph.D.? It would seem to be no coincidence
65
woman selected to do the ad has an unusual, "esteemed" status.
The endorsement here could not be called a "collective endorsement,"
for it is not implied, nor would it seem that many viewers would infer,
from the ad, that all, or even many Ph.D. holders endorse Tang. On the
other hand, the ad is not, in its effect, a personal endorsement, either.
Such an endorsement would be made by an individual who is known and
67
respected65 (i.e., a baseball player, a movie star, or astronauts, as used in
It is true, that older ads for sleeping aids warned, "Take only as directed. Avoid
excessive use." Most products today use a more general warning, such as Bayer's, "As
with all medications, take only as directed," or, as Lloyd Bridges would mention on
radio ads for Contac, "Take Contac only as directed, and only when you know
you need it."
63

Another "consumer myth" may be involved with drug ads which stress strength:
"two tablets are all you should ever take." Drug manufacturers "get around" this
myth simply by increasing the dosage per tablet, and then claim that their product is
superior because it is "stronger." The consumer stays happy, by taking his two
"stronger" tablets, convinced that they are really superior to the "weaker" tablets he
had been taking "two of" before.
65
Recall how the earlier ads stressed how Tang was used in the Apollo Space
Program. Since that N.A.S.A. program has now ended, it would stand to reason that
the advertisers would try to find a suitable "substitute" for astronauts. In another
recent ad for Tang, featuring a woman who appears to be a commercial airlines pilot
as well as a mother, the woman says, "When Stan [her young son] heard that Tang
went to the moon, he said, 'Let's try it'!"
6
6 Readers may be surprised to learn that Eleanor Roosevelt made an ad for Imperial
Margarine in the late 1950's! (Recent Imperial ads show husbands or wives wearing
huge crowns after tasting the spread's "fit for a king" flavor.) The money Mrs.
Roosevelt earned for her testimonial was donated to a United Nations fund, although
that was not disclosed in the ad.
67 The closest, most recent F.T.C. case involving a testimonial of a food product is
Beatrice Foods Co. 81 F.T.C. 830 (1972). Baseball player Lou Brock appeared in a
series of ads for Holloway's Milk Duds. The Commission decided that the ads were
"false, misleading or deceptive" because "the consumption of confectionaries such
as 'Holloway's Milk Duds' is not linked to or necessary for the instilling, improving
or maintaining of athletic ability or performance. Instead, said endorsements are based
upon a monetary relationship... and not upon any nutritional superiority or
attribute of said product."
64
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the earlier Tang ads), and whose personal association with a product
would prompt consumers to buy it. In the Tang ad, since the woman is
not a well known figure, one can only conclude that the advertiser is trying
to suggest that a word of approval from a holder of some sort of advanced
degree is a valid reason for consumers to buy his breakfast drink.
It may be argued that the ad is "false" under Section 55(a) (1) of
the F.T.C. Act, "to the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal
facts material in the light of such representations." 68 By this rationale,
the "material omission" would be the undisclosed reason why an otherwise
anonymous Ph.D. holder approves of a product. The fact would seem to
be a material fact,69 and not disclosing it simply leaves viewers to draw
possibly faulty conclusions that such an endorsement necessarily means
that the product is recognized as desirable by an expert in the field, or
7
that it is preferable to other breakfast drinks or juices. 0
The "Natural"Foods: Numbers (4) through (6) are examples of ads
promoting "natural" foods. The most salient point, at least from the
advertiser's standpoint, is that to call anything "natural" is to say
something good about it; something that, in some mysterious way,
registers a positive impression with consumers and apparently motivates
them to buy.7n But what, exactly, does "natural" mean? Different
advertisers have different ideas. "Sugar in the Raw" was promoted as
"natural" and "organic," because it was claimed that it had no
preservatives, and because it was "unrefined." 7 2 Post Cereals, on the other
hand, promotes its Grape Nuts as a "back to nature cereal." A close
reading of Euell Gibbons' description in ad number (5) would seem to
suggest that since wheat and barley are "natural," that is enough, by
implication, to make the cereal natural when those grains are baked. The
reference, however, to "fortifying" Grape Nuts with vitamins suggests that
there are additional ingredients that are not, indeed, "natural." The
Quaker Oats Co. offers, on the side of its package for Quaker 100%
Natural Cereal, the following interesting information:
Natural foods should not be confused with organic foods generally
represented to be grown without aid of artificial fertilizers and
without pesticides.
68

15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1963).

374 (1965), and text accompanying
note 37 supra.
70In Erikson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 940
(1960), the advertiser was prohibited from using ads which pictured men "attired in
a type of white jacket customarily worn and associated with members of the medical
profession." It is arguable that a Ph.D.'s endorsement, to many viewers, might be the
equivalent of a medical doctor's approval.
71 It is amusing to recall that advertisers have not always promoted "natural" as
necessarily "desirable." George Washington Hill, in 1931, for example, created a
flamboyant ad campaign for Lucky Strike Cigarettes, which claimed that Lucky
Strike's "Toasting" process removes "sheep-dip base" found naturally in all tobacco
leaf. See LEWlm, GOOD-BYE TO ALL THAT 72-73 (1970).
72 Cumberland Packing Co., 81 F.T.C. 352 (1972).
69 See FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S.
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Quaker 100% Natural Cereal is a natural food product, made
from conventionally grown foodstuffs to which no artificial additives
or preservatives have been added.7
the F.T.C. or F.D.A. has been found,
No guideline from either
74
covering the term "natural."
Only one F.T.C. complaint has been found which is even remotely
75
connected with "natural" foods: Cumberland Packing Corporation. On
the basis of ad excerpts number (4), and other similar ads, the Commission
found that Cumberland had falsely represented its product, Sugar in
the Raw, as:
(1) an organically grown food;

(2) not a processed food;
(3) a significant source of vitamins and minerals;

(4) substantially different from, or superior to, other sugars because
it does not utilize or contain any chemicals or preservatives.
The claims made in ads (5) and (6) are more elusive. The
Commission, in its discretion, could conceivably interpret the Grape Nuts

representations as false, for a "back to nature" cereal might be defined to
mean that it is not "adulterated," even with additional vitamins. In order
to move against the Alpen Cereal ad (number [6]) the Commission would
have to depart from its traditional focus of inquiry, which has been
whether the representations are actually "true" or "false," and concentrate
76
on evaluating the very subjective suggestions that are being made. Does
this ad play on consumers' needs, fears, or desires in some way? Even if it

does, it might be argued, most other ads do the same thing, to some
degree. Is there any reason why this particular ad should be singled out
for action? The writer believes that it should be, because it probably is
difficult for a consumer, viewing an ad such as Alpen's, to be critical about
what is being suggested to him. A prospective car buyer, to take another
example, would probably not let a glamorous model, or setting, materially
influence him in his final decision of which car he will purchase. A
housewife will not regularly buy a laundry powder simply on the basis of
claims made in ads for it, that the brand advertised will clean clothes
73 The definition would seem to dispel some confusion in the minds of consumers.

Unfortunately, no advertisement has been found which has attempted to define a
"natural food" as comprehensively. It is puzzling to read, in the list of ingredients of
Quaker 100% Natural Cereal, that non-fat dry milk has been added. It is best left to
experts to argue over whether non-fat dry milk is "a conventionally grown foodstuff,"
or, if it is an additive, they can then argue over whether it is "artificial," or "natural."
74 In Wolnak, Health Foods: Natural, Basic, and Organic, 27 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
453 (1972), the author does not refer to any official guidelines for the meaning of
"natural" and "organic." The inference is irresistible, that no official definitions exist
for those terms.
75 81 F.T.C. 352 (1972).
7
6See Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of F.T.C. Regulation, Wisc. L.
REv. 1097 (1972).
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better than other products. The housewife, instead, will decide whether to
buy the product again on the basis of the results she obtained with it. In
both the case of cars and laundry powders, then, the consumer can
critically evaluate what is represented. In the Alpen ad, on the other
hand, consumers are gently soothed with subtle suggestions, against which
they have not developed a high resistance. After eating "adulterated"
foods, a food with "natural goodness," which is "pure and simple,"
"wholesome and satisfying," must appear to be a desirable, healthful
change from the old fare. A consumer can easily confuse the ad's
incantations with representations suggesting that the product actually
contains more nutrients than other foods. There is little for the consumer
to objectively verify, after he has tried the product once, to help him
decide if he should buy it again. The consumer may not so much be
buying a cereal, as much as he is buying an "idea." The ad is unfair, for
those people who cannot understand what exactly is motivating them to
buy the cereal (i.e., are they buying the cereal because they think that
it is nutritionally superior, or are they buying it simply because they
approve of the enticing words and pictures in the promotion?), and
it is false if the implied promise of nutritional benefits is greater than
what the cereal actually provides. These are questions of fact which
7
the Commission, in its discretion, can determine.
FurtherDrug Advertisements:
The Contac ad number (7) appears to be a very clear-cut violation
of the F.T.C. Act. By mentioning ingredients found in competitors'
products, and then emphasizing that they are not found in Contac, it
would seem that there is a failure "to reveal -facts material in the light of
such representations," as well as a failure to indicate the "consequences
which may result from the use of the commodity to which the advertisement relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement." 7 8
Ordinary consumers do not know what an antitussive, or an analgesic
is. 79 Contac would have us conclude, in our ignorance, that these ingredi77 See text accompanying notes 20-48 supra. See also William Freihofer Baking Co. 81
F.T.C. 921 (1972).
78 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1963).
79An antitussive is a cough suppressant. An analgesic is a pain reliever, and included
in that class would be common aspirin.
In Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972), the F.T.C. complained
that Ocean Spray was confusing customers by using the term "food energy" in place
of the more precise term, calorie. The best rule, obviously, is to require advertisers to
use the terms that will be best understood by consumers. In some instances, it will
be a technical term (i.e. "calorie," in place of "food energy"; "aspirin," in place of
"pain reliever"). In other situations, it will be a generally descriptive term, such
as "cough suppressant," in place of antitussive.
While this Comment was being prepared for publication, Contac has prepared
revised ads, which do not use the objectionable technical terms.
For an amusing judicial discussion of the advisability of using the term "sugar
pill" in place of the term "placebo," see FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669,
676 (2d Cir. 1963).
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ents are undesirable in a cold remedy. The ad also seems to constitute a
clear case of an unfair competitive practice against other manufacturers,
since the ad is definitely disparaging competitive products by innuendo. 80
The second Contact ad (number [8]) is included, to suggest how
inconsistent Contac's reasoning about drug ingredients really is. In the
cold remedy ad, it was suggested that the identified but unexplained
"additional" ingredients of the competitors' products were undesirable.
Now, in the allergy ad, we are being told that we should take Contac if
we suffer from hayfever, because, apparently, one of Contac's ingredients
is effective against hayfever symptoms. The fact that seems to be
overlooked is that if only one ingredient is effective against the symptoms,
the other ingredients in Contac become superfluous. They become, really,
much like the competitors' "additional" ingredients in their cold remedies.
The second Contac ad would thus seem to be seriously inconsistent with
the first. If such a practice is not "false," then surely it is unfair.
Ad number (9) improperly suggests that a drug product which
seems to be designed to relieve the symptoms of one kind of ailment,
can also be taken to relieve the symptoms of a different ailment.
Advertising an arthritis remedy as effective against headache pain, it is
submitted, does not "educate" the public in a beneficial way, but may
instead encourage many consumers to misuse drugs inadvertently. Some
viewers may become convinced that any arthritis remedy, even those
prescribed by doctors, is effective against headaches; particularly since
"Arthritis Pain Formula" could be misconstrued to be a generic term,
instead of a brand name. After watching ad number (9), it seems
very possible for an uncritical viewer to give a child a prescription
drug for arthritis, to relieve the child's headache.,
Ad number (10), when compared with (9), involves a situation
which is the opposite of that found in the two Contac ads, for we have
two "different" remedies, one ostensibly formulated to relieve arthritis
pain, while the other is very likely thought of as a headache remedy, now
being advertised for "each other's" ailments. The fact that both products
come from the same manufacturer reinforces the charges that many
manufacturers create the same products, and then make artificial
distinctions between them.n Here, we go a step further, for the "artificial
distinctions" between the products are in effect being destroyed. Such
advertising can only contribute to the general confusion that must exist
in many people's minds about pain relievers, and should be condemned
as "unfair" to consumers under the F.T.C. Act, even if the representations
are not found to be factually false.
8DSee text accompanying notes 41-55 supra.
81 See note 22 supra; Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1951), and
text accompanying note 40 supra.
82 See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra; see also text accompanying notes 43-55
supra.
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The statement in ad number (9), that "A.P.F. has more pain reliever
than most headache tablets," is descriptively vague. In ad number (7) for
Contac, product ingredients were identified by name, but their effects
were not explained or described. In ad number (10), on the other
hand, we are given a description of an ingredient, and left to guess
its name. The "pain reliever" referred to., presumably, is aspirin, but
advertisers probably avoid identifying it by its most generally understood
name, lest viewers be "misled" into buying plain aspirin instead of the
83
advertised "combination of ingredients" product.
There is another potentially dangerous encouragement in ad number
(9), and in most of the ads which follow. This ad, as many other drug
ads, shows one friend suggesting that another take some kind of drug. In
many ads, the friend who is, in effect, "pushing" a certain remedy, may
cite statistics or other information to back up his recommendation, such
as "Phillips is the kind of laxative doctors recommend most often."
Consumers watching television drug ads can generally assume that
information which one "friend" is scripted to pass on to another is
essentially accurate (unless, of course, we have an outright "false" ad!),
but the real danger is that such ads teach consumers to be very
uncritical about the source of their information on drugs. Consumers
should be encouraged to get their information from more reliable
sources than friends. Normally, one would think that a pharmacy
would be such a source, but an ad for Phillips Milk of Magnesia makes
a mockery even out of that suggestion."
Laxatives: Ad number (11), of course, is objectionable from the
standpoint that one friend, again, is "prescribing" a drug to another. But
besides that ad number (11) is highly objectionable, for it is descriptively
vague about the condition that laxatives are designed to treat. Do
euphemisms such as "not in the swing," "out of sorts," "irregular," or
"sourpuss" faithfully convey the impression that a laxative is to be taken
to relieve constipation? It would seem quite reasonable for some viewers to
conclude that such terms also suggest that laxatives are to be taken for
the treatment of other ailments; ailments for which laxatives are not
83See F.T.C. Proposed Rule of July 5- 1967, supra note 61; see also note 79 supra.
84 In the ad a young girl, apparently just beginning to work at the drugstore, does not
know which laxative to recommend to a customer. A friendly postman walks in, and
advises her to recommend Phillips, for "it's the kind of laxative doctors recommend
most often." Relieved, the girl walks back over to the customer, and recites what she
has just learned. She does not indicate when or how she got the information. The
customer, impressed, buys the Phillips.
The implication of that ad is disturbing, for in it an employee at a drugstore
hears some unverified information about a drug, literally from a man off the street,
and then without attempting to verify it in any way, she passes it on to a customer,
without suggesting how potentially unreliable her source of information is. The
customer is not as critical as she might be, but it is arguable that she should be able
to rely on what she hears about drugs from someone who works at a drugstore.
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designed to be used, such as diarrhea, and "sour" stomach.8 5 These ads, in
effect, dangerously encourage people to self-diagnose a variety of
afflictions as treatable with laxatives.8 6
Over-the-Counter Sleeping Aids: The last two ads, numbers (12)
and (13), are in the writer's opinion extremely objectionable. They are
undoubtedly designed to encourage people who have not used drugs to
help them get to sleep, to start using such drugs. There is a difference
between encouraging a person who is already taking a drug for an
ailment, to "switch" to another brand, and encouraging a person to
introduce an entirely new kind of drug into his "medicinal diet." That
difference at times may only be theoretical, 87 but these two ads do not
make any pretenses about what they are trying to do: they do not try to
persuade sleeping aid users to "switch" from one brand to another, they
are trying to get non-users "started" on what really is "a whole new thing."
From the "aspirin age" of several decades ago,88 this country has
become plagued with drug excesses of all kinds. It seems to be quite
justifiable to argue that, on account of this, advertisers should not
85 Phillips Milk of Magnesia ads at one time stressed that milk of magnesia is not
only a laxative, but an antacid as well.
86 See Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972), for a case involving the
use of the imprecise euphemism "food energy," in place of the term "calorie."
See also J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481 (1965) and Bristol-Myers Co., 74
F.T.C. 780 (1968). in those cases the advertisers were admonished for encouraging
"self-diagnosis" and "self-medication."
The sheer number of laxative ads on television may also have the undesirable
effect of convincing viewers that, with so much promotion, laxatives are to be used by
a great many people fairly often. For example, while in a Phillips ad one friend
phones another saying that, "for the first time in years, I need a laxative," there is
the highly questionable slogan for Ex-Lax which is currently in use: "Everyone needs
help once in a while." Millstein, supra note 29, at 492, observes that the F.T.C. does
not have the power to "regulate the quantity, taste, social values, blatancy, or
frequency of advertising; these are matters with which no federal agency is presently
equipped to deal. A full national debate leading to new legislation is necessary if
these matters are to be controlled."
87 Cigarette advertisers and manufacturers have always insisted that through their ads
they were not trying to encourage anyone to start smoking cigarettes, but, instead, they
were interested in "winning over" people who had already decided to smoke cigarettes.
While that was the theory, it is interesting to recall some of the television
programs which were sponsored by cigarette manufacturers. In the late 1950's,
Marlboro Cigarettes sponsored The Many Loves of Dobie Gillis, a program which
obviously appealed to younger viewers. A more callous example is Winston Cigarettes'
sponsorship of the popular animated series, The Flintstones.On the Flintstone shows,
unlike the Dobie Gillis series, the program characters actually did ads for cigarettes.
It is difficult even to begin to imagine what sort of impact animation of "Fred" and
'Wilma" shown smoking, and extolling the virtues of Winston Cigarettes, would have
on countless young viewers.
In radio days listeners were encouraged to start smoking with such "match-ups"
as Camel Cigarettes and Benny Goodman, in the late 1930's, and Frank Sinatra and
Chesterfield Cigarettes, in the 1940's.
88 Tm AspntrN Aar (M. Leighton, ed. 1949) is a compilation of entertaining articles
about America in the 1920's and 1930's. The title faithfully conveys the impression of
a nation moving into a "higher gear." As the more frantic pace created new "headgches" for people, they turmed more and more to their aspirin bottles to find relief.
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be permitted to inundate the airwaves and periodicals with suggestions
that people can solve more problems by taking more drugs.
The Sominex ads (number [12]) seem to be trying to sell viewers on
the idea that it is not alarming for ordinary people to take drugs in order
to get to sleep. The ads seem to stress wholesome people in wholesome
surroundings encouraging each other to "pop" a Sominex at bedtime. No
individual in any of the recent ads that were viewed had a word of caution
to say about the practice, except to mention that Sominex is fine to take
when one has "occasional" trouble. In the Sleep-Eze ad (number [13]), it
is stated, "If you have occasional trouble [getting to sleep], then perhaps
you'd like to know about Sleep-Eze." The dangerous omission in such a
statement is, how often is occasional? Both ads seem to leave that question
for viewers to decide themselves. In effect, the ads are encouraging
viewers to self-diagnose what is an "occasional" sleeping problem, and
then self-prescribe an over-the-counter drug for its treatment. 89
The Sominex ad was found objectionable for not explicitly warning
viewers that their insomnia might need a doctor's attention. Sleep-Eze, on
the other hand, explicitly warns viewers at the beginning of its ad. Is the
ad thereby made preferable over the Sominex ad? This writer's answer is
that the Sleep-Eze ad ranks among the worst of all the ads considered, for
it seems to motivate people to buy out of fear. What the copywriters have
cleverly done, is to turn a desirable "affirmative disclosure" about the
potential seriousness of a sleeping problem, into a very devious scare
tactic.9 The warning comes at the beginning of the ad. It is reasonable to
assume that such an alarming statement will immediately draw the
attention of a viewer who has been experiencing great difficulty in
sleeping; the kind of person who should really see his doctor instead of his
pharmacist, for a non-prescription sleeping aid. Once that suffering
person's attention has been gotten, on comes the "soft sell" for Sleep-Eze.
The ad encourages the viewer to downplay the potential seriousness
of his insomnia, by suggesting to him, that if he has only "occasional"
trouble, he may not need to see a doctor, after all, for Sleep-Eze is
89 See J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481 (1965); see also Bristol-Myers Co., 74 F.T.C.
780
(1968).
90
In J. B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481, 542 (1965), the F.T.C. considered a drug ad
which advised "check with your doctor":
Despite respondent's argument to the contrary, we find that the implication in
their advertising that a person can self-diagnose a deficiency of iron from his
tiredness symptoms is not dispelled by the phrase "check with your doctor." In
the first place the word "check" suggests that the viewer go to the doctor only
to verify a condition that he is quite capable of recognizing himself. Moreover,
this phrase is usually followed by another statement which completely obscures
its meaning, such as "check with your doctor, and if you've been feeling
wornout, because of iron-poor blood-take GERITOL" On the interpretation
most favorable to respondents, this advertising suggests that the tired viewer
have his condition checked by a doctor, and then treat himself according to a
television statement. We fail to see how this unlikely suggestion clarifies the
meaning of the advertisement.
See also Bristol-Myers Co., 74 F.T.C. 780 (1968).
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available without a prescription. If a person is given a choice in diagnosing
the seriousness of his problem, will he choose the more or less
alarming alternative? It is not very much different from giving an
overindulgent drinker the choice of describing himself as an "alcoholic,"
or as a "social drinker." In the case of an insomniac, the best way
for him to reenforce his hope and belief that his problem is not
serious, is for him to buy Sleep-Eze.
CONCLUSION

The advertising improprieties discussed in this comment seem to
suggest that ads should satisfy four requirements:
(1) Representations and Disclosures: When an ad makes representations, they must be accurate and complete. Certain disclosures may be
required in ads for some kinds of products.
Representations obviously should be accurate, and they should be
complete, to avoid any possible misunderstandings. While it has been
suggested that "each consumer be provided not only with the truth, but
with enough information on which to base an intelligent and informed
decision," '9 this writer believes that a requirement to disclose such
"useful" information should depend upon the kind of product advertised.
With some products, it is difficult to imagine what sort of disclosures
could be made, to help consumers make "rational" evaluations of them.
One example to consider would be the advertising of potato chips. Such
a "snack" or "junk" food was never meant to be bought for "rational"
or "intelligent" reasons. The advertiser should thus be permitted to use
"irrational" promotional techniques in potato chip ads, such as enticing
pictures and jingles, attractive settings, layouts, models, and contagious
humor, as long as consumers are not misled by the ads (misled, for
example, into believing that potato chips are nutritionally valuable), and
as long as there are no problems in the ads, as illustrated in the three
remaining categories. Ads for products such as drugs, on the other hand,
can involve certain dangers, which justify the inclusion of warnings. For
example, an ad which would simply state, "Brand-X Sleeping Potion is
now available at your favorite drugstore," makes no representations about
the product, which might be said to require further elaboration, but it
seems appropriate to require such affirmative disclosures as "Check with
your doctor," and "Observe label directions."
(2) Understandingthe Representations or Suggestions: The ordinary
consumer must be able to understand, from an ad, the meaning or
significanceof the representationsor suggestions.
An "accurate and complete" representation can be as misleading and
91 See Thain, Drug Advertising and Drug Abuse-The Role of the F.T.C., 26 FooD
DRUG CosM. LJ.487, 489 (1971). See also Thain, Food Advertising: The F.T.C. Past
Positions, and Signposts on the Road to the Future, 28 Fool DRuo CosM. LJ. 617
(1973).
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harmful as an outright "false" representation, if the consumer cannot
understand its meaning or significance. The distinction between this
requirement and the first requirement will not always -be well defined,
since a consumer may not understand an advertiser's representations,
because they are "incomplete." This second requirement covers ads in
which the information is provided, but no conclusion from the information
is drawn. For example, the breakfast cereal ads "accurately and
completely" describe some of their ingredients, but the ads fail to indicate
to consumers why it is good for them to eat cereal with such "natural"
ingredients. The ad for Excedrin (ad number [1]), however, offers the
conclusion that it is "more effective against pain," without providing
appropriate preceding representations to warrant such a conclusion. Thus
the Excedrin ad, unlike the cereal ads, is not "accurate and complete" in
its representations, and it comes under the first category.
(3) Understanding the Reason for Buying: The ordinary consumer
must be able to understand, from an ad, why exactly he may be
motivated to buy the product.
This category deals with subtle suggestions in ads, which consumers
may not consciously perceive, which persuade them to buy products. The
Alpen ad (ad number 16]) is a good example of this. The Sleep-Eze ad
(ad number [13]) seems to qualify, too, with its skillfully understated use
of fear, to motivate purchases. The F.T.C. has only begun to explore
"psychological advertising," and this field deserves more detailed consideration by legal writers.92 It is sufficient to say that a consumer has a right
to choose freely between products, and in order for him to be able to
choose freely, he must be able to understand how advertisers may be
attempting to persuade him. A consumer should be able to evaluate ads
critically, and should not be victimized 'by skillful advertisers who may be
able to plant persuasive suggestions in his less critical subconscious mind.
(4) "Fairnessand Ethics:" An ad should not use "un/air" practices,
nor "encourage" consumers in questionable ways.
This broad category takes in such things as unfair competitive
practices, and questionable encouragements. This comment has found
a variety of appalling suggestions made in ads:
(a) A "stronger" drug is a "better" drug (ad [2]).
(b) One can safely rely on friends' advice about drugs (ads [9],
[11], and [12]).
(c) One can, in effect, solve more problems by taking more drugs
(ad number [12]).
(d) One can safely determine, alone, whether a sleeping problem is
serious enough to warrant a doctor's treatment (ad number [13]).
92See Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of F.T.C. Regulation, WIsc. L.
Rev. 1097 (1972). See also Pollay, supra note 1.
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(e) Any vague sort of reference to a hospital, clinical, or university
study guarantees that a product is reliable, and is probably preferable to
other, similar products (ads [1], and [13]).
In closing, it is worth reiterating that since food and drugs have the
potential of injuring health, instead of simply causing financial injury,
increased vigilance of food and drug advertising is justified. Consumers
have a right to be told more than they have been told about the
products they ingest.
BARRY S. DONNER

EXPUNGEMENT IN OHIO: ASSIMILATION INTO
SOCIETY FOR THE FORMER CRIMINAL
I. INTRODUCTION
within the last 50 years that there has been official
recognition of the debilitating legal and social consequences that result
from a citizen's arrest and conviction. Legally imposed restrictions and
the social stigma concomitant with a criminal record effectively operate
to penalize ex-convicts even after they have paid their "debt" to society.
A person with merely an arrest record suffers damage to reputation,
impeachment as a witness, disabilities in acquiring schooling and
professional licenses, more intense police scrutiny, and direct 2 economic
losses.' Consequences of a criminal conviction are more severe.
T HAS ONLY BEEN

Most criminal records are available to the general public; which
fact gives rise to many of the consequences attendant to conviction of a
crime. In recognition of this fact, several state legislatures have enacted
laws commonly termed "expungement statutes."' 3 These statutes seek to
go beyond mere sentence and imprisonment in dealing with the problem
of the criminal offender's relationship with society:
Expungement and annulment are the product of the recent emphasis
in corrections on rehabilitation. Both kinds of statutes are designed
to restore forfeited rights and uplift the offender's status by

I Menard v.

Mitchell, 420 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
examination is found in Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication
Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WAH. U.L.Q.
147, 150-62 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Gough]. For an exhaustive study, see Special
Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv.
929 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Special Project].
3 The use of the word "expungement" to describe these statutes is somewhat of a
misnomer. To expunge "means to destroy or obliterate; it implies... a physical
2 A concise

annihilation." BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 693 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). None of the statutes

call for actual destruction of records.
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exonerating him from the fact of conviction and concealing the
conviction from public view. These statutes are unique because their
imposed by
primary objective is the elimination of the penalties
4
public opinion rather than those imposed by law.
Although the statutes manifest various approaches to the concept of
expungement (no two read exactly alike), they are all linked by the emphasis upon rehabilitation and the former offender's assimilation into society.
II. THE EXPUNGEMENT STATUTES IN GENERAL

Approximately 20 states now have expungement laws, the oldest and
most extensively interpreted being that of California. 5 The nature of the
relief afforded by the different statutes varies from withdrawing a plea
of guilty, or setting aside the verdict, 6 to expungement 7 and sealing of
records. 8 The former attempts to nullify the fact of conviction, while
the latter endeavors to hide all evidence of any proceedings against the
successful applicant. The typical expungement statute states in general
terms the effects of a grant of expungement, such as release from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction 9 and restoration of
all rights and privileges. 10 Most of the more recently enacted statutes
specifically provide that the successful petitioner for expungement may, in
applications for employment or licensing, state that he has never been
convicted of a crime." Almost all the expungement statutes, however,
permit the record of conviction of the expunged crime to be pleaded and
proved in a subsequent criminal prosecution.1
4 Special Project, supra note 2, at 1148-49. Confidentiality of juvenile criminal records
is and has been widely recognized; many states provide for expungement of such
records by statute. E.g., OHIO RaV. CODE ANN.

§ 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973).

Juvenile expungement statutes, however, are not within the scope of this Comment.
5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1974). A comparative reading of this and

the Ohio statute, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.31-.36 (Page Temp. Supp. 1973),
shows how differently expungement can be handled.
6 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1974). Although statutes with such a
provision are commonly called "expungement statutes," they really are not. Gough,
supra note 2, at 152. These statutes are of more limited effect than true expungement
statutes, like that of Ohio. Id. Most existing court decisions about expungement
interpret statutes of this nature and, therefore, are not completely analogous to true

expungement statutes.

7 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973).
8 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1974); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 295.32(C)
(Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
9 E.g., TEx. CODE CRI. PRO. ANN. tit. 42.12 § 7 (1966).
10 OHIo REV.CODE ANN. § 2953.33(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
1 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617(b) (Supp. 1973). Statutes with such a provision

state that the effect of the relief shall be that all criminal proceedings are deemed not
to have occurred. E.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 179.285 (1971). See also MIcH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 780.622 (1968), which merely provides that the proceedings are deemed
not to have occurred, making no mention of applications for employment. Where the
petitioner is released from all penalties and disabilities, such as in the California law,
there is never such a provision.
12
E.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. tit. 42.12 § 7 (1966); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

99

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 1

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 8::3

The applicability of all statutes is limited either to probationers,1 3
convicts who have received pardons, 14 first offenders,' 5 or to those who
committed a crime before reaching the age of 21.16 Some laws combine the
requirements, and some add parolees to the list of those who are eligible."7
Some states make expungement the goal of rehabilitation and
require that the petitioner for expungement show that he has reformed
before he makes his application. He must have exhibited good moral
character since his conviction, or he must show that it is in the public
interest to grant the relief.' 8 Some statutes imply this by providing
that the court "may" grant the applicant's request.' 9 Others apparently
regard expungement as a method to accomplish or a way to encourage
after satisfactory
rehabilitation. They require that the relief be granted
20
completion of parole or probation, or upon pardon.

III.

THE Oao EXPUNGEMENT STATUTE

21

A. The FirstOflender
The availability of expungement in Ohio is limited to the first
offender,22 which the law defines as: "... anyone who has once been
convicted of an offense in this state or any other jurisdiction. When two
or more convictions result from or are connected with the same act, or
result from offenses committed at the same time, they shall be counted
as one conviction." 23 Unfortunately, this definition does not eradicate
all uncertainty.
The most salient uncertainty seems to be in regard to multiple
indictments and multiple counts of a single indictment. The statute makes
it clear that, if the offenses charged in the various counts or indictments
13-1744 (Supp. 1973).
15 § 2161-A (Supp. 1974).

13 E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
14 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.

15 E.g.,

Orno

REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

16 E.g., MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 780.621 (1968).
17 E.g., KAN.STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973).
18IDAHo CODE § 19-2604(1) (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973);
MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 780.621 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.01 subdiv. 2
(Supp. 1974); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973);
UTAu CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953).
19ARIz, REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1744 (Supp. 1973); NEV. REv. STAT. § 176.225 (1971);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:164-28 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-53-18 (1960);
TEx.CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. tit. 42.12 § 7 (1966); WA.s& REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.240

(1961). See also Wyo. STAT. Am. § 7-315 (1957) (court has power in its discretion
to annul verdict or plea of guilty).
20DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4332(i) (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15
§ 2162-A (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 991c (Supp. 1974).
Z The Ohio expungement statute is contained in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.31-.36
(Page Temp. Supp. 1973). As originally introduced in the legislature the numbering
was § 2969.01-.05. This explains the apparently meaningless reference in present
§ 2953.35 to "Sections 2969.01 to 2969.05." (There is no Chapter 2969 in the present
Code). Through oversight the chapter and section numbers were not changed.
22
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
23 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.31 (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
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derive from a single act or from contemporaneous acts, there is still only
one conviction. However, convictions on multiple counts or indictments of
offenses that arise from non-contemporaneous actions are certainly not
uncommon, and the statute does not make it clear whether such conviction
would bar the offender from obtaining expungement of his records.
The question of the relationship between offenses and convictions, on
the one hand, and multiple counts and indictments, on the other, has been
examined by the courts chiefly in dealing with recidivist statutes.24 There
are two views on the matter. One is that separate indictments or counts are
separate offenses and that one convicted under separate indictments

comes within the reach of a habitual criminal statute.25 However, these
cases are narrow in their application, because they interpret specific
statutes and do not announce general principles of law.26
The majority view is that, "... . where there were two or more

convictions on as many indictments or on two or more counts in the
same indictment, only one of them may be subsequently utilized as
a previous conviction within the contemplation of habitual criminal
statutes.'" 7 It appears that the rationale for this view is that the
convictions should be sufficiently separated in time to give the offender

opportunity to reform.2 Rehabilitation cannot begin until the offender
has realized that he has committed a wrong and he fully understands
the gravity of his actions:

It is obviously the experience of the cold steel doors of the penitentiary slamming behind him or the inexorable conditions of probation,
restricting his movement and actions that effectively demonstrate the
futility of crime.... Apparently it is only when he has faced the total,
stark consequences that he should have learned his lesson.29

24 Since no court has yet interpreted the term "first offender" in the context of an
expungement statute, it is not illogical to rely upon and analogize with precedent in
the area of recidivists statutes. The terms "habitual criminal" and "first offender" are
semantically related. S. RuBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 465 (2d ed.
1973). Furthermore, recidivist and expungement statutes have their roots in the same
concept: rehabilitation. See text accompanying note 2 supra. Whereas expungement,
at least in Ohio, is available only to those who reform, recidivist statutes apply to
those who do not, or cannot, reform.
25 People v. Braswell, 103 Cal. App. 399, 407-08, 284 P. 709, 712-13 (1930); People
v. Carney, 203 Misc. 512, 103 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
26 E.g., People v. Braswell, 103 Cal. App. 399, 284 P. 709 (1930), was concerned
with a recidivist statute that was separated into two parts. One part explicitly stated
that prior convictions must be "separately brought and tried," while the other left out
the phrase. The court held that the omission must have been intentional and that
conviction of charges of different offenses tried concurrently would bring the offender
within the reach of the habitual criminal statute. Id. at 407-08, 284 P. at 712-13.
27 Annot., 24 A.LR.2d 1247, 1262 (1952).
2
8People v. Spellman, 136 Misc. 25, 29, 242 N.Y.S. 68, 71 (1930). See also People
v. Snow, 1 N.Y.2d 30, 133 N.E.2d 681, 150 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1956); Cromeans v. State,
160 Tex. Crim. 135, 268 S.W.2d 133 (195 4), which went so far as to hold that
convictions resulting in suspended sentences are disregarded in applying recidivist
statutes.
29

Moore v. Coiner, 303 F. Supp. 185, 191 (N.D. W. Va. 1969).
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Ohio case law is in accord with the majority view.30
The same reasoning that is used in dealing with recidivist statutes is
also valid as to an expungement statute, which also has its basis in
rehabilitation. In all justice, the offender should be given an opportunity
to meet the requirement of reformation, that opportunity coming after
the proceeding against him. Conviction of charges of separate offenses,
tried in the same proceeding, should be counted as only one conviction
3
so that the offender may earn a right to expungement of his records. '
B. The Court's Discretion
Section 2953.32(C) of the Ohio law states that expungement of
official records will be ordered, "[ilf the court finds that the applicant is a
first offender, that there is no criminal proceeding against him, that his
rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, and that
expungement of the record of his conviction is consistent with the public
interest ... .- 32 Thus, the court at nisi prius is given a certain amount
of discretion in' dealing with two of the criteria: the completeness of
rehabilitation and the determination that expungement of the individual's
records will be in the public interest.33 As is the case in other areas of
judicial discretionary powers, an appeal should be considered proper
because of the potential for abuse in the use of this discretion.M
In State v. Miller,35 the applicant for annulment had pleaded guilty
to a charge of burglary, but upon suspension of sentence he was placed on
probation. During the probationary period his fiancee became pregnant
and his probation was revoked. Miller served one year of the sentence and
thereafter married his fiancee, started his own business, bought a home,
and led a totally law-abiding life. The lower court denied his application
for annulment 6 on the evidence presented,3 7 even though there had been
3

oSee Carey v. State, 70 Ohio St. 121, 70 N.E. 955 (1904). The decision in Brumbaugh
v. State, 36 Ohio App. 375, 173 N.E. 267 (1930), should be distinguished because
there the defendant had pleaded guilty to two separate offenses at two different times.
The charges were consolidated only for judgment and journalization.
31 This also was the intent of at least one of the sponsors of the Ohio expungement
statute in the state legislature. Affidavit of State Senator (now U.S. Congressman)
Ronald Mottl, July, 1974, on file Akron Law Review.
32 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
33 Most expungement statutes endow the court with some amount of discretion.
34
People v. Johnson, 134 Cal. App. 2d 140, 142-43, 285 P.2d 74, 75-76 (1955); State
v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 656, 245 P.2d 222, 223 (1952) (An order of expungement
is final and unconditional). See also GEORGETOWN LAW INsTrrTTE MODEL ANNU.MENT AN) SEALiNG STATUTE § 1, in AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, RaMovno OFFENDER
EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONs Appendix K (1972).
35

214 Kan. 538, 520 P.2d 1248 (1974).

36 The application for expungement was made under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4616

(Supp. 1973), which applies to offenders who commit crimes before reaching the age
of 21. Much of the wording of that statute is identical to that of the Kansas adult
expungement law, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973), especially those parts
that relate to the effect Of an expungement order. Furthermore, the reasoning of the
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no showing of non-rehabilitation by the state other than the record of
his probation revocation. In a well-reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed and said:
Judicial discretion must always be exercised within the bounds of
reason and justice. Judicial discretion is abused when it is arbitrary,
fanciful or unreasonable, where 38no reasonable man would take the
view adopted by the trial court.
The court then considered the evidence presented in the lower court:
The facts presented at the annulment hearing clearly demonstrated
that the defendant has made every conceivable effort to conform to
the norms and demands of our society.... There is no evidence
whatsoever in the record to show that the defendant has any
propensity toward continuing criminal conduct or that he is a clear
or present danger to the public. 39
Thus, in spite of the fact that a trial court's handling of a matter
ought to be given due respect, decisions which show a clear-cut abuse
of discretion need not be a total bar to relief for the reformed criminal
seeking expungement. 40 The Kansas court went so far as to spell out
a rule for judges to follow in the future:
We hold that the filing of a simple request with supporting evidence
to show compliance with the statutory requirements should constitute
prima facie entitlement to the annulment of a conviction. Annulment
of a conviction should be granted unless the court finds some strong
affirmative cause to deny it. In other words the norm should be
the granting of relief. . . unless the state shows some good compelling
reason not to grant it.41
Although this may conflict with strict interpretations of expungement, 42 it
is probably closer to the spirit of expungement's attempt to help replace
the former offender in society as a contributing member thereof.

Kansas Supreme Court is in general terms and is equally applicable to adult
expungement laws.
37 The district court also held the annulment law unconstitutional.
38 State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538, 545, 520 P.2d 1248, 1254 (1974).
39 Id. at 546, 520 P.2d at 1255.
4
oHowever, there is no reason to believe that the court has any discretion in dealing
with the matter of the time at which an application for expungement may be brought.
See Anderson v. State, 512 P.2d 1387 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973), for an example of
strict, to-the-day compliance with time provisions in criminal proceedings. OHIO REv.
CoD ANN. § 2953.32(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973) expressly provides for a
three-year lapse for a felon and a one-year lapse for a misdemeanant. The court's
discretion is implied only in § 2953.32(C).
41 State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538, 546, 520 P.2d 1248, 1254 (1974).
42
See Meyer v. Superior Court, 247 Cal. App. 2d 133, 55 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1966). See
also People v. Ignazio, 137 Cal. App. 2d 881, 290 P.2d 964 (1955) (in the absence of
some showing of fulfillment of conditions, there is a presumption that the applicant
did not fulfill them).
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C. The Handling of the Expunged Records
When the court determines that the requirements have been met to
its satisfaction, it orders all "official" records sealed. 43 "Official" records
should be distinguished from "public" records. The latter refers to "any
record required to be kept by any governmental unit." 44 More specifically,
public records would include:
Any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or
characteristic, created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction
of any public office of the state or its political subdivisions which
serves to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
45
procedures, operations or other activities of the office ....
The term "official records," on the other hand, has a broader meaning
in that the term also includes those papers and documents made in
the normal course of the performance of a public official's duty."
Undoubtedly, this definition would also include copies of such papers and
documents. 47 However, matters of opinion contained in an official report
do not come under the definition."
Once it is determined which records are subject to a court order of
expungement, the official in charge of them must decide exactly how he is
to comply with the law. The Ohio statute merely provides for the sealing
of all records pertaining to the case and the deletion of all index
references. 49 There is no provision outlining procedure, nor is there even
a definition for the term "sealed." Therefore, the individual official has
50
been left to decide the procedure he deems appropriate.
A survey of several large Ohio counties 51 shows that the clerks of
court follow a fairly uniform procedure. To delete index references the
4

3

Oso REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

4Ono

REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969).

45

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 149.40 (Page 1969).
6State v. Black, 494 P.2d 1332, 1333 (Ariz. App. 1973). Thus, although a police
investigation report is not a public record, OP. OHIo ATr'Y GEN. 053 (1971), it would
be an official record and subject to sealing under the Ohio expungement statute.
47 See OP.Omo ATr'Y GEN. 034 (1973).
48 Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 Ohio St. 104, 104 N.E.2d 197 (1951).
49 Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
50 Although California and Nevada have adult expungement statutes that call for
sealing, no procedural hints are given. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45' (West Supp.
1974); NEv. REv. STAT. § 179.245 (1971). The Ohio juvenile expungement law
supplies no clarification either. Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973).
The only guidelines found are in a California Attorney General Opinion relating to
the California juvenile law. It states that name cards, master index cards, and other
such juvenile court records are to be removed from the files and either sealed with
other records on the individual or kept in a confidential master index. 40 OP. CAL.
4

ATr'Y

GEN.

50, as cited in CAL.

WELF. & INST'NS CODE

§ 781, Notes of Decisions

(West 1972).
51 Questionnaires were sent to the clerks of court of Cuyahoga, Hamilton, Montgomery, Franklin, Summit, Stark, Lucas, Mahoning and Trumbull counties. Cuyahoga,
Hamilton and Montgomery counties did not reply. The Mahoning County clerk
answered only that one application had been received in the year of the law's
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clerk strikes through the name with a black felt-tipped pen. He then places
all records and papers, including docket references, in a sealed file or
envelope. While a few offices place the old case number on the expunged
file, the clerk in one county assigns it a special number and maintains a
confidential expunged number index. Where the successful applicant for
expungement was one of several defendants in the original case, a special
problem arises since only the applicant's name can be removed from the
documents while some record of the individual's involvement must be
preserved in case he is ever arrested again. 52 In such instances, one clerk
reported that he retypes all papers, omitting the name of the applicant,
and places these in the regular files and dockets, while the original papers
are put in the applicant's expunged file. In every county, expunged files are
kept in a safe or other confidential space. If inquiry is made about
the individual by persons other than'those authorized by the statute,s the
clerks answer that they have no record.54
In general, other agencies follow a similar procedure.55 The Cuyahoga
County Sheriff's Office has devised a complete, well-conceived record
sealing method which might be a model for other agencies with similar
facilities. The original file jacket is removed from the Master Criminal File
and destroyed. All index cards, documents, entries, and all other references
to the applicant's arrest and incarceration are placed in a new file jacket
marked only with the appropriate sheriff's office number. The jacket's
cover tab is then taped shut in such a manner that will deface or tear the
file jacket if entry into the jacket is attempted. This sealed file is then
placed in the numerically proper location in the Master Criminal Files. An
ingenious device is used in the event the individual who has had his records
expunged is ever arrested again or if inquiry of any type is made. The
existence and that case was still pending. Apparently no procedure will be devised
there until the court issues an expungement order.
The questionnaires requested information about the clerks' procedures in sealing
their own records, their procedure in distributing an expungement order to other
agencies, and the number of applications that had been granted and denied in the
first year of the law's existence.
See Omo Ray. CoDE ANN. § 2953.32(D) and (E) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(D) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973) provides:
Inspections of the records included in the order may be made only by any law
enforcement officer, prosecuting attorney, city solicitor, or their assistants, for
the purposes of determining whether the nature and character of the offense
with which a person is to be charged would be affected by virtue of such person
having previously been convicted of a crime or upon application by the
person who is the subject of the records and only to such persons named in his
application.
54 One clerk, however, stated that the inquiring party is referred to the judge who
handled the case. This would seem to defeat the whole purpose of the expungement
law, because, if the inquiring party is referred to a judge, he knows that the
individual, at some time, must have been convicted of a crime.
55 Questionnaires were also sent to the sheriffs and prosecutors of Hamilton, Franklin,
and Cuyahoga counties. Only the sheriffs of Hamilton and Cuyahoga counties replied.
A special questionnaire was mailed to, but not returned by, the Ohio Bureau of
Criminal Identification and Investigation.
52
53

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

105

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 1

AKON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:3

Fingerprint Section of the sheriff's office maintains a fingerprint index that
refers to the expunged file's number. Thus, if the successful -applicant is
charged with another crime, new fingerprints are taken by the arresting
agency and will be referred to the sheriff's fingerprint index, which will
indicate whether there is an existing file on the person. In this manner
all inquiries must be accompanied by a set of original fingerprints.
Those agencies without such a sophisticated apparatus must employ
simpler methods 5 6 For example, one prosecutor's office simply marks
index cards and case files "Expunged" and places them in a special file
in the Administrative Assistant's office. One probation department merely
colored folders in order to
places expunged documents in distinctly
57
distinguish them from other files.
One prevalent criticism of expungement, as a means of hiding the
former criminal's conviction from the public view, has been that "criminal
records are located in so many different places that it is impractical to
' 8
fashion an order to expunge them all." This is a valid observation, and
its truth will surely hinder the effectiveness of any record-sealing statute.
In Ohio, sheriffs and police are required to take the fingerprints of
anyone arrested for a felony and forward them, along with other
description, to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation
(B.C.I.).59 Courts, also, are required to send B.C.I. a weekly summary of
cases involving a felony or misdemeanor which becomes a felony on the
second offense. 60 The Superintendent of B.C.I., in turn, must cooperate
with bureaus in other states and with the F.B.I. to effect a complete
interstate, national, and international system of criminal identification.'
Private agencies and employers also keep records on persons in their
charge, and any criminal activity would probably be noted.
The record acquiring power of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is
more pervasive. Under federal law the Attorney General is required to
acquire, collect, classify and preserve criminal identification and other
6
records6 2 and to exchange them with state, local and federal officials. 3
The F.B.I. may obtain records not only from law enforcement agencies

56 See Gough, supra note 2, at 175 n.120.
57
Inter-Office Memo, Summit County Probation Department, Jan. 24, 1974.
58 Steele, A Suggested Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses of Criminal
Records, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 32, 34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Steele].
59
Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§ 109.60 (Page Supp. 1973). This applies even to those

arrested on suspicion of a felony. If the accused is exonerated, however, the
identification data must be returned to him on request.
0OHmo REv. CODE ANN.§ 109.57(A) (Page Supp. 1973).
61 O1o REv. CODE Am. § 109.62 (Page 1969).
6 28 U.S.C.A. § 534(a) (1) (1968).
6328 U.S.C.A. § 534(a) (2) (1968).
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but also from federal banks and all banks insured under FDIC.6 4 In 1970
alone, the F.B.I. processed 29,000 fingerprint cards daily.65
The problem of reaching the widely disseminated records is not easily
solved. The practice in most counties appears to be that, immediately after
an order of expungement is issued, the first duty of circulating the order
falls upon the clerk of courts. One county clerk sends copies of the
order, as a matter of course and without specific instructions from
the attorney or the court, to the county probation department, the city
police, the county sheriff, the arresting agency (if not the police or
sheriff), the F.B.I., the Ohio B.C.I., and the Ohio Bureau of Statistics.
The clerk of the municipal court also receives a copy if the case had been
bound over. Another county clerk also informs the county and/or city
prosecutor of the order. In those counties where the clerk has a list of
agencies which receive expungement orders as a matter of course, the
clerks will also send to any other person or agency named in the court's
journal entry. In those counties it therefore should be the responsibility
of the applicant's attorney to ensure that all appropriate agencies are
included in the expungement order. In fact, in two of the counties
surveyed, Trumbull and Franklin, the attorney must notify all agencies,
the clerk takes no part in the distribution process. 66 The list of agencies
set out above would likely suffice in most cases; however, notification
to private agencies and anyone else known to have any record of the
67
first offender's former criminal activity would be desirable.
In addition to the clerk and the applicant's attorney, other agencies
sometimes endeavor to aid in the dissemination of the expungement
order. The Cuyahoga and Hamilton county sheriffs send copies of the
order to all agencies or governmental bodies to which they may have
formerly supplied information regarding the individual. This is a wise
policy, since, in the sophisticated computerized system of record keeping
that exists today, it is difficult at best for the attorney to ascertain all
those entities that have records on the individual. The procedure of the
Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation is not known,
but even if it did endeavor to notify all its distributees, much of it would
68
be meaningless effort.
6428 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1974).
65 Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The text of the opinion
contains an extensive discussion of F.B.I. record-keeping procedure.
66 As a California writer and lawyer has suggested, certified copies of the order would
probably be most prudent. Booth, The Expungement Myth, 38 Los ANGELES B.
ASS'N BULL. 161, 163 n.15 (1962).
67 For example, it is likely that the local credit bureau would have some notation in
their files. It is doubtful, however, that an order to expunge records would be
enforceable against a private enterprise. But see Atchison, T. and S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Lopez .......
Kan .......
531 P.2d 455 (1975).
68 A state court judgment "... .restricting the use of criminal records would not extend

beyond the state boundaries." Steele, supra note 58, at 37. This is yet another fact
that makes expungement a less than totally effective means of hiding a former
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The F.B.I., although not required to do so, will remove from its files
and return identification data to the contributing agency upon request.A6
The Summit County Clerk of Courts reports that the F.B.I. returns all
data when it receives the expungement order, the F.B.I. apparently
construing the order as a request for return of records.
In summary, if expungement is to achieve its purpose, all available
means should be employed to conceal records. This is undoubtedly a
70
More
painstaking process and may be rather futile in some cases.
legislative guidance as to procedure and more court supervision of
compliance with its dictates would go far in correcting these defects.7
Perhaps even reciprocity agreements with
eliminate some expungement loopholes.
D.

other

states

would help

The PracticalEflect of Expungement

Of prime concern to the former criminal himself will be the practical
benefits that he receives from expungement. Renewed opportunity for
employment or professional licensing is likely to be the major, if not
sole, reason for turning to the remedy. Ability to serve on a jury or
as a member of a public board or qualification to run for office are
criminal's records from public view.
California's counterpart to B.C.I. is required by statute, however, to notify all
its distributees of a juvenile expungement order. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.5 (West
1970).
69

Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1974). As the court noted, 6,000
such requests were honored in 1970.
7
0 Supra note 68 and accompanying text.
7

1 See

GEORGETOWN

LAW

INsTITUTE

MODEL ANNULMENT

AND

SEALING

STATUTrE,

supra note 34, § 4. The Ohio law does not require agencies to inform the court of
compliance with the expungement order, but the survey reveals that some agencies
do so in the course of normal procedure.
The Ohio legislature did attempt to put force behind the law by making it a
fourth degree misdemeanor to knowingly supply unauthorized persons with expunged
data. OHno RLv. CODE ANN. § 2953.35 (Page Temp. Supp. 1973). Laws providing a
penalty for disclosure of confidential matter are not uncommon, but reported cases
of actual imposition of such penalties are virtually non-existent, Daniel Ellsberg being
a well-known example.
There may be a civil remedy in damages against the indiscreet public employee
who discloses confidential criminal records. The concept of privacy has been the
basis for a growing number of equity cases where the courts, without statutory
authorization, have ordered expungement of arrest records in the case of arrestees
who were discharged before trial or whose constitutional rights were violated in the
arrest. E.g., State v. Pinkney, 33 Ohio Misc. 183, 290 N.E.2d 923 (1972); Eddy
v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971); Annot. 46 A.L.IR3d 900 (1972).
Dean Prosser gives a most complete analysis of the civil action in tort for invasion of
privacy. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1972). The

former criminal, whose expunged records have been illegally disclosed, might well
consider an action against the appropriate official on the basis of Prosser's classifications of Intrusion or Public Disclosure of Private Facts. Id. at 807, 809. Valuable
rights, such as the right to keep private personal records and documents, have been
recognized as appropriate grounds for equitable relief against public officials. Frey
v. Dixon, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 58 A.2d 86 (1948) (dictum). Furthermore, in the light
of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the fact that defendants in such a civil
action for damages are public officials would not necessarily be a bar to the tort suit.
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factors which do not have such a broad effect on the ex-convict's life
but which may nevertheless be important to him.
Covering the practical effect, the Ohio expungement law is general
at one point:
An order of expungement of the record of conviction restores the
person subject thereof to all rights and privileges not otherwise
restored by termination of sentence or probation or by final release
on parole.73
At another point it is more specific:
In any application for employment, license or other privilege, any
appearance as a witness or any other inquiry... a person may be
questioned only with respect to convictions not expunged, unless the
question bears a direct and substantial relationship to the position
for which the person is being considered. 3
These provisions are also susceptible to differing interpretations. Whether
they will be interpreted broadly, so that an ex-convict is truly no longer
an ex-convict, or narrowly, with many loopholes and exceptions, will be
of utmost significance to those first offenders who opt for expungement.
1. Employment
Most private employers show great hesitation in hiring former
criminals. Some flatly reject them, and most will not hire them if there
are other applicants without criminal records. In addition, even if the
ex-convict does find a job, he is usually relegated to menial, unskilled
labor.7 4 Restrictions on public employment may be even greater.75
An inevitable question on any application for employment is whether
the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime.78 Although the Ohio
statute does not specifically authorize a negative answer,' the applicant
whose records have been expunged would probably be safe in replying
"No." Although authority in some states is to the effect that employers
can use expunged convictions in considering an application78 and,
72
73

§ 2953.33(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
OmO REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.33 (B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
Oio Rnv. CODE ANN.

74 Special Project, supra note 2, at 1001-02.
75 Id. at 1013-18.
7
6 Even here, however, employers are being restricted. For example, HAwAn REv.
STAT. § 21-378 (Supp. 1973), prohibits employer discrimination on the basis of past
criminal records and California has recently enacted a law whereby employers are
prohibited from asking questions regarding criminal records on initial employment
applications. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4327 (West Supp. 1975).
7 Some statutes expressly provide that the petitioner may reply that he has never been
convicted. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973). But see MoDEL PENAL
CoDE § 306.6(3)(f) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
78 Taylor v. Macy, 252 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (even though the state has
forgiven the petitioner, the acts continue to exist); Op. TEx. ATr'y GEN. No. M-640
(1970), as cited in T97. CODE Calm. PRO. ANN. tit. 42.12 § 7 Notes to Decisions
(Supp. 1974) (the former criminal may not conceal an expunged conviction from
prospective employers).
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therefore, by implication, may require the applicant to reveal prior
convictions, the reasoning of these authorities probably is based on the
79
narrow relief afforded by their respective expungement statutes. In
Ohio, "the proceedings shall be deemed not to have occurred. ... "80 By
answering negatively, the former offender would merely be accepting the
position that the law assumes. Furthermore, the enigmatic clause ".. . a
person may be questioned only with respect to convictions not expunged
.. " 81 also indicates that a negative answer is appropriate.
The negative answer might in many cases end inquiry into a
prospective employee's criminal past, but the diligent employer may still
82
learn of prior convictions in other ways. The applicant who has
answered in the negative may also be required to account for the period
that he was actually imprisoned. Explanations such as "self-employment"
or "extended vacation" will serve only to aggravate any suspicions an
8
employer may have. 3 Furthermore, it has been said that exceptions,
84
such as those in the Ohio law, to the strict confidentiality of records
open the door for employer access.
From a public policy and public interest standpoint, it may even be
8
unwise to conceal conviction from all employers. Professor Gough has
listed some areas where the nature of the job virtually requires exclusion
of certain prior offenders: a former embezzler with a bank; a former sex
offender as a teacher; any previous offender as a policeman or in a
80
position involving high national security and defense. These areas are
undoubtedly what the legislature intended to affect with the insertion
of the clause ".. . unless the question bears a direct and substantial
relationship to the position for which the person is being considered."'
TOIn both California and Texas a plea or verdict of guilty is merely set aside. CAL.
42.12 § 7 (1966).
PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1970); Tax. CODE Clum. PRo. ANN.tit.

See note 6 supra.
80
OHio REv.CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
81 OHio REv.CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
82 Lack of enforcement of prohibition of access and required waivers of confidentiality giving the employer the authority he needs to gain access to records are two such
means. 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 530, 531-32 n8 (1970). Also, a question on an employment
application, such as, "Have you ever been convicted of a crime that has been
expunged?" should not be permitted as a circumvention of the purpose of the statute.
83AmaE.IcAN BAR ASS'N, REMovINo OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT REsTRicTIoNs 7 (1972).

84 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(D) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

85 Steele, supra note 58, at 40.
88 Gough, supra note 2, at 182-83.
87 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973). This part of the statute presents some serious difficulties. For example, the question arises as to who is to
determine whether the conviction bears a substantial relationship to the position
sought. Surely it cannot be left to the former criminal himself, who would obviously
be prejudiced in his own favor. Resting the decision on the employer seems absurd,
because, if the applicant states that he has never been convicted and if the records are
truly effectively sealed from the public view, the employer will never learn of the
expunged record to make the determination. Perhaps statutory guidance is necessary.
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Such arguments under the uncertain delineations of public policy are
difficult to refute. They do ignore the very tenet of Ohio's expungement:
rehabilitation. "To rehabilitate means to restore to one's former rank,
privilege or status, to clear the character of reputation or stain, to retrieve
forfeited trust and confidence." 8 Thus, expungement, being a result of
rehabilitation, places the former criminal in his status quo ante. 9 For
expungement to do so, it assumes that the one-time criminal no longer has
the criminal character, and, if this assumption is true, a former embezzler
should be considered as qualified as anyone else to work in a bank. 90
2. Licensing
Ohio, like other states, regulates the legal ability to pursue certain
occupations by licensing. 91 Statutes dictate the qualifications which one must
have to be granted a license and outline the grounds upon which one may
have his license revoked or suspended. To become a C.P.A. or a licensed
architect, for example, one must be of "good moral character." 92 A physician's license may be suspended for conviction of a felony,93 and no one
convicted of a felony of moral turpitude may be a real estate broker.9 4
Conviction of a felony is ground for revocation of almost all licenses. 9
The effect of expungement on the applicability of a first offender's
conviction to the licensing laws is not clear. The exception contained
in Section 2953.33(B), discussed above as to employment; did not
appear in the expungement bill as it was originally introduced in the
legislature. But its addition during the enactment process indicates
there will be at least some situations in which the expunged conviction
will be considered by licensing boards. It remains to be determined
which situations, 96 but until such a determination is made, the former
criminal will not be guaranteed that expungement will open the door
to all licensed professions.97

8

89

In re Stoller, 160 Fla. 769 ...... 36 So. 2d 443, 444 45 (1948).
State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538, 544, 520 P.2d 1248, 1253 (1974). See also United

States v. MacLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1967).

90

Needless to say, though, a judicial determination of rehabilitation would not impress

the parent who is faced with the prospect of having a one-time child molester in the
same classroom with his own children.
91 OHio RaV. CODE ANN. § 4701.01-4751.99 (Page 1954 and Supp. 1973).
92 Omo Rsv. CODE ANN. § 4701.06(D) (Page Supp. 1973); Osno REv. CODE ANN. §
4703.07 (Page Supp. 1973).
9

3 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22 (Page Supp. 1973).
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4735.07(B) (Page Supp. 1973).
95 E.g., OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4701.16(E) (Page Supp. 1973).
94

96 Undoubtedly public policy will be an important consideration in the interpretation

of the statute and its effect upon licensing. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text
supra.
97

California has enacted specific provisions to several of its licensing statutes
regarding the effect of expungement. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10177 (West
1970) (real estate licenses).
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The possibility exists that expungement will have no effect in the area
of licensing. It might be argued that the licensing boards can inquire
about any conviction, whether expunged or not, because any occupation
important enough to be licensed and regulated by the legislature would
fall within the exception which allows inquiry concerning expunged
convictions which have a direct relationship to the position sought.
Arguably any conviction has a direct relationship to an occupation
important enough to be regulated by the state.
Although licensing boards are not permitted to be totally arbitrary
in reviewing license applications,98 they have been accorded broad powers
and discretion. In Papatheodoro v. Department of Liquor Control," the
court held that restoration of rights and privileges upon termination of
sentence or discharge from parole does not erase the effect of a licensing
statute's provision that no person convicted of a felony may obtain a liquor
license and that, therefore, the licensing board must deny the application
°
on the basis of the conviction.10 A license is not a property right, and
11
the state may validly deny its issuance. License laws,
... are police regulations designed to promote the general welfare
and protect the public morals. They were enacted in the interest of
public health and safety and their object is not to punish.... It is
essential to distinguish the nature of the statute in question from the
nature of our criminal statutes which are punitive in their nature.
The legislative will of the people of Ohio has been expressed in the
Liquor Control Act .... Here there is a fair, just and reasonable connec2
tion between the statute in question and the common good of society.10
California case law, following the same general reasoning as the
Papatheodoro decision, is uniform as to the effect of expungement on
licensing statutes. Expungement is a criminal remedy, while licensing is
civil in nature 03 Objection is raised to judicial determination of
rehabilitation, and, for the purposes of licensing, such determination does
4
not have to be recognized.' 0 In view of the "high degree of professional
skill and fidelity to the public it [licensed occupations] serves," licensing
boards must be allowed their own discretion in deciding whether a former
0
5
criminal has rehabilitated sufficiently to assume such responsibilities
The narrowness of the provisions of the California expungement law

98Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Miller v. Board of Appeals

and Review, 294 A.2d 365 (D.C. App. 1972).
99 118 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
1oo Id. at 717.
11 Id. at 715.
1ald. at 716.
103 Copeland v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 241 Cal. App. 2d 186, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 452 (1966) (release from penalties and disabilities means release from criminal
penalties and disabilities).
104 Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959).
105 Id. at 872, 338 P.2d at 186.
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as to its practical effect1 08 should not be overlooked in analogizing the
California decisions to the Ohio statute. Mere release from penalties and
disabilities resulting from the Coniction 107 would necessarily be of less
effect than restoration of all rights and privileges not otherwise restored
by termination of sentence or final release on parole.10 8 The latter clause
also distinguishes Ohio's expungement statute from the statute under
consideration in the Papatheodorocase.
A 1949 Ohio Attorney General Opinion19 presents more analogous
reasoning. There a convicted felon had served in World War II and had
thereby come under a postwar Presidential proclamation pardoning all
convicts who had served in the armed services during the war. He applied
for a liquor license, and the Department of Liquor Control requested the
opinion of the Attorney General as to the effect of the pardon on the
licensing statute which prohibited former felons from obtaining a liquor
license. The Attorney General opined that a Presidential or Governor's
pardon totally relieves the person pardoned from licensing disabilities:
It [a pardon], in legal contemplation, obliterates the offense, giving
him a new credit and capacity, and rehabilitating him to his former
position in society. It is said to make of the convict a new man, and
to be, in effect, a reversal of the judgment, a verdict of acquittal,
and a judgment of discharge thereon, to this extent, that there is
a complete estoppel of
record against further punishment pursuant
n0
to such a conviction
This language is virtually identical to that which has been used to describe
the general effects of an order of expungement, 11' and the reasoning of
the Attorney General as to pardoned convicts vis-A-vis licensing statutes
seems equally applicable to the former criminal who has had his
conviction expunged.
Thus, there are two forces at odds in the area of licensing and
expungement: the police power of the state and its interest in assuring
that only the highest caliber of persons practice certain professions, versus
the state's interest, as effectuated by the expungement law, of replacing the
deserving, reformed criminal to a useful position in society. The two
interests are not wholly incompatible if the ex-convict has truly reformed,
but the courts and the legislature have traditionally accorded much power
and importance to the licensing boards, and usurpation of such power by
expungement will most likely not be perfunctorily recognized.
3. Other Areas
The recently enacted Criminal Code provides that a person convicted
06

1

See note 6 supra.

107 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1970).
108 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
109 OP. OFHo Arr'Y GEN. 510 (1949).

l1OId. at 513 (quoting 30 0. Jur. § 17 [xxxxl).
U1

See notes 4, 87-8 8 and accompanying text supra.
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of a felony loses the right to be an elector, to be a juror, and to hold an
office of honor, trust, or profit.1 2 The convicted felon regains his
competency to vote upon final discharge and is restored all the rights and
privileges forfeited upon a full pardon?' 3 This wording may present a
problem for the ex-convict who wishes to hold a public office or serve on
a jury and who seeks expungement to remove his disabilities in these
areas.-1 4 The statute"m only states that upon pardon are the privileges
restored, and the expungement statute states that privileges returned are
those not otherwise restored by termination of sentence, probation, or
final release on parole." 6 The question which therefore arises is whether
the privileges restored by expungement include those privileges restored
only by pardon in Section 2961.01. Although the new Criminal Code and
the expungement statute became effective on the same date, the latter
statute was the first passed through the legislature. If chronology is
significant, it can be argued that the legislature intended to include in the
expungement law the restoration of the privileges restored only upon
pardon in Section 2961.01.1 7 However, it can also be argued that there
is a conflict between the two statutes, and, since Section 2961.01 is the
more specific, it must govern-' 8 In view of the positive remedial purposes
of the expungement law, the courts should attempt to construe it
liberally' 9 and in such a manner so that both laws are given effect.'"
Since Section 2961.01 does not say that restoration of the ability to be
a juror or hold public office occurs only with a pardon, consistent
construction is not impossible.
The Ohio Constitution provides that ,no person convicted of
embezzlement of public funds shall hold any state office."' There is
authority to the effect that statutory expungement will not override
such a constitutional provision.'22
Expungement would probably eliminate the necessity of registration
for the former sex offender.- A first offender who has had his record

-U Oso
'"
'Omo

REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2961.01 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).

REv. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).

IL4 See Matsen v. Kaiser, 74 Wash. 2d 231, 443 P.2d 843 (1968).
5Omo REv. CDE ANN. § 2961.01 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).
IL6 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

117 There is also the argument of the close analogy between the practical effects of a
pardon and that of expungement. See notes 111-12 and accompanying text supra
11
8 See Omo RiEv. CDE ANN. § 1.51 (Page Supp. 1973).
119 OHIo REV. CDE ANN. § 1.11 (Page 1969).
20 Omo RLV. CoVa ANN. § 1.51 (Page Supp. 1973).

M O11o CONST. art. H § 5.
= Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959).
IMSee Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 349 P.2d 974, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1960).
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sealed might be allowed to carry firearms,
not be impeached as a witness.Im

24

and apparently he could

It is open to question whether federal courts, in cases arising under
federal law, will recognize state expungement. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that, for the
purposes of immigration and naturalization, Congress did not intend to
26
accept state expungement.1 Federal courts will most probably decide
basis, using judicial discretion and
individual
each case on an
interpretation of congressional intent.W27
IV. CONCLUSION

Expungement as a method of restoring the rehabilitated criminal to
his former status has been severely criticized: "Record concealment is
unworkable; it fails to lift other penalties attendant to the record;
it
it sanctions deceit; its half secrecy leads to speculative exaggerations; 128
frustrates constructive research; and it is not equally available to all."'
The statement may be true even with a strong, unequivocal law, but its
truth has greater inevitability with a weak, loophole-ridden statute. The
Ohio expungement statute is not unequivocal. Without authoritative
guidance, procedures for sealing have differed and vary from the careful
to the haphazard. Unless there is strict enforcement of the statutory
dictates, employers will still be able to learn of conviction records, and
unless there is a judicial turnabout or a more straightforward statute in
regard to licensing, expungement in Ohio will be of little help to the
first offender who applies for a professional license. It is evident that
more astute legislation is needed. At the very least, liberal court
interpretation, like the Miller decision, is an absolute necessity if Ohio
expungement is to approach the achievement of its purpose.

124Ohio law now allows a former felon to petition the court to relieve him of the
disability provided, inter alia, he has been law-abiding since his discharge.

CODE ANN. § 2923.14 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).
(Page Temp.
.ZOHIoREv. ConEANN .§2953.33(B)

Supp. 1973).

OHIO

REv.

However, the

wording of § 2953.32(E) does not make it clear whether that provision applies only
to criminal proceedings in which the former criminal is himself a defendant or to all
criminal proceedings. If the latter, then he could be impeached at any criminal trial.
28

1

Brownrigg v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 356 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1966);

Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1967).
127 See In re Ringalda, 48 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Cal. 1943).

128 Kogan and Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big

Lie, 61 J.Cazls. L.C. & P.S. 378, 383 (1970).
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APPENDIX
A Lawyer's Expungement ProceduralOutline
I. Facts to be ascertained from the client.
A. The crime of which he was convicted.
Section 2953.36 provides that expungement will not apply where the crime
was one for which probation was unavailable or where the conviction is
under Chapters 4507, 4511, or 4549 of the Revised Code. This includes
crimes under those chapters as they are enumerated under the new Criminal
Code. Some crimes that were listed under those chapters in the old
Criminal Code have been inserted into Title 29 and therefore are not
excluded from expungement.
B. The year of his conviction and when parole, sentence, or probation terminated.
Section 2953.32(A) provides that three years must have passed since his final
discharge in the case of a felony, and one year in the case of a misdemeanor.
C. Whether there is any criminal proceeding presently against him.
Section 2953.32(C) provides that there must be no proceedings against him
at the time of the application.
D. Whether he has been convicted of any crimes since the first conviction.
Expungement is limited to first offenders.
E. The name and location of the sentencing court.
Section 2953.32(A) provides that the application shall be made to such court
if the conviction was in Ohio. If it was an out-of-state conviction, the
application may be made to any court of common pleas.
F. General facts about his personal life that would be persuasive to the court
of his rehabilitation.
Such facts might include the following:
1. Employment record;
2. Marital status and number of children;
3. Whether he is a home owner;
4. Community activities;
5. Interests and hobbies; and
6. Record on probation.
H. Filing with the court.
A. The form of the application.
Since the form differs from county to county, the attorney should ascertain
the procedure in the particular county in which he is filing. The application
should allege fulfillment of the conditions as enumerated in Section 2953.32(C)iB. A $50 filing fee is required, except for the indigent applicant.
C. The attorney should obtain a hearing date at the time of filing.
The court will notify the prosecutor of the hearing and may also have the
probation department make inquiries and a written report as to the merit
of the application.
III. When the order is granted.
A. The attorney must file a judgment entry for court approval to the effect that
expungement has been granted.
B. Depending on the practice of the county in which the granting court sits, the
attorney may have to list agencies to whom the order is to be sent. Some
counties require that separate Instructions to the Clerk be filed. The text
contains a discussion of agencies that should receive a copy in all cases;
whether other agencies should be sent a copy depends on the facts of the
client's history.
C. Agencies that receive the order are not required to report compliance with
it. However, the conscientious attorney might take it upon himself, after a
period of time, to inquire of the agencies as to whether they have sealed
their records.
JAEs 'L.WAGNER
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JUVENILE COURT AND DIRECT APPEAL FROM
WAIVER OF JURISDICTION IN OHIO

ANY

DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC ASPECTS

of juvenile law necessarily requires

that at least a brief inquiry be made into the history of its development. This becomes apparent when it is realized that juvenile law is not
the product of a neat and orderly background, but rather the result of
numerous sociological and economic conditions surrounding not only individual communities but the whole society. It is with this motivation that
the statutory creation of juvenile law builds and continues to thrive. And,
it is for this reason that this comment concerning the loss of the benefits
of the juvenile laws through waiver of jurisdiction, with emphasis on the
Ohio waiver statute' and its interpretation by the Ohio Supreme Court in
In re Becker,2 should begin with a thumbnail sketch of its background.
The first laws in the United States specifically designed to govern the
conduct of juveniles were implemented by the Illinois legislature on
April 21, 1899. 3 This statute and the ones which were to closely follow
in other states, 4 were born in a society surrounded with problems of mass
immigration, rapid and haphazard urbanization, and industrialization of
unprecedented dimensions. Social and legal reformers sought to offset
some of these conditions and remove the children from the rigid, technical,
and sometimes harsh justice of the adult criminal court, and place them in
the "protective" custody of the parent state.5 The goals were "to
investigate, diagnose, and prescribe treatment, not to adjudicate guilt or fix
blame," and in this light "children were not to be treated as criminals nor
dealt with by the process used for criminals." This "rehabilitative spirit"
was best described by Julian Mack in 1909:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or
girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become
what he is, and What had best be done in his interest and
in the
7
interest of the state to save him from a downward career?

I Omo REv.CODE ANN. §2151.26 (Page Supp. 1973).
2 39 Ohio St 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).
3
Juvenile Court Act, ILL. LAWS, 1899.
4 Ohio's first juvenile laws were enacted in 1902 and became general with subsequent
enactments in 1904 and 1906. See Young, A Synopsis of Ohio Juvenile Court Law,
31 U. CiN. L. REv. 131, 135 (1962). By 1917, 46 states had enacted similar juvenile
legislation. See Willey, Ohio's Post-Gault Juvenile Court Law, 3 AKRON L. REV. 152,
n.2 (1970), citing R.NYQuIST, JuvENmLE JusrICE 114 (1960).
5See generally A. M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS, 123-34 (1969).
e PRESmENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

TAsK FORCE REPORT: JuvENn.E DELiNQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FoRcE REPORT].
7Comment, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L REv. 104, 119-120 (1909).
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1. JUVENILES AND THE STATE

The Doctrine of ParensPatriae
The jurisdiction of the state is based primarily on the assumption of
the power of parens patriae.8 This doctrine was initially developed in the
English court of chancery, where the chancellor acted as the personal
representative of the crown exercising this prerogative to aid unfortunate
minors. The underlying basis of this jurisdiction is somewhat unclear;
but, the execution of this presumed authority generally took form
in the assumption of the duties of maintenance and protection which
resided in the minor's parents.9
In retrospect the derivation of parens patriae seems to have been an
improper exercise of jurisdiction and this fact has been the subject of
comment and criticism. 10 Nevertheless, this doctrine was accepted at an
early date by the states and continues as a statutorily sanctioned basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction over minors." Through these statutes, each
state legislature has devised a separate specialized court and method of
procedure for exercising jurisdiction whenever the interest of the state
is determined to be better served by governmental interference.
These juvenile courts no longer operated through the principles of
chancery or entirely under common law principles, but rather in a
semblance of equity by statute. Generally, the procedures instituted in
these courts were intended to be as informal and non-adversarial as
possible, in keeping with their stated purpose of "saving" rather than
punishing the child. Consequently, proceedings involving juveniles were
described as "civil not criminal";U the juvenile offender was classified as
delinquent not criminal;13 and, the juvenile was entitled only to the basic
8

Literally translated as "father of his country." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269
(4th rev. ed. 1968).
9 See FLEXNER & OPPENHEIMER, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF THE JUVENILE COURT 7

(1922). See also State ex rel. Fortini v. Hoffman, 12 Ohio App. 341, 344, 32 Ohio CL
App. 193, 196 (1920) (offering an excellent historical outline of the development of

juvenile law); S. DAvis, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 1-5 (1974).

10 See, e.g., Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23
SuP. CT. L. Rsv. 205 (1971); Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance of
Parens Patriae,22 Sup.CT. L. REv. 147 (1970).
11InOhio, parens patriae has been used for the purposes of commitment since 1869.
See Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869). See also House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37

Ohio St. 197 (1881) (involving a petition in habeas corpus for release of a committed
minor, which, on appeal, was upheld under this doctrine).

12 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554
(1966).

See also Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 601, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954)

(referring to a juvenile proceeding as a "civil inquiry or action looking to treatment,
reformation and rehabilitation of the minor child..."); Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio
St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964); In re Benn, 18 Ohio App. 2d 97, 247 N.E.2d 335
(1969); State v. Shardell, 107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (1958).

13 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23 (1967). The definition of a "delinquent child" in
Ohio is found in OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.02 (Page Supp. 1973). The juvenile
court may also designate a juvenile a Juvenile Traffic Offender-OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2151.021 (Page Supp. 1973), Unruly Child-OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
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14
right of fair treatment in the proceedings. Thus, the courts were given
the fullest of control and authority in making decisions as to treatment,
while avoiding the substantive and procedural problems found in the
criminal law.' 5

It was felt that when the common law doctrine of parens patriae was
linked with this form of statutory equity the application of constitutional
safeguards was unnecessary.
There is no probability, in the proper administration of the law, of
the child's liberty being unduly invaded. Every statute which is
designed to give protection, care, and training to children, as a
needed substitute for parental authority and performance of parental
duty, is but a recognition of the duty of the state, as the legitimate
guardian and protector of children where other guardianship fails..., 1
This philosophy, of course, resulted in an enormous amount of power
being centered in the juvenile courts, particularly in the individual juvenile
judges. One eminent authority, in an observation of the situation as it
existed in 1909, made the candid remark that "[t]he powers of the Star
Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts....1.7
It is almost axiomatic that where great discretion exists, abuses of
discretion, or at least major inequities, will also exist. The juvenile justice
system is no exception. Perhaps emphasis should have been placed upon
the phrase "proper administration of the law" in the preceding quotation,
for it is a crucial assumption. Generally we think of constitutional
procedural safeguards as defining the meaning of this phrase. By excluding
them from consideration in juvenile cases it is virtually insured that some
inequities will arise. Yet, to introduce them full force into juvenile
proceedings would be to transform them into proceedings so closely
approximating those of the criminal system that their protective and
rehabilitative aspects could be forfeited. While this certainly presents a
dilemma of considerable dimension in a vital arena of governmental and
2151.022 (Page Supp. 1973), Neglected Child-Omo

REv. CODE

ANN. § 2151.03

(Page Supp. 1973), or Dependent Child-OHio RaV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 (Page
Supp. 1973). All of the above definitions became effective in 1969.
See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959). This case established
a due process standard for determining which constitutional guarantees were applicable
to juveniles. This standard was later modified and used by the Supreme Court in Gault.
15 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-26 (1967). See also F. A. ALLEN, THE
14

BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

50-61 (1964).

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 56-57, 62 A. 198, 201 (1905). Contra, In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967): "... neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone." See generally Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender,
41 MINN. L. RPv. 547 (1957) (suggesting that constitutional rights which are in
conflict with parens patriae must give way).
17R. Pound, Foreword to P. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY (1952). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967), also citing the text
accompanying this note.
16
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societal concern,' 8 it is far from insoluble. An examination of the approach
utilized by the Supreme Court in several major juvenile cases is not only
instructive but earmarks a path to the potential solution.
II. GATEWAY TO CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION:
THE SUPREME COURT

Kent v. United States and Due Process
In Kent v. United States,'9 the Supreme Court decided the first in a
progression of cases that would define a number of the bounds of juvenile
rights. Morris Kent, Jr., was arrested in 1961 at 16 years of age on
charges of housebreaking, robbery, and rape in the District of Columbia."o
Because of his age, he was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. Without a hearing and over protestations of counsel, who
had offered to show that Kent was suffering from a mental disorder and
that he would be a suitable subject for rehabilitation if given proper
treatment, the juvenile court judge waived jurisdiction and ordered the
youth bound over to the regular procedure of the District of Columbia.
He made no findings and did not recite any reason for the waiver.21
Kent was subsequently convicted of all of the offenses mentioned
above, excluding rape. On appeal based on the allegedly improper
waiver, 22 the court of appeals expressed the opinion that the exclusive
method of reviewing the juvenile court's waiver order was a motion to
dismiss the indictment in the district court, and affirmed Kent's conviction.
18 The foremost items inducing such concern seem to be the increased rates of crime
and recidivism recently evident in the juvenile population. See Wizner, The Child and
the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIG-TS L.
REV. 389, 393 (1972), citing F. A. ALLEN, THE BoRDERLINTE OF CRIMINAL JusTicE

43-50 (1964); Leonard, LEAA and Federal Delinquency Control Programs, 23
JUVENILE JUSTICE 7, 8 (Aug. 1972). As noted by Senator Birch Bayh: "... [O]ur
juvenile justice system is too often a revolving door which for many ultimately leads
to the adult criminal justice system and a lifetime of criminal behavior." Bayh,
Juveniles v. Justice, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RiGoTs L. REV. 309, 313 (1972). The total
number of cases handled by the Ohio juvenile courts has steadily been on the
increase at a rate which is not necessarily correlative to the total number of persons
comprising the juvenile population. For further numerical data see OHIO DEPT. OF
MENTAL HYGIENE AND CONVICTION, OHIO JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS, which is
published annually. See also Note, A Proposalfor the More Effective Treatment of
the "Unruly" Child in Ohio: The Youth Services Bureau, 39 U. CiN. L REV. 275,
275-81 (1970)4
19 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
20 The history of this case is offered by the Court at 383 U.S. at 542-50. It is there
noted that Kent was on probation at the time of his arrest and indictment from
charges stemming from housebreakings and attempted purse snatchings in 1959, when
he was 14 years old.
XL383 U.S. at 546. The juvenile judge apparently felt that as interpreted in Wilhite
v. United States, 281 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the District of Columbia waiver
statute required only a "full investigation" and not a hearing on the matter of
waiver. He recited in the order that after "full investigation, I do hereby waive
[jurisdiction]."
22Kent v. Reid, 316 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/1

120

Milligan: Dissolution of Marriage

Spring, 1975]

COMMENTS

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case
for a new hearing on the waiver order in juvenile court. In rendering its
decision, the Court found that "the waiver of jurisdiction is a 'critically
important' action determining vitally important statutory rights of
the juvenile [and thus the waiver hearing] ... must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment."
This guarantee of due
process was found to afford certain procedural protections, namely: the
right to a hearing; the right to counsel at the hearing; that the attorney be
granted access to all records relating to the juvenile, and the right to a
statement by the court of the reasons for the decision. 24 The Court in so
doing rejected the view that parens patriae and the "civil v. criminal"
rationale was sufficient reason to disregard all constitutional rights. The
Court did not express the view that this meant a total application of all
the requirements of a criminal trial or even an administrative hearing.
Although Kent has been interpreted by some courts as having been
decided purely on the grounds of a statutory interpretation of the District
of Columbia code, rather than constitutional due process grounds,Z the
opinion did set out eight basic criteria that can be used by the juvenile
judge when considering a waiver of jurisdiction. These have been written
into many of the state statutes in whole or in part to satisfy the "essentials
of due process and fair treatment." They are:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense against the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver;
(2) whether the alleged 6ffense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated, or willful manner;
(3) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property;
(4) the prospective merit of the complaint;
(5) the desirability of trial and disposition in one court where the
juvenile's associates in the commission of the offense are adults;
(6) the maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of
criteria such as his home life, environmental situation, emotional attitude,
and pattern of living;
(7) the record and previous history of the juvenile; and,
(8) the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
6
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation.9
2

383 U.S. at 556, 562.

24 Id. at 557.

3See State v. Steinhauer, 216 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968); People v. Jiles, 43 InI. 2d 145,
251 N.E.2d 529 (1969); Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967).

Contra, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); United States ex rel. Turner v. Rundle, 438

F.2d 839, 841 (3d Cir. 1971): "[lIt is our view that Kent, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in In re Gault ...sets forth certain principles of

constitutional dimension." See also State v. Yoss, 10 Ohio App. 2d 47, 225, N.E.2d
275 (1967).
26 383 U.S. at 566-67, an appendix to the majority opinion by Justice Fortas. See, e.g.,
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page Supp. 1973) and OHIo R. Juv. P. 30; ILL.
ANN.STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
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In speaking for the majority, Justice Fortas viewed the situation from
a realistic point of view and questioned whether the system worked at
all: "... . There is evidence in fact, that there may be grounds for concern
that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children." 2 7
The Gault Decision2
In 1964, Gerald Gault, 15 years of age, was picked up by the Sheriff
of Gila County, Arizona, on a verbal complaint alleging he had made a
lewd and obscene phone call to a neighbor. No notice that Gerald was
being taken into custody was conveyed to his mother or even left at his
home 'by the authorities. The youth was subsequently brought before the
appropriate juvenile court having jurisdiction over him by reason of his
age. A hearing was held. However, neither Gerald nor his mother was
ever given advance notice of the charges against him. Neither the youth
nor his parent was ever informed of any constitutional rights which he
might 'have possessed. In fact, the complaining neighbor who had
allegedly received the phone call never appeared in court, nor did she
ever talk to the juvenile judge regarding her complaint.29 The judge found
Gerald to be delinquent by reason of his violation of an Arizona
misdemeanor statute prohibiting the use of obscene language over the
telephone and committed him to the State Industrial School "for
30
the period of his minority.. ." a six-year sentence.
A petition of habeas corpus was brought in the state courts
challenging the constitutionality of the delinquency proceedings. After
a hearing on the petition, the Superior Court dismissed the writ and the
appellants sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which also
dismissed the writ, finding that the requisite constitutional due process
requirements had been met.31
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, ruling that the due
process clause applied in juvenile court proceedings when a determination
is to be made as to "whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of
alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be
committed to a state institution." 32 The Court thus limited its finding
to the adjudicatory stage of proceedings which present a possibility of
383 U.S. at 556. Justice Fortas is certainly not alone in these convictions as can
readily be found throughout TAsK FORcE REPORT, supra note 6. See generally Wizner,
The Child and the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4 COLUM.
HuMA.N RIGHTs L. REV. 389, 392-93 (1972); Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of
the Juvenile Court, 7 Cuimm AND DEL. 97, 102-03 (1967).
28
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
291d. at 7.
30 Id. at 7-9. The penalty actually prescribed by the Arizona misdemeanor statute was
a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months.
31
In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), rev'd 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
82 387 U.S. at 13.
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incarceration. The Court also found that a juvenile is entitled to certain
specific due process rights, namely: the right to notice which complies
with constitutional due process requirements;33 the right to counsel; 3 4 the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; 35 and, absent a valid
the right to
confession adequate to support a delinquency adjudication,
36
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.
One of the most important and relevant portions of the opinion is
found in the reaffirmation of its position in Kent toward the relationship
between parenspatriae and constitutional guarantees:
In Kent v. United States, supra, we stated that the Juvenile Court
Judge's exercise of the power of the state as parens patriae was not
unlimited. We said that "the admonition to function in a 'parental'
relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."... We
announced with respect to such waiver proceedings that.. ."the
hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment." We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile
court adjudication of "delinquency," as a requirement which is
part of the Due 3 7Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
our Constitution.
As Justice Harlan perceived it, the stress should be placed on
determining the forms of procedural protection necessary to guarantee
the "fundamental fairness" of juvenile proceedings. 38 This opinion seems
to suggest the desirability of a delicate balance of supplying rehabilitation
and reformation while not denying constitutional procedures guaranteeing
"fundamental fairness" and replacing the same with the arbitrary
imbalance of a non-adversarial and completely informal proceeding.

Id. at 23-24, described in other terms as that which would be "constitutionally
adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding." See, e.g., Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948) (criminal notice); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950) (civil notice).
34 387 U.S. at 41. For a recent expression of the constitutional right to counsel in
adult criminal cases involving the possibility of even minimal incarceration, see
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Although this article will not deal with
the right of the juvenile defendant to defend himself in the action against him by the
state, the circuit courts appear to be in disagreement as to the propriety of such a
situation in adult criminal proceedings. Compare United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the defendant does have a right of pro se representation) with United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that
there is no right to pro se representation in criminal actions even though a majority
of state constitutions appear to guarantee this right).
35 387 U.S. at 47, at which is found the following language: "It would indeed be
surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened
criminals but not to children."
38 387 U.S. at 56.
37Id. at 30.
38387 U.S. 1, 74-75 (Harlan. J., concurring opinion).
33
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Winship and McKeiver39
In re Winship 4° involved a youth who had been found delinquent on
a standard of proof lower than "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," which
is required in adult criminal proceedings.4 The state juvenile court there
relied on the New York statute dealing with the subject of delinquency
proceedings," which not only authorized, but mandated the standard of
proof of "a preponderance of the evidence" for such proceedings.
The Supreme Court determined that in procedures involving a
juvenile who is charged with an offense which would be a crime if
committed by an adult, "the same considerations that demand extreme
caution in fact-finding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the
innocent child." Justice Brennan, who delivered the majority opinion,
did examine the historical significance and importance of the reasonable
doubt standard in the operation of the criminal law." It should be noted
however, that Winship was also carefully limited to the adjudicatory stage
of proceedings in which the juvenile could be deprived of his freedom.'
Thus, the majority opinion in Winship emphasizes the narrowness of
the application of the reasonable doubt standard, intimating "no view
concerning the constitutionality of procedures governing children 'in need
of supervision.' "4 The procedures involving the unruly or ungovernable,
dependent, or neglected child are not affected. 47 Furthermore, the Court
insisted that it did not see how the application of the safeguard of the
reasonable doubt standard would compel the states to abandon or displace
any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process,4 which were
described as: the non-criminal nature of the proceeding; the informality,
flexibility and speed of the hearing; the discretion in the use of treatment
techniques; and, the prehearing intake procedures. 4
The Court seemed to indicate, at least by implication, that a
balancing process based on the standard of "fair treatment" 50 would not
39 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

40 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
41
In re Winship, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969), rev'd
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
42NEw YORK FAMIy COURT Acr § 744(b) (McKinney 1962).
"397 U.S. at 365.
44See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 & n.7 (1954); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174
(1949). See also 22 CASE W. Rys. L. REv. 115, 116 (1970).
45 397 U.S. at 358, 366.
46 Id.at 359.
47 See note 13 supra.
4397 U.S. at 367. But see 397 U.S.

358,

376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting opinion)

(asserting what the Chief Justice considered a conflict between the majority decision
in Winship and the intentions of the several legislatures to create benevolent and less
formal institutions).
49 397 U.S. at 366-67.
50 See note 14 supra and accompanying text
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automatically result in the application of all the guarantees in the
Bill of Rights to juvenile procedures.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania51 seems to uphold the view of the majority
in Winship that the total incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
juvenile system is not the ultimate destiny of Kent, Gault, Winship and
its progeny. It seems clear, as the result of McKeiver, that the Court will
use a theory of "selective incorporation" when dealing with the Bill of
Rights as applied to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 52 or with other fundamentally recognized rights.
The sole issue presented for determination in McKeiver was, "whether
there is a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court."' ' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed McKeiver's conviction by the
single juvenile judge, concluding that the addition of a trial by jury
"might well destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings," and
further expressed the opinion "that a properly structured and fairly
administered juvenile court system can serve our present societal needs
without infringing on individual freedoms." 54
In 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
decision 55 and held that there is no guarantee of the right to trial by
jury in juvenile courts even in cases where the offense charged would
be a felony if committed by an adult or where the juvenile's loss of
freedom is possibly at stake.5
51403 U.S. 528 (1971).
52 This seems to be holding true not only in juvenile law, but in other areas of the law
as well. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Compare
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972) with Tribe, Foreword:
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1973), for an excellent review of the subject, although containing differing predictions for future standards of review and use of the fourteenth amendment. See also
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection GuaranteeProhibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,62 GEO. LJ. 1071 (1974).
53
1n re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 342, 265 A.2d 350, 352 (1970), aff'd sub nom. In re
McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Joseph McKeiver, then age 16, was charged under
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4704, § 4807, and §4917 (1963), with robbery, larceny, and
receiving stolen goods in 1968, all of which were felonies. He was subsequently
convicted before a single juvenile judge, his counsel's motion for a jury trial having
been denied. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed without opinion at 215 Pa.
Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969).
5 438 Pa. at 350,265 A.2d at 355-56.
55 403 U.S. at 551.
5
eSee In re Alger, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969) (construing OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page 1968) as constitutional even though providing no right
to a trial by jury). Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 was amended effective November
19, 1969, although the statute still reads: "The court shall hear and determine all
cases of children without a jury." OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page Supp.
1973). Accord, In re Baker, 18 Ohio App. 2d 276, 248 N.E.2d 620 (1969). But se*
State v. Fisher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 183, 245 N.E.2d 358 (1969) (concerning repealed
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(E) (Page 1968), which specifically prescribed
commitment to the Ohio State Reformatory, an adult penal institution).
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In its consideration, the Court found that the requirement of a jury
trial: (1) would remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary
process putting an end to the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding;5 7 (2) would not remedy the defects of the
system;8 (3) would disallow any further experimentation by the states
59
to seek new ways to solve the problems of the young; and, (4) would
bring with it into that system the traditional delay, formality, and clamor
60
of the adversary system, and possibly, the public trial. Thus, the decision
rested on the Court's finding from the totality of the circumstances that
a regressive effect would result from constitutionally guaranteeing the
right to a jury trial with the consequence actually being a "[loss of] what
has been gained, and tending once again to place the juvenile squarely
in the routine of the criminal process."61
The effect of the Supreme Court decisions in Kent, Gault, and
Winship has been to offer new insight into the workings of the juvenile
system. McKeiver should not be read as retarding the progress of this
viewpoint. It should be interpreted as a meaningful limitation placed on
the application of constitutional principles to the juvenile field evidencing
the Court's desire to continue with a rehabilitative outlook.
While the consolidation of the aforementioned cases does not
establish what might be termed a firm constitutional test capable of
uniform and determinative application, four principles seem to emerge as
prospective guidelines: (1) procedures essential to "fundamental fairness"
are not to be disposed of merely because of rehabilitative and benevolent
aims; (2) that these procedures which are essential will not distract from
those original benevolent and rehabilitative aims; (3) the Court is not
prepared to dispose of the juvenile system by totally incorporating guarantees of the Bill of Rights which would, in reality, defeat these aims of
rehabilitation and add little to "fundamental fairness"; and, (4) the Court
will concern itself only with the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings,
all other phases seemingly too close to real treatment and rehabilitation,
and subject only to fair treatment as defined by the state.
Any set of guidelines which may reasonably be drawn from the
consideration of these four major Supreme Court decisions must of
necessity be somewhat broad. However, it seems fair to assert that these
decisions reflect a recognition on the part of the Court of the continued
value of the maintenance of separate juvenile justice systems based upon
protective and rehabilitative, rather than punitive, ideals. It seems clear
that the guidelines spelled out in these cases are meant to complement
rather than displace the "special rights" afforded children in juvenile
57 403 U.S. at 545.
58 Id.

at 547.

59 Id.

60 Id. at 550.
6 Id. at 547.
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court proceedings. It is with these guidelines in mind that we should
proceed to an analysis and evaluation of Ohio juvenile procedure and
its system of waiving juvenile court jurisdiction.
III.

DIRECT APPEAL FROM WAIVER OF JURISDICTION IN OHIO

Statutory Rights of Juveniles in Ohio
The "special rights" of children under Ohio's juvenile justice system
are readily apparent upon examination of the basic procedure involved in
bringing a child within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the
ultimate dispositions made by the juvenile court, and the manner in which
an order waiving the court's jurisdiction is carried out as controlled by
statute in Ohio. 62 The Juvenile Code provides that "any person" may
swear out and file a complaint against a juvenile in the county in which
63
the child resides or where the offense was committed. Section 2151.27
states that although the complaint may be based on information and
belief, it must allege the particular facts upon which the allegation of
delinquency, traffic offender, unruliness, neglect or dependency is based.
A juvenile can also be taken into custody by police in all cases in
4
which the police could arrest an adult for the same offense. After
custody, however, the proceedings regarding juveniles in custody are to be
initially held in the juvenile court.6 5
When a child is thus brought before the juvenile court, an intake
officer must initially make an investigation. Following this investigation,
the officer must release the child unless detention seems warranted or
required under Section 2151.31.66 If the juvenile is so detained under
67
Section 2151.314, a complaint is filed and a hearing must be had within
68
72 hours to determine if the detention is necessary or required. Under
62

OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01-.41 (Page 1968 and Page Supp. 1973). See
particularly Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.23 (Page Supp. 1973), which is the

jurisdictional section of the Ohio Juvenile Court Code. See Willey, Ohio's Post-Gault
Juvenile Court Law, 3 AKRON L. REV. 152 (1970).
63
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.27 (Page Supp. 1973).
64 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.31 (Page Supp. 1973). This section provides that such
action is not deemed to be an arrest except for the purpose of determining its
constitutional validity: "A child may be taken into custody: (B) Pursuant to the laws
of arrest;..." (emphasis added). See also OHio R. Juv. P.7.
65 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.25 (Page Supp. 1973). Provision is also made in this
section for the discontinuance of proceedings and the transfer of the case to juvenile
court if the child is taken before another competent court of the state.
66 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.314 (Page Supp. 1973). OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.31
(Page Supp. 1973) reads in pertinent part: ". .. A child taken into custody shall not
be detained or placed in shelter care prior to the hearing on the complaint unless his
detention or care is required to protect the person or property of others or those of
the child, or because the child may abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction
of the court, ... or because an order for his detention or shelter care has been made
by the court pursuant to this chapter."
6
7 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.27 (Page Supp. 1973).
68
According to OHio R. Juv. P. 7(F) (3) the juvenile court may hear any evidence
without regard to the formal rules of evidence at this preliminary hearing.
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Section 2151.314, reasonable notice must be given to the parents,
guardian, or custodian of the juvenile, as well as to the juvenile himself;
and, the parties must be informed of their right to counsel at this
preliminary hearing on temporary commitment. If the parties are unable
69
to afford counsel, one will be appointed by the court.
Although there is no explicit statutory right to be shielded from
publicity, the general purpose of the juvenile statutes, as outlined in
Section 2151.01, would seem to demand this.o The pressures on both
the juvenile and the officers of the court, which are necessarily coincidental
to public display, can hardly be termed conducive to rehabilitation in
the hope of checking his downward career.
The juvenile may not be kept or jailed in a facility intended primarily
to house adult offenders, except where almost quarantine-like surroundings
are provided which allow the juvenile to neither see, hear, nor come into
contact with an adult offender.71 Likewise, he may not be fingerprinted or
photographed (a common procedure for adults) except for identification
purposes, or with the permission of the juvenile judge.72 If fingerprints or
photographs are taken, they are to be transferred to the juvenile court
7
where they become a part of the youth's confidential file.
As previously stated, a juvenile taken into custody by police pursuant
to the laws of arrest is not considered under arrest, except for the purpose
of testing the constitutional validity of that custody. 4 Thus, a juvenile
would not compile an "arrest record" unless the juvenile court waives its
jurisdiction. Although a juvenile may acquire an official record, which
would include the actual adjudicatory measures and procedures and an

Omo K Juv. P.
7(F) (1), (2), and (3). See generally Lehman, A Juvenild's Right to Counsel in a
Delinquency Hearing, 17 Juv. CT. JuDGE's J. 53 (1966); Riederer, The Role of
Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 2 J. F.s. LAw 16 (1962) (each dealing extensively
with the juvenile's right to counsel in the pre-Gault era).
7
OSee Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cook, 324 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1963).
71Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2151.34 (Page Supp. 1973):
Treatment of children in custody; detention home. No child under 18 years
of age shall be placed in or committed to any prison, jail, or lockup, nor shall
such child be brought into any police station, vehicle, or other place where such
child can come in contact or communication with any adult convicted of crime
or under arrest and charged with crime..."
69 See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.314, § 2151.352 (Page Supp. 1973);

See Omo R. Juv. P. 7(H).
7 OHIo REv. CODE ANN.§ 2151.313 (Page Supp. 1973). However, fingerprints may be
taken by law enforcement officers investigating an act which would be a felony if
committed by an adult where there is probable cause to believe the youth is involved.
See generally Ferster and Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices
and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. R.ev. 567 (1969) (criticizing the maintenance
of fingerprint files by the police and the personnel having access to the same).
73
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.313 (Page Supp. 1973).
7
4 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.31(D) (Page Supp. 1973), which reads in part: "Taking
a child into custody shall not be deemed an arrest except for the purpose of deter-

mining its validity under the constitution of this state or of the United States."
(Emphasis added). See text accompanying note 64, supra. See generally S. DAvis,
RiGors OF JuvEamEs 38-54 (1974).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/1

128

Milligan: Dissolution of Marriage

Spring, 1975]

COMMENScr

unofficial record, which would include the reports and tests made by intake
officers and other court officials, these juvenile records are all subject to
expungement upon application by the person to the court or upon the
court's own motion following a period of two years after the termination of
an order of the court or the child's release from a state treatment facility.7
In addition, any orders made by the court prescribing commitment
can continue only until the child reaches the age of 21 years. 7 The wide
discrepancy in the possible commitment period between the juvenile laws
and incarceration under the criminal code is generally evidenced by the
sentence initially imposed in Kent. If Kent had been adjudicated under
the juvenile code of the District of Columbia his maximum commitment
would have been for five years or until 21 years of age; whereas, he was
in fact sentenced to 30 to 90 years under the criminal code after waiver
7
was ordered and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court relinquished.
In In re Whittington, the Fifth District Court of Appeals of Ohio
concluded "that the Juvenile Code was established to afford valuable
rights to juveniles." 78 The juvenile rights as set out in the Ohio Revised
Code are indeed valuable as tools in tailoring informal and flexible
juvenile procedures, this presumably being the original intention of the
legislature in creating a separate system to deal with juveniles. The
approach is both realistic and practicable, dictating an avoidance of the
stigma attaching to criminal procedure which is so detrimental in attempts
to foster an atmosphere conducive to effective rehabilitation.
Waiver of Jurisdiction
While critically important, these rights are not absolute. Prior to the
adjudicatory, fact-finding stage, the process begins which will ultimately
determine whether an order to relinquish the juvenile court's jurisdiction
for the purpose of criminal prosecution should issue from the court.79
75 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973). However, the right here is not
automatic and in reality operates only for those with sufficient interest, understanding
of its consequences, and money to proceed under the statute. Whatever stigmatizing
effect a juvenile record might have, it is inconsequential when compared to a criminal

arrest record after the juvenile court waives jurisdiction. See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell,
430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (the mere fact of arrest limits opportunity for
schooling, employment, and professional licenses). See generally J. Coffee, Privacy

v. Parens Patriae:The Role of Police Records in the Sentencing and Surveillance of
Juveniles, 57 CORNELL L REV. 571, 591-94 (1972) (dealing with the realistic effect on
prospective employers and employment agencies); Comment, Juvenile Police RecordKeeping, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 461 (1972) (statutory assurances of
confidentiality are illusory because of the nature of the treatment given to juvenile
records); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 92-93.
76 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.38 (Page Supp. 1973).

7See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 550 (1966). But see note 30, supra, and
accompanying text.
7817 Ohio App. 2d 164, 177, 245 N.E.2d 364, 372 (1969).
79 See Omo REv.CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A) (Page Supp. 1973):
After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is delinquent by reason of
having committed an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an
adult, the court at a hearing may transfer the case for criminal prosecution to
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When a juvenile is so transferred to the criminal court for adjudication
8
as an adult, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is "abated" 0 and each
and every one of the aforementioned statutory rights is forfeited. Rights
which are, as indicated by the Whittington court, so valuable and
important to the juvenile process, should be jealously guarded by society,
and every attempt should be made to protect them from being lost through
an arbitrary or even an unintentionally inappropriate order. Section
2151.26, which deals with the waiver process, attempts to preclude such a
result, and shows the effect of Gault and Kent in requiring a hearing,
82
8
notice thereof at least three days prior to the hearing, ' counsel, and
a written finding of facts which includes a statement of reasons for
8
transfer if one is actually made. 3 These due process requirements meet
those set up in Kent and Gault for determining the " 'critically important'
question of whether a child will be deprived of the special protections
8
and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act." 4
Section 2151.26 also prescribes the criteria that are to be used in
deciding whether to transfer the case. These criteria essentially represent
the Ohio legislature's recognition that rehabilitation and treatment are not
suitable for some juveniles. Before issuing the transfer order, the court
must find that: (1) the act would be a felony if committed by an adult;
(2) the child is 15 years of age or older; (3) there is probable cause
82
and, (4) after
to believe that the juvenile committed the act;
the juvenile
that
believe
to
grounds
reasonable
are
there
investigation,
the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense, after making the
following determinations:
(1) The child was 15 or more years of age at the time of the conduct charged;
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act alleged;
(3) After an investigation including a mental and physical examination ... that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(a) He is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in any facility designed
for the care, supervision, and rehabilitation of delinquent children;
(b) The safety of the community may require that he be placed under legal
restraint, including, if necessary, for the period extending beyond his
majority..
See Omo R. Juv. P. 30.
8DOHIo REv. CODE ANN.§ 2151.26(E) (Page Supp. 1973), which states: "Such transfer
abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged
in the complaint"
81 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(C) (Page Supp. 1973): "Notice in writing of the
time, place and purpose of such hearing shall be given to his parents, guardian, or
other custodian and his counsel at least three days prior to the hearing."
82 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (Page Supp. 1973): "A child, his parents, custodian, or other person in loco parentis of such child is entitled to representation by
legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings and if, as an indigent person, he is
unable to employ counsel, to have the court provide counsel for him..."
83 Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(E) (Page Supp. 1973); OHIo R. Juv. P. 30(E).
84 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
85 See In re Jackson, 21 Ohio St. 2d 215, 257 N.E.2d 74 (1970) (finding that a
standard of probable cause is sufficient in a waiver proceeding). See generally
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (defining probable cause).
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is not amenable to rehabilitation or that the safety of the community
88
may require legal restraint beyond his majority.
In a determination that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the child is not amenable to rehabilitation, the Ohio Rules of Juvenile
Procedure provide the procedural guidelines. 87 However, these guidelines,
as set down in Juvenile Rule 30, do not totally encompass all the criteria
which are listed in the appendix to the Kent decision. A considerable
amount of latitude and discretion is still afforded the presiding juvenile
judge.8 8 If the waiver order does issue, the juvenile is turned over for
criminal prosecution, under the terms and conditions set by the juvenile
court pursuant to Juvenile Rule 30(F).89
In re Becker and Direct Appeal of Waiver Orders in Ohio
On July 10, 1974, the Supreme Court of Ohio spoke to this issue in
In re Becker.90 This decision unfortunately places in question the effective
availability of statutory juvenile rights to juveniles eligible for an order
waiving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The specific question
before the court was whether a transfer order, pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code Section 2151.26, was a final appealable order.
A complaint was filed in the Summit County, Ohio, Juvenile Court
against Richard Becker charging him with delinquency by reason of first
degree murder. After a proper probable cause hearing, as required by the
juvenile code and rules of procedure, the juvenile court relinquished
jurisdiction and transferred Becker to common pleas court for criminal
prosecution as an adult. Prior to his trial in common pleas court, Becker
appealed the waiver order to the Ninth District Court of Appeals of
Ohio, which court found that a transfer order was a final appealable
order.9 ' In so doing, the court overruled a motion by the State of Ohio
86 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A) (3) (Page Supp. 1973).
87 OHIO R. Juv. P. 30(C):
Determinationof amenability to rehabilitation. In determining whether the child

is amenable to treatment or rehabilitative processes available to the juvenile
court, the court shall consider:
11)The child's age and his mental and physical health;
2) The child's prior juvenile record;
3) Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child;
4) The child's family environment; and
(5) School record.
8sSee State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St. 2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973) (the scope of
"reasonable grounds" is left to discretion of court). But see People v. Fields, 388
Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972) (finding a statute similar to Ohio's waiver statute
unconstitutional because it lacked suitable and ascertainable standards). See generally

S. DAvis, RIGHTS OF JuVNmEs 116-121 (1974), for a good overview on the general
vagueness of juvenile statutory standards involved in waiver proceedings.
89 Omo R. Juv. P. 30(F), reads as follows: "Release of transferredchild. The juvenile
court shall set terms and conditions for the release of the transferred child in
accordance with Criminal Rule 46."
90 39 Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).
91In re Becker, C.A. No. 7353 (9th Jud. Dist. Ohio App., Jan. 22, 1974). In its
journal entry, the court stated: "We hold that a transfer order under Juv. R. 30 is a
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for dismissal and ordered a stay of proceedings in common pleas court
pending the final outcome of the appeal.
92
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals, basing
its decision primarily on the fact that a dispositional finding of
delinquency was not made in juvenile court. The court also relied heavily
on an Illinois case, People v. Jiles,93 finding that such an appeal would
provide for unnecessary delay in the disposition of Becker's innocence
or guilt regarding the alleged offense.

Prior to November 19, 1969, a transfer order pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code Section 2151.26 required the juvenile court to find the
95
4
juvenile delinquent before relinquishing jurisdiction. State v. Yoss, a
leading case on point, had found that such a transfer order was a final
appealable order based on Ohio Revised Code Sections 2501.02 and
2505.02, which deal with the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal
9
and the definition of "final" in the context of "final appealable order."
Subsequent to November 19, 1969, Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.26
was amended and the requirement of a finding of97 delinquency prior to
transfer was removed and thus is no longer needed.
The decision in Becker, then, effectively construes the right of appeal
as being based on the dispositional adjudication of delinquency rather
than on the finality of the juvenile court action in substantially affecting
the statutory rights of juveniles. In favoring the former rationale rather
than the latter, the abatement of the juvenile court's "exclusive" jurisdiction is given less weight than the importance of a speedy determination
final appealable order, because it terminates the Court's jurisdiction and prevents that
minor from being adjudged a delinquent and treated as a minor in the rehabilitative
process."
92 39 Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).

93 43 Ill. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969).
94
See State v. Carter, 27 Ohio St. 2d 135, 272 N.E.2d 119 (1971) (recognizing that
specific language is not required for a finding of delinquency and requiring that a
finding of delinquency is necessary to waive jurisdiction); In re Mack, 22 Ohio App.
2d 201, 260 N.E.2d 619 (1970) (the waiver order is conditioned on a finding of
delinquency). Please note that in both Carter and Mack, the waiver order was made
prior to the November 19, 1969, amendments to the Juvenile Code.
95 10 Ohio App. 2d 47,225 NXE.2d 275 (1967).
96
Omo REv.CoDE ANN.§ 2501.02 (Page Supp. 1973), reads in pertinent part:
mhe court of appeals shall have jurisdiction: (A) Upon an appeal upon
questions of law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or
ial orders of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals... including the
finding, order or judgment of a juvenile court that a child is delinquent,
neglected, or dependent... (emphasis added):
OHIo REv. CoDE AN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954), reads in pertinent part: "Final Order.
An order affecting a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the
action and prevents a judgment.. ." (emphasis added). Neither statute has been
amended since the determination in State v. Yoss, 10 Ohio App. 2d 47, 225 N.E.2d
275 (1967).
97 OHIo REv.CoDE ANN.§ 2151.26(A) (Page Supp. 1973). Accord, In re Becker, 39
Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).
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of innocence or guilt. This seems to be directly in conflict with the issue
98
described in State v. Yoss as being one of jurisdiction.
9
The Becker court's reliance on the Illinois case of People v. Jileso
for support in its concern for speedy disposition seems somewhat shaded
since the statute relied on in Jiles was amended subsequent to that court's
decision.9° Under the previous Illinois statute, which was used in Jiles, the
state prosecutor made the decision whether to proceed criminally or
not. The juvenile judge's participation was limited to noting an objection
to the prosecutor's decision which brought about a hearing before the
chief judge of the circuit. 01 Although this method of determination is a
relatively unique situation, it logically implies that there is nothing to
appeal other than the prosecutor's discretion and the first "real decision"
made by a court is that of guilt or innocence at the criminal trial. Under
this particular set of circumstances, the Illinois court's concern for
speed in obtaining the first judicial determination, i.e., the guilt or
innocence of the juvenile, can readily be justified.

The Illinois statute, as amended prior to the Becker action, appreciably limits the prosecutor's discretion in removal matters by requiring a
hearing and investigation by the juvenile court to determine its propriety
under set criteria, 10 2 before a waiver order is granted. Now, the first
judicial determination effectively limiting substantial juvenile rights is
made by the juvenile court in the "critically important" waiver proceeding.
In considering one aspect of appealability, a Supreme Court
determination construing "finality," as applied in 28 U.S.C. Section
1291,103 is found to be helpful. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 104 the Court considered the finality of a denial of an indemnity
bond in stockholder litigation and stated: "The effect of the statute
[Section 1291] is to disallow appeal from any decision which is tentative,

98

10 Ohio App. 2d 47, 49, 225 N.E.2d 275, 276 (1967).

9943 IM. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969).
100ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)

(1965') as amended P.A. 77-2096 § 1 (Jan.
1973), P.A. 78-341, § I (Oct. 1973) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
101 Id. See also Note, Due Process and Juvenile Court Removal Procedures, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 673 (1972).
102 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974) reads:
In making its determination on a motion to permit prosecution under the
criminal laws, the court shall consider among other matters: (I) whether there
is sufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an
indictment; (2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was committed
in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (3) the age of the minor; (4) the
previous history of the minor; (5) whether there are facilities particularly
available to the Juvenile Court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the
minor; and (6) whether the best interest of the minor and the security of the
public may require that the minor continue in custody.., beyond his minority.
103 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958), reads: "The courts
of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States..

104 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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informal or incomplete.... [S]o long as the matter remains open,

unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no intrusion by appeal."'01
Cohen also speaks of giving the provision of finality a practical
rather than technical construction. The adoption of this point of view

would seem to fit the benevolent role of the state in rehabilitation and
treatment. In addition, the waiver order relinquishing the "exclusive

jurisdiction" of the juvenile court leaves nothing open, unfinished or
incomplete as to the relinquishment, although it cannot be denied that
his guilt or innocence has not yet been determined.
In Lantsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co., 06 the Supreme Court of Ohio

spoke of the concept of final orders being based upon the rationale that
a court which makes an order which is not final retains jurisdiction
for further proceedings. In definition, the court stated in substance that
a final order is one disposing of the whole case or some separate and
distinct branch."" The waiver order is separate from the determination
of guilt in that it only determines which court wil hear the case on
the basis of distinct criteria as set out in the juvenile code.
But, a determination of finality in an order or its effect on substantial
rights does not in and of itself grant the right to an appeal.108 The Supreme
Court has never held that states must afford citizens the right of appellate
review as an element of due process, 109 and thus such a right must rest
upon statute. The applicable jurisdictional statute in Ohio is Ohio Revised
Code Section 2501.02 with Ohio Revised Code Section 2505.02 lending

itself to the definition of "final order."'' 0 It is upon the interpretation of
these two statutes that the right to an appeal will ultimately depend.
The Becker court made an interpretation which limits Ohio Revised
Code Section 2501.02 to a technical and literal reading. This in turn led
to a conclusion which excluded juvenile appeals not involving a specific
dispositional finding of delinquency, neglect, or dependency.'"
105 Id. at 546.

10627 Ohio St. 2d 303, 272 N.E.2d 127 (1971) (speaking particularly to final orders
in OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 [Page 1954]).
10727 Ohio St. 2d 303, 306, 272 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1971). Accord Roach v. Roach,
164 Ohio St. 587, 132 N.E.2d 742 (1956) (an order is final and appealable if it
divests a party of the right to have the court making the order place him in his
original position); Schindler v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Ohio St. 76, 133 N.E.2d 336
(1956) (finding that the sustaining of a general demurrer on grounds of misjoinder
where no petition amendment is possible is a final appealable order since it effectively
terminates a substantial right).
10See State v. Thomas, 175 Ohio St. 563, 197 N.E.2d 197 (1964). But see Malone
v. Malone, 119 Ohio App. 503, 199 N.E.2d 405 (1963) (a final order from which an
appeal may be taken is an order which affects a substantial right). But Cf. State v.
Lenhart, 116 Ohio App. 55, 186 N.E.2d 497 (1961).
109 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967), citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
1o See notes 95 and 96 supra and accompanying text.
n1 See In re Bolden, 37 Ohio App. 2d 7, 306 N.E.2d 497 (1973), which construed
o temporary commitment order under Oreo REv, CODE § 2151.355 as not a final
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CONCLUSION

An order waiving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is "critically
important" as determined by the Supreme Court in Kent v. United
States.n12 The core issue in a waiver hearing is the question concerning
which court shall have jurisdiction of the juvenile and the case. However,
much more is determined than merely the court and location in which
the action will be prosecuted, for a number of important collateral issues
surround this question of jurisdiction and necessarily depend upon the
outcome of that finding by the juvenile court.
While Ohio can surely be seen as having a valid state objective in
limiting delay for the purpose of the administration of criminal justice, it
must initially be recognized that, although the ultimate objective of the
court to which the juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction will be a
determination of the guilt or innocence of party, the primary objective at
a waiver hearing is a determination of proper jurisdiction. For the
purposes of finality and appealability then, the abatement of the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court, where no other judicial determination can possibly
follow therein, and the irreparable loss of substantial statutory juvenile
rights should weigh more heavily in the balance than a speedy determination of guilt or innocence which is not in issue at the waiver hearing.
The criteria for deciding whether a waiver order should issue are set
out by Ohio statute in what appear to be definitive terms.m Yet these are,
in reality, merely guidelines to be used by the juvenile judge. The weight
and interpretation that is to be given these criteria is dependent upon
the posture and attitude of each individual judge and thus may vary
considerably throughout the state.
Many factors can influence a juvenile judge's opinion, not the least
of which is his background, development, and understanding of not only
the law in general, but juveniles and juvenile law in particular. Indeed, it
was found in a 1969 poll of Ohio juvenile judges" 4 that in response to
the question, "[dloes public feeling concerning the offense influence your
decision?" 17% of the judges answering indicated an affirmative reaction.
The problems of the size of the caseload being handled by the court and
the financing available with which to operate might possibly enter the

appealable order although it affected a substantial right-the freedom of the juvenile.
But, in Bolden, the juvenile court still had a determination to make following the
temporary commitment order and retained jurisdiction in contrast to the abatement
of jurisdiction in waiver orders.
383 U.S. at 556. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A) (Page Supp. 1973); OHIO R. Juv. P. 30. See
also S. DAvIs, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES (1974).
14 Comment, Waiver of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Courts, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 132,
n12

D3 OHo

137-138 (1969). The national survey indicated a slightly lower percentage of 14% in

TAsx FoRCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 78.
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picture, as well as the political outlook of the elected juvenile judge in
dealing with an offense which might be touchy in the public eye.
Through the decision in Becker, the Ohio Supreme Court has taken
a place among a minority of states which deny a direct appeal from a
. 5
While the statements in the preceding paragraphs were
waiver order)not intended to be critical of any individual juvenile judge in Ohio, for
they are often the quickest to recognize and push for a needed reform
when it presents itself, they do bring to light some of the reasons
which may in fact underlie a waiver decision, and the resulting variables
which weigh heavily in the determination.
By not providing direct appeal from orders of waiver, Ohio has, in
a sense, left the door open to the possibility that a decision on waiver,
which is arbitrary or even due to mistake, will not be corrected until
the juvenile has been exposed to the criminal system. By that time, it
doesn't matter to the juvenile that the decision was unintentionally
arbitrary, or due to an oversight or mistake, for he has already been
subjected to that which the juvenile court was instituted to protect him
from in the interest of rehabilitation and reformation.
Thus, a motion to dismiss in criminal court and the possible appeal
from the ruling on that motion following the course of the trial, are in
fact, truly ".... hollow remed[ies] which cannot possibly give complete
relief, because by that time the juvenile will already irretrievably have lost
his right[s]..."us with all the safeguards accorded a minor gone. It is
from this point of view that the waiver order should be measured, always
keeping in mind the balance between a speedy determination and the
possible 50 or 60 years of life which remain to the juvenile, at least part
of which will see the juvenile back in the mainstream of society.*
THoMAs F. HAsKiNs, JR.

15 For some of the states allowing direct appeals from orders of waiver, see, e.g.,
P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); Graham v. Ridge, 107 Ariz. 387, 489
P.2d 24 (1971); In re Doe I, 50 Hawaii 537, 444 P.2d 459 (1968); In re Templeton,
202 Kan. 89, 447 P.2d 158 (1968); In re Trader, 20 Md. App. 1, 315 A.2d 528
(1974); Juvenile Dept. v. Johnson, 86 N.M. 37, 519, P.2d 133 (1974). For some of
the states which do not allow direct appeals from orders of waiver, see, e.g., People
2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969); In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo.
v. Jiles, 43 Ill.
1972); Commonwealth v. Croft, 445 Pa. 592, 285 A.2d 118 (1971); State v.
McArdle, 194 S.E. 2d 174 (W. Va. 1973).
216In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Mo. 1972) (Seiler, J., dissenting).
* Richard D. Becker was found guilty of First Degree Murder in Summit County,
Ohio, Common Pleas Court, following the remand by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
On October 2, 1974, his motion for a new trial was overruled and he was subsequently sentenced to the Ohio State Penitentiary for the remainder of his natural life.
An appeal was taken by Becker challenging not only his conviction but also the
juvenile court waiver order. While the case has been argued by counsel for both
parties, no decision had been rendered as of the date of printing. See State v. Becker,
C.P. No. 73-12-1265 (Summit County, Ohio C.P. Sept. 18, 1974), appeal docketed,

CA. No. 7616, 9th Jud. Dist. Ohio App., Dec. 12, 1974.
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OHIO RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT
INTRODUCTION

T

derived from English feudal
law. In feudal England a lease was primarily a conveyance of an
interest in rural land that would be used for farming. 2 The value of the
lease was not measured by any structure on the premises but rather
by the land itself. Influenced by this simple arrangement, somewhat
rudimentary rules evolved governing leases. 3 Later, due to the shift in
population from rural to urban areas, leases became more complex and
HE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP is
1

entailed more than the mere conveyance of land. 4 Today the tenant of an
apartment is more concerned with his dwelling than with the land upon
which the apartment rests. A modern lease is, therefore, viewed more
as a "package of goods and services" consisting of adequate heating,
lighting and plumbing, rather than four walls and a ceiling. Though
the needs of the tenant have changed, the law6 governing leases has
remained rooted in archaic property law principles.
While under modern contract law the buyer of goods and services
may rely, unless otherwise agreed, on the quality of goods and
services furnished to him, 7 the tenants of residential premises are still
burdened with the doctrine of caveat emptor.8 Though the trend is
changing, 9 the general rule is that there is no implied warranty of
& MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 115-17 (2d ed. 1898).
See Comment, Landlord-TenantRelationship in Perspective from Status to Contract
and Back in 900 Years? 9 KAN. L. REV. 369, 371 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 9 KAN.
L. REV.]. See also Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FoRDHAM L. REV. 225, 229 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Quinn].
3 See 9 K.AN. L REV.,supra note 2, at 371.
4 See Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Lease, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 445
(1972); 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 221 [1] (1967).
5
See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 App. D.C. 369, 372, 428 F.2d 1071,
1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
e ld.

12 F. POLLOCK
2

7See, e.g.,

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 2-312 to -316; Jaeger, Warranties of

Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REV.493
(1967). See also Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 App. D.C. 369, 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).

81

AMERICAN LAW

OF

PROPERTY

§ 3.45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).

9 More and more courts have overturned caveat emptor in favor of implied warranties
of habitability in residential premises. See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138
App. D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970);
Green v. Sumski, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Hinson
v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Brown v. Southall Realty
Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Lemele v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d
470 (1969); Jack Spring v. Little, 50 IM. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v.
Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Reed v. Classified Parking System, 232 So. 2d
103 (La. App. 1970); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 485, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972);
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habitability in a lease of residential premises. 10 Where a tenant secures
a covenant to repair from the landlord, that covenant is independent of
the tenant's duty to pay rent." If the landlord fails to repair, the tenant is
still obligated to pay rent. The tenant is a party to a contract which
he has little opportunity to formulate.' 2 While a buyer in a consumer
setting is protected because of his unequal bargaining position,13 the
residential tenant is not afforded such protection.
5
4
The new Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act' is the legislature's attempt'
at correcting the imbalance between landlord and tenant. This new law is
Ohio's unique adaptation of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act.' 6 The thrust of the new act is to abrogate the Ohio common law
Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973); Resto Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53
NJ. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971);
Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Pine v. Pierson, 14 Wis. 2d 509,
111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). Contra, Pointer v. American Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 573
(S.D. Ind. 1969); Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972).
10 See Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393 (1875); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPnTY
§ 3.78 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
1 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Hutcherson v. Lethin, 313 F. Supp.
1324 (N.D. Cal. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 522 (1970); Johnson v. Haynes, 330
S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1959); Henry v. Pittsburg CC & St. L RR Co., 20 Ohio N.P. 118,
50 Ohio Dec. 41 (C.P. 1875); but see John Mecke & Sons v. American Meat Co., 96
Ohio App. 17, 117 N.E.2d 191 (1958). See generally Quinn, supra note 2, at 257.
12 Due to housing shortages and standardized leases, the landlord places the tenant "in
a take it or leave it" situation. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 App. D.C.
369, 377, 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970);
2 R. POWELL REAL PROPERTY § 221[1] (1967). See generally Mueller, Residential
Tenants and Their Leases an EmpiricalStudy, 69 MICH. L. REv. 247 (1970).
2 See note 7 supra. See also Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943); Meyer, Contracts of
Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178, 1181 (1964).
4
1 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.02, 1923.04, 1923.06, 1923.061, 1923.081, 1923.14,
1923.015, 5321.01-5321.19 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For the legislative history of the
new act, see Blumberg, The Ohio Struggle with the Uniform Residential Landlord
Tenant Act, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 265 (1973).
lCincinnati has enacted legislation to deal with landlord-tenant relationships. See
Cincinnati, Ohio Ordinance No. 314-1973, July 5, 1973, as quoted in Comment,
Landlord-Tenant Reform in Cincinnati,43 U. CIN. L. REv. 175 (1974).
16 The entire Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act may be found in NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 210 (1972) [hereinafter cited as URLTA].

The Uniform Act has been adopted entirely or partially in other states. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.010-.380 (Supp. 1974); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1301 to
33-1376 (1974); FLA. STAT. § 83.401.70 Supp. (1974); HAWAII REv. STAT. §
521-8 to 521-76 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. § 91.700-.865 (1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-248.2 to 55-248.40 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. COnE § 59.04.010-.410 (Supp.
1974). Other states have enacted legislation to deal with landlord-tenant relations.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 25, § 5102-6504 (Non Cum. Supp. 1974); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 80, § 1-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 8, § 203-501 (Supp. 1974);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239 § 8A (Cum. Supp. 1974); MICH. COMaP. LAWS ANN.
§ 554.139 (Supp. 1974); N.J. REv. STAT. 2A:42.10.1-.97 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. REAL
PROF. ACTIONS § 770, 755, 782 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. §
302(a) (McKinney 1974); N.Y. Soc. SERVICES § 143(b) (McKinney 1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 704.01-704.40 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
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8
of caveat emptor 17 and independent covenants 1 and reinterpret residential
9
leases in light of modem contract law.

The purpose of this article is to acquaint the reader with the newly
defined rights, duties and remedies of the landlord and the tenant. Analysis
will be placed on: (1) Ohio case law prior to the act; (2) similar
provisions of URLTA, and (3) comparative case and statutes in other
jurisdictions emphasizing the new trend in landlord-tenant relations.
SCOPE AND COVERAGE

The Ohio Landlord Tenant Act contains two sections. The first section
20
redefines and broadens the Forcible Entry and Detainer procedures. The
second section encompasses the rights and duties of both landlord
and tenant. 21 The latter section contains six basic definitions including
Landlord, Tenant, Rental Agreement, Security Deposit, Dwelling Unit, and
the principal definition of Residential premises.3 The Act does not extend
coverage to commercial leases, which are still governed by traditional
property law.2 3 The rationale for this distinction is that the inequality of
17 See Rodeheaver v. Sears & Co., 220 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Godall v.
Deters, 121 Ohio St. 432, 169 N.E. 443 (1929); Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St.
393 (1875); Herman v. Albers, 13 Ohio N.P. 98, 22 Ohio Dec. 429 (C.P. 1912).
1 See Dickson v. Hunt, 9 Ohio Dec. 408 (Dist. Ct. 1899); Henry v. Pittsburgh CC
St. L. RR. Co., 20 Ohio N.P. 118, 50 Ohio Dec. 41 (C.P. 1875).
19 See generally note 7 supra.
20mo

REv. CODE ANN.

§ 1923.02, 1923.04, 1923.06, 1923.061,

1923.081,

1923.14,

1923.15 (Baldwin Supp. 1974); see also Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.01, 1923.03,
1923.05, 1923.07, 1923.08, 1923.09-.13 (Baldwin 1974).
2
1 Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 5321.01-.19 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
22
Osio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (C):
"Residential Premises" means a dwelling unit for residential use and occupancy
and the structure of which it is a part, the facilities and appurtenances therein,
and the grounds, areas, and facilities for the use of tenants generally or the use
of which is promised the tenant. "Residential Premises" does not include:
(1) Prison, jails, workhouses, and other places of incarceration or
correction, including halfway houses or residential arrangements which are used
or occupied as a requirement of probation or parole;
(2) Hospitals and similar institutions with the primary purpose of providing medical services and "Homes" licensed pursuant to chapter 3721 of the
Revised Code;
(3) Tourist homes, hotels, motels, and other similar facilities where
circumstances indicate a transient occupancy;
(4) Boarding schools, where the cost of room and board is included as
part of the cost of tuition, but not college and university approved housing and
private college and university dormitories;
(5) Orphanages and similar institutions;
(6) Farm residences furnished in connection with the rental of land of a
minimum of two acres for production of agricultural products by one or more
of the occupants;
(7) Dwelling units subject to the provisions of sections 3733.41 to 3733.48
of the Revised Code;
(8) Occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit.
23 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974.) Most landlord-tenant acts
deal solely with residential premises. See URLTA § 1.101 and Comments thereto.
Other states have enacted separate statutes to deal with commercial leases. See FL.
STAT. § 83.001-.255 (Supp. 1974). Still other states have made no distinction. See
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.01 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
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bargaining power evidenced in residential leases is not manifest in
commercial leases.2 4 However, certainly this proposition is not always
true, for the lessor of commercial premises, like his residential counterpart, has knowledge superior to that of the tenant concerning the
condition of the rental property.25 Therefore, non-residential tenants
should also be afforded some protection. 26
While the definition of Residential Premises is broad-"a dwelling
unit for residential use and occupancy.. ."--the act does not cover
residential arrangements that are incidental to another primary purpose.
Correctional institutions such as jails, prisons and halfway houses, as
well as medical facilities, including hospitals and nursing homes,
"orphanages and similar institutions"28 are excluded. The act also
29
specifically excludes transient occupancies such as hotels and motels,
condominiums,30 farm labor camps31 and -farm residences employing
32
over two acres of land to agricultural production.
The final exclusion from residential premises is: "Boarding schools
where the cost of room and board is included as part of the cost of
tuition, but not college and university approved housing and private
college and university dormitories."' The inclusion by the legislature of
college approved housing and private college dormitories, through the use
of a double negative, is unusual, but even more perplexing is the denial to
private college students those remedies granted to other tenants in parallel

24 See Kruvant v. Sunrise Mkt., 112 NJ. Super. 509, 271 A.2d 741 (1970); cf., Reste
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). Compare D. H.
Overmeyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (upholding a cognovit against a
corporation) with Feuntes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (striking down prejudgment
replevin in a consumer setting).
25
See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444, 449, 251 A.2d 268, 273 (1969).
26 E.g., the minimum duties of the landlord and the tenant should be applied to
commercial leases. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04, 5321.05 (Baldwin Supp.
1974).
27 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For the full text, see
note 22 supra.
28 Id.
2 Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 5321.01 (C) (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 22 supra; cf. URLTA § 1.202. See also OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01 (0)
(1973), which defines "transient guest" for sales tax purpose as a "person occupying
a room or rooms for sleeping accommodations for less than thirty consecutive days."
30
0mo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (C) (8) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 22 supra. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.01-.22 (Page 1970) for state regulation of condominiums. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.39 to 55-79.103 (Interim Supp.
1974).
31 OHio REv. CODB ANN. § 5321.01(C) (7) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 22 supra. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3733.41-48 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), for
the state's regulation of farm labor camps.
32
OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C) (6) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 22 supra.
3
3Omo REV. CODE AN. § 5321.01 (C) (4) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 22 supra.
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situations.3 4 Since under the new act private college students, who reside in
a dormitory, are even denied the right to injunctive relief, the only effective
remedy for these students is an action for breach of contract against private
5
college and university landlords who fail to perform their statutory duties.
A notable subject 36 covered by the Act is public housing which, like
its private residential counterpart, is often in dire need of reform.37 By
comparison, some landlord-tenant acts exclude public housing3 8 but the
trend is to provide coverage to such projects.3 9 Although state landlordtenant laws are not applicable to wholly federally owned and operated
projects, they are applicable to state and municipally owned housing
authorities which receive federal financial assistance.40
APPLICATION

Ohio's Landlord-Tenant Act became effective on November 4, 1974.
The first problem the courts will face is the law's application to leases
entered into prior to the effective date. Under the Ohio Constitution,
retroactive application of substantive law is prohibited. 41 Remedial
legislation, however, is not similarly limited by this constitutional provision,
based upon a distinction between changes in accrued rights and changes in
remedies to enforce those rights.4 Thus, there is nothing to prevent
application of the new Act's remedial measures to causes of action accruing
after November fourth, but based upon rights existing prior to that date.
For example, obligations breached under a lease entered into prior

34

Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). The exclusion of tenant

remedies applies only to private college and university dormitories, which would
presumably bring any state college or university approved housing within the purview
of the act. See text accompanying notes 92-119 infra.
35 Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), which allows either
party to bring an action for breach of contract or duty imposed by law. See also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), which allows a tenant when
being evicted for nonpayment of his rent to counterclaim.
36 It is also noteworthy that while the URLTA § 1.202(2) excludes land sale contracts,
the Ohio act does not.
37
Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see note 22
supra. See Note, Remedies for Tenants in Substandard Public Housing, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 561, 570 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 68 COLUM. L. REV.].
38 See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1308(7) (1973).
39 See URLTA§ 1-202; See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5111 (Non Cure. Supp.
1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.42 (Supp. 1974-75).
40 See 68 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 37, at 570-576. See generally for provisions
pertaining to federal funding, operation and assistance to public housing projects, 42
U.S.C. § 1401-1435 (1970).
41 OHIo CONST. art. II, § 28. See Kilbreath v. Ruby, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 242 N.E.2d
658 (1968); Smith v. N.Y. Cent. R. CO., 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N.E. 637 (1930);
Safford v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 119 Ohio St. 332, 164 N.E. 351 (1928).
42 See Smith v. N.Y. Central R. CO., 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N.E. 637 (1930). Compare
Kilbreath v. Ruby, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 742 N.E.2d 658 (1968) (longarm statute) with
Bagsarian v. Parker Metal Co., 382 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1968) and Lantsberry
v. Tilley Lamp Co., 270 Ohio St. 2d 303, 272 N.E.2d 127 (1971).
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to the enactment date of the law could be enforced by application of
remedial provisions of the new Act. 43
The application of the substantive sections of the Act, especially the
landlord's duties, 44 creates a more difficult problem since under the Ohio
Constitution, they can not be retroactively applied. 45 However, there is
some basis for making retroactive warranties of habitability in Ohio
case law. Other jurisdictions have applied these warranties as a matter
of public policy prior to the effective date of legislation creating those
duties. 4 Such a pattern should be followed in Ohio under a 1972
case, Glyco v. Schultz, 47 where the court incorporated warranties of
habitability in residential leases.
As to the application of the Act to leases entered into after the effective
date, the constitutional issue of impairment of the obligation of contract
may arise.48 The problem dissipates when one considers that private
property rights are not absolute, but subject to the reasonable exercise of
the state's police power, and that the state has a general police power to
impose regulations provided there is a substantial relationship between the
regulation and protection of public welfare." The Ohio Landlord-Tenant
Act meets this test because leases as contracts must be interpreted in light of
changing concepts of public welfare. 50 Similar landlord-tenant laws in other
states have withstood constitutional attack on the issue of infringement of
contract, since there is a substantial state interest in upgrading landlordtenant relations.5 ' The new landlord-tenant law superimposes reasonable
rights and duties upon the traditional landlord-tenant relationship.5

43

Sections of the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act which could be considered remedial are

OmIo REv. CODE ANN.

§ 1923.04 (Baldwin Supp. 1974),

pertaining to notice in

Forcible Entry and Detainer; OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.06 (Baldwin Supp. 1974),
pertaining to Summons; and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974),

pertaining to counterclaiming at Trial in Forcible Entry and Detainer. See generally
Michaels v. Morse, 165 Ohio St. 599, 138 N.E.2d 660 (1956).
44 OHIO REv. ConE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
45 See cases cited note 42 supra.
46 SeeFoisyv. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Berizito v. Gambino, 63
N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
4735 Ohio Misc. 25, 32,289 N.E.2d 919,925 (Mun. Ct. 1972).
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1); Omo CONsr. art. I, § 28.
49See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1964); Homebuilding and Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256
U.S. 170 (1921); Smith v. Jullierat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E.2d 611 (1954); Akron
v. Pub. Utilities, 149 Ohio St. 347, 78 N.E.2d 890 (1948).
50 See Alkire v. Cashman, 350 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Ohio 1972), afl'd, 477 F.2d 598
(6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973). See generally cases cited note 49

supra.
51 See Troy Hill Village Inc. v. Fischler, 122 N.J. Super. 572, 301 A.2d 177 (1971).
52 See Teondll4 v, Rttagiata, 120 N.J, Super. 400, 294 A.2d 431 (1972).
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Under Ohio common law, prior to Glyco v. Schultz, 5a in the absence

of fraud the landlord made no warranty of fitness in residential premises.54
Even where the tenant repaired the premises, he had no right of
reimbursement against the landlord.55 Since covenants in a lease were
independent, a substantial breach by the landlord did not relieve the
tenant of his obligation for rent.56 Until changed by statute, the obligation
57
to pay rent remained even after the premises were totally destroyed.
The sole dependent covenant which relieved a tenant of his
covenant to pay rent was "quiet enjoyment." Under this covenant, the
landlord promised that neither he nor anyone with title superior to his
would interfere with the tenant's possession. In order to be relieved
of the duty to pay rent, the breach not only must be a substantial
interference with the tenant's use of the land, but must also have
required the tenant to vacate.5 8
The three principal obligations imposed on the landlord under the
statute are dependent covenants. Under the statute, the landlord is
required: (1) to comply with all health, housing and safety codes which
materially affect health and safety; (2) to make repairs to keep the
premises fit and habitable, and (3) to keep all common areas of
the premises safe and sanitary. 59 When any one of these obligations is
53 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. 1972).
54See Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St 393 (1875); Rotte v. Meirjohan, 78 Ohio App.
387, 70 N.E.2d 684 (1947); Mitchell v. Greive, 25 Ohio Dec. 670 (Super Ct. 1913).
55 See Holder v. Farmakis, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 279, 117 N.E.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1951);
Cinn. Oak Motor Co. v. Meyer, 37 Ohio App. 90, 174 N.E. 154 (1930).
56 See Dickson v. Hunt, 9 Ohio Dec. 408 (Dis. Ct. 1899); Henry v. Pittsburgh CC &
St. L. R.R. Co., 20 Ohio N.P. 118, 50 Ohio Dec. 41 (C.P. 1875). The tenant could,
however, have a setoff for rent, see Nye v. Schuler, 110 Ohio App. 443, 165 N.E.2d
16 (1959).
57See Osno REv. CODE Am. § 5301.11 (Page 1970), which overruled the case of
Linn v. Ross, 10 Ohio 412 (1841).
58
See Nye v. Schuler, 110 Ohio App. 443, 105 N.E.2d 16 (1959); South Main Akron
v. Lynn Realty, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 103, 106 N.E.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1951). Compare Gulf
Refining Co. v. Fetschan, 130 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 764
(1943) with Thompson v. N.W. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 31 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ohio
1937). See generally Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24
BAYLOR L. REv. 445, 462 (1972).

59 Omo REv. CODE ANN. (Baldwin Supp. 1974) § 5321.04:
(A) A landlord who is a party to a rental agreement shall:
(1) Comply with the requirements of all applicable building, housing,
health, and safety codes which materially affect health and safety;
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and
keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) Keep all common areas of the premises in a safe and sanitary
condition;
(4) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning fixtures and appliances and elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him;
(5) When he is a party to any rental agreements that cover four or more
dwelling units in the same structure, provide and maintain appropriate
receptacles for the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental
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breached, the tenant can, after notice and failure of the landlord to remedy
the situation within a reasonable time not exceeding 30 days, pursue the
tenant remedies under the statute. 6 These remedies include the right to
deposit all rent payments with the clerk of municipal or county courts. 6'
Among other remedies, the tenant has in certain circumstances a statutory
62
right to counterclaim for breach of these dependent covenants.
The landlord's obligations are not as burdensome as they seem on
first reading. The landlord must correct only those housing code violations
which materially affect health and safety. 63 The landlord has always had
this duty. Prior to the enactment of this statute, however, the landlord's duty
was owed to the state"s and not to the tenant.65 The duty to repair also is
limited. It extends no further than to keep the premises fit and habitable. 6
The extent of the landlord's duty to meet housing code regulations
and to provide repairs in general will directly depend on the interpretation
of the statutory language of "materially affects health and safety" and "fit
and habitable." Definitions of these standards may be provided from
three sources. The landlord and the tenant may define these standards by
agreement, provided that their definitions are not inconsistent with the
intent of the statute. 67 These terms may also be defined by reference to
to the occupancy of the dwelling unit, and arrange for their removal;
(6) Supply running water, reasonable amounts of hot water and reasonable heat at all times except where the building that includes the dwelling unit
is not required by law to be equipped for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is
so constructed that heat or hot water is generated by an installation within the
exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility connection;
(7) Not abuse the right of access conferred by division (B) of Section
5321.05 of the Revised Code;
(8) Except in the case of emergency or if it is impracticable to do so,
give the tenant reasonable notice of his intent to enter and enter only at
reasonable times. Twenty-four hours is presumed to be a reasonable notice in
the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(B) If the landlord makes an entry in violation of division (A) (8) of
this section, or makes a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner, or makes
repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful which have the effect of harassing
the tenant, the tenant may recover actual damages resulting therefrom and
obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, and if
he obtains a judgment, reasonable attorney's fees, or terminate the rental
agreement.
60 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). See text accompanying notes
92-123 infra.
61
OHio REV. CoDE ANN. § 5321.07 (B) (1) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
62
OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). See text accompanying notes
137-152 infra. See also OHIo R~v. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), which
allows the tenant to bring a separate action for breach of contract against a landlord
who has breached his statutory duties.
63 OHio REv. CDE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (1) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 59 supra.
6
4 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3709.20, 3709.71, 3709.99 (Page 1970).
65 But see Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. 1972).
66
Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (2) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 59 supra.
67 See Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.06, 5321.13 (A), 5321.14 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
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municipal housing codes" and case law from other jurisdictions. 09
The landlord's third principal obligation, to keep common areas safe
and sanitary, 70 is a codification of the duty imposed upon him by Ohio
tort law.7 Under Ohio case law, a landlord is under a duty to use
ordinary care to keep common areas under his control in a reasonably
safe condition. He is liable for injuries to the tenant or his guest
proximately caused -by the failure to perform that duty.72 Both the
practitioner and the courts may wish to make reference to the landlord's
common law tort duty to define his statutory obligation to keep the
common areas safe and sanitary.73
Beyond these three principal obligations, the landlord must meet
certain other specific statutory requirements. Among these requirements
are the duty to provide ,for the upkeep of plumbing and electrical systems
and to provide waste receptacles for buildings containing more than four
dwelling units. 74 The landlord may also have a duty to provide running
water, hot water, and heat depending upon the nature of the 'building in
which the dwelling unit is contained. The requirement of providing heat
and hot water may also be eliminated depending on who has control of
the heating equipment and the nature of the utility hookup itself.7 The
landlord may also have a duty to maintain appliances furnished to
the tenant, but he can pass the responsibility to maintain appliances
78
to the tenant through a stipulation in the lease.

68

See, e.g., AKRON CITY CODE § 1820.16(C) (3), which defines unfit as that which
creates a "serious hazard to health, morals, safety, or general welfare of the occupants
or other residents of the City." See also AKRON CrrY CODE §§ 1820, 1828, 1898.99

(1975).
69
See Lemele v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
70OmoRav. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 59 supra.
7

1See Weber v. Schlemmer, 365 F.2d 323 (6th Cir. 1966); Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio
St. 316, 85 N.E.2d 545 (1949); Mulaiski v. Brzuchalski, 117 Ohio App. 480, 192
N.E.2d 669 (1961). Compare Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio St. 2d 45, 233 N.E.2d 589
(1969) with Oswald v. Jeraj, 146 Ohio St. 676, 67 N.E.2d 779 (1946).
72
See Young v. Mager, 41 Ohio App. 2d 60,70 Ohio Op. 2d 59 (1974).

7 The practitioner should be advised of the possibility of the development of a

negligence per se tort liability under the statute. The statutory duties defined in
OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Baldwin Supp. 1974) (for full text, see note 59
supra), may become synonymous with "reasonable care." A breach of the statutory
duty causing injury to the tenant or his guest may become negligence in itself. See
generally PRossER, Tim LAw Op TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971), for a discussion of the
concept of negligence per se.
74 0mo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (4), (5) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 59 supra.

7
5Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (6) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 59 supra.
76
Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (4), 5321.05(A) (7) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For
full text, see note 84 infra.
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RIGHT OF ACCESS

To enable the landlord to comply with his new obligations, the
legislature has provided him with a statutory "right of access," 7 which
supplements his prior limited right of entry. 78 The legislature has defined
this right by reference to the tenant's duty not to withhold consent in
certain situations. 79 Whether this circular definition is the sum total of the
landlord's right of access, the legislature has left unclearse In any event,
the statute provides for a cause of action against both parties. On the
landlord's side, he may not abuse his right nor harass the tenant by
continually demanding access. If he does abuse his right, the tenant can
terminate the lease, obtain an injunction, or, more importantly, sue for
actual damages. Upon judgment, the tenant is also entitled to reasonable
attorney fees. 81 On the other hand, the tenant may not unreasonably
withhold consent. The landlord's remedies mirror those of the tenant
where the landlord abuses his right to access.82
TENANT'S

DunEs

Under the common law, the only affirmative duty that a tenant owes
to his landlord, outside of the duty to pay rent, is the duty to refrain from
committing waste.83 Under the new Act, the tenant retains this duty.84 In
addition, he must forbid others who are on the premises with his consent
77 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (7) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text see note
59 supra.
78 At common law, the landlord could enter the premises only to prevent waste. See
Helvich v. Rutherford, 96 Ohio App. 367, 114 N.E.2d 514 (1953); Rammell v. Bulen,
51 Ohio L. Abs. 125, 80 N.E.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1948). See generally McGuire v.
Corn. 92 Ohio App. 445, 110 N.E.2d 809 (1952); Coward v. Fleming, 89 Ohio App.
485, 102 N.E.2d 850 (1951).
9
7 OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 5321.05 (B), (C):
(B) The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent for the landlord
to enter into the dwelling unit in order to inspect the premises, make ordinary,
necessary, or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements, deliver
parcels which are too large for the tenant's mail facilities, supply necessary or
agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers,
mortgagees, tenants, workmen, or contractors.
(C) If the tenant violates any provision of this section, the landlord may
recover any actual damages which result from the violation together with
reasonable attorney's fees. This remedy is in addition to any right of the
landlord to terminate the rental agreement, to maintain an action for the
possession of the premises or injunctive relief to compel access under division
(B) of this section.
SoCf. URLTA § 3.103 which is specific in defining the landlord's right of access.
8l Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 5321.04(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see note

59 supra.

82 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see note
79 supra.
83See United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1877); Peter v. Durroh, 28 Ohio App.
2d 245, 277 N.E.2d 69 (1971); Freedline v. Cielinsky, 115 Ohio App. 138, 184 N.E.2d
432 (1961).
84 OHIo REv.CoDE ANN.§ 5321.05(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974):

(A) A tenant who is a party to a rental agreement shall:

(1) Keep that part of the premises that he occupies and uses safe and
sanitary;
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8
from committing waste. 5 The statute also requires the tenant to keep

the premises safe and sanitary, to comply with all applicable health
and safety codes, to dispose of garbage properly, to keep plumbing
88
fixtures clean, and to operate electrical and plumbing fixtures properly.
the lease the duty to maintain
The tenant may also assume under
87
appliances furnished by the landlord.
The most significant requirement imposed upon the tenant is to
refrain from disturbing his neighbors. 88 Since the landlord may enforce
this duty, 89 it may be extremely important to other tenants. Under
common law, unless the landlord expressly or impliedly authorized
the acts of the tenant, the landlord was not responsible for the tenant's
conduct.90 Now that the landlord can legally control the tenant, he ought
to be responsible -forsuch disturbances to other tenants.9 '
TENANT'S REMEDIES

The tenant's basic remedy under the new Act is to withhold rent
from the landlord by paying it into the court, 92 although he does have
(2) Dispose of all rubbish, garbage, and other waste in a clean, safe, and
sanitary manner;
(3) Keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by tenant as
clean as their condition permits;
(4) Use and operate all electrical and plumbing fixtures properly;
(5) Comply with the requirements imposed on tenants by all applicable
state and local housing, health, and safety codes;
(6) Personally refrain, and forbid any other person who is on the premises
with his permission from intentionally or negligently destroying, defacing,
damaging, or removing any fixture, appliance, or other part of the premises;
(7) Maintain in good working order and condition any range, refrigerator,
washer, dryer, dishwasher, or other appliances supplied by the landlord and
required to be maintained by the tenant under the terms and conditions of a
written rental agreement;
(8) Conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with his
consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his neighbors'
peaceful enjoyment of the premises.
85 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05 (A) (6) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 84 supra.
86 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (2), (3), (4), (5) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full
text, see note 84 supra.
87 Omo Rav. CoDE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (7) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 84 supra.
88 OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (8) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For full text, see
note 84 supra.
89 Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
9DSee, e.g., Milheim v. Baxter, 46 Colo. 155, 103 P. 376 (1909); Bowers v. Sells, 125
Ind. App. 282, 123 N.E.2d 194 (1954); Lancanshire v. Garford Mfg. Co., 199 Mo.
App. 418, 203 S.W. 668 (1918)* Hannon v. Harpy, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255 (1926).
91 See Colonial Court Apartments Inc. v. Kern, 282 Minn. 533, 163 N.W.2d 770
(1968); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974).
Contra, Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122 (1969).
92OmO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), which also allows the tenant
injunctive relief or to terminate the lease. Rent withholding is prevalent in many
jurisdictions. E.g. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 127a-127h, ch. 239 § 8A (Supp.
1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ArN. § 125.530, 125.535 (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 441.550-.640 (Supp. 1975); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:42-74 to 2A:42-84 (Supp. 1974);
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other remedies. 93 The initial step to the tenant's remedies is notice. The
tenant may send effective notice under the statute when:
(1) The landlord has breached the rental agreement or his statutory

obligation;
(2) "[Tlhe condition of the premises are such that the tenant
reasonably believes" that the landlord has breached the rental
agreement or his statutory obligations;
(3) A government agency has found housing code violations which
materially affect health and safety. 94
The notice must specify the condition which the tenant contends
represents a violation of the landlord's rental or statutory obligations.95
The notice is sent to "the person or place where rent is normally paid."' '
Upon receipt of the notice, the landlord has 30 days or a reasonable
97
time, whichever is shorter, to rectify the condition.
If the landlord fails to remedy the condition and the tenant is current
in rent, the tenant can pursue his remedies under the statute. 98 The statute
presents these remedies in terms of three disjunctive alternatives. 9 The first
and third remedies are very simple: either deposit the rent with the clerk
of court, or terminate the lease. 1 °° The second remedy is a logistician's
delight and an attorney's nightmare, in providing the tenant the option to:
Apply to the court for an order directing the landlord to remedy the
condition. As part thereof, the tenant may deposit rent pursuant to
division (B) (1) of this section, and may apply for an order reducing
the periodic rent due the landlord until such time as the landlord does
remedy the condition, and may apply for an order to use the rent
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. §§ 302a, 309 (McKinney 1974); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcIONS
§ 755 (McKinney Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1974); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-248.27 (Supp. 1974). See also Dreamy Hollow Apart. Corp. v.
Lewis, 4 Conn. Cir. 355, 232 A.2d 346 (1966); Burlington Summit Apartment v.
Manolato, 233 Iowa 15, 7 N.W.2d 26 (1942); Farrell v. Drew, 19 Misc. 2d 486, 227
N.E.2d 824, 281 N.Y.S. 291 (1967); Himmel v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 47 Misc. 2d
93, 262 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Civ. Ct. 1965); Depaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d
500 (1971), which have upheld rent withholding statutes as constitutional.
93

See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 321.12 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), which allows the tenant
to bring a separate action for breach of contract against a landlord who breaches his
statutory obligation; Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), which
allows tenant to counterclaim in Forcible Entry and Detainer.
94 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

See OHIO

REv.

CODE

ANN. § 5321.18(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974) (the landlord waives his right of notice if
he fails to give the tenant written information as to ownership or managing agent).
98
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). See OHno REv. CODE
ANN. § 5321.09(A) (2) (Baldwin Supp. 1974) (if the tenant is not current in rent or
has not given proper notice, the landlord may obtain rent release from the Clerk of
Courts).
99 OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (1), (2), (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
100 Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07 (B) (1), (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
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deposited to remedy the condition. In any order issued pursuant to
this division, the court may require the tenant to deposit rent with the
clerk of court as provided in division (B) (1) of this section. 101
A careful deciphering of subsection two reveals that the tenant has
these principal options: 2
(1) The tenant can seek injunctive relief to compel the landlord to
repair the condition and reduce the periodic rent due until the
repair is made. Furthermore, rent deposit is unnecessary unless
stipulated by the court. 103
(2) The tenant can deposit his rent with the court with the understanding that he can later apply for a release of the money to
remedy the condition.
How effective will one of the above options (rent deposit, injunctive
relief, or termination of the lease) be to the tenant? The first option,
simple rent deposit, may motivate the landlord to fix minor defects in
order to obtain release of these funds. 04 A more recalcitrant landlord
would require the tenant to seek his second option of a court order to
compel the landlord to repair. 1° 5 However, the burden is on the tenant to
(1) establish the need for repair, and (2) to obtain the court order."°
This would necessitate the retention of private counsel or legal aid
assistance. Since there is no provision for such fees in the Act, the cost
involved may and often would exceed the benefit to be gained by the
tenant. 0 7 Besides the expense of the court order, the tenant must first have
given the landlord 30 days or a reasonable time, whichever is shorter, to
101 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (2) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
102 Id. The alternatives enumerated in the text are not intended to be exclusive.
Through the use of ambiguous drafting, subsection two appears to provide the tenant
with four options, which are: (1) rent deposit; (2) injunctive relief to compel the

landlord to remedy the condition; (3) a court order to have the periodic rent reduced
until the landlord remedies the condition, and (4) release of deposited rent to remedy
the condition. On its face, the statute allows these four options to be sought
individually, together, or in combination. However, there are practical considerations
as to the application of all four options together, since certainly the court cannot
compel the landlord to repair while at the same time releasing deposited rent to allow
the tenant to repair. For further explanation, see URLTA § 4.101, after which, in
theory, the Ohio section is modeled.
103 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (2) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). Whenever the tenant
seeks a court order, he may be well advised to deposit his rent with the clerk of
courts, since he is still obligated on his lease and would otherwise be responsible to
pay his rent to the landlord. Although not required to do so, the tenant by depositing
his rent may apply even greater leverage against a landlord to repair the premises.
1
04 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07 (B) (1) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). Repair of the premises by the landlord is the most desirable remedy. See Javins v. First National Realty
Corp., 138 App. D.C. 369, 376, 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

400 U.S. 925 (1970). The act allows for an action for damages in addition to rent
withholding. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
10
5 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (2) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
108 Id.
1071d. Cf. URLTA §§ 4.101, which allows for attorney fees if the breach by the

landlord is willful.
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remedy the condition. This delay may be intolerable where emergency
situations exist, such as lack of heat in the winter, or inadequate toilet
facilities. 08 Even if the tenant wishes to repair the emergency condition
109
By
using his rent money, he must, under the Act, have court approval.
comparison, other states in such situations allow the tenant to repair, where
he can do so in a workmanlike manner, and deduct the amount of the
0
repair from his next month's rent.- The deduction must be reasonable
in relation to the repair and may not exceed one month's rent. Litigation
may later arise as to the necessity of the repairs or the reasonableness
of the deduction, but at least the premises will be habitable."' "Repair
and deduct" statutes provide a simple and more satisfactory remedy
to the tenant than the Ohio procedure in which rent is deposited and
then released by court order.
The tenant's third option is to terminate the lease and vacate.-- This
remedy, while simple and direct, has two disadvantages. First, residential
housing is a seller's market and the tenant's ability to quickly find other
m
Second, if, in fact, the landlord has not
housing is questionable.
or lease obligations, the tenant could remain
statutory
his
of
any
breached
4
liable on his lease agreement."
From a social viewpoint, one general problem with the tenant's rent
deposit with the court, as well as any increase in tenant's rights and
remedies is that it tends to discourage private investment in residential

housing.u 5 In many instances, the profit from residential housing is
marginal. Without the continual flow of rent, the landlord can not finance
his operation. By allowing the tenant to withhold his rent and deposit
it with the court, the landlord may become too financially burdened to

CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
109 OHao REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (2) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

10 Omo REv.

See
110 See URLTA § 4.103, which allows repair and deduction for minor defects.
,
also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 5306
(Non Cum. Supp. 1972); HAwAII REv. STAT. § 521-64 (Supp. 1974); MONT. REv.
CODES §§ 42-201, 202 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODES §§ 47-16-13 (1960); Okla. STAT.
ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31, 32 (1954); WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.100 (Supp. 1973).

M See Schweiger v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97,
90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970):
Jackson v. Riveria, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
112 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). See Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 5321.16(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974), for the tenant's ability to regain his
security deposit.
11 See Lemele v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 431, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969). See generally ABA Committee on Leases, Trends in Landlord Tenant Law including the Model
Code, 6 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST J. 550, 554 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as

ABA Committee].
114 OHro REv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). However, the right to
terminate the lease, one of the tenant's remedies may be based upon a reasonable
belief due to condition of the premises that the landlord has breached his statutory
duties or the rental agreement. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Baldwin
Supp. 1974).
l15 See ABA Committee, supra note 13, at 588, 589.
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make needed repairs.116 Other jurisdictions faced with this problem have
taken the property into receivership, remedied the condition and placed
a lien on the premises.11 7 The forcing of repairs either by court order or
receivership may drive landlords to seek alternative uses for their residential
property. Apartment buildings may be torn down and replaced by office
buildings, which provide a more attractive investment." 8 The net effect of
rent withholding and judicial activity may be to increase rents and housing
shortages which would frustrate rather than aid the beleaguered tenant."
In response to the special burden which the tenant's remedies of rent
deposit with the court, injunctive relief, and termination of the lease place
on smaller landlords, the legislature has exempted landlords of one, two, or
three dwelling units. 120 In order to 'be exempted, the landlord must send
written notice of his ownership of three dwelling units or less to the tenant
at the initial time of occupancy."'1 Whether this exemption is a distinct
advantage to smaller landlords remains to be seen. When rent is deposited
by the tenant with the clerk of court, it is held in escrow, and a landlord
who has not breached his obligations can obtain its release.12 On the
other hand, the tenant of an exempt landlord, who cannot deposit his
rent, may nonetheless withhold it, if he feels the landlord has breached
his obligations. Thus, the exempt landlord will bring an action in Forcible
Entry and Detainer to regain possession and rent due with no guarantee
that the tenant will have the money to pay a judgment in the landlord's
2
favor.lm
Therefore, is the exempt landlord really granted a benefit
by the legislature?
LANDLORD'S ACTION FOR RENTAL RELEASE
The landlord has an effective procedure 'for obtaining release of
us Id.
U7 See Community Renewal Foundation, Inc. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 44 Ill. 2d
284, 255 N.E.2d 908 (1970);

ILL.

Rnv.

STAT.

ch. 24 § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd

Supp.

1974); In re Brooke Ave., 38 Misc. 2d 589, 236 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1962); N.Y.
MULT. DWELL. § 309 (McKinney 1972). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5906
(Non Cun. Supp. 1974).
8

11 See Gibbons, Residential Landlord Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern Problems

with Reference to the Proposed Code, 21 HAsTiNGs L.J. 369, 386, 413 (1970).
119 Id.
120 O5o REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). As already mentioned,
private college and university dormitories are also excluded. See text accompanying
notes 33-35 supra.
12. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). The landlord of three
units or less is not exempt from the tenant's right to counterclaim in Forcible Entry
and Detainer, or the tenant's right to bring a separate action for breach of contract.
See Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1923.061, 5321.12 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
M Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.09 (Baldwin Supp. 1974), for the duties of the clerk
of court, who may charge 1% of the rent deposited as court costs. See Omo Rsv.
CODE ANN. § 5321.08 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
123 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). The unsatisfied judgment
creditor-landlord will have to seek the same remedies as any other judgment creditor,
such as garnishment. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1911.33 (Page 1968).
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funds deposited with the clerk of court. 24 The landlord may obtain a total
rental release in three situations which are:
(1) The landlord has rectified the condition complained of and the
tenant sends written notice to the clerk of courts that the
condition has been remedied;
(2) The tenant did not give proper notice or was not current in rent
when he deposited his rent with the clerk of courts, or
(3) The landlord has not breached his rental agreement, his statutory
obligations, or violated any "building, housing, health or safety
code."lIZ

Upon filing of a complaint for rental release, the tenant is given
notice and the right to answer and counterclaim as in "any other civil
case."' 2 A trial on the merits must be held within 60 days of the filing of
the landlord's complaint. 127 Once again, the tenant is burdened with the
need of legal counsel. This will be both time-consuming and expensive, since
there is no provision for recoupment of the tenant's attorney's fees, even
if he is successful at trial. However, if the tenant himself has caused
the condition upon which he deposited his rent or has acted in bad
faith, he is liable for damages plus reasonable attorney's fees.128 Altogether,
the tenant's remedies are not very attractive.
Further complicating matters, the landlord may, during the pendency
of his action for total rental release, apply for a partial rental release129
The landlord may bring an action for partial rental release to meet his
usual and customary operating expenses such as mortgages and insurance
premiums.130 Whether this action is ex parte or before both parties is not
stated, but certainly the landlord's ability to recoup part of the rent will
lessen his incentive to make any necessary repairs. In considering whether
to release part of the rent, the court will consider factors such as the
amount of rent derived from other dwelling units in the building, operating
expense of these units, and the cost to remedy the condition alleged by the
tenant.m A factor notably not included is the landlord's income obtained
from other apartment buildings. Therefore, a seemingly wealthy landlord
may recover substantial funds on the narrow criteria enumerated in
the statute. The courts will have to consider whether the statute's
42
criteria are exclusive3

'mOmo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.09 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
z OHio REV.
1M Omo REv.

CODE ANN. § 5321.09(A) (1), (2), (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
CODE ANN. § 5321.09(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

127 Id., although the court may grant a continuance upon a showing of good cause.
128 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
1M Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.10(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
230 Id.
131 OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.10(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

m Id.
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LANDLORD'S REMEDIES

Under prior Ohio law, the landlord had a quick summary remedy, in
Forcible Entry and Detainer, to evict a tenant who was wrongfully holding
possession by either holding over his term or being in default of his rent
payments. 3 The new law does not disturb this basic landlord remedy, but
expands both the scope and procedure in Forcible Entry and Detainer to
respond to the new rights and duties on the landlord and the tenant. The
scope of the landlord's remedy in Forcible Entry and Detainer is
expanded to include (1) breaches by the tenant of his statutory duties
which materially affect health and safety, and (2) breaches by the tenant
34
of the rental agreement.
From a procedural standpoint, the complaint must specify the alleged
breach since the notice requirement differs depending upon which section
the landlord bases his action. 135 It is also necessary that proper summons
containing the new statutory language be served on the tenant, five days
prior to the trial date instead of the former three days.3 6
(A)

TENANT'S RIGHT TO COUNTERCLAIM AND RAISE
DEFENSES IN FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER

The landlord often used his remedy of Forcible Entry and Detainer
to both evict a tenant who failed to pay rent, while at the same time adding
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
L34 OHIO RE'. CODE ANN. § 1923.02(H) (I) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
133

The

landlord may

not write tenant's duties into leases to shorten the notice requirement; this would be
prohibited as an inconsistent provision. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.06 (Baldwin
Supp. 1974).
5OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.02(H) (1) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). Thirty days notice is
required for an alleged breach of the tenant's duties, within which the tenant can
remedy the condition. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.11 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
Three days notice must be given for a breach of the rental agreement. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1923.04 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). Notice must have the proper statutory
language in a conspicuous manner: "You are being asked to leave the premises. If
you do not leave, an eviction action may be initiated against you. If you are in doubt
regarding your legal rights and obligations as a tenant, it is recommended that you
seek legal assistance."
In order to terminate month to month tenancy, 30 days notice is required. Seven
days is required for a week to week tenancy. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.17
(Baldwin Supp. 1974).
136 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.06 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). The language must be present in a conspicuous manner:
A complaint to evict you has been filed with this court. No person shall be
evicted unless his right to possession has ended and no person shall be evicted in
retaliation for the exercise of his lawful rights. If you are depositing rent with
the clerk of this court, you shall continue to deposit such rent until the time
of the court hearing. The failure to continue to deposit such rent may result in
your eviction. You may reouest a trial by jury. You have the right to seek legal
assistance. If you cannot afford a lawyer, you may contact your local legal aid
or legal service office. If none is available, you may contact your local bar
association.
There is an issue of whether summons must be served under the Civil Rules.
Compare Cotterman v. Fahrig, 28 Ohio Misc. 237, 277 N.E.2d 466 (Mun. Ct. 1971)
with Jansen v. Barclay Square, 34 Ohio Misc. 14, 295 N.E.2d 443 (Mun. Ct. 1973).
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a supplemental action to recover the rent due. 137 Since the primary action
was the landlord's right to regain possession, this action was normally tried
separate and apart from the action for rent. 38 Prior to Glyco v. Schultz
the landlord generally made no covenant as to the condition of the
premises.139 The only defense available to the tenant, at a trial for
possession, was payment of rent.14° Thus, the landlord could successfully
evict the tenant, who had no valid counterclaim against the landlord's
action for possession.' 4 '
Under the new Ohio law, whenever the tenant fails to pay his rent
while in possession, and the landlord responds by seeking to evict the
tenant or bring a separate action for rent due, the tenant is given a
statutory right to counterclaim and raise defenses. 42 Thus, a practical
effect of the new act is that the landlord now joins his primary action
to regain possession along with his supplemental action for rent. 1' At the
hearing, the tenant can counterclaim for breaches by the landlord of his
statutory duties or the rental agreement along with the right, in proper
circumstances, to raise the defense of retaliatory eviction'"
If a tenant wishes to counterclaim, he must pay special attention to
rule 13 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and the effects of res
judicata.1 The unchanged section of Forcible Entry and Detainer states
1
that a judgment is "not a bar to a later action brought by either party."'"
However, when the landlord adds the second cause of action for rent to
his primary action for possession, the nature of the tenant's counterclaims
may change from permissive 147 to compulsory counterclaims.'"8 In such
137 OHio

REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.02(A), (B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
M See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); ex rel Jenkins v. Hamilton County
Ct., 114 Ohio App. 231, 173 N.E.2d 186 (1958); Cotterman v. Fahrig, 28 Ohio Misc.
237, 277 N.E.2d 466 (Mun. Ct. 1971).
39 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. 1972). See text accompanying notes
53-58 supra.
140 See Lauch v. Monning, 15 Ohio App. 2d 112, 239 N.E.2d 675 (1968); Schmidt
v. Hummell, 81 Ohio App. 167, 73 N.E.2d 806 (1947). See also Meyer v. Carmichael,
29 Ohio App. 2d 183, 279 N.E.2d 622 (1971).
141
See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Central Park Place v. McDowell, 38
Ohio App. 2d 29, 311 N.E.2d 533 (1974). But see Kuhn v. Griffin, 3 Ohio App. 2d

165, 209 N.E.2d 824 (1964).
Rav. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). See also URLTA § 4.105;
Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 485, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972). But see Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
143
Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
144 Id.
145 OHIo R. Crv. P. 13.
142 OHmo

14

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.03 (Page 1968).

147 OHIO

R. Crv. P. 13(a). See Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286

F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961); Waltham Industries Corp. v. Thompson, 53 F.R.D. 93,
95 (D. Conn. 1971).
14sOmoREv. CODEANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974); OHio R. Civ. P. 13(b)).
Sef Rosenthal v. Fowler, 12 F.R.D: 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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a case, the tenant's counterclaims arise out of the same cause of action,
namely, the lease, and are therefore compulsory counterclaims, which
if not raised at trial will be barred from later suits.149 The tenant should
be careful to raise his counterclaims at the proper time.
In the event the tenant counterclaims, the court may require the
depositing of "past due rent and rent becoming due during the pendency
of the action."' 150 While the concept of prepayment of rent as a condition
precedent to counterclaiming is not unique to the Ohio law, there remains
a substantial question as to what circumstances necessitate rent deposit.' 5'
In New York, for example, a state court struck down as unconstitutional
a statute which required the mandatory depositing of funds as a condition
precedent to asserting a counterclaim. 1' Other states have been reluctant
to impose such a burden on the tenant and only require prepayment
in order to protect the landlord's interest.'5 The Ohio courts should
follow this example by examining the potential merits of each case
before requiring deposit.
(B) EQUITY POWER OF THE COURT TO
INSPECT RESIDENTIAL PREMISES

In order to aid the court in ascertaining the condition of the
residential premises, the statute authorizes the court to order an inspection
of the premises by an appropriate government agency154 In addition, the
court at its discretion is authorized to order restoration of the premises to
a habitable condition and where the tenant has vacated, it may refuse
to allow any rerental until the premises are habitable.'55 While this
procedure is permitted in the case where the landlord brings suit in
Forcible Entry and Detainer, it is deleted from the already discussed
tenant's remedies. 58 Certainly, a court-ordered inspection of the premises
to expose housing code violations would ease the burden on the
tenant to obtain injunctive relief.'5 7 The courts should consider using their
equity power to supplement the tenant's remedies.
149 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). See Dindo v. Whitney, 451

F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1971); Mesker Bros. Iron Co. v. Donata Corp., 401 F.2d 275 (4th
Cir. 1968). See generally Wright, Estoppel by Rule: Compulsory Counterclaim under
Modem Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REv. 423 (1954); WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PRocEDuRE § 1417 (1971).
1S0 OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
= Id.
152 See Amanuensis Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d I1 (Civ. Ct. 1971),
which held unconstitutional N.Y. MULT. DwELL. § 302(c) (McKinney 1971).
153
See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Cooks
v. Fowler, 459 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"4 OHio REv.CODE ANN. § 1923.15 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
155 Id.
155 OHIo REv.CODE ANN. § 5321.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
15 Id.
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JUDGEMENTS WHEN THE TENANT COUNTERCLAIMS
IN FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER

As already discussed, the new act provides for a joinder of the
landlord's two causes of action, possession and rent, while at the same
time allowing the tenant to counterclaim and raise defenses. 5 8 Regardless
of who prevails in the litigation, the tenant can still have possession of the
premises if he pays into the court the amount necessary to satisfy
the judgment for rent obtained by the landlord.5 9 The landlord may not
refuse the money and evict the tenant. Thus, the tenant may leave his rent
unpaid, be successfully sued by the landlord in Forcible Entry and
Detainer, and then, upon paying the amount due under the judgment into
the court, be in the same position as if he had paid his rent on time. 16
Under this procedure, a well-advised tenant may refuse to pay his
rent rather than use the tenant's remedies (rent deposit with the court,
injunctive relief, terminating lease)161 if he feels the landlord has breached
any of his obligations. The tenant may notify the landlord of the breach
and that no rent will be paid until the condition is remedied. The
landlord is placed in the perplexing position of deciding between the time
and expense of Forcible Entry and Detainer and remedying the condition.
The end result in either case is that the tenant will still be in possession of
the premises. 62 In the meantime, the tenant can deposit his rent money
with the bank, rather than the clerk of courts.
Since the new Act provides a better remedy for the tenant in refusing
to pay his rent, than in paying his rent to the clerk of courts, the Ohio
courts will have to decide whether this is the true intent of the statute.
The courts may have to impose a good faith requirement on the tenant
counterclaiming, to parallel the same requirement imposed on the tenant's
rent deposit, 63 and to avoid tenant misuse.' 64 If the courts do not
impose such a requirement, the elaborate rent depositing procedure as
well as the other tenant remedies may not be utilized.
RETALIATORY ACTION

In order to protect the tenant in the exercise of his new statutory
8

L9 Omo REV. CoDE ANN.
159 Id.

§ 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

16l Id. The only disadvantage to a tenant by not being current in rent is that he loses
the defense of retaliatory eviction. See Onto REv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.02, 5321.03(A)
(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
1l1 OHio Rev. CODE ANN. § 5321.07 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
16 2 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). If the tenant can pay the
judgment, he still retains possession after the landlord's action.
163 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1974), which states that if the

tenant has deposited his rent in bad faith, he will be liable for the damages caused
the landlord plus reasonable attorney fees.
164
See URLTA § 1.301(4), which defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the
conduct of a transaction concerned." See also URLTA § 4.105, which requires the
tenant to counterclaim in good faith.
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rights and to promote the reporting of housing code violations, the new Act
68
restricts'65 the landlord's absolute right to terminate a periodic tenancy.
Traditionally, some landlords would respond to a complaining tenant by
terminating the lease. The effect of termination was to silence that particular tenant while setting an example for other tenants. Since retaliatory
eviction on the part of the landlord has the potential to undermine the
18 7
entire Landlord-Tenant Act, the legislature has prohibited such conduct.
More specifically, the landlord is prohibited from increasing rent,
decreasing services, evicting or threatening to evict in response to a tenant
who asserts one of his protected rights, which are: (1) complaining to a
government agency of a violation which materially affects health and
safety; (2) complaining to the landlord concerning a breach of his
statutory obligations, and (3) joining a tenant union.68 Upon a successful
showing of retaliatory conduct on the part of the landlord, the tenant can
either regain possession, if he has been evicted by the landlord, or
terminate the lease or, in appropriate circumstances, raise retaliatory
action as a defense to a landlord's eviction suit in Forcible Entry
and Detainer. 169 In addition, the tenant can recover actual damages plus

reasonable attorney fees.
While the purpose behind the Ohio statute is commendable, it may
not afford the tenant the necessary protection from the landlord's
retaliatory conduct, since there are three decided loopholes for the
landlord. 70 The first is that he is only prohibited from retaliating against
a tenant who complains to a government agency of a violation which in
actuality materially affects health and safety."' Conversely, under a strict
reading of the statute, the landlord can retaliate against a tenant who in
good faith complains to a government agency of violations which are not
1

5321.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
Calvin v. Martin, 64 Ohio L Abs. 265, 11 N.E.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1952).
167 See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Co., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Edwards
v. Haib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 106 (1969). See also
Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Aweeka v. Bonds,
20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971); Fredman v. Clore, 13 Ill. App. 3d
903, 301 N.E.2d 7 (1973); Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63
(Monroe County Ct. 1972); Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc. 2d 384, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275
(Civ. Ct. 1973); Tom Point Aparts. v. Goudward, 72 Misc. 2d 478, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281
(Civ. Ct. 1972); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
168 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
169 Id. The tenant may not use retaliatory eviction as a defense to a landlord's eviction
proceeding in four situations: (1) the tenant is in default in rent payments; (2) the
tenant is holding over his term; (3) the tenant himself or others on the premises with
his consent were the primary cause of applicable code violations, and (4) in order for
the landlord to repair the premises, the tenant must vacate. However, the tenant can
still bring an action for any damages caused by the landlord's retaliatory conduct.
See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.03 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
1700no REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
171 OHIo REv. COD ANN. § 5321.02(A) (1) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). However, URLTA §
5.101 is worded the same way.
65 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §

166
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code violations or not serious code violations. Thus, paradoxically, under
a statute designed to promote the reporting of housing code violations, the
tenant, who has no expertise in housing code regulations, may be reluctant
to report a violation since if he is incorrect in his assertion of a
72
violation, he will have no protection under the statute.
Secondly, the landlord may be provided a loophole since the statute
does not enumerate what constitutes a prima facie case of retaliatory
conduct. 73 By comparison, many states aid the tenant by creating a
rebuttable presumption that the landlord's motive is retaliatory when,
within a specified period of time after the tenant has asserted a protected
74
right, the landlord brings an action for eviction or increases the rent.1
The Ohio law affords the tenant no such protection and grants the landlord
the unrestricted right to increase "the rent to reflect the cost of improve175
Since the Ohio law
ments" or "the cost of operation of the premises."'
allows the landlord economic grounds to increase the rent, the tenant
appears to have the difficult burden to show: (1) he asserted a protected
right; (2) the landlord knew he asserted that right, and (3)7 6 the action
taken by the landlord was for the sole purpose of retaliation.
The third loophole for the landlord is that, since he can increase the
rent to reflect the costs of improvements or increased operating costs on
the premises, he may use this right to pass back onto the tenant the
expense of any repairs made necessary by tenant complaints.'77 Whether
needed repairs are to be termed "improvements" or increased operating
78
However, to allow the
expenses will be left for the court to decide.
landlord the right to make the tenant pay the costs of repairs may stifle
any further attempts by the tenant to complain about the need to repair.
SEcuRITY DEPOSITS

The landlord in a landlord-tenant relationship will require the tenant
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(A) (1) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). However, the tenant
is allowed to pursue his remedies based upon reasonable belief due to the condition of
the premises. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
7
1 3 Omo REv.CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
1 74
See URLTA § 5.101; CAL. CI. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1975); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 19-375a (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 5516 (Supp. 1972);
MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1975); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 2A
(Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
540:13-a-b (1974); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 242-10.10 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§§ 8590, 8609 (McKinney 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 1700-1 (Supp. 1975).
175 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
176 Cf. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 2A (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03
(Supp. 1974); ULRTA § 5.101; Robinson v. Diamond Housing Co., 463 F.2d
853 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Applestein v. Quinn, 281 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1972); Brown v.
Olson, 291 Minn. 546, 192 N.W.2d 188 (1971); Pine Realty Co. v. Guarino, 126
N.J. Super. 134, 312 A.2d 898 (1973); Silberg v. Lipscomb, 117 N.J. Super. 491, 285
A.2d 86 (1971).
177 Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
178 Id. Cf. URLTA § 5.101 which allows the landlord no absolute right to increase rent.

172
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179
to deposit a sum with him in order to secure the tenant's performance.
While the new Act does not abrogate this right, it does create a duty,
under certain circumstances, to pay interest at a rate of 5% per annum
on portions of the deposit which are in excess of $50.00 or one month's
rent, whichever may be the greater.8° While this can be seen as a minor
deterrent to the landlord's charging of an excessive amount, it actually is
of little value to the normal tenant since the majority of deposits demanded
181
are generally one to two months' rent or an even lesser amount.

The new Act codifies what was previously a common law concept in
Ohio, and allows the landlord to apply the deposit toward past due rent
and to any damages which the tenant may have caused by a violation of
the statutory duties as itemized in section 5321.05,182 or other duties
contained in the rental agreement between the parties. 18 When the
landlord does so elect to make a deduction from the security deposit at
the termination of the relationship, he must itemize and identify in
writing the purpose for which each and every deduction is made and
4
forward the same with the amount remaining within 30 days.l The
tenant also has an obligation, under this section, to give the landlord
written notice of his new or forwarding address to which the deposit
and itemized list may be sent.lm
When the tenant has thus given notice and the landlord fails to
comply with his statutory duties, the landlord is subjected to the tenant's
right to recover the security deposit due him. In addition, the court may
grant damages in an amount equal to that sum wrongfully withheld, and
reasonable attorney's fees expended in the tenant's effort to regain his
property. 18 Conversely, if the tenant does not give the required notice, he
loses his right to punitive damages and compensation for attorney's fees
187
and may recover only the security deposit due him from the landlord.
A strict reading of the statute reveals that the landlord is penalized

§ 5321.01 (E) (Baldwin Supp. 1974), which defines security deposit as "any deposit of money or property to secure performance by the tenant
under a rental agreement."
180 OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). This section also requires
the landlord to pay annually the interest on the deposit to tenants who remain in
possession over six months.
181 See Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 825 (1974),
179 See Omo REV. CODE ANN.

where the author points out that the majority of leases are limited to security deposits

not in excess of one month's rest. For example, under OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
5321.16(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974), if the monthly rent due is $100 and the security
deposit is $110, the landlord pays interest on $10.00.
2
18 See Cain v. Brown, 105 Ohio St. 264, 136 N.E. 916 (1922); Tuteur v. P. & F.
Enterprises, Inc., 21 Ohio App. 2d 122, 255 N.E.2d 284 (1970).
183 For a full discussion, see text accompanying notes 83-91 supra.
184 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
185 Id.
188 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
1

OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

159

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 1

AKRON LAW REviEW

[VoL 8:3

only when he fails to forward to the tenant an itemized list of the
deductions and the amount of the security deposit remaining after
the deductions18s Thus, deductions which are nonetheless frivolous but
itemized and sent to the tenant along with the remaining security deposit
will not subject the landlord to the penalty section. 89 In any case, by
imposing the most severe penalty in the act, the statute has aided the
tenant in his quest to regain his deposit, by providing him with
the opportunity to have a clear written record of all damages which the
landlord has allegedly incurred during the tenant's possession.
SELF-HELP PROHIBITED

Under the common law, the landlord was deemed to have a quick
remedy against tenants through the self-help eviction. 9 0 Provided, of
course, that the landlord did not breach the peace in the utilization of this
method, he saved both the time and expense which otherwise would have
been involved if the matter were litigated in the courts. The new Act not
only enlarges the rights of tenants in Forcible Entry and Detainer, 19 1 but
also limits the common law right by prohibiting self-help evictions even
in situations where the tenant's right of possession has ceased. 192
While distress for rent has been given a certain amount of recognition
in other states, it has never gained the support of the judiciary in
Ohio. 193 This concept is continued in the Act by prohibiting summary
seizure of the tenant's property by the landlord for the purpose of
securing past rent due except pursuant to a court order.'9
The prohibition against self-help remedies as contained in the Act is
not merely an empty right. Section 5321.15 (C) includes a penalty for the
landlord's violation of either the self-help or the distress provisions. That
particular section grants to the tenant a cause of action for all damages
18 OHio REY. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
18 9
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1974). However, there may be
an alternative interpretation of the application of the penalty section against landlord
misconduct, since punitive damages are equal to the undefined term "wrongfully
withheld" amount. In view of the expanded rights for tenants under the new act, a
fair interpretation of the amount "wrongfully withheld" may subject the landlord to
penalty when he deducts for frivolous but itemized deductions, or itemized deductions
for damages which are outside the tenant's statutory or lease obligations. In either
case, such itemized deductions from the security deposit by the landlord may imply
bad faith and a wrongful withholding of the security deposit, which should subject
him to penalty. However, while the interpretation provided in the text is more in line
with a strict reading of the statute, this point seems destined to be determined by
litigation in the courts. See URLTA § 2.101.
190 See Smith v. Hawkins, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 733 (1862); Note, Forcibly Ejected
Tenant-Damages, Possession, Both, or Nothing, 28 U. CiN. L. REv. 369 (1959).
But see Edwards v. C. N. Investment Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 272 N.E.2d 652 (Mun.
Ct. 1972).
191 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
19 2
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.15 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
193 1AmmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.72 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
194 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.15(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
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arising from wrongful acts of the landlord plus reasonable attorney fees
incurred in prosecuting the action. Such a provision should serve to make an
errant landlord wary of impeding the tenant's statutorily recognized rights.
FUTURE LEASES
The drafters of leases which are utilized subsequent to the enactment
date of the act, should concern themselves with specific compliance with
four particular stipulations added to the Ohio code by the new Act.195 The
first of these sections requires that the residential tenant be given written
notice of the name and address of the owners of the rental premises and
the owner's agent.""6 The underlying purpose of such a requirement is not
only to enable the tenant to ascertain the true identity of his landlord, but
also to afford an efficient method of initiating the legal proceedings against
the landlord which are authorized under the new Act. 19 7 By failing to
comply with this section, the landlord waives his right to notice from the
tenant that rental funds have been deposited with the clerk of courts,' 9
and the right to notice by the clerk that the funds have been so
deposited, 199 each of which would otherwise be mandatory.
The second relevant provision prohibits the inclusion within the
rental agreement of exculpatory and cognovit clauses and agreements
whereby the tenant must pay the attorney's fees of the landlord. 2° Each
of these clauses would otherwise limit the liability of the landlord to a
great extent. In addition, the landlord may not transfer his interest in the
premises by rental agreement, assignment, conveyance, trust, deed, or
security instrument free of his statutory duties. 291 While the statute is
unclear as to whether the original landlord retains responsibility for the
fulfillment of his statutory duties, it is certain that the landlord remains
liable on his express covenants, such as those to repair the premises, even
after an assignment to a third party.y
The third factor evolved by the legislature was created in an attempt
to protect the tenant and insure that all of the statutory rights created in
the act remain available. Basically, the majority of leases entered into
by the tenant are set forth in standardized forms which are provided by the
landlord on somewhat of a "take it or leave it basis."=e Even in cases
195

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.06, 5321.13, 5321.14, 5321.18 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

See Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 836 (1974).
l96 OIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.18 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

197

See URLTA § 2.102, and comments thereto.

198 Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
19 9
Omo REv.CODE ANN. § 5321.08(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
200 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 5321.13 (B) (C) (D) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
201 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
202 For discussion of this concept, see Buany, REAL PROPERTY § 58 (3d ed. 1965).
203

See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 App. D.C. 369, 377, 428 F.2d 1071,

1079 (D.C. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Mueller, Residential Tenants
and Their Leases: An EmpiricalStudy, 69 MiCm. L. REv. 247 (1970).
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where the lease is not on a standardized form, but is drawn up on an
individual basis, it would seem likely that its contents would be found to
be more favorable to the landlord. In order to counter this, the Act
provides that no lease may contain a provision inconsistent with or
prohibited by the Act, 20 4 nor may it provide for the modification or waiver
of rights expressly granted in the Act.3 The only exception to this
mandate allows a clause whereby the tenant's duties are expressly
206
assumed by the landlord.
The fourth and most interesting provision involves a carryover of
the aspects of unconscionability, which are included within section 2-302
of the Uniform Commercial Code."( This was accomplished in the new
Act by substituting the words "rental agreement" wherever "contract"
28
appeared and retaining the remaining text of UCC 2-302 in its entirely.
Prior to this addition of the Code concept of unconscionability, which was
initially drafted merely for use in the sales area, 209 it had met with only
0
limited success when applied by analogy to real estate rental agreements.2"
While this may serve as a drawback in some situations, the new Act will
conceivably allow the varying concepts of economic duress, 2 "1 one-sidedness"n and deceptive forms 213 to be applied to lease arrangements. Since
this is arguably intended to provide the same protection to the tenant as is
afforded to the consumer in the sales arena, the courts should strictly
4
scrutinize individual leases to fulfill the intentions of this section.2
20

4 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.06 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
205 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13 (A) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
206 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13 (F) (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
2
mOIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
208 Compare OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (Baldwin Supp. 1974) with UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
209
210

See Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 791, 806-821 (1974).
See Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 71 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct.
1972); see also 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp.. 71 Misc. 2d
353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
2
u See In re Elkins Dell Mfg. v. Dorsett Steel, 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
212
See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
213 See Davenport, Unconscionabilityand the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 121, 139-42 (1968).
214
See note 13 supra; Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) LAw OF CoNTRAcTs § 234 Comment(d) (Tent Draft Nos.
1-7 (1973).
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CONCLUSION

The new Ohio law has brought the landlord-tenant relationship into
the twentieth century. The nature of the relationship is now governed by
statute instead of common law. By creating rights and duties for both the
landlord and tenant, the legislature has established a policy of promoting
fit and decent housing. The purpose of this article has not been to
criticize this new legislation, but to point out to the court and to the
practitioner the possible interpretations of the new Act.3
ROBERT J. CROYLE

FOUR YEARS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS: A REVIEW OF AGENCY
ADMINISTRATION OF NEPA

T

INTRODUCTION

HE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,

through its presence in almost every phase

of the nation's activity, is shaping the character of the future. This is
perhaps nowhere more true than in the field of environmental concerns
where choices about uses of our physical resources are frequently
irrevocable. Recognizing this, Congress set out to impose on the federal
government a course of "preventive and anticipatory"' decision making
with respect to the environment. This effort took the form of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (hereinafter NEPA or
the Act). 2 The Act officially declares environmental quality to be a
3
national priority and lists as goals for the nation to:
(1) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(2) Assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences;
215 The last section of the new act preempts municipal ordinances which conflict or
regulate the relationship between landlord and tenant. See OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §
5321.19 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For a somewhat analogous situation, see the State's
regulation of trailer parks. OmHo REv. CODE ANN. § 3733.02 (Page 1974); Noland
v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90 (1964).
1 115 CoNo. Rac. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEPA].
3 NEPA § 4331 (b).
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(4) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity, and variety of individual choice;
(5) Achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's
amenities; and
(6) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
4
These goals may reveal a naive optimism but, as has become clear,
they do not represent the heart of the bill. The policy of the Act is to
make the environment a legitimate and necessary concern of all
government officials. No agency of the federal government is to undertake
any major action without first understanding the implications of the action
for the surrounding physical environment.
Underlying the Act is also the recognition that major public works
often proceed at cross purposes and without reference to the wishes of
the people who are most affected by them. 5 Thus, it requires, at least
insofar as there are environmental values at stake, that agency decision
agencies, from state and
making open itself to input from other federal
6
local governmental units, and from the public.
NEPA is not simply the statement of a philosophy or an empty
exhortation. Section 4332(2)(c) of the Act is an "action forcing"
provision, 7 imposing on all agencies of the federal government the duty to
include an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter EIS) in all
recommendations for "major federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment." The impact report must be a detailed
statement discussing unavoidable adverse environmental effects, alternative
courses of action, the relationship between the short-term use of the
environment and long-term productivity and, finally, any irretrievable
commitments of resources. 8 There are no specific sanctions for failure to
4 See notes 114-25 and accompanying text, infra, for discussion of procedural versus
substantive rights under NEPA.
NEPA is not an "environmental bill of rights." Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). [hereinafter cited as EDF v.
Corps]. In the original, S. 1075, § 101(C) spoke of a "fundamental right" to a
healthful environment. Members of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs voted to excise the phrase from the final version. 115 CoNo. REc. 40,416
(1969). See also Klipsch, Aspects of a ConstitutionalRight to a Habitable Environment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 INDIANA L.J. 203 (1974).
5 SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
6 NEPA § 4332(2) (C).
7 NEPA was modeled after the Employment Act of 1946 which was concerned with
the responsibility of the federal government to act to avoid economic dislocations.
However, the action-forcing provisions of § 4332(2) (C) have no direct legislative
model in their application to all federal actions rather than those of a particular
agency. 2 CEQ ANN. REP. 222-23 (1970).
8 NEPA § 4332(2) (C)."
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comply with the EIS requirement. The drafters appear to have assumed
that the Act would be self-enforcing.
This article will focus on the environmental impact statement process
of NEPA functions. It will analyze some of the structural weaknesses of
the process, some of the interests private parties are using it to protect
and, finally, whether or not it is bringing us closer to a realization of
the lofty goals the Act sets forth in Section 4331.
THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY
NEPA creates in the Executive Office of the President, the Council
9
on Environmental Quality (hereinafter the Council or CEQ). The
Council is to serve primarily as an environmental clearinghouse, gathering
and disseminating data and making recommendations for national
environmental legislation.' 0 The statute gives CEQ no specific authority to
enforce its policies and, up to now, it has exercised none directly." CEQ
nevertheless plays an important part in the EIS process. Executive Order
No. 1151412 authorized CEQ to issue guidelines for the implementation of
4
the provisions of Section 4332(2).13 These Guidelines,' coupled with
expansive interpretations of NEPA by the courts, have created a major
evaluation step in almost all administrative decision making. Pursuant
to the Guidelines, agencies must follow an elaborate procedure for at
least giving formal recognition to potential ecological effects of their
actions. CEQ Guidelines are not binding on agencies and on occasion
courts have invalidated them as not sufficiently stringent.as But as a
rule, both administrative bodies and the judiciary rely on them for
guidance as to NEPA compliance.
16
In Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, rejecting the FPC's
argument as to when an EIS had to be filed, Judge Kaufman commented:

9 NEPA § 4342.
10 NEPA § 4344.
11 But see Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240 (9th Cir.
1974), af'd, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974) for a possible developing trend. Justice Douglas,

sitting as Circuit Justice for the 9th Circuit, granted a stay of a district court order
allowing dam construction to proceed, on the strength of a letter from the CEQ
which expressed the opinion that the impact statement prepared was inadequate. This
was later affirmed by the whole Court.
12 Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970).
iS Prior to the issuance of the Order, it may have been thought that § 4332(2) (C)
would be self-effectuating "despite its vague terms and lack of clear procedure..."
Comment, The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence
on the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATs!. U.L. REv. 547, 550 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Comment]. The legislative history of the Act does not address
the issue of implementation.
14 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.01-.14 (1974).
15 See Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th
Cir. 1971); Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
16 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Although the Guidelines are merely advisory and the Council on
Environmental Quality has no authority to prescribe regulations
governing compliance with NEPA, we would not lightly suggest that
the Council, entrusted with the responsibility of developing and
recommending national policies "to foster and promote the improvement of the environmental quality," NEPA
Section 204, 42 U.S.C.A.
17
Section 4344, has misconstrued NEPA.
NEPA has provoked an extraordinary amount of litigation. In the
four years since its passage, there have been over 500 lawsuits based on
the Act.' 8 CEQ monitors the judicial development closely and attempts
to incorporate new interpretations into its Guidelines. In Calvert Cliffs'
CoordinatingCommittee v. Atomic Energy Commission,9 the Court held
that, at every important stage in decision making, there must be an explicit
balancing of environmental values against the commonly used economic
values. This holding became a "recommendation" in a memorandum by
CEQ to all federal agencies, 2° and it is now included in the revised CEQ
Guidelines. 2 ' One author suggests that where there are conflicting holdings
by the courts, as frequently there are, CEQ adopts the most expansive
interpretation as its policy. 22 Because of judicial deference to the Guidelines, "[t]he process resembles a feedback loop whereby a new position
taken by CEQ induces a corresponding change in the court decisions which
in turn produces a further change in CEQ interpretation of NEPA." 23
In addition to authorizing the establishment of Guidelines of general
applicability, Executive Order 11514 requires that each agency develop its
own formal environmental clearance procedures designed to fulfill the
mandates of NEPA.2 4 Calvert Cliffs represented a direct challenge to
the Atomic Energy Commission's rules for NEPA compliance. Judge
Wright agreed with the plaintiffs, inter alia, that regulations which
permitted the AEC Safety and Licensing Board to decline to review
environmental issues at the hearing level unless they were specifically
raised, and which prevented consideration of "backfitting" of technological
innovations to nuclear plants under construction, were fatally defective.
The case was remanded for further rulemaking. Despite the very vague
17 Id. at 421.

18 Yarrington, JudicialReview of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation
of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 So. DAK. L. REV. 279

(1974) [hereinafter cited as Yarrington].
19 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Calvert Cliffs v. AEC].
2o CEQ Memo to Federal Agencies on Proceduresfor Improving Impact Statements,
3 BNA ENV'T Rym. 82 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Memo].
2140 C.F.R. § 1500.8 (a) (4) (1974).
= Comment, supra note 13, at 566.
2
3 Comment, supra note 13, at 571.
24
Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3(a). For
examples of individual agency regulations for NEPA compliance, see General Services

Administration, 36 Fed. Re& 23702 (1971); Department of Transportation, 38 Fed.
Reg. 31935 (1973).
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language of the statute, and the relatively undeveloped state of the
5
CEQ Guidelines at that time, the Court relied on the expression in
possible," to find that NEPA bound
extent
Section 4332, "to the fullest
28
agencies to strict procedural standards.
The CEQ assists agencies on an individual basis in preparing their
27
own rules for implementing NEPA, but the official CEQ Guidelines are
28
the primary model, and agency regulations tend to follow it very closely.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS

In evaluating NEPA compliance, courts focus both on the adequacy
of the information flow that occurred during the preparation of the
impact statement, a process-oriented inquiry, and the sufficiency of
the statement itself, a content-oriented inquiry. For achieving the purposes
of the Act, both are equally important. This section of the paper will
examine the information flow process.
Briefly, the CEQ Guidelines set out four distinct stages of
environmental assessment for every major project: early notice, draft
statement, comment period and final impact statement. Theoretically,
review the proposal
only when all of these are completed can an agency
29
and make a determination whether to go forward.
Early Notice. Th e "early notice" system informs the public of the
decision to prepare an impact statement as soon as the agency makes
it.30 It is much more likely that intervention at this stage will help to shape
the final project than intervention which comes when a dam is two-thirds
complete, 3 ' or a nuclear power plant is constructed and ready to begin
operation. 32 Yet regardless of this timely opportunity to participate, courts
are unwilling to invoke the doctrine of laches to dismiss an action which is
3
brought well after the date of final project approval. It may be that courts
25See 40 C.F.R. § 1500 et seq. (1970).
26449 F.2d at 1115.

27 4 CEQ ANN. REP. 246 (1973).
28 Compare the description of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
Interim Regulations for preparing EIS's in Duckworth, HUD Explains Its Environmental Clearance Procedures, 34 MORTGAGE BANKER 42 (1974) with the CEQ
Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.01-.14 (1974).
29 Because the Act has some retroactive effect and is applicable to many ongoing
projects, agencies may modify the sequence in certain cases. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.13
(1974).
3040 C.F.R. § 1500.6(e) (1974).
31 See EDF v. Corps, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
32
See generally Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing
Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace? 72 COLUM. L.
RExV. 963 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Murphy].
33 See Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 332 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Va.
1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); City of New York v. United States, 344
F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also BNA ENV'T RPmR., Monograph No. 17, at
15-16 (1974), for a survey of the doctrine of laches in NEPA cases.
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recognize that publication in the Federal Register, the means of early
notice the Guidelines suggests, is unlikely to give actual notice to members
of the general public, however great their interest.
Ideally, the interagency, interdisciplinary approach urged by the Act
should begin with the earliest planning stages of a project.34 The Office of

Management and Budget Circular A-95 allows local, regional and state
governmental agencies to review and comment upon many proposed
applications for federal assistance. Use of this for environmental objectives
could make the early notice system an effective means for soliciting
local viewpoints at a meaningful time.35 However, it has experienced
only limited success even in its application to general non-environmental
38
planning problems.
Draft Statement. CEQ suggests that an agency make an effort to
discover and discuss at the draft stage all major points of view with respect
to an action under consideration. 37 "The draft statement must fulfill and
satisfy to the fullest extent possible at the time the draft is prepared the
requirements established for final statements by Section 4332(2) (C)."38
This requires consultation with federal agencies who have particular
expertise in the relevant subject matter, other specialists, local governmental units which will be affected, pro-environmental organizations
and citizens who have expressed an interest in the project. 39 When the
draft is complete, the preparing agency has an affirmative duty to
circulate the document and to solicit comments from those same groups
and from any others who have announced their concern or who may
have a contribution to make.4
Comment Process. The comment period lasts from 30 to 60 days
even though the agency members may have spent years compiling the
draft. It may include a public hearing. There are frequently general
statutory requirements for hearings, and where that is the case, the hearing
must address itself to environmental as well as non-environmental
concerns. Participants should be given the opportunity to cross-examine
agency officials and applicants for the federal assistance on the basis of the
draft EIS.41 If there is no general provision for a hearing, the agency
3440

C.F.R. § 1500.8(c) (1974).

5 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1974).
3OMB Circular A-95: A Neglected Environmental Assessment Tool Provides an
Early Pressure Point, 4 ENV'T L. RPT. 50043, 50044 (1974).
37 CEQ Memo, supra note 20.

3840 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1974).
39The recommendation that comments be solicited from environmentalist groups
marks a major stride forward from Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1970),
where the issue was whether such a group could show a sufficient interest to support
a claim of standing.
4040 C.F.R. § 1500.9 (1974).
41 Greene County Planning Bd. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 423 (2d. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Greene County v. FPC].
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should make an independent determination as to whether environmental
issues warrant a hearing. Relevant considerations are: the size of the
project, the level of public interest, the likelihood that members of
the public will be able to make significant contributions at a hearing, the
extent to which the public has already had an opportunity to participate. 42
Although any administrative agency within the federal government
can be called upon 4" to comment on another agency's draft statement, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to by law whenever
44
a proposal may have an impact on an area within its scope of authority.
In practice, the EPA comments on virtually all EIS's. 45 It does not have
a veto power over agency projects on which it comments but, if EPA
finds a proposed action unsatisfactory from an environmental standpoint
or determines that an EIS is so inadequate that meaningful comment is
not possible, it must report its findings to the CEQ and to the public.4
A few other agencies, because of their particular fields of expertise,
are asked to comment on large numbers of the draft statements. The
Department of Interior, for example, reviews hundreds of proposed
actions affecting land use and fish and wildlife values. 47 Although CEQ is
the overseer of NEPA, it has only a minor role in the comment process.
Agencies must file copies of every EIS with the Council. CEQ selects a
very small number of statements for actual review and its purpose is to
discover structural weaknesses in the preparation process and promulgate
improved Guidelines to deal with those weaknesses. CEQ comments
48
directly only on particularly troublesome or controversial projects.
Final Impact Statement. All written comments submitted to the
principal agency become part of the final environmental impact statement
(FES) and, to the extent that the draft does not adequately address issues
raised in the comments, the agency must review and modify the statement.49 Frequently dispute in litigation centers around whether an agency
sufficiently answered in the final EIS objections raised by commenting
parties.50 After the agency completes the final report and distributes it to
those who participated in the comment process, it must wait 30 days
before action on an approved project begins. This allows a period for
final review. If, after submitting comments on the FES, there is a
4240 C.F.R. § 1500.7(d) (4) (1974).
43 CEQ ANNa.
REP. 237 (1972).
44

Among the statutes which provide for EPA to comment on draft ElSes are the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1955), and the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 4901 etseq. (1972).
45 BNA ENV'T RPTR., Monograph No. 17, at 10 (1974).
48 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9(b) (1974).
47 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9 (1974).
4Id.

4940 C.F.R. § 1500.10(a) (1974).
50 E.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

169

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 1

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:3

discovery of significant new information or a judicial order necessitates
further modifications, CEQ generally will not require recirculation of
the impact study.51 Unless an agency is refusing to file an EIS, judicial
inquiry into NEPA compliance must await the agency's final determination
to proceed with the project in question.5
The foregoing discussion has assumed that an environmental impact
statement is required. Frequently, this is the issue in dispute. NEPA
applies to "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment." 5 3 That phrase has resolved itself into four
distinct threshold questions: Is the project a major action? Is it federal
in nature? Will it have a significant effect? Does it involve the quality
of the human environment?
If an agency decides that the answer to all of these is negative, it
need not prepare an impact statement. However, to ensure that appropriate
consideration is given to the policies of NEPA and to provide a reviewable
record should anyone challenge the preliminary determination, courts
have required a formal "negative declaration" stating the reasons why
the agency is not undertaking an environmental study.5 4 It is unlikely that
such a step was foreseen by the drafters of NEPA. But in their attempt to
force compliance "to the fullest extent possible," judges have found
support for it in Section 4332(b), 5 which directs agencies to: "Identify
and develop methods and procedures, . . . which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic
and technical considerations."
To allow meaningful review, the negative declaration must be detailed
and specific to the peculiar demands of the use and site under
5
consideration. It is, in effect, a scaled-down EIS. In Hanly v. Mitchell, 6
the General Services Administration (GSA) decided that an EIS was not
required for a Metropolitan Correction Center in lower Manhattan.
GSA's negative impact statement discussed plans for heat, water, and
garbage and sewage disposal. The court held that the document was
inadequate and remanded the case to GSA twice to consider, inter alia,
the impact of a prison on the families who lived in the neighborhood, the
likelihood of riots and disturbances, the possibility of increased crime and
drug availability, and the parking arrangements for visitors. The court's

R3

CEQ ANN.RaP. 238-39 (1972).
52 Greene County v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
849 (1972).
53 NEPA § 4332(2) (C).
54 E.g., Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AFC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094
(D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SIPI v. AEC].
55 See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835 (2d Cir. 1972).
56 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
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rulings were not that an EIS was necessary,5 7 but only that prior to
making a threshold determination, GSA had to consider a broad range
of relevant factors and had to give the public an opportunity to submit
information which might bear on the agency's decision.
Where it is conceded that an action is a "major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," one of
several limited exceptions may operate to exclude it from the scope
of NEPA. Courts exempt actions where there is a valid claim of national
security, emergency or legislative stipulation.
In a rapid series of decisions during the eleventh hour controversy
over nuclear testing near Amchitka Island, Alaska,58 the Fifth Circuit
ruled that the impact statement prepared by the AEC was deficient, that
presidential approval does not negate an agency's obligation to comply
with NEPA and that executive privilege would not be recognized to
prevent discovery of the documents used to prepare the EIS. But when
faced with the final request to enjoin the blast, the court refused..
Although the AEC had not met its duties under NEPA, the court
acceded to the important interests of national security urged by the
government. The Supreme Court affirmed. 59
During the recent Middle East oil embargo, the Federal Energy
Office (FEO), with congressional authorization, imposed regulations
governing the allocation of crude oil among refiners. Gulf Oil Company
argued that the allocation scheme was invalid because FEO inaugurated it
without preparing an EIS. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
held that in circumstances such as critical oil shortage the need for
immediate action takes precedence over NEPA.60 The "emergency" exception also applies to temporary actions such as an interim rate increase. 6 '
If the legislature explicitly so stipulates, an agency action may be
excused from the requirements of NEPA. Administrative officials often
argue that when Congress approves appropriations bills for individual
projects or programs, it is tacitly agreeing that the action is consistent
with the policies of NEPA. Courts reject this theory of "repeal by
implication." In the Gillham Dam case, Judge Eisele responded to that
argument by saying: "It is more reasonable to assume that the Congress
in making annual appropriations for such projects, assumes that the

The Second Circuit later ruled that the negative impact statement was adequate, and
that construction could proceed without the preparation of a full EIS. Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).
58 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 463 F.2d 788,
463 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971).
59404 U.S. 917 (1971).
6OGulf Oil v. Simon, 502 F.2d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Accord, Cohen v. Price
Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
6
1See Port of New York Authority v. ICC, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971).
57
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responsible agencies are complying with all applicable laws."2
On the other hand, where congressional intent is clear, "even severely
circumscribed judicial review is both inapposite and unnecessary." ' In
the Alaska Pipeline case, 64 NEPA claims were rendered moot by a statute
which specified that the six-volume EIS prepared by the Department of
the Interior shall be deemed sufficient under NEPA.65
A fourth and very different kind of exception 66 to NEPA applica-

bility, is federal revenue sharing.6 7 One justification offered for the
exemption is the absence of sufficient "federal action." This is not entirely
persuasive. The Office of Revenue Sharing retains full veto power over
proposals; it supplies, restricts and oversees the allocation of funds and it
conducts periodic audits and investigations.68 Some authors 69 suggest that
Ely v. Velde, 70 which held that NEPA applies to a block grant program of
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, lends support to the
application of NEPA to revenue sharing. The court in Ely distinguished
the two: "A block grant is not the same as unencumbered revenue sharing,
for the grant comes with strings attached. The state voluntarily requested
federal participation in the center and in this manner obtained construction
funds conditioned upon compliance with NEPA..." r While this distinction
is not compelling, it seems likely that courts will continue to accept the
exemption out of respect for the "no strings" philosophy of unrestricted
grants. And if states continue at the current rate to pass their own NEPA's,
the exception will have minimal impact on the policy of the Act.72 Courts
have carefully limited all of these exceptions and they probably do not represent a significant retreat from the standard of fullest possible compliance.

6

2See SIPI v. ABC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1971); EDF v. Corps, 325 F. Supp. 749

(E.D. Ark. 1971).
63EDF v. Corps, 492 F.2d 1123, 1141 (5th Cir. 1974).

Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970), affd sub nom.
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 479 F.2d 822
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
65Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1651 et seq. (1973).
60 Another exception to note only in passing applies to the District of Columbia.
Because of the special status of Washington, certain activities may require federal
approval. However, they are, by nature, municipal activities and the EIS requirements
are waived. See Tolman Laundry v. Washington, 6 ERC 1264 (D.C. Super. 1974).
67 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a) (2) (1974).
6 See State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq. (1972). See
generally Note, The Application of Federal Environmental Standards to the General
Revenue Sharing Program: NEPA and UnrestrictedFederal Grants, 60 VA. L. REv.
114 (1974).
69F. ANDERsoN, NEPA iN ma CoUaTs 60-61 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
70 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
71497 F.2d at 256.
72
See 4 CEQ ANN. REP. 248 (1973). The CEQ notes that 15 states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have enacted their own versions of NEPA.
6Wilderness
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The impact statement process applies to every "recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions ....-73
However, the impact statement process outlined above is best suited to
evaluating individual actions which frequently are part of, and assume the
value of, much larger programs. In that context, the principal agency
or applicant for federal assistance tentatively selects the course of action
and a site. Environmental analysts can then isolate the particular kinds
of effects the action will generate in the particular location. The need for
speculation is diminished and citizen participation is maximized. Agency
officials can easily identify the segment of the public whose input they
should seek and, because of the immediacy of the threat or benefit of the
proposed action, there is more likely to be a high level of public interest.
If an agency delays environmental evaluation until it has before it
an application for an offshore oil lease or a funding request for the final
segment of a highway, it defeats the policy of NEPA to choose courses
of action that are least detrimental to the natural environment. By that
point, the agency has made the major program decisions and only
minor adjustments in the plans of the particular project 'are possible.
Whether consciously or through oversight, the agency has avoided
serious consideration of alternative approaches. To remedy this, there
has been some progress toward program impact studies whereby an
agency begins environmental evaluations at the earliest possible stages.
Calvert Cliffs invalidated the Atomic Energy Commission's regulations for implementation of NEPA because they postponed consideration
of certain crucial environmental issues with respect to nuclear power
plants from the construction permit stage to the operating license
proceedings. Judge Wright noted that:
Compliance to the fullest extent possible would seem to demand that
environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the
decision making concerning a particular action-at every stage
where an overall balancing of environmental and nonenvironmental
be made in the
factors is appropriate and where alterations might
74
proposed action to minimize environmental costs.
Two years later, Judge Wright recognized that, for effective
balancing of environmental factors, impact studies may be required
at the research stage, long before the agency considers an application
for a particular action.
To wait until a technology attains the stage of commercial feasibility
before considering the possible adverse environmental effects attendant upon ultimate application of the technology will undoubtedly
73NEPA § 4332(2) (C).
74449 F.2d at 1118.
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frustrate meaningful consideration and balancing of environmental
costs against economic and other benefits.-"
The Court was unconvinced by the AEC's position that the liquid metal
fast breeder reactor program that the plaintiffs were challenging was in
such incipient stages that any EIS would be purely speculative. To support
its request for funding, the Commission had prepared an elaborate costbenefit analysis involving projections for the development of the technology
and the Nation's energy needs through and beyond the year 2000. The
analysis notably lacked any discussion of ecological dangers.
The Court set out several criteria by which agencies should judge
when an EIS is required: 76
1. Does the agency know enough about the program to make an
evaluation meaningful?
2. Is the agency restricting consideration of other alternatives
because of the development of this program?
3. Is the agency making any irretrievable commitments of resources,
financial or otherwise?
4. How significant are the anticipated effects of the overall program?
The CEQ Guidelines now require that an agency establish a formal
procedure for deciding what acts necessitate an environmental evaluation
of a given program. 77 When an agency concludes that -an EIS is not
yet necessary but will be at a later date, it must file a "negative
78
declaration" stating the reasons for its determination.
The problem of timely evaluation is not limited to the field of research
and development. If the federal government is considering a major
highway building program or strip mining legislation, some NEPA studies
should begin at that time to decide whether those answers to transportation
or energy needs are consistent with environmental values and whether the
agency can structure the program in ways that will minimize adverse effects.
If the agency or Congress authorizes the broad policy objectives with
full knowledge of the general kinds of impacts the program will have, later
individual project statements need not reexamine those issues. 79 At each
successive stage in the decision making, the EIS should focus increasingly
on impacts which the program statement did not anticipate a° or which are
peculiar to the individual project in question. This "tiering" of impact
statements is a step toward compliance with NEPA's mandate to "Study,

75SIPI v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1074, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
76 Id. at 1094-98.
7740 C.F.R. § 1500.6(c) (1974).
78 40 C.F.R.§ 1500.6(d) (2) (1974).
9

Id.

60 $ee Union of Concemie4 Scientists v. AEC, 499
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develop and describe appropriate alternatives to recommend courses of
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
appropriate uses of available resources."1 The primary risk that tiering
introduces into the EIS process is that, at the early stages of evaluation,
some risks may seem too remote to merit attention. Later in the process,
those conducting project evaluations will assume that previous discussion
on those same issues was sufficient. In addition, it is more difficult to
define standards of adequacy for an EIS at the program level.82
Multi-agency actions also may require modifications of NEPA
processes. If several federal agencies contribute to the planning and
execution of a single project, the Council on Environmental Quality
recommends that they conduct a single environmental assessment. 83 This
can be done on a joint basis or through the selection of a "lead"
agency, usually the agency with the greatest overall involvement or the
greatest environmental expertise.84 In either case, all participating agencies
contribute to the final product.8
Frederick Anderson of the Environmental Law Institute criticizes
the composite EIS approach because it excuses an agency from the
obligation to focus directly on the effects of its own activities.84 While
this may be so, the absence of a single study evaluating the cumulative
impacts of a multi-faceted program presents an even greater likelihood
that the policies of NEPA will be thwarted. Separate actions within the
general scheme may not be sufficiently major to require an impact
statement themselves even though the project as a whole will significantly
affect the quality of the human environment. Furthermore, when each
agency prepares its statement alone, no one official is in a position to
make an accurate cost-benefit analysis of the whole program. To ensure
that each agency has adequately balanced environmental concerns with
respect to its actions and that the lead agency has considered the
cumulative effects, CEQ should specially scrutinize multi-agency plans.8 7

81 NEPA § 43 32 (2) (D). See also ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 290-92.

82 SIPI v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(b) (1974).
84 3 CEQ ANN. REP. 234-36 (1972).

8540 C.F.R. § 1500.7(b) (1974). The paucity of cases in which there are several
defendant agencies may indicate that this is not a widely used practice. But see Upper
Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332 (D.N.M. 1971), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th
Cir. 1971), vacated 409 U.S. 1021 (1972).
86ANDERsoN, supra note 69, at 199-200. Anderson's position is supported by the
reasoning in Calvert Cliffs v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and in Greene
County v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), which prohibit an agency from relying
on compliance with the environmental regulations of another agency or the impact
studies conducted by the applicant. Both cases hold that the principal agency must
conduct an independent review.
s7 Warm Springs v. Gribble, 378 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1974), suggests that at least in
the litigated cases, a formal expression of opposition by CEQ carries substantial weight.
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specialists 9 unanimously
insist that an environmental statement must be more than a "post hoc
rationalization" for a predetermined course of action. Yet that seems to be
inescapably the nature of a project EIS. The EIS is not a general inquiry
into various possible solutions to a given problem. Rather, it is a
justification for the agency's choice. It serves as an advocacy tool. Pursuant
to Section 4332(2)(C)(iii), the impact statement must mention alternative
approaches. Treatment of those is frequently only cursory and the focus
remains on the preferred action. 91 As a practical matter, the agency may
92
be choosing between the main proposal and not acting at all. If there is
an urgent need or political pressure, then even inaction is not a real
choice. Environmental impact studies for legislation, research and
development, and broad federal programs offer at least a limited guarantee
that responsible agencies will do some balancing of environmental factors
prior to selecting the lead proposal over other viable alternatives.
Courts,88 the CEQ8 and environmental

The character of the administrative agency system is a further
obstacle to effective consideration of alternatives. Federal agencies have
narrow, usually well-defined fields of responsibility and expertise. To
perpetuate their existence, they must have a major program or industry
to regulate. Each agency has a vested interest in developing and continuing
the programs within the scope of its authority. Addressing an attempt
by the Department of the Interior to execute a lease for offshore drilling,
the court in National Resources Defense Council v. Morton 93 held that an
agency must consider all reasonable alternatives, including those outside
what it has the power to adopt. 94 If agencies are vying with each other for
influence, they are likely to evade this obligation whenever possible. But
willingness to comply is only one part of the problem. One agency
may be unaware of alternate approaches that other agencies could
pursue. 95 More likely, they will lack the information they would need
to balance the costs and benefits of the solutions that are not within its
competence against the known consequences of its own proposal. As was
noted above, a situation may demand immediate action and, if the
s8See Greene County v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1972). See also SIPI
v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
89 4 CEQ ANN. REP. 234 (1973).
90 See EDF v. Corps, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
91 For examples where courts remanded cases to the preparing agencies for failure to
treat adequately alternative proposals, see Arlington Coalition on Transportation v.
Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1337 (4th Cir. 1972), and National Resources Defense Council
v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971), 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971),
motion for summary rev'l denied, 418 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), dismissed as moot,
337 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 1972).
92 See Murphy, supranote 32, at 980-81.
93 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971).
94It now appears in the CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.H. § 1500.8(a)(4) (1974).
95 The comment phase of the EIS process is imperfectly suited to gathering sufficient
data about the solutions other agencies might pursue.
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principal agency decides that another department can achieve the same
objectives with less detriment to the environment, it has no means to
implement the other plan. It can only decide not to act.
op NEPA
deeper than the problem of
goes
much
to
NEPA
Agency resistance
adequate consideration of alternatives. Federal regulatory agencies are
primarily concerned with economic expansion. Congress sought to impose
on them what it described as an equally important duty to protect the
environment.9 6 But the ecological concerns remain foreign and secondary,
particularly when they appear to be inconsistent with the agencies' broader
mandates. 97 Noncompliance ranges from deliberate concealment of known
serious impacts to simple miscalculation of the magnitudes of effects.
AGENCY ADMINISTRATION

The Atomic Energy Commission is among the most criticized
agencies for its reluctance to comply. In Calvert Cliffs, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia said of the AEC's proposed
regulations: "We believe that the Commission's crabbed interpretation
of NEPA makes a mockery of the Act."198 Later, the same court found
that the AEC could have "no rational basis" 99 for its determination that
it was not yet required to prepare an EIS for a research program which
AEC had funded for more than $200 million. That opinion very nearly
accused the AEC of outright bad faith violations of the law.
Despite these and numerous other lawsuits, 00 it appears that the AEC
continues to hedge and dissemble in order to win approval of its projects.
A recent newspaper report indicates that for the last 10 years the
Commission has purposefully concealed information about the dangers of
nuclear power plants for which it has issued both construction and
operation permits.' 0 ' Many of the efforts of concealment occurred in
the context of EIS studies. Dr. Glenn Seaborg, former head of the
AEC,said that the agency wished to avoid the public "misunderstanding"
and the adverse reactions the studies might provoke. This suppression
of data is a direct contravention of the policy of the Act which
Judge Eisele described in the Gillham Dam case:
At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law. The
Congress, by enacting it, may not have intended to alter the then
96 SENATE

REPORT, supra note

5, at 20.

97

See Yarington, supra note 18, at 293. "There exists a natural, in fact, healthy bias
on the part of most action-oriented federal agencies in favor of doing what they were
established to do...."
98 449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
99 SIPI v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
100 See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
SIPI v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility
v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109

(D.C. Cir. 1971).
1M New York Tunes, November 10, 1975, § 1, at 1, cot 1.
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existing decision making responsibilities or take away any then existing freedom of decision making, but it certainly intended to make
such decision making more responsive and more responsible. 1
It would be less troublesome if we could assume that the AEC is alone in
flouting NEPA goals. However, there is substantial evidence to the contrary.
The Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) investigated
impact statements prepared for highway construction by the Department of
Transportation which is, by a significant margin, the largest single source
of impact studies. 03 Their results show that, although many of the EIS's
are legally insufficient, the Department regularly approves the projects.
Among the findings of CSPI are: 13% of the statements did not mention
air pollution; 34% did not consider community disruption; 54% did not
consider the impact on nearby property values; 86% failed to discuss mass4
transit alternatives; 30% denied that there would be any adverse effects.1
For several years, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
argued that it was not bound by the procedural restrictions of NEPA.
Courts agreed on the theory that there was "little need in requiring a
NEPA statement from an agency whose raison d'etre is protection of the
environment and whose decision [making] is necessarily infused with
the environmental considerations so pertinent to Congress in designing the
statutory framework."'' 1 In fiscal 1974, Congress earmarked $5 million of
EPA funds for the preparation of impact statements. This persuaded EPA
to conduct environmental studies on a "voluntary basis" for certain of its
major regulatory actions. 1' 6 Following that announcement, Region X
Director John Burd reported that during fiscal 1975, because of limited
resources, EPA would write EIS's for only 5% of its major construction
1 7
grant projects under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 0
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) may finally be ready
to accept its duties under NEPA. After four setbacks in court, 08 the
ICC is changing its procedures and increasing the number of environ102 EDF v. Corps, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
103

In 1971, DOT accounted for 66% of all ElSes; in 1972, the figure was 49%; and

through June 30, 1973, DOT was preparing 40% of the
(The downward trend is due in part to increased reliance
ANN.REP. 244-45 (1973).
4
10 For a summary of the CSPI report, see Morgenthaler,
cation Acceptance Forces NEPA to Adapt, 4 ENv'T L

total number of statements.
on program ElSes.) 4 CEQ
On the Road Again: CertifiRPTR. 50023, 50026 n. 29

(1974).
105Internat'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 n.130 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 1973); Getty

Oil Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973).
106 1974 BNA ENV'T RPm. "Federal Laws" 21:4001.
107 BNA ENv'T RPTR."Current Developments" 187.

10s Port of New York Authority v. ICC, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971); SCRAP v.
United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972); City of New York v. United States,
344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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mental assessments it conducts. From 1970 through 1973, the ICC
submitted two impact statements to CEQ. During the first eight months
of 1974, it submitted eight. 109
Zabel v. Tabb" 0 provides a different perspective on agency use of
NEPA. In Zabel, the Corps of Engineers relied on the Act to justify its
decision not to issue a dredge and fM1 permit. The EIS process and a public
hearing revealed widespread opposition to the plan but the applicants
urged that the Corps could only refuse to proceed for environmental
reasons. This is the only case this writer discovered wherein NEPA
was used as an affirmative defense.
Agencies can also undermine the Act by insufficient impact
evaluation. Failure to analyze secondary impacts such as changes in land
use patterns in the surrounding area or increased traffic a new project will
precipitate is probably the most common form of noncompliance.'- U EPA
recently announced that it is curbing its grants to localities for sewer
mains because the program had been encouraging unsound patterns of
community growth." 2 The program got underway in 1972 and EPA
approved negative impact declarations for several sites. Localities, anxious
to obtain the federal subsidies, began building sewage facilities which, in
some instances, anticipate expectable population increases for the next
2,000 years. Because EPA did not require land use and energy impact
evaluations as part of the grant award process, communities have been
planning for low density, urban fringe development despite the fact that
the cause of energy conservation might be better served by high density,
urban living patterns. EPA obligated itself to more than $3.4 billion in
grants before it discovered this problem. Had the agency prepared a
program EIS before funding individual projects, it might have foreseen
that such infrastructure improvements would induce changes in land
development and it could have regulated award grants to provide for
more desirable patterns.
Administrative decision making remains a low visibility process and,
if an agency seeks to avoid the requirements of NEPA, purposefully or
through negligence, it can do so with impunity for long periods of time.
Judicial intervention tends to come late, frequently after the agency has
made most of the critical determinations. It is not rare that a court-ordered
EIS can do no more than consider ways to minimize the harms of a program

1 09

Comment, Harlem Valley Transportation Ass'n v. Stafford: One More Decision
Tells the ICC to Stop Dragging Its Feet on NEPA Compliance, 4 ENV'T L. RPR.

10141 (1974).
110 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
LaUSee 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a) (3) (ii) (1974). See generally Dunn, Dutton, Wayman,
The Adequacy of Environmental Impact Statements and the Development of State

Laws, 27 SOUTHWEsTERN LJ. 630 (1973).
U12 New York Tumes, Oct. 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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to which the agency is all but irrevocably committed. Thus, agency recalci3
trance stands as the single most potent obstacle to the success of NEPA."
PROCEDURAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW UNDER NEPA
In spite of the problems of timeliness, judicial review is an integral
part of the operation of NEPA. Courts and commentators are now
wrestling with whether the Act allows substantive as well as procedural
review.? 4 Substantive review permits a plaintiff to ask not only, "Did
the agency go through all the appropriate steps in assessing the
environmental impact of its proposal?" but also, "Is the finished
product, the final EIS, an adequate evaluation?"

The courts that do allow inquiry into substantive issues rely on
the standard for review that the Supreme Court set in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe." 5 The statute in question in Overton Park, the
Federal-Aid Highway Act," 6 has an impact statement requirement similar
to that of NEPA. It provides, in pertinent part,
Any State highway department which submits plans for a Federal-Aid
highway project.., going through any city... shall certify to the
Secretary that it has had a public hearing... and has considered
the economic and social effects of such a location, its impact on the
environment, and its consistency with the goals and objectives of7
such urban planning as has been promulgated by the Community."
In response to a challenge for noncompliance with that provision,
Justice Marshall said that the reviewing court must determine: whether
the Secretary acted within the scope of his authority, whether his
determination was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with the law, whether the agency failed
decision, or if the decision
to consider all relevant factors in reaching its
8
itself represented a clear error in judgment."
Under this "substantial inquiry" test, 119 the scope of review is very
narrow. The plaintiff must establish that "the actual balance of costs
and benefits that the agency struck was arbitrary or clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental values."' 12 If the court so finds, as
it did in Overton Park, it remands to the agency for further decision
making. 1 " It does not have the authority to order the abandonment of
11 EDF v. Corps, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
114 EDF v. Corps, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974), provides a recent listing of which
circuits permit substantive review.
"5 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
11623 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (1958).
17Id. at § 128(a).
118401 U.S. at 416.
119 1974 BNA ENV'T RPrR. 39.
2
0Calvert Cliffs v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
nM Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1970).
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a project even if it believes that modification cannot bring the project
into compliance with Section 4331 policies.
Many commentators argue that NEPA's future success rides on the
availability of substantive judicial review. 12 In light of the restricted
review allowed, this position is unwarranted. The subject matter of an
EIS is often very technical, beyond the comprehension of most lawyers
and judges.12 It is quite common for there to be serious, good faith
dispute among experts about the effects of a particular kind of action.124
Finally, the EIS may require a balancing between incomparables such as
housing for the poor and the destruction of aqualife in a nearby river
as a result of the pollution such housing will cause.l 25 Under these
circumstances, it is necessary that an agency have a broad range of
discretion. On the other hand, only the most wide-ranging review would
permit a court to determine whether an agency is in accord with the
policies of NEPA, except in cases of blatant noncompliance. The
complexity of these factors makes it easy for an agency that wishes to
avoid substantive compliance. It can confuse the issues even further by
including extraneous technical data and by bolstering its position with
additional expert opinions. In part, writing an EIS that will survive judicial
scrutiny is an art; agency personnel can be expected to improve with
practice. In summary, the "substantial inquiry" test is too meagre a device
to combat all the varieties of mere pro forma acquiescence to NEPA. But
regardless of the limited scope of review, plaintiffs have seized upon
NEPA and attempted to expand its meaning in all directions.
PLAINTIFFS IN NEPA LITIGATION

A review of the more than 500 suits' 26 that have been filed under
NEPA since its inception suggests that complainants are using it to protect
a much wider range of interests than those for which Congress originally
intended. Plaintiffs in NEPA suits fall into four major categories: national
groups organized for the protection of the environment; private individuals
and neighborhood groups that have banded together to oppose a particular
action because they fear its effect on their property values; businesses
with an identifiable economic interest in the outcome of the litigation, and
state and local governmental units seeking to protect the interests of their
citizens. 27 These categories are, at best, rough generalizations. The

1M See, e.g.,

Lukey, NEPA's Impact Statement in the Federal Courts: A Case Study
ENV'TAL AlAS
807, 811 (1974).

of NRDC v. Morton, 2

Im Oakes,

Environmental Litigation: Current Developments and Suggestions for the

Future, 5 CONN. L. Rlv. 531, 553 (1973).
124 See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240, 244 (9th Cir.
1974), aff'd, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
1m5Greenburg & Hordon, Environmental Impact Statements: Some Annoying Questions, 40 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 164, 170 (May 1974).
126 102 CEQ MoNiTOR 135 (May 1974).
127

See ANDERSON, supra note 69, Appendix B,
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pairing of plaintiffs and motives may be interchanged in some cases
and, many times, plaintiffs will have mixed motives. Nevertheless, they
do point out a pattern in the litigation.
It is not surprising that large, nationally known conservationist
organizations initiate much of the NEPA litigation. The environmental
impact statement process is calculated to alert such groups, if not the
general public, to projects in which they are likely to take an interest.
The CEQ Guidelines institutionalize the participation of "relevant
conservation commissions."' 12 8 Courts have also helped to ensure a major
role for them by their holdings with respect to standing, attorneys' fees
and, to a lesser degree, burden of proof.
In Sierra Club v. Morton,129 the Supreme Court ruled that a person
seeking review of agency action on environmental grounds must be able
to show some injury to himself or a member of the group he represents.
This was not a substantial -burden but it was lightened even further
by SCRAP v. United States'" which permits standing where the injury
alleged is to the public at large. It now seems unlikely that any court
will deny standing to an environmentalist association.13 '
The cost of litigation can pose a significant barrier to the pursuit
of the important public interests embodied in NEPA. To encourage
environmental groups to advance their claims, courts rely on the "private
attorneys general" doctrine to award fees and costs, generally to a
prevailing party. In Wilderness Society v. Morton,13 2 the court awarded
fees even though, strictly speaking, the plaintiffs did not prevail. The
NEPA claims were never finally resolved by the court because of
congressional intervention.rn However, the court recognized that the
plaintiff's lawsuit served "as the catalyst to ensure that the Department
of Interior drafted an impact statement and that the statement was
thorough and complete." 3 4
In Wilderness Society, only half the fees were recoverable because
28 U.S.C. Section 2412 prohibits the assessment of fees against the
federal government or any agency thereof unless otherwise specifically
provided. This statutory prohibition will be a complete bar to recovery
where the government is the only defendant. In the instant case, Alyeska,
the permit applicant for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, had intervened
128 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.9-.10 (1974).
In 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
130412 U.S. 669 (1973).
1M14 CEQ ANN. RPT. 241 (1973.) For a more extensive discussion of standing in NEPA
cases, see ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 26.
132 495

F.2d 1026 (1974).
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1652 (1973), indicates
that the impact statement prepared by the Department of Interior shall be deemed
sufficient under NEPA.
L34 495 F.2d at 1034,
13
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and actively participated in the litigation as a real party in interest.
The court found that it was fair to assess Alyeska for half of the cost
of the attorneys' fee.
Cases which explicitly address the problem of burden of proof are
few and conflicting. Several decisions have recognized that the agencies
have the "labor, public resources and expertise to make the proper
environmental assessment and to support it by a preponderance of the
evidence."' 135 They have held that the plaintiff asserting environmental
interests need only make a prima facie showing of noncompliance with
6
NEPA before the burden shifts to the defending agency.Some argue that the courts have been far too generous in their
treatment of organizations such as the Sierra Club. 37 The result has been
the serious delay of important national programs. In Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,18s a major flood control effort was
two-thirds complete when the court granted injunctive relief pending an
environmental impact statement. The court noted that annual spring
flooding caused widespread destruction of life and property. Later in the
opinion the court discussed more extensively the claim advanced by
the plaintiffs that the project would change one of the few remaining
locations for stream fishing into a more common flat water fishing site.
Individuals and local citizens groups who sue under NEPA are not
always as public-spirited in their motives as conservationists and courts
may subject their claims to closer scrutiny. In Nucleus of Chicago
Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn,139 a coalition of community organizations
and individuals claimed that a proposed low income, federally subsidized
housing would significantly affect the quality of the environment so as to
require the Department of Housing and Urban Development to file an
EIS. The plaintiffs argued that, as a class, tenants of low income housing
have a high propensity for anti-social behavior and that their presence
would have a deleterious effect on the neighborhood. 140 The court held
335 Simmans

u3

v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 12 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
Id. at 12. See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1334-35 (S.D. Tex.

1973). But ci. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 468
(2d Cir. 1971); EDF v. Corps, 492 F.2d 1123, 1130 (5th Cir. 1974).
137 See Murphy, supranote 32, at 993.
18 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
MS9
372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
140
[TJhe plaintiffs allege that they are members of the "middle class and/or working class" which emphasizes obedience and respect for lawful authority, has a
much lower propensity toward criminal behavior and acts of physical violence,
and possesses a high regard for the physical and aesthetic improvement of real
and personal property. The plaintiffs further allege that "as a statistical whole"
tenants of public housing possess a higher propensity toward criminal behavior
and acts of violence, a disregard for the physical and aesthetic maintenance of
real and personal property, and a lower commitment to hard work. Therefore,
so the plaintiffs insist, the construction of public housing will increase the
hazards of criminal acts, physical violence, and an aesthetic and economic
decline in the immediate vicinity of the sites. The plaintiffs maintain that these
factors will have a direct adverse impact upon the physical safety of the
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that the evidence did not support the proposition that prospective tenants
would significantly affect the environment. In its opinion, the court
noted that, "[e]nvironmental impact in the meaning of the Act cannot
be reasonably construed to include a class of persons per se."'' The
relevant inquiry is whether actions resulting from the economic and
social characteristics will affect the environment and, on that issue,
plaintiffs' sociological predictions were not persuasive. 42
The legislative history of NEPA does not resolve the issue of whether
social impacts of particular groups of people are within the scope of the
statute. Undesirable land use patterns and urban congestion are among
the concerns of NEPA. 4 3 The primary and, arguably, exclusive focus
of the Act is ecological, not sociological. Senator Jackson stated that the
policy of the bill is to strive "to achieve a standard of excellence in man's
relationship to his physical surroundings." 14
Industrial plaintiffs have begun to rely on NEPA to protect their
economic interests. The threshold problem in these cases is standing. A
corporation's competitive position is not within the ambit of NEPA
protection. If a business enterprise establishes that there is a public
interest as well, courts generally allow the case to go forward on the
merits even when it is clear that the pecuniary motive dominates.
National Helium Corp. v. Morton14 involved the cancellation of
purchase contracts for helium by the Department of Interior. Although
government contractors have standing to sue, the court also recognized
National Helium Corporation as a private attorney general for purposes
of the NEPA claims. The interests of the business coincided with the
public interest in possible irreparable harm resulting from the escape
of helium into the atmosphere.
In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. United States,1 a trucking
company challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation
which eased licensing proceedings for carriers of recyclable material
which was currently being discarded. Despite both the plaintiff's economic
motive and the ICC's pro-environmental aim, the district court permitted
plaintiffs residing in close proximity to the sites, together with a direct adverse
impact upon the aesthetic and economic quality of their lives.

372 F. Supp. at 148.
141 372 F. Supp. at 149.
142 Accord, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1971): "It is doubtful

whether psychological and sociological effects upon neighbors constitute the type of
factors that may be considered in making such a determination since they do not lend
themselves to measurement."

14 115 CoNo. REc. 40417 (1969).
144 Id. at 40416.
145 361 F. Supp. 78 (D. Kan. 1971), rev'd, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 995 (1974).
146 343 F. Supp. 1269 (D. DeL 1973).
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standing. The industry and the public shared a stake in evaluating
the potential environmental drawbacks of higher levels of pollution,
highway congestion and depletion of the national fuel supply which
might result from increased truck traffic.
In a more restrictive holding on standing, the District Court of
Maryland dismissed a suit by a hospital seeking to bar approval of the
construction of another hospital in the immediate vicinity, concluding
assert an injury to its aesthetic
that a plaintiff corporation "cannot
'147
enjoyment of the environment."
The last identifiable group of NEPA plaintiffs is that of state and
local governmental units. Recognizing the traditional dominance of these
bodies in land use areas, the Act sought to make them an integral part
148
of decision making in the NEPA scheme. Several of them have pursued
the interests of their citizens through the administrative process into the
5°
courts. 49 In City of New York v. United States, the city sought to annul
an ICC order allowing abandonment of a Brooklyn railroad line. They
successfully argued that the action required an impact study of the
economic and physical deterioration that would occur in the local
community as a result of the loss of jobs and loss of business for
the railroad users, suppliers and customers. In Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC,'5 ' New York intervened to argue that the EIS
prepared for a proposed power plant did not adequately assess the
danger to a nearby aqueduct that is a major source of the city's water
supply. These aims are more consistent with NEPA goals.
NEPA set very ambitious procedural and substantive goals for
itself. It is not clear that it will succeed in accomplishing them. However,
if parties exploit the Act as a vehicle for obtaining judicial review of
all government actions with which they are dissatisfied for any reason,
they will overburden it and obscure its primary aims. Because of the
broad language of the Act and a general sympathy with its philosophy,
courts have been hesitant to restrict its application. The bulk of litigation
and the varieties of relief sought suggest a problem that looks far beyond
NEPA to the need for a more open and responsive administrative process
that allows greater opportunities for the expression of local and individual
preferences in every sphere of government activity.

147 Clinton Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Maryland Medical Center, 374 F.
Supp. 450, 456 (D. Md. 1974).
148 NEPA §4332(2) (C), (F).
149 See Montgomery County v. Richardson, 340 F. Supp. 591 (D.D.C. 1972); Delaware v. Pennsylvania New York Central Transportation Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D.
Del. 1971).
150 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
151453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
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CONCLUSION

As indicated throughout this paper, the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 has distinct procedural and substantive goals. The
procedural aims, as courts have interpreted them, are quite specific and
strictly enforceable. The substantive goals,'15 on the other hand, are
ambitious sounding but vague and not readily susceptible of enforcement.
If we are interested principally in absolute qualitative improvement in
our physical surroundings, NEPA is not the most appropriate solution.
The environmental impact statement process is a cumbersome
procedural machine and there is little to suggest that it is producing drastic
changes in agency programs and attitudes. The Council on Environmental
Quality in its Fourth Annual Report listed a number of projects that
agencies have abandoned as a result of NEPA studies.1 0 That they were
able to list them may be the best indication that such abandonment is the
rare exception. There are numerous litigated cases, as well, in which
project review goes up and down through the courts at various stages
in the EIS process, perhaps as many as three or four times over
several years. In the end, the court finds that the agency has not
been guilty of an abuse of discretion in its approval of the project
in substantially the same form as originally planned.54
The mere requirement of evaluating environmental impact may
have some beneficial side effects that are difficult to detect from outside
an agency. In fulfilling the rituals of preparing an EIS, enumerating
alternatives and reviewing suggestions of ways to minimize adverse
effects, agencies may be discovering and adopting modifications of their
projects. However, there is no positive evidence of this.
Minimum quality standards, nondegradation regulations and absolute
prohibition of certain harmful substances and activities are more direct

152As indicated in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1651
et seq. (1973).
3 4 COUNCIL ON ENVmONMENTAL QuALrrY ANN. RFp. 246-47 (1973).
1 4
5 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.
1972), af'd, 468 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1972), 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973),

aff'd, 492, F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1974).

The Storm King hydroelectric plant has been in litigation since 1965. Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied
sub nom., Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference, 348 U.S. 941 (1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 926 (1972); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974). The Hudson River
Fisherman's Association (HRFA) has become the plaintiff's successor in interest and
the litigation continues. Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 827 (2d
Cir. 1974). The NEPA claims were added in 1971. Currently, the FPC is conducting
further hearings on the potential harm to fish. New York Times, Nov. 12, 1974, at
35, col. 7. There is no indication that Consolidated Edison has made any significant
alterations in its original plans.
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methods for achieving an improved environment. 55 They set out much
clearer standards than NEPA and limit the range of discretion of
recalcitrant agencies. However, they are not without their flaws.5 6 They
may involve unwarranted assumptions about the state of knowledge of
pollutants and environmental impacts. 57 Because of their concreteness,
they tend to stifle the kind of research and case-by-case analyses that
agencies should be conducting under NEPA. But the primary drawback
in the absolute standard approach is that it fails to recognize that difficult
environmental questions involve serious competition among important
conflicting values. A single, inflexible rule cannot answer those questions.
Congress did not establish the protection of our natural habitat as
our foremost national priority. Only an environmental crisis of much
greater proportions than the one we -face now could provoke that
determination. It is premature to abandon it and yet no radical reforms
present themselves either. Many have suggested a veto power for the CEQ.
That assumes that CEQ can acquire an adequate understanding of agency
processes and goals to make a responsible judgment about when a veto
is appropriate. It may also represent an over-valuation of our concern
for the environment. We generally do not accord any single agency
the weight a veto power entails.
The present structure of NEPA is ideal for according the environment
the attention it deserves. What is lacking are incentives for enforcement
within the agencies. It is necessary to create for agencies the same vested
interest in the environment as they have in their main field of concern.
Earmarking agency funds to be used only for NEPA-related purposes,
making special environmental study grants available for major programs
and providing separate funding for environmental staffing might help
to create that vested interest. These suggestions require a reaffirmation by
Congress-in the form of additional appropriations-that they still believe
in the goals they set out in NEPA.
Theoretically, EIS procedures are suited to encouraging rational
balancing and that, in itself, seems like a minimal burden to impose
on agencies. But NEPA is not working in several important respects
as this paper has illustrated. Congress should reevaluate NEPA and
determine national priorities.
MARY ANNE SULLIVAN
Yale Law School

155 Cf. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1955); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1966).
1W See generally Note, The NondegradationControversy: How Clean Will Our Air Be?
1974 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 314 (1974).
157 Greenburg & Hordon, Environmental Impact Statements: Some Annoying Questions, 40 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 164 (May 1974).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
Student Rights Under the Due Process Clause...
Suspensions from Public Schools
Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975)
N ADDRESSING ITSELF to the constitutionality of Section 3316.66 of the

Ohio Revised Code,' the United States Supreme Court in Goss v.
Lopez 2 has ruled for the first time upon the extent to which the rights of
students are to be protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment in conjunction with any disciplinary removal from a public
school. 3 By its action the Court has tacitly undertaken to lift the cloud on
student rights which has existed under the common law doctrine of in loco
parentis,4 and interpose procedural safeguards upon any decision of
school officials to deprive a student of educational benefits. 5
During the early months of 1971, Betty Crome attended a demonstration at a neighboring school and was subjected to mass arrest with other
students and later released without being formally charged. Before her
own school was to begin on the following morning, she was notified of
her suspension for a 10-day period. Dwight Lopez was also suspended for
10 days without a hearing following a disturbance in his high-school
lunchroom. He later testified that he was an innocent bystander to the
disturbance. 6 Dwight Lopez, Betty Crome and seven other secondary
school students, each of whom had been suspended from schools in the
Columbus, Ohio, Public School System due to various incidents arising

1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page 1972), provides in pertinent part:
[T]he principal of a public school may suspend a pupil from school for not
more than ten days.... Such ... principal shall within twenty-four hours after
the time of expulsion or suspension, notify the parent or guardian of the child,
and the clerk of the board of education in writing of such expulsion or
suspension including the reasons therefor....
As the terms are utilized here, "suspension" refers to a dismissal from a school for
a short duration, generally 10 days or less; "expulsion" refers to a dismissal from a
public school for the remainder of a school term or longer.
295 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
3The Goss court approached the issue as to whether a state-created right to an
education is either a protected property or liberty interest under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.
4 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453 described this common law doctrine thusly:
[A parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of
restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer for the purposes for
which he is employed.
5 In the absence of sufficient state involvement, private or parochial secondary schools
are not amenable to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for the
purposes of preventing arbitrary suspensions or expulsions. See Bright v. Isenbarger,
314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
6 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1285 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
[570]
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during a period of student unrest, instituted a class action suit under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 7 against their respective school administrators.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that
Section 3316.66 of the Ohio Revised Code was unconstitutional in
that it permitted public school officials to deprive them of their rights
to an education without a hearing in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
A three-judge United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio declared that plaintiffs were denied procedural due process in
being suspended without a hearing either prior to suspension or within a
reasonable time thereafter, and that Section 3316.66 of the Ohio Revised
Code as it related to permitting such suspensions was unconstitutional. 8
The requested injunction, ordering the school administrators to expunge
all references to such suspensions from the students' records, was granted.
On direct appeal, 9 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the district court. Writing for a majority of five, 10 Justice
White held that students facing a temporary suspension from a public
school have a "property interest in educational benefits" and a "liberty
interest in reputation" which require protection under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment from arbitrary deprivations." The
opinion added that as a constitutionally protected minimum, due process
requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the
student be given notice of the accusation, an explanation of the evidence,
and an opportunity to proffer a vindication. 2
In historical context, the public school students' struggle for
recognition of constitutional rights has been long and arduous.1 As a
matter of tradition the courts have been renitent to interfere with the
policies and practices of the educational community. 14 Although
the Supreme Court has infrequently reached constitutional rights issues

Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
[1970]). The expansion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
helped to facilitate the presentation of student rights suits in federal due process
7

proceedings.
8 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom. Goss v.

Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
9Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (1966), direct appeals to the Supreme Court are
provided from decisions of three-judge district courts granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil proceeding.

10 Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall joined in the White opinion.
21 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 737 (1975).
SId. at 740.

I See generally J. HOoAN, Tm ScHooLs,

THE CouRTs, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

(1974), for an historical overview.
14See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390,402 (1923).
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in the educational sphere, 15 the state and its school boards have been
acknowledged to have broad express or implied powers to adopt policies
and regulations relating to student conduct. 16 The reasoning under the
due process test has been that the courts will not strike down any policy
established by a state or its school boards which 7is reasonably calculated
to effect and promote discipline within the school.'
Prior to 1954 and Brown v. Board of Education,8 public education
was almost exclusively considered to be a matter of state and local concern
and a body of case law developed at the state level that permitted, if not
actually sanctioned, educational policies and practices that failed to meet
federal constitutional requirements.' 9 Traditionally, a court would view a
particular school regulation to assure itself that reasonableness prevailed
as a factor in the making of school law.20 A state or school board's
treatment of its pupils carried a presumption of validity with the burden of
proof on the complainant to establish the unreasonableness of the regulation
or policy."' The concept has evolved, however, that when a constitutional
right is invoked, the burden is upon the state to justify the reasonableness
of educational regulations or policies that infringe upon that right.2"
Since 1954 the courts have embarked upon a minimal supervision of
public education. There has been a gradual infusion of constitutional
standards into educational policies, practices and structures. Under
traditional constitutional criteria in line with the due process test, the
attack on a state sanctioned educational policy or regulation has
generally involved two questions: 23

15 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97

(1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (cases generally recognizing a liberty right under the first and
fourteenth amendments of a freedom to teach and a freedom to learn).
16 In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (in which the
Court recognized a student's protected right of symbolic expression under the first
and fourteenth amendments) the Supreme Court stated: "[Tihe Court has repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the states and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools."
17 Compare Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
1966) with Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), where the court balanced
a school regulation that prohibited the wearing of "freedom buttons" ("One man one
vote SNCC") against the interference with the students' protected right of free
expression on the basis of whether or not the buttons occasioned disruptive conduct.
18 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19J. HooAN, Ta SCHOOLS, Ta CoUaTs, AND TIM PUBLIC INTEREST 5, 79 (1974); see.
e.g., Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P. 959 (1915).
2DSee Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 251, 252, 250 S.W. 538, 539 (1923), which
upheld a school regulation which prohibited the wearing of talcum powder on the
faces of female students.
21 Id. at 254,250 S.W. at 539.
22 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23 Id. at 509.
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573

(1) whether the student has been unnecessarily denied a constitutionally protected right, and
(2) whether the policy or regulation is reasonable, and not arbitrary,
as being pertinent to the operation and welfare of the
educational process.
Therefore, it is deemed permissible to enforce appropriate standards of
behavior provided that they are consistent with constitutional safeguards.
Until its decision in Goss, the Supreme Court only acknowledged
first amendment rights to exist in the public schools, as incorporated by
the force of the fourteenth amendment. 24 The Supreme Court was hesitant
to rely solely on the due process clause since any reasonable basis for a
state sanctioned policy or regulation would defeat the application of the
due process test. This hesitancy on the part of the Court was best expressed
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,Z wherein Jehovah's
Witnesses challenged the constitutionality of a school board regulation that
made a refusal to salute the flag grounds for expulsion from school. In
delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Jackson stated:
[I]t is important to distinguish between the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the
principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is
applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with
the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the
principles of the First is much more definite than the test when
only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the
due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of
26
the First become its standard.
Although the force of specific constitutional provisions strengthens
the applicability of the due process clause, in a proper case the Supreme
Court will recognize property or liberty interests to be protected by
the due process clause alone.
Prior to Goss, only inferences could be drawn as to how the
Supreme Court might rule upon the extent of due process rights to be
accorded public school students.2 7 With Dixon v. Alabama State Board
2

4E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (symbolic expression
is protected as long as normal school functions are not disrupted); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (the states' right to prescribe public school
curriculum does not "carry with it the right to prohibit on pain of criminal penalty,
the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon
reasons that violate the First Amendment"); West Virginia v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624
(1943)

(a state cannot compel a student to pledge and salute the flag as a condition

for access to public education where such compulsion would interfere with the
student's intellectual or spiritual beliefs).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28 Id. at 639.
27 See generally Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 CASE W.

RES. L. REv. 378 (1969); Buss, ProceduralDue Process or School Discipline:Probing
the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545 (1971); H. C. Hudgins, Jr., The
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of Education,28 In re Gault,29 and Kent v. United States 30 as a backdrop,
increased emphasis was placed in the federal courts on the expansion of
the judicial concern with individual rights to secondary school disciplinary
cases by the means of the due process clause. In Goss, the due process
rights of students expelled were not questioned. 31 The distinction between
a suspension and an expulsion was recognized. 32 The Court attested that
Dixon had been uniformly followed by the federal courts in making the
due process clause applicable -to decisions to remove a student from
the public school for a period of time long enough to classify the removal
as an expulsion. 33 However, it appears to be due to conflicting decisions
of the lower federal courts, regarding the extent to which due process rights
were to be accorded suspended public school students, that the 3Supreme
4
Court made its delineation of applicable due process guarantees.
It was recently held in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriquez-5 that while education is important, it is not a fundamental
right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the federal constitution.
Wielding this principle as a basis for their argument, the appellants in
Goss contended that the due process clause did not attach to protect
against suspensions from the public school system. The Court made use
of a two-part analysis suggested in Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth3 6 in its approach to this issue: first, it determined whether the
interests at stake were within the fourteenth amendment's protection of

Discipline of Secondary School Students and Procedural Due Process: A Standard,
7 WAKE FoR.ss'r L. REv. 32 (1970); Comment, ProceduralDue Process in Secondary

Schools, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 358 (1971).
28294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (wherein the due
process clause was held applicable to decisions made by a tax supported college to
remove a student from the institution for a period of time long enough for the removal
to be classified as an expulsion).
29 387 U.S. 1,13 (1967). The Court described the due process to be accorded juvenile
offenders with the statement that "whatever may be their precise impact neither the

Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."
30 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (wherein the Court stated, "the admonition to function in
a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness").
31 While Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3316.66 (Page 1972) provides in pertinent part in
the case of an expulsion that, "[tihe pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian of
a pupil so expelled may appeal such action to the board and shall be permitted to be
heard against the expulsion..." no similar procedure is provided for a suspended
student.
32
Goss v. Lope; 95 S. Ct. 729, 737, 738 & n.8 (1975).
33 E.g., De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 1972); Fielder v. Board
of Education, 346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D. Neb. 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Public
Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
34 As to the divergent holdings of the federal district courts compare Mills v. Board

of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) with Hernandez v. School District
Number One, 315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970).
35411 U.S. 1 (1973).
36 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/1

192

Milligan: Dissolution of Marriage

Spring, 19751

RcrENT CAsEs

liberty or property and then it determined whether the nature of the interests
were sufficient to cause procedural due process requirements to apply.
The Court in Roth had stated that property interests protected within
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause "are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules... that stem from an independent source such as state
law ....
-37Drawing upon the Roth definition, the Court in Goss recognized educational benefits to be a protected property interest where the
state elects to "extend the right to an education" to its citizens by statute. 3
Under this criterion, a citizen's entitlement to an education is to be
protected by the due process clause. On the basis of Ohio Revised Code
Sections 3313.4839 and 3313.64, 40 directing local authorities to provide a
free education to all residents between five and 21 years of age, and Ohio
Revised Code Section 3321.04,4 a compulsory attendance law, the Court
established that the appellees were legitimately entitled to a public
education. Under the Court's analysis, a right once created is not to be
arbitrarily denied simply due to a charge of misconduct, as a procedural
process must come into operation to substantiate the charge."
The Court based its decision not only upon a protected property
interest, but also found a protected liberty interest in the appellees'
reputations. Due to the damaging effect which sustained and recorded
charges of misconduct can have upon a student's standing in his or
her educational community and on later opportunities for higher education
and employment, the Court held, under the authority of Wisconsin
v. Constantineau," that the appellees had a liberty interest in their
reputations which must be protected under the due process clause."
The appellants presented the argument, adopted by the dissenting
37 Id. at 577.
38 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735, 736 (1975).
3
9 Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3313.48 (Page Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part:
"The board of education of each city, exempted village, local, and joint vocational
school district shall provide for the free education of the youth of school age within
the
district under its jurisdiction...."
40
Omo REv. CODE AiN. § 3313.64 (Page Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part:
The schools of each city, exempted village, or local school district shall be free
to all school residents between five and twenty-one years of age.... School
residents shall be all youth who are children or wards of actual residents of the
school district. District of school residence shall be the school district in which
a school resident is entitled to attend school free. ...
41Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Page 1972) provides in pertinent part: "Every
parent, guardian, or other person having charge of any child of compulsory school
age ...must send such child to a school, which conforms to the minimum standards
prescribed by the state board of education, for the full time the school attended is in
session.... Excuses ...may be granted...."
42
Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736 (1975).
43400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) wherein the Court stated: "Where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."
44 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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opinion, that a state created entitlement to education is not protected by
the due process clause unless the state subjects the student to a "severe
detriment or grievous loss" of that entitlement. 4 5 Suspensions from school,
it was argued, do not assume constitutional dimensions. 46 Applying the
Roth test to determine whether due process requirements attached,
the Court in Goss looked to the nature of the property interest in
educational benefits, rather than the weight that interest had when
balanced against the interests of the school system. 47 Stressing the
importance of the educational process, the Court concluded that a
suspension for "more than a trivial period," clearly indicating even
a one-day suspension," has a serious impact upon a child and that certain
minimal requirements of due process must be accorded to the student.49
In determining the nature of the minimum due process applicable to
students facing suspension, the Court stated that "some kind of notice"
and "some kind of hearing" is mandated. 5° The concern of the Court
appears to be to prevent unfair or erroneous exclusions from the
educational process and consequential interference with a student's protected interests. As a general rule notice and a hearing are required prior
to suspension. However, the Court's ruling allows immediate removal of a
student from school where his or her presence endangers persons or
property or threatens disruption of the academic process, with notice and
a hearing to follow as soon as is practicable.5 1 Although not deciding nor
construing the due process clause to require the school to afford the
student an opportunity to secure counsel or to call and confront witnesses,
the Court acknowledged by way of dicta that in longer suspensions,
expulsions, or unusual situations, something more than the rudimentary
52
procedures that the Court has detailed may be necessary.
Justice Powell, writing for the minority,53 dissented on the basis that
although Ohio Revised Code Sections 3313.48, 3313.64, and 3321.04
create the educational entitlement, under the Roth rationale Ohio Revised
Code Section 3316.66 "defines"
the "dimensions" of the property
interest. 54 The contention was that the Ohio legislature, having created
a property right amenable to the due process clause, may also protect or
45As authority for the "grievous loss" standard, the case of Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge

Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) is
cited.
46 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 742 (1975).
47 Id. at 737.
48 Id. at 742 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 737.
50Id. at 738.
51Id. at 740.
52Id.at 740,741.
53 Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, joined in the Powell
dissent.
54
Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729,742 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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limit the operation of that right when it is encompassed within an "entire
package of statutory provisions." 5 5 Protesting that the majority ignored
precedent in reaching its decision, the dissenting opinion cited Tinker
v. Des Moines School District56 and Epperson v. Arkansas 57 for the view
that the states have traditionally broad based powers concerning the
operation of their schools which are not incompatible with the individual
interests of the student. 58 The dissenting opinion further protested the
majority's intrusion of the due process clause into "routine classroom
decisions." 59 Classifying a suspension as an inconsequential infringement
upon a student's interest in education, the minority expressed concern
that the Court had entered into a "thicket" of judicial intervention
into the operation of the educational process which would adversely
60
affect the quality of education.
Despite the concern expressed by the minority in Goss, and although
the Supreme Court there expanded the scope within which procedural
due process is to be accorded to public school students, the Court has not
abandoned its traditional due process approach to state sanctioned
educational policies and regulations. 61 Presumably on a case by case basis
any reasonable legislation affecting public school students will be upheld
wherever specific constitutional guarantees are not invoked. The Court
has consistently denied review to public school haircut and appearance
cases even though they are frequently couched in due process terms.6 "
Similarly, it appears unlikely that the Goss decision will have an immediate

5Id.
56 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); see also note 13 supra.
57 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
58 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 744 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 746.
60 ld. at 747.
61In Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1003 (1975) (an action for damages arising
out of the expulsion of students who "spiked" punch at a school function in violation
of a school regulation prohibiting the use of intoxicating beverages), which was
decided after Goss was handed down, the Court held that a school board member
enjoys a qualified immunity from liability for damages, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless
he knew or should have known that his official disciplinary actions would violate the
constitutional rights of the student, or acted with malicious intent. The majority
(White, J.) took the opportunity to reaffirm the traditional due process approach:
It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.
Public high school students do have substantive and procedural rights while at
school [citing Tinker, Barnette and Goss]. But § 1983 does not extend the right
to reitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary
proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. The system of
public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necesarily [sic] upon the
discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members,
and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of
errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of
violations of specific constitutional guarantees [citing Epperson and Tinker].

62 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 508 (1969)
(specifically exempting any relation which that case might have to the "regulation of
the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style or deportment ... "); Olff
v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970);
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impact on the success of those cases which challenge corporal punishment'
or searches and seizures" in the public schools. The Goss decision,
however, is evidence that the Supreme Court is willing to extend
constitutional protection to public school students in a proper case.
In perspective, Goss furthers the continuing erosion of the
proposition that the constitutional rights of children are not co-extensive
65
with those of adults. The concept that a public school student has
interests which in a proper case may call forth the protection of the
due process clause may promote the application and expansion of
additional constitutional rights for minors. However, in continuing an
assessment of the constitutional rights due to public school students, the
courts appear destined to decide on a case by case basis.
While the Goss decision is not a "cure-all" for unjust and arbitrary
suspensions of students from the public schools, it is to be expected that
the requirements of procedural due process will at least curtail summary
suspensions. Furthermore, the implication is that neither the Ohio school
boards, nor the school boards in states similarly affected by the Goss
decision, will be forced to seriously alter their administrative procedures
in order to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate. The Court itself
states, "we have imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than
a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to
'6 6
avoid unfair suspensions." Despite the minimal requirements involved in
remain. Recent events indicate that
problems
according due process,
disciplinary suspensions have been meted out for reasons which may
appear upon their face to be arbitrary and unreasonable. These include
suspensions based solely on race, under the guise of suspensions for
68
67
and the increasing extent of reliance upon the right to suspend.
truancy,

Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970);

Ferrel v. Dallas Indep. School Dist, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
856 (1968).
63 See generally Ware v. Estes,

328

F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afl'd per curiam,

458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Comment, Corporal
Punishment in the Public Schools: The Legal Questions, 7 AKRON L. REV. 457 (1974).
64 See generally Frels, Search and Seizure in the Public Schools, 11 HousTON L. REv.
876 (1974); Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public
Schools, 59 IowA L. REv. 739 (1974).
65 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).

66 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S.Ct. 729, 740 (1975).
67 See Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1975, at C-1, which reported that the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund has filed suit alleging that disproportionate suspension
figures in Prince George's County Schools present a pattern of racial discrimination
in discipline. The news article states in pertinent part:
In past years, about one-third of those students suspended were suspended for
truancy.... At Benjamin Tasker Jr. High, for example, where 65.9 percent of
the students suspended in 1972-73 were blacks, 71 per cent of the students
suspended last year [1973-74] were blacks. Blacks make up 14 percent of the
school's population.
6
8See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 745 n.10 (Powell, J.,dissenting) (which makes
reference to various suspension statistics contained in amicus briefs).
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Now that they are under the scrutiny of the courts for the purposes of
guaranteeing procedural due process, public schools presumably will be
more cautious to avoid arbitrary and unreasonable deprivations of
educational benefits. It is foreseeable however, that many more student
rights cases will be brought into the courts on due process grounds.
Curiously, the Court places greater emphasis on a student's property
interest in educational benefits than on a student's liberty interest in his or
her reputation as calling forth the protection of the due process clause.
The Court's rationale appears to be based on the idea that although a
property interest in educational benefits is inherent wherever a state has
enacted a compulsory education statute, a liberty interest in reputation
may not be as clearly evidenced. In contrast to the property interest, the
liberty interest in reputation is abstractly defined.6 9 Additionally, in any
particular case the liberty interest in reputation may be safeguarded by
the fact that the suspension resulting from charges of misconduct is not
recorded, or that legislative enactments allow the parent or student to
challenge the contents of such school files.70 However, if the liberty interest
in reputation is to be as broadly construed as the Court appears more
inclined to view it, an unconstitutional denial of an educational benefit
which other students enjoy may be found. Wherever a student is deprived
of an education for any period of time on charges of misconduct without
procedural due process, when the charges could seriously damage the
student's standing with fellow students and his teachers, an unconstitutional
denial under the liberty interest may be in evidence.7
The Goss decision fails to answer the question whether a public
school student is entitled to due process prior to suspension, or as soon as
is practicable thereafter, in the absence of a state compulsory education
statute. The obvious answer under the Court's rationale appears to be that
there can be no property interest in educational benefits without a state
compulsory education statute and that a right under the due process clause
to notice and a hearing could not be invoked. The question is not without
merit. For example, Mississippi has neither constitutional nor statutory
mandatory provisions for public education. 72 It is arguable that in a case
similar to Goss arising in such a state a liberty interest in reputation alone

69

See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)

("In a constitution for a free people there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty'
must be broad indeed.").
7OE.g., Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 513, 88 Stat. 484 (Aug.
21, 1974) (parents and students are allowed access to certain public records under
specific circumstances and may challenge the content of such records before they are
released to employers or other schools).
71 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736 (1975).
72 Mississippi's statutory provisions which mandated public education were encompassed within Miss. CoDE ANN. § 6509, 6510, 6512-6517 (1942), but were repealed
by ch. 288 of the 1956 session laws,
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may be enough to invoke the minimal due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment before a student may be suspended from a
public school on charges of misconduct.
Having expanded the Roth rationale to its logical limits, the Supreme
Court in Goss lends further authority to the proposition that governmental
infringement of any property interest granted by state law which is not
de minimus may, in a proper case, come under the protection of the due
process clause.73 However, the primary impact of the Goss decision is that
the courts are now in agreement that education is a property interest
protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus,
a person cannot be arbitrarily deprived of an education, wherever the
right to that education is secured by a state compulsory attendance statute.
The Supreme Court appears to have gone as far as it can without
overruling Rodriquez74 and declaring education to be a fundamental right
protected by the United States Constitution.
GLENN W. SODEN

WRONGFUL DEATH: FETAL RIGHTS-CAUSE

OF ACTION GRANTED FOR FETAL DEATHS
UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974)

A

Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores,' was decided
automobile
accident that occurred on March 2,
of
an
as a result
1974, near the small Alabama town of Gulf Shores. Although the facts
of the incident were not fully recounted, it appears that the plaintiff, who
was eight and one-half months pregnant at the time, 2 was struck by a
negligently operated city police car and severely injured. Although plaintiff
recovered from her injuries, the child did not and was stillborn. 3 Mrs. Eich
then sued, seeking damages for the death of the unborn child and basing
her action on an Alabama wrongful death statute, entitled "Suits for
injuries causing death of minor child."' 4 That statute reads in relevant
73

WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION,

E.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), at 164 (Powell, J., concurring), and

at 171 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
74411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973), and at 110-17 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
1300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974).
2 Id. at 355.
3 Id.

4The defense of gove:mmental _mmunity had been waived. Id.at 355 n.1.
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part: "When the death of a minor child is caused by the wrongful act, or
omission, or negligence of any person... the mother... may sue .... 5
The trial court dismissed the case, and the appeals court affirmed,
holding that the term "minor child" cannot be construed to include
children yet unborn.6 The Alabama Supreme Court did not agree however,
and in Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores held that a cause of action for
prenatal wrongful death does exist under the Alabama statute. 7
In so holding, the Alabama Supreme Court joins a growing number of
courts that have broadened judicial construction of wrongful death statutes,
to allow the prosecution of wrongful death actions in cases involving fetal
deaths. 8 In this respect Eich is not unique. However, the rationale used to
support this decision is unique and appears highly unsatisfactory.
Perhaps the most widely recognized rule of statutory construction is
that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed,
and wrongful death statutes are in derogation of the common law rule that
a cause of action in tort dies with the victim. 9 In examining the statute
relied upon in Eich' 0 it would seem apparent that the result should turn
upon the meaning of the term "minor child." Should it be construed so as
to include a fetus? The defendant argued that selection of this term
indicated legislative intent to limit the cause of action granted to children
born alive, and pointed for support to the decisions of other courts
construing similar language, which have held that fetal deaths are not
encompassed by such language, and that only the legislature can properly
extend a wrongful death statute to include such a cause of action.'
The Eich court was unimpressed, however, stating that "it is often
necessary to breathe new life into existing laws less [sic] they become stale
and shelfworn," and asserting that it felt responsibility to "insure the
necessary growth of the law in this vital area."'3 Thus, having stated its
5 ALA. Co.

tit.
7, § 119 (1960).

6 300 So. 2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1974).
7Id.

sSimmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F.

Supp.

529 (D.D.C. 1971); Panagopoulos v.

Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901

(Ky. 1955); Verkennes v. Cornica, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (this was
the first case in which recovery was allowed for the death of a fetus under a wrongful

death statute); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 NW.2d 229 (1951). See
also Note, PrenatalInjuries and Wrongful Death, 18 VAN. L. REv. 847 (19659.
Henry v. Jones, 306 F. Supp. 726 (D. Mass. 1969); Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App.
361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d
178 (1954); Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).

9

10 ALA. CoDE tit. 7, § 119 (1960).

3 Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967).

See also Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d (1962) (dissenting opinion); Christofogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 II1. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d (1973)

(dissenting opinion).

12300 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1974).
Is Id.
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objective the court proceeded to justify its granting a cause of action in this
case, without ever touching directly upon the central issue, i.e., the true4
meaning of the term "minor child" in the context of the statute at hand.'
To justify this action the court pointed to the underlying purpose of
the statute which was perceived as being the preservation of human life
through the punishment of wrongdoers, rather than the awarding of
compensation to survivors.15 According to the court, damages recoverable
under the wrongful death statute "are entirely punitive and are based on
the culpability of the defendant and the enormity of the wrong, and are
imposed for the preservation of human life."' 16
By emphasizing this retributive purpose the court was able to resolve
what it felt was an inconsistency under prior law whereby recovery was
allowed where injury occurring during pregnancy caused the death of a
child after a live birth, but was denied where the injury caused the
immediate death of the fetus.17 The court pointed out that to deny recovery
in Eich "would only serve the tortfeasor by rewarding him for his
severity in inflicting the injury."' 8 The prospect of punishing a tortfeasor
in a situation where the child was born alive, but subsequently died
because of the injury, and denying a cause of action where the wrongful
act prevented live birth so impressed the court that it considered itself
compelled by "logic, fairness and justness" to recognize a cause of action
for prenatal wrongful deaths. 19
Although recognizing such a cause of action may lead to a just result,
basing this result on a theory of retribution presents certain problems. One
such problem was raised in the dissenting opinion. The homicide statutes
of Alabama, which also have as their purpose the preservation of human
life, have been construed so as to prevent the conviction for murder or
20
manslaughter of a person who has killed a fetus that was stillborn. The
that
axiom
laws
is
the
homicide
the
rationale behind this interpretation of
one cannot kill someone who is already dead.2 ' This inconsistency between
5
interpretations of the wrongful death statute and the homicide statute' is
14 ALA. COD

tit. 7, § 119 (1960).

15 The inapplicability of the concept of compensatory damages with respect to the
Alabama death statutes was determined in 1912 in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Bogue, 177 Ala. 349, 58 So. 392 (1912).
16300 So. 2d 354, 356 (Ala. 1974), citing, Magnusson v. Swan, 291 Ala. 151, 279 So.
2d 422 (1973).
17 300 So. 2d 354, 355 (1974).

lId.
19 id.

20 Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948).
21 Id. at 378.
2 This inconsistency can also occur under Ohio law. The Ohio wrongful death statute,
OHIo REv. Con ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1968), allows recovery for a stillborn child as
shown by Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959). However,
under the Ohio vehicular homicide statute, Owio REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (Page
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because, logically, the punitive purpose behind a
a fortiori be stronger than for a wrongful death
respect to homicides that involve a willful or
life.

Another problem left open by the Eich court's reliance upon a theory
of retribution is precisely when the state's interest in the life of a fetus
begins for purposes of applying the wrongful death statute. If the Eich
court had squarely faced the problem of defining a "minor child" under
the statute, the problem of determining when the state's interest begins
would have been resolved. However, since according to the Alabama
Supreme Court wrongful death damages are to be determined solely "by
2
reference to the quality of the tortious act," the implication is strong
that the life rights of a fetus, for purposes of applying the statute, emerge
at the moment of conception. If the emphasis is truly to be placed on the
punishment of those who interfere with potential human life, then it can
be argued that the same standard for recovery employed in an action
involving an eight and one-half-month-old fetus should be used in an
action involving a recently fertilized egg. But, if this be the case, how
would the court handle the complicated problems of proving causation
that would surely ensue? 24
Apparently, the Alabama Supreme Court would recognize a wrongful
death action in the case of a fetus that is considerably younger than eight
and one-half months, since the Eich opinion contains references to a state
interest in fetal deaths at earlier stages of pregnancy. In particular, the
court pointed out a provision of Alabama law requiring that a "death
certificate must be registered for all fetal deaths where the fetus was
25
as
advanced to or beyond the twentieth week of uterogestation,"
expressive of a public interest in fetal deaths. In addition, the Eich court
2
cited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade "
from
is
present
life
human
for the proposition that "a potential future
the moment of conception and the state's interest and general obligation
to protect life thus extends to prenatal life."'27
It would appear from a close reading of Roe v. Wade that the Eich
court's reliance on this case for direct support is somewhat shaded for the
1973 Special Supplement), there was no conviction for killing an unborn fetus, since
the unborn fetus was held not a "person" in State v. Dickinson, 23 Ohio App. 2d
259, 263 N.E.2d 253 (1970).
23300 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1974).
24 The practical problems of proving causation increase dramatically with less devel-

oped fetuses. However, as the Etch court points out, modem technology has made it
easier to prove the cause of death through the testimony of expert witnesses. 300 So.
2d at 358.
25

ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 24 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
26 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27

300 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1974).
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Supreme Court, when referring to the legitimacy of recoveries in wrongful
death actions for fetal deaths, spoke in terms of actions to "vindicate the
parents' interest" in the loss of the potential child.E The court in Eich, on
the other hand, was not necessarily concerned with the personal loss to the
parents, but rather was concerned with the culpability of the tortfeasor and
the use of punishment as a means to promote the preservation of human life.
Nevertheless, there appears to be no direct conflict between the result
in Eich, and the Roe holding that a state may not outlaw abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy. In Roe v. Wade states were restrained
from regulating abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy because the
mother's right to privacy was considered to outweigh the state's interest in
preserving fetal life.2 While the state must subordinate its interest in the
preservation of human life in the first trimester of pregnancy when
confronted with the mother's right to privacy, the state would not appear
to be precluded from asserting this interest as against a third party
tortfeasor. Consequently, there would seem to be no reason why Eich and
Roe need interfere with one another, since in the case of the tortfeasor
there is no countervailing interest equal to a mother's right to privacy.
Although the retributive rationale of Eich need not conflict with
abortion decisions, the traditional civil law rule on punitive damages raises
one further problem. In Kelite Products v. Binzel,30 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in applying this rule, summarized
the Alabama cases on punitive damages and noted: "To subject a
wrongdoer to punitive damages, the jury must find that he acted with
actual malice.., or conscious disregard of consequences to others." 3' It
was thus recognized that something more than the mere commission
of a tort is necessary for an award of punitive damages.
Therefore, it seems strange that the concept of punitive damages
should be applied to an ordinary case of vehicular negligence simply
because an action is brought under a wrongful death statute on behalf of
a decedent. Nor does it seem proper to base such a result on the theory
that a reasonable man would be "doubly careful toward a woman who is
obviously pregnant."
Certainly the potential tortfeasor in an accident
involving two or more vehicles is most often not in a position to discern
the maternal condition of potential victims. Thus, it would seem that no
matter how compelling the equities in favor of allowing a cause of action
for a fetal death under a wrongful death statute, the theory of retribution
set forth in Eich does not provide a proper basis for such a cause of action.
28 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
29Id.at 163.

3o224 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1955).
31
Id. at 143.
32
Note, Torts-Right of Infant to Recover for Prenatal inures, 48 MICH. L. REv.
539, 540 (1950).
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As alluded to earlier, other courts faced with similar issues have
achieved like results without resorting to the Eich court's questionable and
confusing reliance on a punitive rationale. 33 The majority of such courts
have straightforwardly ruled that the language of the statute involved does
include a fetal death, basing that decision on the rationale that the statute
is compensatory in nature, and the survivor has as much right to
compensation for a life prevented, as for a life lost.3 4
Furthermore, these courts have presented identifiable guidelines for
recovery bearing upon the problem of proving causation, by ruling that
wrongful death actions should result in recovery only in cases where
prenatal death had been inflicted on a fetus that was viable (capable of
life outside the womb) at the time of the injury.3 5 The rationale is that the
probability of continued survival once this stage of development is reached
is great enough to outweigh lack of proximate cause arguments based
upon the probability of miscarriage or other natural causes of stillbirth.36
Basing recovery on viability of the fetus at the time of the injury has
been viewed as a convenient answer to the troublesome hypothetical first
mentioned in Stidam v. Ashmore, 37 wherein an Ohio Court of Appeals
posed the situation of twins who are wrongfully injured during pregnancy
whereupon the one born alive and who subsequently dies is allowed
recovery, but the one stillborn is denied recovery. Presumably, if
viability was the only factor determining recovery, the death of both
38
twins would result in recovery.
Indeed, the viability concept provides a rational demarcation point
for courts faced with the issue of when a fetus is to be recognized as a
person in any context. As a matter of law, a court can readily draw the
line between recovery and no recovery when it is determined that a

33 See cases cited note 8 supra.
34 See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Stokes v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); McKillip v. Zimmerman.
191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Lecese v. McDonough, 279 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1972);
c/. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). See also cases cited
note 8 supra.
35 A fetus becomes "viable" when it can "potentially live outside the mother's womb,
albeit with artificial aid." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). Viability is usually
placed in the six to seven months of pregnancy range, although there are instances of
younger fetuses that have survived outside the womb. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955). For those courts allowing recovery based on viability, see Christofogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Orange v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1969); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518
P.2d 636 (Ore. 1974), rehearing denied, 520 P.2d 361 (Ore. 1974); Baldwin v. Butcher,
184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971). For case law development prior to 1969 see Note,
Wrongful Death and the Stillborn Fetus--A Current Analysis, 7 HousToN L. REv.
449, 452 n.1 (1970).
3
6 See cases cited notes 8 &34 supra.
37109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
38 See cases cited note 35 supra.
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particular fetus was not viable at the time of injury.3 9 If the determination
of viability was not made at the trial level, a higher court may remand
a case for an examination of a fetus' ability to live independently of
its mother at the time of the injury.4 0
As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Libbee v.
Permanente Clinic,4 the United States Supreme Court's abortion decision
in Roe v. Wade" contains important language bearing on the role of
the viability concept in determining the rights of a fetus:
...a fetus is not a "person" for the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States... after a fetus
has become "viable" a state may prohibit abortion altogether, except
those necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother and...
"State regulation protective of fetal life after viability.., has both
logical and biological justification."3
Perhaps the greatest difficulty stemming from the Eich decision is its
failure to explain why the viability concept, with its "logical and
biological justification," should have no bearing even as to a wrongful
death statute that is based solely on a punitive purpose.
Not only does recognition that the Alabama statute has "always been
held to be punitive only" 44 obscure application of the widely accepted
viability concept, but it runs contrary to the fundamental concept of
tort law that instead of directing punishment against a wrongdoer, it
is more important to provide "compensation to an innocent plaintiff
for the loss that he has suffered." 45
It would seem that the punitive nature of the Alabama statute is
purely a- product of judicial construction, since a simple reading of the
statute reveals that it is phrased in much the same language as is used in
the wrongful death statutes of states that adhere to the compensation
concept." In light of the principle that punitive damages should be
awarded only where there is actual malice or its equivalent, the concept
of punitive damages should logically apply only under a wrongful death
statute that provides for separate causes of action that distinguish between
purely negligent killings and wanton or intentional killings. Without such
39

Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (fetus was 4-4% months old at
time of injury).
40
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
41518 P.2d 636 (Ore. 1974), rehearingdenied, 520 P.2d 361 (Ore. 1974).
42410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4
3Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, 640 (Ore. 1974).
44300 So. 2d 354, 356 (Ala. 1974).
45 Gay v. Thompson, 146 S.E.2d 425, 430 (N.C. 1966), citing, D. Gordon, The Unborn
Plaintiff, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 579, 595 (1965).
4Most wrongful death statutes, including that of Alabama, apply to killings caused
in any manner whatsoever. See OnIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1968) (deaths
caused by "wrongful acts, neglect, or default"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953)
(deaths "occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence").
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a distinction justification of an award based on compensatory damages
becomes logically compelling.
Even the court in Eich could not completely divorce itself from the
concept of compensatory damages, for in countering defendant's argument
that allowance of a wrongful death action in cases involving fetal deaths
would make for a double recovery, the Alabama court referred to the
existence of an injury to two different persons, but pointed out that
the plaintiff should be given relief for her physical and mental injuries,
and punitive relief "derived through her right to maintain the wrongful
death action for the loss of her minor child."' 47 (Emphasis added.)
Such language clearly indicates an intent to compensate the survivor;
and, for the reasons outlined above, it appears that a less confusing result
and more justifiable opinion would have resulted from a formal recognition
of the compensatory concept in Alabama wrongful death statutes.
It should be pointed out, however, that adoption of the compensatory
standard, in and of itself, does not solve the problem of the amount of
damages that should be awarded for fetal deaths in an action based upon
a wrongful death statute. This problem has so perplexed a few courts
that they have simply denied recovery on the ground that the wrongful
death damages are too speculative. 48
Perhaps the most ingenious attempt to measure the monetary loss
occasioned by the death of a fetus is presented by the Federal Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gullborg v. Rizzo.4 There the court
adopted an elaborate formula by which monetary damages were arrived at
by subtracting the anticipated maintenance expenses of the child from the
present value of the child's prospective earnings for the balance of its
life expectancy after the age of 21.50 Pursuant to this formula the court
determined from actuarial tables that a female child would have 53 years
of earning capacity and that a jury award of $5,000 or even $10,000
for the loss of a fetus was not excessive. 51
Other less adventuresome courts might well conclude, as the Oregon
court in Libbee v. Permanente Clinic,52 that a recovery should not be
limited to the pecuniary value of the lost child's life, but rather should
simply reflect the "value of life lost."

47 300 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1974).
48 Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 398, 146 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1966). See also Norman
v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 99, 268 P.2d 178, 180 (1954); Graf. v. Taggert, 43
NJ. 303, 204 A.2d 140, 145 (1964).
49331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964), interpreting Pennsylvania's Survival Acts, PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 20, §§ 320.601-.603 (1958), and wrongful death statutes, PA. STAT. ANN.,

tit. 12, §§ 1601, 1602 (1953).
50 331 F.2d at 560.
Sl Id.at 561.
52518 P.2d 636, 639 (Ore. 1974), rehearing denied, 520 P.2d 361 (Ore. 1974).
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Perhaps this disparity could be resolved by turning away from the
wrongful death statutes themselves as the vehicle through which such
awards are delivered. As long as courts are "breathing" into the law why
not cast the wind in another direction and recognize that the reason a
mother should be allowed a recovery beyond her immediate physical and
mental pain and suffering is because she has suffered a very special kind of
loss--one that goes beyond ordinary concepts of pain and suffering.
If one were actually to make a serious attempt to quantify such a loss
for the purpose of making a monetary award, the best place to start would
be considering that in spite of the many thousands of dollars that a child
costs its parents during its years of dependency, the value of the child to
its parents must be an amount even greater, for if this were not true,
parents given the choice would not elect to have children in the first place.
Exactly how much more children are worth than their "maintenance cost"
is anybody's guess. At any rate, it hardly seems likely that the answer to this
question is any more difficult than the determination of how much money
53
allows for an adequate punishment under a theory of wrongful death.
In any case the question will be further complicated by the possibility
that the fetus, had it been left unharmed, might not have been born alive
in any event. Naturally, the older the fetus is, the more likely it is to
survive. This factor is no doubt responsible for decisions that allow recovery only if the fetus was viable when the injury occurred.5 However, the
difficulty with the viability theory is that undoubtedly a great number of
fetuses that are killed before they become viable could have reached a live
birth. Thus, a Georgia court of appeals, recognizing that the viability point
does not fully account for the potential for live birth inherent in most fetuses
at earlier stages of development, has allowed recovery for death caused at
any time after a fetus has become "quick" or capable of movement.55
It seems logical that if a court is willing to go this far, it could allow
recovery for any death from the moment of conception and permit the
technical difficulties of proof of causation to weed out claims for
the wrongful killing of fetuses only a few days or weeks old. Consequently,
if the age of the fetus is to have any bearing at all, it stands to reason that
it should simply be another factor to consider in assessing damages. All
other factors being equal, it seems logical that the younger fetus, being less
capable of surviving independently of its mother and thus being subject to
a greater risk of nonsurvival, should be the subject of a lesser award.
53 Consider what amount of money is proper to punish a motorist whose negligent

making of a left-hand turn causes the death of a fetus he did not know existed in the
womb of a woman riding in a car he did not see until after the accident occurred.
54 See cases cited note 35 supra.
55 The court in Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1955),
recognized that the question of whether a fetus was "quick" is one for a jury. In this
case a fetus was deemed "quick" after only 1% months of pregnancy.
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Whatever the method used to calculate the monetary loss engendered
by the killing of a fetus, it is the loss itself, however elusive to define,
coupled with the fact that the tortfeasor has caused this loss, that should
serve as the basis for recovery. To the extent that the decision in Eich
allows recovery in a wrongful death action where a tortfeasor has caused
a mother to suffer this special kind of loss, the decision is just and
logical. But, it is hoped that other courts facing this issue will reach their
result in a more acceptable manner.
MARY ANN KOVACH
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